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Showing 21 to 40 of 119 Records
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1970 (2) TMI 129 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of section 14 comes into play only when a fresh assessment is sought to be made as a result of the assessment having been set aside by a competent tribunal or a court of law and not as a result of an assessing authority or a superior authority as mentioned in sub-section (4-C) of section 14 discovering that a part of the turnover of the business of a dealer has escaped assessment to tax and assessing the dealer on that escaped turnover. The period of limitation in cases where action is taken under sub-section (4) of section 14 is prescribed in sub-section (4-A) of section 14. In view of the fact that action was not taken by the Commercial Tax Officer within the period of limitation specified in sub-section (4-A) of section 14 of the Act, we are constrained to quash the impugned notice and the order made in pursuance thereof by him in P.R. No. 16169-70 dated 31st December, 1969. In the result, the writ petition is allowed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100. Petition allowed.
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1970 (2) TMI 128 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... on attached to section 3, such sales were exempted from tax where they were taxed in the hands of the commission agents. Clearly this is a case where the turnover in dispute would have been taxable but for the exemption granted by the explanation to section 3. There was no sale of the nature in respect of which there was a prohibition like the one contained in section 27 of the Act. We are therefore of the opinion that the sales made by the assessee through the commission agents can be taken into consideration for the purpose of determining the gross turnover of the assessee within the meaning of rule 8, even though they are not liable to tax in the hands of the assessee. We accordingly answer the question in the affirmative, in favour of the department and against the assessee. As no one has appeared on behalf of the assessee to contest this reference, we make no order as to costs. The fee of the learned counsel is assessed at Rs. 100. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1970 (2) TMI 127 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ommercial understanding of the expression. The learned Tribunal rightly relied upon the elucidation of the product as given by the Neyveli Lignite Corporation Ltd., in its letter dated 12th September, 1969. Therein, the Corporation says that leco is produced from lignite by a process of briquetting and carbonisation, and that leco is a product obtained from lignite after a certain process and after certain substances are extracted from it, such as phenyl, tar and linoleum, etc. Thus, it is clear that even the manufacturer of this new product has understood it and treated it as fuel corresponding to charcoal. In the light of the pronouncement of the Supreme Court under similar circumstances and in view of the factual situation that leco in common parlance is fuel, we are unable to appreciate as to how and in what respect the order of the Tribunal is wrong. We confirm the order of the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, Pondicherry, and the tax case is dismissed. Petition dismissed.
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1970 (2) TMI 126 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ide state that the Sales Tax Officer is the appropriate authority where this matter can be properly investigated into in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court. 7.. It may be noted that the Central Government have issued a circular enumerating classes of goods which may be specified in the registration certificate of dealers manufacturing particular classes of goods. This is to be found at page 367 of Chaturvedi s Central Sales Tax Laws, Vol. I. We do not express any view on the legality of such a circular. We merely bring it to the notice of the Sales Tax Officer for consideration at the time of re-examination. 8. In the result, the writ application is allowed. The orders passed by the Sales Tax Officer and the Commissioner of Sales Tax relating to items 4, 5, 7 and 8 are quashed. The case is remanded to the Sales Tax Officer for reconsideration in the light of our observations made above. There will be no order as to costs. ACHARYA, J.-I agree. Application allowed.
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1970 (2) TMI 125 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... this court in exercising its jurisdiction under section 37, cannot be of any assistance so that the assessee could reopen the entire conduct of the case throwing new light which was never thought of nor projected at any time before. The Board rejected every one of the contentions of the assessee and found that having regard to the incriminating materials discovered from the assessee himself, he should be considered and deemed to be a dealer in foodgrains for the particular year in question and that he sold rice to parties as is seen from the entries made in the slips recovered and that the estimated turnover was not in any way excessive. The Board also found that the penalty could be reduced to Rs. 985. All such conclusions on the contentions raised do not raise any question of law and certainly do not call for an interference. Even though they are findings on facts, they appear to be reasonable. The appeal is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1970 (2) TMI 124 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... who are expected to see that such avoidance of tax is brought to book at the earliest possible stage. The petitioner concedes such suppression of nearly rupees two lakhs and that his regular account books did not contain any such reference to the turnover shown in the various forty slips discovered. The Tribunal finds that the addition of about rupees six lakhs for the year in question cannot be considered to be unreasonable for the reason that for the next year, the turnover as reflected in the books was Rs. 22,64,751.32 for the assessment year 1963-64. It was also noticed that in the subsequent years the turnover as disclosed by the assessee was higher. Having regard to the design and motivated conduct of the assessee, which necessarily gives the impression that there was a wanton suppression of the turnover to avoid taxation, we are unable to interfere with the order of the Appellate Tribunal. No other question of law arises. The tax case is dismissed. Petition dismissed.
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1970 (2) TMI 123 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... thereof is all along in the statute. Moreover, if we refer to section 9(3) as it stood before the Amendment Act, it will be found that it also provides that the provisions of such law, including provisions relating to returns shall apply accordingly. It is therefore clear that both under section 9(3) before it was amended and under the substituted section 9(2) of the Central Act, the provisions relating to returns of the general sales tax law of the State, are applied. In my view, the provision of rule 11 of the State Rules, 1958, subserves the purpose of the Central Act, and it is quite consistent with the provisions of the Central Act. The contention of Mr. Bhattacharjee challenging the provisions of rule 11 of the State Rules of 1958 as ultra vires the rule-making power of the State, is overruled. All the contentions on behalf of the petitioner having failed, the Rule is discharged, but, in the circumstances, there will be no order for costs in this Rule. Rule discharged.
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1970 (2) TMI 122 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nt being made. 10.. One more point need be noticed. Mr. Mohapatra raised a preliminary objection that the petitioner did not come against the original order of dismissal of the revision by the Commissioner and has come at a subsequent stage. We do not attach much importance to this technical objection inasmuch as there is no limitation to our powers under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution to interfere in a case where penalty is being realised without any finding that the petitioner is liable to pay tax. We accordingly overrule the preliminary objection. 11.. In the result, the orders imposing penalty are quashed. The writ application is allowed. A writ of certiorari be issued quashing the aforesaid orders imposing penalty. A writ of mandamus be issued directing the opposite party to refund whatever penalty has been paid. The attachment of the security deposit is vacated. In the circumstances there will be no order as to costs. ACHARYA, J.-I agree. Application allowed.
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1970 (2) TMI 121 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... . The term kanch ka saman has also to be interpreted in the commercial sense and interpreted in that way it would mean only such articles of glass as are in a finished state and are capable of being sold to the consumer. We are, therefore, of opinion that reference to the Hindi version should be omitted from the question which should be reframed as under Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the turnover of glass rods and glass tubes manufactured and sold by the assessee are to be taxed as glassware at 7 per cent. or as an unclassified item at 2 per cent. (multiple point)? We answer the question as reframed by us by saying that the turnover of glass rods and glass tubes would be taxable not at 7 per cent. under the notification in question but at 2 per cent. under section 3 of the Act. The assessee is entitled to the costs of these references which we assess at Rs. 100 (one set). Counsel s fee is also assessed at the same figure. References answered accordingly.
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1970 (2) TMI 120 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ereof other than tyres and tubes. However, there is no material difference between this notification and the notification referred to in the question except that in the later notification the words cycle rickshaws have been added. We would, therefore, reframe the question to read Whether the rexine covers and pads are cycle parts or accessories as mentioned at item No. 34 of Notification No. S.T. 1363/X-1045(19)/60 dated 5th April, 1961, and taxable as such or as unclassified articles taxable at 2 per cent. For the reasons stated in our judgment in Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. v. M/s. Free India Cycle Industries (S.T.R. No. 574 of 1968)(1), we answer the question by saying that rexine covers and pads are not cycle parts and accessories but are unclassified items taxable at 2 per cent. The assessee is entitled to its costs which we assess at Rs. 100 for both the references. The fee of the learned counsel is also assessed at the same figure. References answered accordingly.
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1970 (2) TMI 119 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... orks under the, Executive Engineer, P.W.D. (R. and B.) Mayurbhanj Division, and in course of such works he has supplied certain materials like hard stone metal, morrum, hard solling stones etc. If title to these goods passed to the purchaser in the course of doing the road work, then they are not assessable to sales tax. The subsequent part of the assessment order shows that in one agreement there is a separate contract for supply of movables. We do not find anything in the agreement supplied to us to bring out a clear distinction. 2.. In the circumstances, we quash the impugned assessment orders and direct that the assessing authority would determine the nature of the agreement and if title to the movables passed as a part of the construction of road work or otherwise. The assessment is to be completed by the end of June, 1970. 3.. In the result, the writ application is allowed as indicated above. There will be no order as to costs. ACHARYA, J.-I agree. Application allowed.
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1970 (2) TMI 118 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... charged for the same separately in the bills. The agreement being one and indivisible the printed materials are liable to sales tax. The fact that the bills indicated separate payment for both is not decisive of the matter. In certain cases such separate charging in the bills may constitute a piece of evidence for ascertaining the real intention of the parties entering into the agreement. Here, the factual position is clear. The agreement was for purchase of printed materials. Charging separately for the paper and printing does not alter the essential character of the agreement. 6.. We accordingly hold that the printed materials were liable to sales tax. The Tribunal took a wrong view in separating the cost of printing from that of the paper and in saying that paper alone was taxable. 7.. All the three questions are accordingly answered in the negative. The references are accepted. Hearing fee Rs. 50 (Rupees fifty only). ACHARYA, J.-I agree. References answered accordingly.
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1970 (2) TMI 117 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s, therefore, disposed of on the fundamental principle that an article coming within a specific entry must be excluded from a general entry. It cannot be an authority for the proposition invoked here, whether cloth dyed or printed after coming out of the mill would come within the meaning of mill-made cloth. Similarly Ahmedabad Silk Factory v. Commissioner of Sales Tax 1966 18 S.T.C. 23. is also distinguishable on facts. 7.. We are clearly of opinion that this case is concluded by the principle laid down in Kailash Nath and Another v. The State of Uttar Pradesh 1957 8 S.T.C. 358. In that view of the matter the first question must be answered in the affirmative, that is hand-printed mill-made saris on which a second processing is done through manual labour, before they are marketed for sale, are mill-made cloths. 8.. In the result, the references are discharged, but in the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. ACHARYA, J.-I agree. References answered accordingly.
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1970 (2) TMI 116 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... that the licence fee of Rs. 645 is chargeable on the turnover for the period subsequent to 1st October, 1962, His contention is that he was not liable to pay licence fee exceeding Rs. 2,000 for his turnover of the period up to 30th September, 1962. The respondent on the view that maximum licence fee provided under subsection (2) of section 6 as it originally stood was not applicable after the amending Act came into force, charged licence fee of Rs. 2,974.50. Section 6 of the amending Act adding sub-section (3) of section 43 of the Act makes it clear that up to the date of amendment, tax is chargeable only at the rate in force under the law as it stood before the amendment. That law provides a maximum licence fee of Rs. 2,000. Therefore the respondent was clearly in error in levying a licence fee of Rs. 2,974.50 instead of Rs. 2,000. In that view, this writ petition succeeds and the impugned order marked exhibit 3 dated 7th June, 1967, is quashed. No costs. Petition allowed.
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1970 (2) TMI 115 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the Tribunal on a question of law, the Tribunal must modify its order in the light of the order of the High Court if the High Court has held that the judgment of the Tribunal is vitiated, because it is based on no evidence or that it proceeds upon conjectures, speculation or suspicion, or has been delivered after a trial contrary to the rules of natural justice, the Tribunal would be under a duty to dispose of the case conformably with the opinion of the High Court and on the merits of the dispute. In all cases, however, opportunity must be afforded to the parties of being heard. Section 66(5) of the Income-tax Act in relation to which the aforesaid observations were made corresponds to section 24(5) of the Orissa Sales Tax Act and as such they are fully applicable here. 13.. In the result the reference is accepted and the questions are answered in the negative. In the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. ACHARYA, J.-I agree. Reference answered in the negative.
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1970 (2) TMI 114 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ayer liable to pay any additional amount, but only creates a criminal offence for breach of any of the rules, whereas the provision under the General Sales Tax Act provides for a penalty of paying additional tax which may be 1 frac12 times of the tax payable. In the case of enforcement of rule 9, which created only a criminal offence, the punishment could be awarded only by a criminal court on a complaint being made, while on the other hand the penalty recoverable under the General Sales Tax Act will be only a civil liability, which can be enforced by the tax authorities. The same set of facts may create a criminal offence as well as create a civil liability and it was rightly urged on behalf of the respondents that rule 9 does not cover the same field as the penalty provision in the Act. In this respect, I am also in respectful agreement with my learned brother. With these observations, I agree with the order proposed that the writs should be dismissed. Petitions dismissed.
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1970 (2) TMI 113 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... and given an opportunity to prove the fact. In our opinion, the impugned provisional monthly assessment orders disclose a manifest error of law apparent on their face. The learned Standing Counsel relied on State of Punjab v. Sant Singh 1970 25 S.T.C. 525 (S.C.) (1970) 1 S.C.C. 101. There the Supreme Court held that though the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948, imposed an yearly sales tax, yet since it provided for the filing of periodical returns and payment of tax periodically, periodical assessments could validly be made. The case is inapplicable. There is no dispute here that quarterly assessment cannot be made. The question before us is if the provisions of the U.P. Sales Tax Act provide for monthly returns or assessments for old dealers. No such problem arose before the Supreme Court. In the result, the petitions succeed and are allowed. The impugned provisional monthly assessment orders are quashed. The petitioners would be entitled to their costs. Petitions allowed.
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1970 (2) TMI 112 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... to the facts of the present case. 7.. The learned Standing Counsel submitted that this court should merely issue a writ directing the Commissioner to hear the matter and dispose of the revision application pending before him. Ordinarily, such a course is adopted by us. But in view of the fact that the revision has been pending before the Commissioner since 1964 and in view of the further fact that we are satisfied that the petitioner has got a clear case, no useful purpose would be served by giving a direction for further hearing of the revision. 8.. In the result, the writ application succeeds. A writ of certiorari be issued quashing the order of the Sales Tax Officer dated 20th July, 1964, refusing refund of the tax. A writ of mandamus be also issued directing the opposite parties to make refund of the tax to the petitioner without any delay. The application is allowed, but, in the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. ACHARYA, J.-I agree. Application allowed.
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1970 (2) TMI 111 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... er as to costs. O.P. No. 2642 of 1967 The facts in this writ petition are these A consignment of goods of the petitioner from Kodhacherry to Chittattukara was intercepted on the night/morning of 16/17th April, 1967. The goods were released on cash security of Rs. 1,000 after giving the owner the option contemplated by the section and the rule, to get them so released in lieu of confiscation. Thereafter, by exhibit P-3 proceedings a penalty of Rs. 1,000 is levied on the petitioner and the cash security already furnished in lieu of confiscation has been adjusted towards the penalty so levied, in accordance with the proviso to section 29(5) of the Act. In view of our finding that section 29(5) is unconstitutional, we allow this writ petition and quash exhibit P-3 order and direct the 1st respondent to return the cash security of Rs. 1,000 furnished by the petitioner to obtain release of his goods, as referred to in exhibit P-3. We make no order as to costs. Ordered accordingly.
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1970 (2) TMI 110 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... exercise its discretion and excuse the delay, then the court would be rather slow to interfere with such an order. Further, there should be an explanation for the delay, which is palpably acceptable and reasonably believable. The Tribunal finds that there is no such explanation offered by the appellant either in the matter of the delayed payment of the admitted tax or in the re-presentation of the papers after it was returned for rectification of defects. In such a case the argument of the learned counsel that the bona fides in the matter should be considered does not arise. The bona fides of a situation or conduct of a litigant is subject to scrutiny only if he has sufficiently explained himself by factual details as to what he did was beyond his control. If no such explanation was given, the question of consideration of such bona fides in his conduct does not and cannot, therefore, arise. The order of the Tribunal is correct. This tax case is dismissed. Petition dismissed.
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