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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 85 Records
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1972 (2) TMI 112 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ch concerns the question of sufficiency of the proof in respect of the claim and it will be for the Official Liquidator to examine as I am not inclined to adjudicate upon the applicant's debt myself. 6. The third objection is, that the application is premature inasmuch as the claim has not been filed with the Official Liquidator in the first instance It will be sufficient to say in this connection that as a provision has been made in Rule 177 of the Rules permitting a creditor who fails to file proof of his debt with the liquidator within the time specified for the purpose to apply to the court for relief, it. is not possible to take the view that an application for such relief should be rejected merely because the creditor has not approached the Official Liquidator in the first instance. 7. The Official Liquidator is therefore directed to adjudicate upon the debt of the applicant according to the law. The applicant shall pay Rs. 200/- as costs to the Official Liquidator.
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1972 (2) TMI 111 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 7; 8,000/-representing her deposit with the company. Thirdly, the statement of Sardari Lal Khanna, accountant of the respondent was not at all convincing. The real book of account which would have helped in the decision of the matter was held back by him or by the respondent. For all these reasons. I hold issue No. (2) to have been proved. Issue No. (3) 7. Interest at the rate of 12 percent per annum has been claimed only on the basis of the customary rate at which interest was being charged by the company on hire-purchase agreements. The amount in question was admittedly not given to the respondent on any hire purchase basis. If the claim had been filed within limitation. I would have allowed interest to the company only at the rate of six percent per annum. This issue stands decided accordingly. Issue No. (4) 8. In view of my finding of issue No. (1) this claim fails as barred by time, and is accordingly dismissed though without any order as to costs. 9. Petition dismissed.
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1972 (2) TMI 110 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... by induce that person so put in fear to deliver to any person some property, valuable security or anything signed or sealed which may be converted into valuable security. Intentionally putting a person in fear of injury to himself or any other is, thus, a necessary ingredient of the offence of extortion. In ground No. 1, however, there is no allegation that the petitioner bad put any person in fear of any injury, to that person or to any other. As such, it cannot be said that the petitioner was guilty of extortion. 8. We thus find that ground No. 1 was of an extraneous character and did not justify an order of detention. There is also nothing to show that the District Magistrate would have passed an order of detention of the petitioner in case he was not influenced by facts given in ground No. 1. The extraneous nature of even one of the grounds of detention would, in our opinion, vitiate the order of detention. 9. We, therefore, quash the order of detention of the petitioner.
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1972 (2) TMI 109 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... recovered. It is also in evidence that the said car before the recovery of gold was brought at an odd hour of 2 a.m. and taken on the kutcha track towards salt pans near Bassein Bridge. The car was thereafter parked on the kutcha track near that bridge and its engine was kept running. After the car was intercepted the Customs Officials interrogated the appellant and Wali Mohammad accused. No, statement was then made by the appellant that he did not know about the presence of gold in the dicky. The fact that the mud on the gunny bags was wet shows that the gunny bags had been placed on the dicky shortly before they were examined by the Customs Officials. All these incriminating circumstances, in our opinion clearly point to the guilt of the appellant. 15. We are satisfied that the conviction of the appellant was fully justified in view of the material on record. We, therefore, upheld his conviction. We see no cogent ground to interfere with the sentence and dismiss the appeal.
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1972 (2) TMI 108 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... nce of public order. We are not inclined to accept the contention on behalf of the petitioner that it is only Sub-clause 1 of Clause a of Section 3(2) which deals with the matters, which adversely affects the security of the State. In fact that very sub-clause refers to the matters mentioned therein as affecting the security of the State or the maintenance of public order. Therefore, in this case the grounds of detention cannot be held to be vague nor can the order of detention be held to be in valid on the ground that the petitioner must have been detained only to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and not to the security of the State. 29. Although an attempt was made to assail the correctness of the above view, we find, for reasons stated earlier, no cogent ground to take a different view. The result is that the petition fails and is dismissed. ORDER 30. In view of the opinion of the majority the Writ Petition is dismissed.
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1972 (2) TMI 107 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... s according to the order the petitioner was detained "with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State or the maintenance of public order". It is urged that the use of the word "or" in the order shows that the detaining authority was not definite regarding the ground of detention. Similar argument was advanced before us in the case of Ananta Mukhi alias Ananta Hari v. The state of West Bengal (Writ Petition No. 322 of 1971, decided today) and was rejected. It has been held by us that the use of the word 'Or' in the detention order would not introduce an infirmity as might justify the quashing of that order. 6. It has also been urged that the order of detention was mala fide. There is, however, no material on the record as may justify an inference that the order was made mala fide. The petition consequently fails and is dismissed. In view of the opinion of the majority, the writ petition is dismissed.
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1972 (2) TMI 106 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ensation Officer did not consider the entire forest income for the Fasli years 1352, 1356, 1357 and 1358 for the Prithipur forest on the ground that the entire income was not the sale price of forest but that the Lalas worked the forest and a portion of the income was from the sale of the timber of that forest. The High Court rightly held that the forest income was referable to the price of the standing timber and income which the Lalas derived by processing wood would not be within forest income. 19. For these reasons we uphold the judgment and order of the High Court with this modification that when the Compensation Officer will deal with the income from poola grass as sayar income as derived by the High Court the Compensation Officer will also take into consideration the income from poola grass for the Prithipur forest for the years 1352 and 1353 Fasli. 20. In the facts and circumstances of the case the appeals are dismissed. The parties will pay and bear their own costs.
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1972 (2) TMI 105 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he appointment of a provisional liquidator is necessary. The intervention of a provisional liquidator is a very serious matter, for he has normally the same powers as the liquidator, and his appointment is therefore a serious inroad on the management and standing of the company and its affairs, Such an interference has to be avoided as far as possible, and it will not, in our opinion, be sufficient justification for the appointment of a provisional liquidator to say that it has become necessary because the company has taken out summons for the authorisation of a disposition of its property under Section 536(2). 9. For the reasons stated above, we have no hesitation in holding that the Court has jurisdiction to make an appropriate order under Section 536(2) of the Act in a case where the petition for the winding up of the company is pending but a winding up order has not been made. We accordingly answer the reference in the affirmative. There will be no order as to the costs.
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1972 (2) TMI 104 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... gold by the accused. Therefore, the evidence in the case is not sufficient to hold the exclusive possession or control of the seized gold by the ac-caused. Therefore the prosecution has to fall". In Khadu Morton v. State of Bihar, , their Lordships of the Supreme Court have pointed out that where the lower Court has found the accused not guilty, unless the conclusions reached by it are palpably wrong or based on an erroneous view of the law or that its decision is likely to result in grave injustice, the High Court should be reluctant to interfere with its conclusion. If two reasonable conclusions can be reached on the basis of the evidence on record, then the view in support of the acquittal of the accused should be preferred. 13. For the reasons mentioned above, we are of opinion that there are no good grounds made out to interfere with the order of acquittal of the respondent passed by the learned Magistrate. In the result the appeal fails and the same is dismissed.
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1972 (2) TMI 103 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... amount received by Uttamchand under the agreements entered into between him and the persons to whom he had assigned certain rights in the flats, offices and shops in the building. Those persons had an independent right of their own. Their rights did not flow from the impounded Assignment Deed. Whether the title obtained by them was perfect or not, there is no denying of the fact that they had acquired valuable rights even before the impounded Deed was executed. For the reasons mentioned above, we allow this appeal and in place of the answers given by the High Court, we answer the question formulated by that Court thus "1. The Article applicable in this case is Article 23 in the First Schedule to the Stamp Act, and the consideration is as mentioned in the Deed of Assignment itself i.e. no consideration." The first respondent shall pay the costs of the appellant in Civil Appeal No. 58 of 1972. There will be no order as to costs in Civil Appeal No. 660 of 1967. V.P.S.
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1972 (2) TMI 102 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... deliberation. That is why rule 15(5) has provided for representation of a Government servant charged with dereliction of duty or with contravention of the rule by another government servant or in appropriate, cases by a legal practitioner. o p /o p For the reasons mentioned above, we think that there had’ been a contravention of rule 15(5). We are also of the opinion that the ’appellant had not been afforded a reasonable opportunity to defend himself. Hence the impugned order is liable to be struck down and it is hereby struck down. The facts of this case are not such as to justify any fresh enquiry against the appellant. Hence we direct that no fresh enquiry shall be held against the appellant and he be restored to the position to which he would have been entitled to but for the impugned order. The appeal is accordingly allowed. The appellant is entitled to his costs from the respondents both in this Court as well as in the o p /o p S.C. Appeal allowed. o p /o p
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1972 (2) TMI 101 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... rest of the Administration, the temporary post is abolished, the question as to what were the personal relations between the appellant and his superiors was irrelevant. Moreover, all that the appellant has been able to say is that his immediate superiors in the Department were with the action of his immediate superiors but the action of the Government. The decision to discontinue the post was the decision of the Government and it is not alleged in the Writ Petition that in taking this decision the Government acted malafide. We, therefore, agree with the High Court that there is no substance in the allegation that the post was discontinued or abolished in order to punish the appellant. 12. It is a tragedy that it has not been possible to utilize the services of a highly qualified officer like the appellant in an appropriate post which could bring the best out of him. However, we can do no more than express our sympathy. The appeal fails and is dismissed. No order as to costs.
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1972 (2) TMI 100 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... , was perhaps due to some misunderstanding. Before us the counsel urged this point as a pure point of law depending on the construction of the provisions of the Act. 11. It was not seriously argued before us, and in our opinion rightly so, that the Trust was bound to give reasons for holding as to why the entire land of the appellants was necessary for executing the scheme. There is no provision of the Act which imposes such an obligation on the Trust when coming to a decision under Section 56 and indeed in the High Court this point was conceded by the appellants. 12. An attempt was also made by Shri Gupte to show by reference td a map that the land of the appellants and of those who were granted, exemption were similarly located. We do not consider it necessary to go into that question nor is it competent to this Court in these proceedings to go into such questions of fact. 13. The appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed but in the circumstances of the case without costs.
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1972 (2) TMI 99 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... for the initial constitution of the service (2) On receipt of the Committee's report the Commission shall forward its recommendations to the Government and such recommendations may include a recommendation that a person considered suitable for appointment to a grade may, if a sufficient number of vacancies are not available in that grade, be appointed to a lower grade; (3) Vacancies in any grade which remain unfilled after the appointment of departmental candidates selected under sub-rules (1) and (2) above shall be filled by direct recruitment through the Commission. Rule 3 indicates that appointments to the newly created' service could take place either by selection under Rule 5 or by direct recruitment with which we are not concerned here. The grades and the fixation of an authorized strength of each grade are provided for by Rule 4. Only posts in the first 3 grades are classified as Class I (Gazetted) posts. Rule 5(2) enables the Selection Committee, to recommend
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1972 (2) TMI 98 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... Government has power to make such a retrospective declaration. The order dated 20 September, 1967 which also directed the years of allotment on the basis that there could not be any retrospective declaration of equivalent post cannot be sustained. The High Court however further directed that the promotees must continue to hold ranks as assigned to them in the year This order of the High Court is to be set aside, for the reason that the year of allotment will now have to be determined by the approval of the Central Government in consultation with the Union Public Service Commission. The appeals are therefore dismissed in so far as they relate to quashing of the order of the Central Government dated 20 September, 1967. The appeals are allowed setting aside the order of the High Court that the promotees would continue to hold ranks as assigned to them in the year 1958. In the facts and circumstances of the case, parties will pay and bear their own costs. G.C . Appeals allowed.
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1972 (2) TMI 97 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... s. In their affidavit in reply the Administration has stated that the appointment to the selection grade is made on the basis of seniority-cum-merit based upon a test open to all Assistants carried out in accordance with a prescribed procedure. It appears that there is a Departmental Promotion Committee whose business it is to prepare a promotion list of such Assistants who after passing the necessary tests are to be appointed in the selection grade. It is on the basis of this selection that Respondents 4 to 20 and some others were appointed in the selection grade after they passed the tests and were selected by the Departmental Promotion Committee. The appellants did not appear for these tests and, therefore, can have no complaint about the selection. In fact they have not challenged the selection and appointment of Respondents 4 to 20 in the selection grade posts. 10. In our opinion, there is no substance in the appeal and it deserves to be dismissed. No order as to costs.
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1972 (2) TMI 96 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... building. From these materials the conclusion is inescapable that P. W. 2 is a person brought up for the occasion. The refinery, and the residential building are two structures with a courtyard in between. The statement of P. Ws. 1 and 4 that the two structures are in fact, one compact building, cannot be accepted. My conclusion, therefore, is that the requirements of Sections 123 and 105 of the Customs Act have not been complied with in the present case, and that the entire proceedings should be held to be vitiated by the non-compliance of the mandatory provisions of the Act. Conviction cannot be entered on mere suspicion, nor on the conscience of the court being morally satisfied about the complicity of the accused. He can be convicted, and sentenced only if the prosecution proves its case beyond all reasonable doubt. 13. The order of acquittal entered by the learned appellate Magistrate in the circumstances, is correct, and in confirmation of it, this appeal is dismissed.
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1972 (2) TMI 95 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ule 10(1) is a strong indication of the intent to make the rule mandatory. Further, rule 10(2) makes it clear that where prior consultation with the Finance Department is required for a proposal, and the department on consultation does not agree to the proposal, the department originating the proposal can take no further action on the proposal. The cabinet alone would be competent to take a decision. When we see that the disagreement of the Finance Department with a proposal on consultation, deprives the department originating the proposal of the power to take further action on it, the only conclusion possible is that prior consultation is an essential pre-requisite to the exercise of the power. We, therefore, think that the order passed by the Minister of Forest, Government of Bihar on December 13, 1970, settling the coup in favour of the 6th Respondent was bad and we quash the order. We allow the appeal to the extent indicated but make no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.
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1972 (2) TMI 94 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ourt appear to have persuaded that court that there was no merit in the appellants' case. 21. In view of our above conclusion, it is not necessary for us to go into the question whether the executing court could have directed the delivery of the properties for which occupancy certificates had been granted under the Land Reforms Act. At the trial stage, the parties had chosen to put into issue the effect to those certificates. The Board had gone into the matter and had pronounced on the same. The pronouncement has not been challenged in appeal. Therefore, whether the order of the Board is correct or not, it is binding on the parties to the litigation. 22. For the reasons mentioned above this appeal is partly allowed and the execution petition in respect of items Nos. 3, 4, 5, 6 and 10 in the Darkhast is dismissed. In other respects this appeal is dismissed. As the contesting parties have partly succeeded and partly failed, they will bear their own costs in all the courts.
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1972 (2) TMI 93 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... tial for the prosecution to examine Thangam as a witness and its failure to do so would make the Court draw an inference against the prosecution. Ex. 1 in his bed in the house of Chakravarthi (PW 9) when he had ample opportunity to throw away the knife in some lonely place before arriving at the house of Chakravarthi. The knife in question was found by Chemical Examiner to be not stained with blood and according to the prosecution case, the accused had washed it before leaving it in the bed in the house of Chakravarthi. If the accused realised the importance of doing away with the blood stains on the knife, it does not seem likely that he would bring that knife’ to the house of Chakravarthi and leave it in the bed. Looking to all the circumstances, we are of the view that it is not possible to sustain the conviction of the accused on the evidence adduced. We accordingly accept the appeal, set aside the conviction of the accused-appellant and acquit him. Appeal allowed.
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