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Showing 21 to 40 of 54 Records
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1973 (6) TMI 51 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... v. Hiralal 1966 17 S.T.C. 313 (S.C.). In this case, however, I do not think it advisable to go into the question as to whether exercise books, envelopes, letter-pads, blank registers, etc., could be characterised as paper in the light of the principle of law laid down in the two cases referred to above. Here, on a plain reading of the language of the notification in column 2 it is clear that all these articles have been included in the word paper . That being so, the assessee was not liable to pay sales tax at the second stage when at the first stage it had paid sales tax on paper, merely because at the second stage the sale was of paper, (sic) not paper as such but of some articles manufactured from the paper. 6.. For the reasons stated above, the second question must be answered in favour of the assessee and against the Commercial Taxes Department. Since the success is divided in this case, there will be no order for costs. JHA, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1973 (6) TMI 50 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tioner did not become a defaulter. When the petitioner was not a defaulter at all he does not incur penalty under sub-section (2) of section 13 of the Act notwithstanding the provisions under rule 21(4b) empowering the exaction of such penalty. In our opinion, the words together with the Penalty due under sub-section (2) of section 13 calculated on the said sum from the day immediately following the date on which the return was due in rule 21(4b) are ultra vires of the Act. Since the said rule has now been repealed, it is not necessary to strike down that portion of the rule. For the reasons stated above, the petitioner is entitled to succeed in these writ petitions and, accordingly, we issue a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the first respondent to forbear from enforcing payment of the penalty claimed as per exhibit 3 dated 6th September, 1971. It is ordered accordingly. The petitioner is entitled to his costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100 (one set). Ordered accordingly.
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1973 (6) TMI 49 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... usiness. It is now well-established that the passing on of tax is not a necessary incidence of sales tax. From the economic point of view the sales tax on almost all occasions will be reflected by an increase in the price at which a consumer may have to buy goods. But it is a direct tax on the sale or purchase and it can be imposed either on the seller or purchaser. The tax does not become invalid because in given circumstances it cannot be passed on. It is possible to conceive of circumstances where a tax can infringe article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. Though we have not seen any case where it has been held that a tax has infringed article 19(1)(g), in fact, it appears to us to be difficult to establish that a tax has infringed article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. We have no material before us from which it is possible to say that there has been any infringement of article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. 14.. We dismiss this batch of cases with costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1973 (6) TMI 48 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... lding that it was difficult for the Tribunal to uphold the contention of the revenue that bhinda seeds could be said to be known as oil-seeds used principally for extraction of oil. Even applying the test laid down by the decision of the Kerala High Court construing the expression that is to say as illustrating the general term, we do not find any evidence on the record or any material placed from which the further question, whether bhinda seeds are yielding volatile or non-volatile oil which can be used for purposes of human consumption or industrial use or for medicines, perfumes or cosmetics, can be satisfactorily determined. In that state of affairs, therefore, we answer the question as under On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the bhinda seeds purchased by the opponent-mill are not oil-seeds covered by entry 6, Part II, of Schedule B, to the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959. There should be no order as to costs in this reference. Reference answered accordingly.
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1973 (6) TMI 47 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... parate argument was advanced in support of the order of assessment. As the order of assessment was based upon the decision arrived at on 31st July, 1967, and as the said order dated 31st July, 1967, is liable to be set aside, the assessment order also is to be quashed. In the result, the orders dated 31st July, 1967, and 4th October, 1967, made by the Commercial Tax Officer and the order dated 10th January, 1968, made by the Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes are quashed by a writ of certiorari. As the assessment is set aside, the certificate proceedings are also liable to be quashed. There will be a writ in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents to forbear from giving effect to the said orders and the certificate issued under the Public Demands Recovery Act. The rule is made absolute to the extent indicated above. The respondents will be at liberty to proceed with the assessment in accordance with law. There will be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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1973 (6) TMI 46 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Company – Service of documents on members by, Meetings and Proceedings – Quorum for meeting, Compromise and arrangement, Amalgamation
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1973 (6) TMI 37 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Exclusion of time required in obtaining copies of orders of Court ... ... ... ... ..... Court, by virtue of rule 37 of the Companies (Court) Rules, 1959, there is no duty on the litigant or his lawyer either to draw up the orders under the Companies Act and to lodge them with the Registrar or to apply to him for the orders being settled or even to remind the court or its office about its obligation to draw up such orders. I am afraid, it is the function of the Registrar to draw up all orders and no party can be penalised for the default of the office in drawing up the orders. These rules apply uniformly to all courts in India including those where the dual system prevails and including the Bombay High Court on its original side. In view of the fact that I have taken the view that there is no delay on the part of the applicant, the Registrar is directed to take the order and copies of the memorandum on file. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. The Registrar of Companies shall act on a certified copy of the minutes of this order.
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1973 (6) TMI 27 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
Import - Bond for re-export - Confiscation - Detention of goods ... ... ... ... ..... clause 3 of the Imports (Control) Order, 1955. As no licence was necessary for import of these goods the question of commission of an offence under the Customs Act, 1962, does not arise and the orders passed for confiscation of the goods by the Customs Authorities are liable to be set aside . 9.In view of the decision of the appeal Court the present petition must be allowed. 10.The order of confiscation dated 30th December, 1970, Ex. C to the petition is set aside. The respondents are directed to proceed with the application of the petitioners for bonding the goods in question under Sections 59 and 60 of the Customs Act, 1962, in accordance with law. The respondents are also directed to issue all such documents under certificates as may be necessary, and required by the petitioners by reason of the said goods having been confiscated and detained on the basis of the order dated 30th December, 1970, which has now been quashed. Respondents will pay the costs of the petitioners.
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1973 (6) TMI 26 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
A Partner, Estate Duty Gift ... ... ... ... ..... 970 is concerned, there are two questions referred to us for our opinion. We answer the first question by saying that only a sum of Rs. 1,99,500 out of the amount of Rs. 2,00,000 gifted by the deceased in favour of his grandson, Kishorchand, was liable to be included in the principal value of the estate of the deceased under section 10 and the balance of Rs. 4,00,000 gifted by the deceased in favour of his sons, Shankerdas and Narandas, was not liable to be so included and the addition of Rs. 5,99,500 made by the revenue in the principal value of the estate of the deceased was, therefore, justified only to the extent of Rs. 1,99,500 and was not justified in so far as it included the balance of Rs. 4,00,000. The second question would be answered in the affirmative. The accountable person will pay the costs of Estate Duty Reference No. 2 of 1970 to the Controller of Estate Duty and, so far as Estate Duty Reference No. 4 of 1970 is concerned, there will be no order as to costs.
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1973 (6) TMI 25 - KERALA HIGH COURT
1922 Act, 1961 Act, Assessment Order, Assessment Year ... ... ... ... ..... tful agreement with the principles laid down in the decisions referred to above. Therefore, section 154 of the 1961 Act is also not available to the revenue. In view of what is stated above, the question as to the scope of the phrase any mistake apparent from the record occurring both in section 35 of the 1922 Act and section 154 of the 1961 Act does not arise for decision in this case. However, we may point out that it does not bear the same meaning as the phrase an error apparent on the face of the record in Order XLVII, rule 1, of the Civil Procedure Code (See Income-tax Officer v. Asok Textiles Ltd.). Our answer to the question under reference is in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. The revenue will pay the costs of the assessee including advocate s fee of Rs. 250. A copy of this judgment shall be sent under the seal of this court and the signature of the Registrar to the Appellate Tribunal. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1973 (6) TMI 24 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Assessment Order ... ... ... ... ..... . The order of rectification dated 25th February, 1963, was passed subsequent to the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner dated 18th August, 1961, and it affected the final assessment of the firm. We must, therefore, hold that the order of rectification dated 25th February, 1963, was the final order passed in the case of the firm and the period of four years within which an order of rectification could be passed under section 35, sub-section (5), was liable to be counted from the date of the order of rectification, namely, 25th February, 1963, and not from the date of the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, namely, 18th August, 1961. If that be so, the impugned orders of rectification made by the Income-tax Officer must be held to be within the time limit prescribed by section 35, sub-section (5). These were the only grounds urged on behalf of the petitioner and since there is no substance in them, the petition fails and the rule is discharged with costs.
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1973 (6) TMI 23 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Fixed Deposit, Immovable Property, Movable Property, Search And Seizure ... ... ... ... ..... 32 of the Act or rule 112A of the Rules. They would, of course, be covered by sub-section (8) of section 132 of the Act. But, for the purpose of this petition, we are not concerned with sub-section (8) of section 132. It is undoubtedly true that these fixed deposit receipts and documents of title relating to an immovable property were actually seized on 10th July, 1969, and if those documents were found to be valuable articles or things , as contemplated by sub-section (5) of section 132 and rule 112A, then a notice within 15 days from the date of that seizure was necessary. But, as we have found that these documents are not valuable things or articles, we are of the opinion that no notice contemplated by rule 112A was necessary. In this view of the matter, the petitioner cannot succeed even so far as point No. 3 is concerned. The result, therefore, is that this petition should fail. The same is, therefore, dismissed and the rule is discharged with costs. Petition dismissed.
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1973 (6) TMI 22 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
Being Heard, Natural Justice ... ... ... ... ..... to the assessee before passing the impugned order of penalty, the order is invalid for violation of the rules of natural justice. The impugned order of the Agricultural Income-tax Officer is, therefore, void, and the same is hereby quashed. The petitioner made a revision application before the Commissioner against that order under section 27(2) of the Act. The Commissioner, however, gave a hearing to the petitioner but his order does not seem to have dealt with the question of violation of the principles of natural justice in passing the original order of penalty. Since we have quashed the order of the Agricultural Income-tax Officer, the order of the Commissioner also fails. The application is accordingly allowed and, in the result, the impugned order of penalty is quashed. It will, however, be open to the authority to proceed under section 36(1) of the Act in accordance with law if it so chooses to do. There will, however, be no order as to costs. R. S. BINDRA J.--I agree.
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1973 (6) TMI 21 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Undisclosed Income ... ... ... ... ..... hat the High Court had jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition though their Lordships said that it should not have exercised discretion in favour of the assessee in view of the alternative remedy they had. In the case before us we are unable to say that the assessee had an adequate alternative remedy in the matter that was brought before this court by an application under article 226 of the Constitution. Mr. Pal also cited before us another decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner of Income-tax v. K. Y. Pilliah and Sons for urging the proposition that the Tribunal is the final fact-finding authority. There is no question that it is so. The order that has been made by the learned trial judge has only directed the Tribunal to exercise that authority by correcting its view that it had no jurisdiction in the matter. In the result we do not find any merit in the appeal, and, therefore, dismiss it with costs. AMIYA KUMAR MOOKERJI J.--I agree. Appeal dismissed.
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1973 (6) TMI 20 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Assessment Notice, Notice Of Reassessment, Original Assessment, Reassessment Notice, Writ Petition
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1973 (6) TMI 19 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Assessing Agent Of Non-resident ... ... ... ... ..... of the non-resident firm, left India after obtaining a certificate from the income-tax department that no tax was due from him. Under section 230 of the Act, if he was not given such a certificate, he would have been obliged to stay in India, or pay the tax if he wanted to leave India and, to that extent, hardship is undoubtedly caused to the petitioner, because its liability continues. But, that does not mean that the petitioner is relieved of the obligation cast upon it by Chapter XV of the Act. No authority was cited in support of the contention that, since no action under section 174 of the Act was taken, the proceedings cannot be continued against the petitioner. We are not aware of any authority on this point. There are no provisions in the Act to that effect. We are, therefore, satisfied that no effect can be given to this contention also. Since no other contention was raised, the writ petitions fail and are, accordingly, dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 250.
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1973 (6) TMI 18 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Estate Duty, Interest In Property, One Partner, Property Deemed To Pass, Taxing Statutes ... ... ... ... ..... ill, a business concern would not be able to earn anything if it lacks in other resources which are necessary for running a business. It would, therefore, follow that the goodwill property in which the interest of the deceased has ceased had no income of its own, and if it had no income of its own, the value of the benefit which has resulted on account of the cesser of the interest in that property cannot be measured in terms of section 40. If that be so, the interest which has ceased is not the interest contemplated by section 7 of the Act. The result, therefore, is that the case is not covered either by section 5 or section 7 of the Act and, therefore, question No. 2, which is referred to us, should be answered in the negative. Thus, we answer question No. 1 in the affirmative, question No. 2 in the negative and do not give any answer to question No. 3, which is not pressed on behalf of the applicant. This reference is accordingly disposed of without any order as to costs.
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1973 (6) TMI 17 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Claiming Allowance, Deduction Of Bonus, Income Tax ... ... ... ... ..... he residuary provision in section 5(1). But a similar contention has been negatived by this court in State of Madras v. Glenburn Estates Ltd. and State of Madras v. Balmadies Plantations Ltd. In view of those decisions, the contention that section 5(e) cannot be invoked in respect of bonus paid to the staff cannot be accepted. The next item in dispute relates to the allowance in relation to the deduction claimed under section 80E of the Central Income-tax Act. The Tribunal has held that the assessee is entitled to the benefit of the said provision in section 80E even in respect of proceedings for assessment under the Madras Agricultural Income-tax Act. The view taken by the Tribunal is in accord with the view taken by this court on the point in Commissioner of Agricultural Income-tax v. Periakaramalai Tea and Produce Co. Ltd. In view of that decision, the Tribunal s view cannot be taken exception to. The result is, the tax case is dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 150.
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1973 (6) TMI 16 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Agricultural Income Tax, Attributable To, Rubber Trees ... ... ... ... ..... nd that which is attributable to the value of trees. (v) The part pertaining to latex is agricultural income, liable to tax, and the other part which is attributable to the value of the trees is not liable to tax. In the case in hand the assessee (a company) is the owner of the land on which the rubber trees sold stood. The consideration amount received by the company in respect of the transaction has to be bifurcated, that pertaining to latex and that which is attributable to the value of the trees. The former is to suffer agricultural income-tax and the latter not. Our answer to the first question is in the affirmative, both as regards the first and second parts of that question, that is, in favour of the revenue and against the assessee. The assessee will pay the costs of these references including advocate s fee of Rs. 250 in each of the cases. A copy of this judgment shall be sent under the seal of this court and the signature of the Registrar to the Appellate Tribunal.
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1973 (6) TMI 15 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Agricultural Income, Rubber Trees ... ... ... ... ..... trees are standing may not be agricultural income, but not so in the hands of the owner. The principles enunciated in E. J. John s case also have no application to the facts of this case, in so far as the assessee has not sold the trees to another and received any amount representing partly capital receipt and partly agricultural income. This court held in that case that that portion of the total consideration which is attributable to latex is agricultural income liable to tax. The receipts sought to be taxed in this case is attributable wholly to latex there was no sale of the trees, and consequently there are no receipts which is attributable to the value of the trees. We answer the question in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the revenue and against the assessee. The assessee will pay costs of the revenue including advocates fee of Rs. 250. A copy of this judgment shall be sent under the seal of this court and the signature of the Registrar to the Appellate Tribunal.
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