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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 88 Records
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1975 (10) TMI 99 - COLLECTOR CENTRAL EXCISE, NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... t it was wrong on the part of the Asstt. Collector to have depended on the record of personal hearing which was granted by his precessor. The Assistant Collector should have again extended an opportunity of personal hearing to the appellants at his level. In view of the above I set aside the order of the Assistant Collector without going into its merits and direct him to decide it de novo after ensuring that principles of nature justice are fully complied with.
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1975 (10) TMI 98 - COLLECTOR OF CENTRAL EXCISE, NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... rinciples of natural justice was pointed to the Assistant Collector by the appellant unit in their letter No. Excise/74, dated 25-1-1974. I, therefore, hold that principle of natural justice have not been followed by the Assistant Collector before passing the order under appeal. I, therefore, vacate the order of the Assistant Collector and further direct him that he should re-decide the matter after observing principles of natural justice.
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1975 (10) TMI 97 - COLLECTOR CENTRAL EXCISE, NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... ated 27-11-1971 in which it was intimated that they would submit their refund claim for differential duty in due course. The Assistant Collector does not seem to have taken into consideration the fact that it was he who had delayed the necessary permission under the above notification and that the appellants had mentioned in their letter dated 27-11-1971 that they would be claiming refund of differential duty in due course. Under the circumstances the rejection of the refund claim on the plea of time far by the Assistant Collector cannot be substained either in law or on facts. The order of the Assistant Collector is therefore set aside and the appeal is admitted. Refund is allowed, if otherwise in order.
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1975 (10) TMI 96 - COLLECTOR CENTRAL EXCISE, NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... the filing of the writ petition, his client was being harassed by the departmental authorities and hence he preferred to approach this court directly without availing the statutory remedies. 3. The learned Government Pleader also stated that the departmental authorities would consider the appeal if the petitioner prefers one with an application for the condonation of the delay. As there is a change in the personnel of the departmental authorities, who are alleged to have given trouble to the petitioner, I feel it just and proper to dismiss this Writ Petition on the ground that the petitioner may approach the Collector, Central Excise by preferring a statutory appeal. With an application to condone the delay in filing. The petitioner may prefer an appeal to the Collector with an application to condone the delay and I am sure the Collector will consider the desirability of condoning the delay in filing the appeal. In the circumstances there shall be no order as to costs.
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1975 (10) TMI 95 - COLLECTOR CENTRAL EXCISE, NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... nsurance, covering breakage was a fait accompt. After the High Court order, which remained unchallenged. Therefore subsequent action of Shri Virendra Singh, Asst. Collector in disallowing the insurance covering breakage was against the order of the High Court. 2. The other issue is that Shri Virendra Singh was not competent to review the order passed by his predecessor and that invoking of Rule 10 was bad in law. In this connection it is observed that the grant of the subject refund could not be considered to be a case of erroneous refund under Rule 10. In granting the above refund Shri H.K. Handoo, Asstt. Collector, was complying with the orders of the High Court of Delhi. If however the order of Shri Handoo was considered to be wrong in law, the proper course was its review by the Central Govt. under Section 35-A of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. In view of the above facts and circumstances of the case I quash the order appealed against and accept the appeal.
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1975 (10) TMI 94 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the substance known as Pyratax-Vinyl Pyridine Latex (for short, V.P. Latex) is not rubber raw classifiable under Item No. 39 of the Indian Tariff Act, 1934?
Held that:- In the state of the evidence before the revisional authority no reasonable person could come to the conclusion that V.P. Latex would not come under rubber raw. The basis of the reason with regard to the end-use of the article is absolutely irrelevant in the context of the entry where there is no reference to the use or adaptation of the article. The orders of the authority are, therefore, set aside. In the result the appeals are allowed with costs.
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1975 (10) TMI 93 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... chasing dealer and the goods in respect of which that concessional rate is claimed is included in the registration certificate of the purchasing dealer. As observed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Radio and Electricals Ltd. 1966 18 S.T.C. 222 (S.C.)., he has to satisfy himself about this fact. 13.. We would, therefore, answer the question referred to us as follows On the facts and circumstances of the case, the assessee who has obtained a declaration in form XII-A from the purchasing dealer was not entitled to claim the concessional rate of tax under section 8(1) of the Act because the goods were not specified in the registration certificate of the purchasing dealer. 14.. A copy of this judgment be sent to the Tribunal as required by section 44(5) of the Act who shall dispose of the case in the light of the judgment given above. In view of the circumstances of the case, we shall leave the parties to bear their own costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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1975 (10) TMI 92 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ly provision in the agreement which talks of retention of any liability. This agreement does not contain any provision to suggest that any asset is retained by the seller. In our opinion, the finding of the Tribunal that other assets were retained by the seller is totally devoid of any basis. The mere fact that the seller had undertaken to settle liabilities which had accrued prior to the sale of the business would not by itself show that the seller had not transferred the business as a whole. So long as there is nothing to suggest that any part of the assets was retained by the seller or any amounts standing to the credit of the business were taken over by the seller, it cannot be suggested that the business as a whole was not transferred. In our opinion, the finding of the Tribunal on this question is erroneous. We, therefore, allow the tax revision case and set aside the order of the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, Trivandrum. We make no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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1975 (10) TMI 91 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... this purpose, and also charge its commission for effecting the sales. It has been found by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner that the sales receipts were being issued by the assessee in his own name and that the assessee had full control over the goods that were pawned with it. This finding has not been reversed by the revising authority. It is also clear that the activity of the society is carried on regularly as a business. This being so, the mere fact that the assessee could not sell the goods without the consent of the members cannot take it out of the mischief of section 2(c) and explanation I thereof. In view of the wide definition of the word dealer as given under section 2(c) of the Act a person who sells goods for commission is also a dealer. Accordingly, we answer the question referred in the affirmative, in favour of the department and against the assessee. The department is entitled to costs which is assessed at Rs. 100. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1975 (10) TMI 90 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... on 23rd August, 1969, while it was served on the petitioner on 6th September, 1969. In R.M.E. Works, Raipur v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, M.P.M.C.C. No. 346 of 1973 decided on 26th August, 1975 since reported at page 306 supra. , we have held that computation of period of three years anterior to the notice will be from the date of issuance of notice and not from the date of service of the notice. In this view of the matter, the notice dated 23rd August, 1969 (petitioner s annexure B), was well within three years of the order of the Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax dated 25th August, 1966 (petitioner s annexure A), and, as such, the question of limitation would not at all arise. 12.. As a result of the discussion aforesaid, this petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. However, under the circumstances, we direct that there shall be no order as to costs of this petition. The outstanding amount of the security deposit shall be refunded to the petitioner. Petition dismissed.
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1975 (10) TMI 89 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... on 23rd August, 1969, while it was served on the petitioner on 6th September, 1969. In R.M.E. Works, Raipur v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, M.P.M.C.C. No. 346 of 1973 decided on 26th August, 1975 since reported at page 306 supra. , we have held that computation of period of three years anterior to the notice will be from the date of issuance of notice and not from the date of service of the notice. In this view of the matter, the notice dated 23rd August, 1969 (petitioner s annexure B), was well within three years of the order of the Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax dated 25th August, 1966 (petitioner s annexure A), and, as such, the question of limitation would not at all arise. 12.. As a result of the discussion aforesaid, this petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. However, under the circumstances, we direct that there shall be no order as to costs of this petition. The outstanding amount of the security deposit shall be refunded to the petitioner. Petition dismissed.
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1975 (10) TMI 88 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rstanding of the present entry. What emerges from the above discussion is that the legislature has power to decide what to tax and whom to tax. While taxing some objects and excluding certain others, it must make reasonable classification. In other words, that classification should not be violative of article 14 of the Constitution. Entry 43 in this case stands the test of reasonable classification and the legislature has justifiable differentia between fresh milk and milk powder, etc. Therefore, entry 43, which is now entry 44, in the First Schedule to the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, is not violative of, or repugnant to, article 14 of the Constitution. That being the case, sales tax is leviable on the petitioner in respect of his sales of milk powder also. In the result, the writ petition is dismissed. Since a liability to tax has been a matter of doubt, we direct the parties to bear their own costs in the writ petition. Advocate s fee Rs. 150. Petition dismissed.
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1975 (10) TMI 87 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ver relating to sale of khadi silk where the price exceeds rupees ten a piece, would be taxable at seven per cent. In the last year, such investigation is not necessary and the rate of tax has to be seven per cent on the turnover of khadi silk. Sale of tassar cloth would not at all be taxable for the reasoning given by the Tribunal while disposing of the appeals relating to the first three years. 7.. Our answers to the two questions referred, therefore, are (1) On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was correct in holding that khadi silk is taxable at seven per cent being covered by entry in serial No. 8 of the list of taxable goods. (2) On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal is not right in holding that sale of tassar cloth is taxable and it is covered by entry in serial No. 8 of the schedule of taxable goods. As success is divided, we direct parties to bear their own costs. PANDA, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1975 (10) TMI 86 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... mand notices produced cannot be considered as satisfactory material to satisfy the Magistrate that in fact assessment orders had been passed against the petitioners. The Magistrate had to satisfy himself, i.e., before proceeding under section 421 of the Code, that the names of the petitioners were available in the concerned assessment orders as assessees. In the absence of that material, he could not have proceeded to act under section 421 of the Code. This is another reason why the orders in question are required to be set aside. In view of the foregoing reasons, I allow these two revision petitions and set aside the orders dated 16th December, 1974, passed by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Siddapur, in Criminal Misc. No. 20 of 1974 and Criminal Misc. No. 17 of 1974. The records are directed to be remitted to the Court of the Magistrate for disposal of the proceedings according to law, bearing in mind the observations made in the body of the order. Petitions allowed.
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1975 (10) TMI 85 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e dispute has arisen because of the Sales Tax Officer raising the additional demand under section 12(8) of the Act on the footing that the assessee s turnover had been assessed at too low a rate. We think both these objections are insurmountable and preclude us from entertaining the new contention canvassed for the first time before us. 6.. It is unnecessary to answer each of the questions separately. In our view, a combined answer would serve the purpose and our answer, therefore, is Nylon-ware and nylon twines are not covered by entry No. 7-C of the notification dated 30th December, 1957, made in exercise of the powers under the first proviso to section 5(1) of the Orissa Sales Tax Act. The assessees in these references shall be entitled to costs except in the first batch of cases (S.J.C. Nos. 113 to 116 of 1973), where the assessee went ex parte. Hearing fee is assessed at rupees one hundred for each of the assessees. N.K. DAS, J.-I agree. References answered accordingly.
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1975 (10) TMI 83 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... goods. All relevant documents were in the name of the corporation whose contract of sale was the occasion of the export. The expression occasions in section 5 of the Act means the immediate and direct cause and, but for the contract between the corporation and the foreign buyer, there was no occasion for export. Therefore, the export was occasioned by the contract of sale between the corporation and the foreign buyer and not by the contract of sale between the corporation and the appellant. Precisely, the same situation prevails in the instant case. Here also the real exporter is the State Trading Corporation, and the contract of sale between the State Trading Corporation and the foreign buyer occasioned the export of goods. The other two preceding sales are local sales. We, accordingly, answer the question in the negative in favour of the department and against the assessee. The department is entitled to costs which we assess at Rs. 100. Reference answered in the negative.
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1975 (10) TMI 82 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... counsel for the revenue in India Pistons Limited v. State of Tamil Nadu 1974 33 S.T.C. 472. seems to support the contention raised on behalf of the revenue. The decision of the Orissa High Court in Orient Paper Mills Ltd. v. State of Orissa 1975 35 S.T.C. 84 1974 Tax. L.R. 2224. has not been referred to by the Madras High Court and the aspect that we have emphasised that in cases where a trade discount had been bona fide granted, the actual consideration paid for the sale is only the amount paid after deducting the trade discount from the quoted sale price has not been adverted to or considered by the Madras High Court. With respect we are unable to agree with the decision of the Madras High Court 5.. We adopt the reasoning of the Orissa High Court in Orient Paper Mills Ltd. v. State of Orissa 1975 35 S.T.C. 84 1974 Tax. L.R. 2224. and on that basis this tax revision case has to be dismissed. We do so. We direct the parties to bear their respective costs. Petition dismissed.
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1975 (10) TMI 81 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ls or substitute its judgment in the place of the judgment of the Tribunal in regard to questions of fact, nevertheless, if the conclusions drawn by the Tribunal are so irrational in the sense that no reasonable man would have come to such a conclusion either because of a total lack of evidence or because of irrelevant considerations, this court would interfere with such finding. In the present case, the material available to the Tribunal were confined to a mere span of three months, which, as the Appellate Assistant Commissioner found, covered six months. The Tribunal had no materials whatsoever to extend the same pattern to cover beyond six months. In our opinion, the Tribunal was not justified in interfering with the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. 6.. In the result, we allow the tax revision case, set aside the order of the Appellate Tribunal and uphold that of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner but we do not make any order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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1975 (10) TMI 80 - HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Winding up – Power of court to appoint or remove liquidator ... ... ... ... ..... y orders on the CM. Mr. Gian Singh Vohra, learned counsel for the liquidator, stated before us that the liquidator does not raise any objection to the appointment of the official liquidator, Mr. S.C. Mittal, as additional liquidator, in the place of Mr. V.S. Juneja. He also stated that he does not press the cross-objections, CM. (M) 2 of 1969, filed by Dr. Hardit Singh Giani against the order of Hardayal Hardy J. We had already passed an order on August 25, 1975, dismissing the said cross-objections as not pressed. We appoint the present official liquidator, Mr. S.C. Mittal, as additional liquidator in the place of Mr. V.S. Juneja, and direct the liquidator and the additional liquidator to endeavour to complete the winding-up proceedings without any avoidable delay. Subject to the above appointment and direction, the Letters Patent Appeal No. 61 of 1968 is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, we direct the parties to bear their own costs in this Letters Patent Appeal.
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1975 (10) TMI 71 - SUPREME COURT
Scope of section 433(f) of the Companies Act, 1956 (briefly "the Act"), and in particular whether the principles applicable in the case of dissolution of partnership could be invoked in the case of the company?
Held that:- Appeal is allowed with costs. The judgment of the Division Bench is set aside. The winding-up petition stands dismissed and the stay petition of the appellant is allowed. Failure to convince us that the conclusion of the Division Bench that the company is in substance a partnership, is correct.
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