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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 35 Records
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1969 (6) TMI 44 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... (Andh Pra ) by Mirza J. in which action under Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, was taken in cases where minimum sentence of imprisonment of six months under Rule 126 (p) of the defence of India Rules was prescribed. 18. In view of the special circumstances of the case which are referred to above, I consider that this is a fit case for action under Section 4 (1) of the Probation of Offenders Act. Accordingly, I set aside the conviction and sentence already passed against the accused and instead of awarding any sentence straight way, direct the accused to be released under section 4 (1) of the Probation of Offender Act on his entering into a bond for Rs. 2,00/- with two sureties each for a like sum to the satisfaction of the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Madanapalle, to appear and receive sentence when called upon during a period of one year and in the meantime to keep the peach and be of good behavior. If fine is paid, it will be refunded. 19.Order accordingly.
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1969 (6) TMI 43 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... P.S. Kailasam, J. 57. I agree with the reasons and the answer given to the reference in the concluding paragraph of the judgment of Venkataraman J. In the view that the endorsement of the Court Itself should indicate that the presiding officer has applied his mind and considered that the summons had been duly served, the decision in AIR1944Mad193, has to be found as not good Jaw. (After the expression of the opinion of the Full Bench aforesaid, this appeal coming on for hearing before Kailasam J. on 29-8-1969 the Court delivered the following Judgment --) In view of my finding sitting singly that the process server had not verified the return by an affidavit, there is non-compliance of the requirements of the first part of Order V, Rule 19 C.P.C. and on this ground alone the sale has to be set aside. In view of the decision of the Full Bench there is no compliance of the second part also. In the result the appeal against appellate order is allowed with costs. Leave refused.
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1969 (6) TMI 42 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... , that does not invalidate the action, if it could be justified under some other provision. P. Balakotaiah v. Union of India, 1958 SCR 1052 (AIR 1958 SC 232 ).) (17.)The learned appellate Judge has also held that the suit cannot be maintained by the appellant unless he deposits the amount claimed from him in Court. Now, it is true that if the appellant had contested the claim on merits and had challenged the liability, then probably Section 4 of the Revenue Recovery Act would have applied. If he, however, challenges only proclamation and its legality, then in every probability that section may not have any application. It is, however, not necessary for me to decide that point as on merits I have decided against the plaintiff. (18.)In the result, the appeal fails and the plaintiff's suit is dismissed with costs through out. Interim injunction in the Civil Appli cation is vacated. The appellant will pay the costs of the application also to the Union. (19.)Appeal dismissed.
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1969 (6) TMI 41 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... we think the conclusions based on this test should not be allowed to prevail. It is no doubt true that in any best judgment assessment, it is open to the assessing authority to follow such method as in its opinion would lead to correct results, but the method followed should be such as would reduce the chances of error to as negligible extent as possible. As the test followed, in our opinion, does not satisfy this condition, we set aside the assessment and direct the assessing authority to make afresh the best judgment assessment for the year in relation to this petition. The method to be followed will be left to its discretion and should be such as is calculated to reduce the error to a negligible extent as far as possible. With these directions, we allow this petition, and remit the case to the assessing authority so that he may make a fresh assessment in accordance with law, bearing in mind the directions given above. There will be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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1969 (6) TMI 40 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... person who imposes penalty should be the same as the person who had made the assessment order. If immediately on making the assessment, the officer is transferred or the jurisdiction is conferred on another authority, certainly such authority is competent to take up the case from that stage to its final stage. What is required by law is that the assessing authority has to initiate the proceedings for the levy of penalty and not whether the same person or officer, who had made the assessment. Judged thus, it is plain to us that the Appellate Tribunal has erred in holding that the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer, who was seized of the matter by reason of the transfer of the file, the matter being within his territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction, and who had revised the assessment order was not competent to initiate penalty proceedings. The order of the Tribunal is, therefore, set aside and the petition is allowed. No order as to costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100. Petition allowed.
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1969 (6) TMI 39 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of the fact that a tax may be payable on the sale of jaggery under the provisions of the General Sales Tax Act, a cess may also be levied under section 18(1) of the Madras Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1959. It is permissible, and this court has held so, that on the same taxable event, there may be more than one charge, but for different purposes. That is the case here. Nor are we able to see any substance in the other point that jaggery is an agricultural produce. Section 2(r) of the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1959, defines turnover so as to exclude proceeds of sale of agricultural or horticultural produce. But, obviously, jaggery by no means can be regarded as an agricultural produce. It is the result of a process, both physical and mechanical, and, without such processing jaggery cannot be produced. It is not a case of mere cleaning, grading, sorting or drying as mentioned in explanation (1) to clause (r) of section 2. The petition is dismissed. Petition dismissed.
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1969 (6) TMI 38 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... al Sales Tax Act does not include sugar candy is not correct. We approve of the view taken in this behalf in T.A. No. 717 of 1963. If that be the case, sugar candy which is no other than purified sugar would be exempt from tax as provided in item 6 of Schedule V. In that case, in the absence of any qualifying words in the amended Act of 1958, it would be unnecessary for a further enquiry as to whether any Central tax had been already levied thereon or not. In this view T.R.Cs. Nos. 2 of 1966 and 3 of 1966 are allowed. The order of remand made in T.A. No. 717 of 1963 out of which T.R.C. No. 14 of 1965 arises is set aside. The orders of the Appellate Tribunal in T.As. Nos. 343 of 1964 and 699 of 1964 are set aside and it is held that the assessee is not liable to any tax in relation to sugar candy and the orders of assessment in that behalf are set aside. The petitioner-company shall be entitled to its costs. Advocate s fee is fixed at Rs. 50 in each case. Ordered accordingly.
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1969 (6) TMI 37 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... oner of Income-tax v. Sinclair Murray and Co. (P.) Ltd. 1970 75 I.T.R. 494 25 S.T.C. 233., the question of deduction in respect of the liability for sales tax under section 10(2)(xv) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, for an assessee who follows the mercantile system of accounting and has made provision for payment of sales tax, did not fall for consideration. Similar is the position with the case of Ikrahnandi Coal Co. v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1968 69 I.T.R. 488 22 S.T.C. 229. In the view we have taken it is not necessary for us to deal with the alternative argument made on behalf of the assessee as to whether the amount provided for sales tax was deductible under section 10(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. In the premises the question referred to this court must be answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. The Commissioner of Income-tax will pay the costs of this reference. SANKAR PRASAD MITRA, J.-I agree. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1969 (6) TMI 36 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of tax, where there is no tax charged on the transaction under the Act, section 18(1) is contravened, which attracts the penalty provision of section 18-A. Where sub-section (1) of section 18 is not contravened, even though the aggregate amounts collected on all the transactions of the dealer during the accounting period exceed the tax chargeable on the total turnover of the dealer, there is no power to invoke the penalty provision. In view of the clear error of law apparent on the face of the impugned orders, the said orders are liable to be quashed. They are accordingly quashed. We further direct the Commercial Tax Officer (respondent No. 2) to consider the explanation offered by the petitioners after affording them a reasonable opportunity to be heard and then pass appropriate orders in the light of the interpretation of sections 18 and 18-A. We express no opinion on the rest of the grounds raised in the writ petitions. Writ petitions allowed. No costs. Petitions allowed.
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1969 (6) TMI 35 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d be vegetable or not would depend on the particular area or locality. What may be a vegetable in Kerala may not be a vegetable in Orissa on the application of the aforesaid restricted definition of the expression vegetable . On the aforesaid analysis, ginger is a vegetable. Doubtless it is not used for the primary purpose of food, but is used to give flavour or taste to the food but it is grown in the kitchen garden and is used for the table. 4.. The same view has been taken in Krishna Iyer v. State of Kerala(1) (Kerala) and Wazi Ahmed v. State of West Bengal(2) (Calcutta) and no contrary view has been brought to our notice. 5.. In the result we hold that the Tribunal took a wrong view. We would answer the question by saying that ginger is a vegetable. In the circumstances parties are to bear their own costs. The petitioner is however entitled to refund of the money deposited under section 24(1) of the Orissa Sales Tax Act. PATRA, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1969 (6) TMI 34 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nversion of the seed into oil and deal exclusively in the produce of such ghanis which they own are entitled to exemption. Evidently, if any one of the above conditions is not satisfied, no benefit under the notification can be claimed. As already noticed, it is necessary that the dealer should deal exclusively in the produce of such ghanis. If he deals in other commodities as well he is manifestly out of the purview of the notification. As the petitioners are dealers in other commodities as well, and they do not deal exclusively in the oil produced from the ghanis, they are not entitled to the benefit of the notification. The same view was taken by us in T.R.Cs. Nos. 30 and 31 of 1964 disposed of on 10th June, 1969. As this T.R.C. fails on this ground, the other question, whether the petitioner-firm is included in the definition of person , need not be considered at all. This tax revision case is, therefore, dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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1969 (6) TMI 33 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... w the question of exemption to be raised. It seems to us that it is unnecessary to decide the question of jurisdiction, as we think that the case is capable of disposal from another point of view. The assessee having not urged that the particular turnover was entitled to exemption before the assessing authority, the Tribunal could have well said on that ground that the question was no longer open instead of disposing of the matter on a point of jurisdiction. On that view, the tax case is dismissed. Petition dismissed.
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1969 (6) TMI 32 - HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT
Winding up - Powers of liquidator and Summons for directions to be taken out by official liquidator
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1969 (6) TMI 23 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Show Cause Notice for seized goods ... ... ... ... ..... in particular case, the answer to the question cannot but be in the negative. There is nothing in the statute which requires the Collector of Customs to act judicially and to direct him to act judicially or quasi-judicially and compel him to serve notice upon the party whose goods have been seized before making an order of extension under the proviso to Section 110 (2) of the Act would be contrary to the statute itself and would defeat its purpose. 54.For the reasons mentioned above this application fails and is accordingly dismissed. The Rule is discharged. There will be no order as to costs. All interim orders are vacated. 55.The questions involved in Matter No. 359 of 1966, Sheikh Serajuddin v. The Assistant Collector of Customs of Preventive and Ors. which was heard along with Matter No. 332 of 1966 are identical. For the reasons mentioned in my judgment in Matter No. 382 of 1966 this application is also dismissed. The Rule is discharged. All interim orders are vacated.
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1969 (6) TMI 22 - HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Prosecution (Customs) - Appeal against conviction ... ... ... ... ..... nal papers of the appellant were recovered from the third floor room. 7.We, therefore, find that the prosecution has failed to prove appellant s possession of the third floor room or of the locker. They have failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the key was produced by the appellant or that certain personal papers were recovered from that locker. All the personal papers were jumbled up on the first floor and the manner in which simultaneous searches were conducted and the two separate search lists prepared show an unheard of manner of conducting the searches and we cannot but view with strongest disapproval of this manner of search and seizure and also preparation of search lists. 8.In the result, we find that there was no evidence to convict the appellant in connection with the recovery of the gold. 9.This appeal, therefore, succeeds. The conviction of the appellant and the sentence passed on him are set aside, and he is acquitted. He be discharged from the bail bond.
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1969 (6) TMI 21 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Adjudication ... ... ... ... ..... understand, how even the application of principles of criminal jurisprudence will debar the original authority from proceeding further or taking proceedings afresh. 3.Learned Counsel then contended that there is no provision in the Act conferring power on the Assistant Collector to take proceeding afresh. In my opinion, when the order of an officer is set aside by an Appellate Authority not on merits but on the ground of procedural irregularity, the original authority is entitled to proceed afresh unless there is any statutory power preventing or prohibiting such proceeding. In this case, there is no provision in the Customs Act expressly or by implication which will have the effect of preventing the Assistant Collector from instituting proceedings afresh against the Writ petitioner. Consequently, I am unable to accept this contention of the learned counsel as well. 4.For these reasons, there are no merits in the Writ Petition and the Writ Petition fails and it is dismissed.
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1969 (6) TMI 20 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Whether the Tribunal was justified in holding that the amount of Rs. 2 lakhs had been remitted to the taxable territories by the assessee during the accounting year out of his accrued profits of earlier years - assessee stays for more than 365 days in the four preceding previous years and for two months in the relevant previous year - burden of proving that the visit for two months in the latest previous year is only occasional or casual is on the assessee - onus being on the assessee to establish that the remittances were out of capital, the Tribunal was justified in holding that the conditions of section 4(1)(b)(iii) of the Income-tax Act have been complied
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1969 (6) TMI 19 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Dividend declared subject to taxation and remittance from Pakistan - whether it amounts to declaration of dividend and whether it is liable to Indian Income-tax
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1969 (6) TMI 18 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Tribunal was right in holding that in calculating the penalty leviable u/s 271(1)(i) the amount paid by the assessee under the provisional assessment u/s 23B of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, was to be deducted from the amount of tax determined u/s 23(3) of that Act in order to determine the amount of tax on which the computation of penalty was to be based and in reducing the amount of the penalty
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1969 (6) TMI 17 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Double income-tax relief - goods manufactured in India and sold in Burma which are also taxed in Burma - though the income has been assessed both in India and Burma, it cannot be said that the income is an income arising without the taxable territories - assessee cannot claim the benefit of section 49D
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