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Showing 1 to 20 of 126 Records
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1975 (11) TMI 182 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ted version. It is also true that the appellant had been most unwise in not sending a Registered letter in reply to the registered notice received by him on 8th January, 1971 by the complainant. His version that he spoke to the complainant on the telephone and sent a letter in reply on 15th January, 1971, of which a copy was Ex. RI, had been rejected by the Committee on the ground that the Advocate's conduct did not appear to he above board We cannot help thinking that the Committee had been unduly swayed by the unsavory background of the appellant so that it could not see its way to giving the appellant even the benefit of doubt in the instant case. 12. In the circumstances of this case, we think that the appellant is entitled to the benefit of doubt. We, then fore, allow this appeal and set aside the order disbarring the appellant who, we hope, has learnt now to conduct himself in a more satisfactory manner in his dealings with his clients. We make no order as to costs.
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1975 (11) TMI 181 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... according to natural justice cannot be exhaustively enumerated. A duty to act judicially will arise in the exercise of a power to deprive a person of legitimate interest or expectation that additional price would be paid. The factors which power to an exercise of powers judicially are the nature of the interest to be affected, the circumstances in which the power falls to be exercised and the nature of the sanction, if any, involved. It is clear that the purpose and purport of the 1966 Control order, the scheme of having sugarcane growing areas reserved for factories and in particular, the payment of additional price point to the inescapable conclusion that the sugarcane growers are to be heard not only when additional price is filed but also when any exemption is granted to factories from payment of additional price. For these reasons, the judgment of the High Court is affirmed. The appeals are dismissed. Each party will pay and bear its own costs. P.H.P. Appeals dismissed.
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1975 (11) TMI 180 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ppearing for the respondents, and I reject the same. 14. In the result, there will be an order in terms of prayer " B " subject to this that the respondent Nos. 1 to 4 would return the transfer deeds with the relative shares to the respective petitioners within a fortnight from date. There will be an order in terms of prayer " A " subject to this that the petitioners would return the said documents within a month from date. There will be an order in terms of prayers " D " and " E" subject to this that such rectification of register of members of the respondent-company is to be made within two months from date. Having regard to the facts of this case that the petitioners having not cancelled the stamps on the transfer deeds when the relative share-scripts were lodged for transfer with the respondent-company, I do not think that it is fit for making any order for costs of this application, and, therefore, there will be no order of costs.
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1975 (11) TMI 178 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tion 108 of the Transfer of Property Act. But, in the case before us, "the concurrent finding of the courts below is that the landlord neither pleaded nor proved that the premises was let out only for the business of food grains. Therefore, the first part of clause (O) of Section 108 was not attracted and the landlords or owners of the premises could not claim to have a cause of action under the first part. As regards the second part of clause (O) of Section 108, we have pointed out that the lower courts concurreritly found that the installation of an electric motor and machinery for running the flour mill would not cause any damage within the meaning of the second part of clause (O) of Section 108. Therefore, the landlords had no cause of action under that second A part also." The operative parts of the judgments of the lower courts dismissing the suit were, therefore, correct. ( 14. ) For the foregoing reasons, the second appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
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1975 (11) TMI 177 - HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
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... ... ..... ent application immediately after 24-7-1973 when Chinnappa Reddy, J., held that the University could not maintain the appeal, if the petitioner really wanted to do so. Filing this petition 13 months after the above decision is only an afterthought and is in any case vitiated by gross negligence. We are not, therefore, inclined to grant this petition for transposition in this case. (45.) Since this is sufficient to dismiss the petition, we are not expressing any opinion on any other question relating to transposition as it is wholly unnecessary in the context of the present case. (46.) SInce we have held that the appeal is not maintainable and the petition for transposition cannot be granted, it is not necessary to go into the question of merits relating to the actual value of the lands as on the date of the notification. (47.) For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss the appeal and the petition for transposition with costs. (48.) Appeal and petition for transposition dismissed.
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1975 (11) TMI 176 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... affixing it in the outer door or some other conspicuous part of the premises. Though no objection could be taken for sending the registered notice to the last known address of the petitioner, when it was returned unserved, the department should have taken action to serve the petitioner by affixing it in the outer door or some conspicuous part of the premises in which that person last resided as provided under Rule 11(c). Unless such an affixture was effected notice could not be deemed to have been served on the petitioner and therefore, there was no commencement of the proceedings under Section 23. Compliance with the conditions prescribed in Section 19-G is mandatory, if the department wants to retain the amounts beyond the period of one year. Since notice as required by the Rules had not been effected, the extended period is not available to the department. 6. The petition is accordingly allowed, and the rule nisi is made absolute. But, there will be no order as to costs.
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1975 (11) TMI 175 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ed to be and is conceived as a useful thing and is therefore an "article". The Statement of objects and Reasons to the Act says that many an advertisement causes the ignorant and the unwary "to resort to quacks who indulge in such advertisements for treatments which cause great harm". The appellant may not be a quack, so will be assume, but his "machines of science" designed to confer on man kind the blessings of 'New Life, New Vigour, New Spirit, New Wave" are most likely to trap the ignorant and the unwary. The articles of commerce which he has benefully advertised must, as far as possible and without doing violence to the language of the Act, be brought within the mischief of the Act. It does no violence either to common sense or to rules of interpretation to say that a machine is an "article". In the result, we confirm the judgment of the High Court, though for a different reason, and dismiss this appeal. Appeal dismissed.
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1975 (11) TMI 174 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ate court to the effect, that the plainiff had failed to prove that defendant 1 was in a position to dominate his will, was not wrong or unreasonable. In any case, it did not suffer from any "illegality, omission, error or defect such as is referred to in sub-section (1) of section 100". It was a finding of fact and the High Court in second appeal, had no jurisdiction to interfere with the same, even if it appeared to be erroneous to the High Court, the error not being of a kind indicated in section 100(1). Since the plaintiff had failed to substantiate the first element essential to the proof of undue influence, the High Court was wrong in holding that the burden had shifted on the defendant to show that the Hiba-bil-Ewaz was not induced by undue influence. For these reasons we allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court and dismiss the suit, but, in the circumstances of the case, leave the parties to bear their own costs throughout. Appeal allowed.
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1975 (11) TMI 173 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the documents produced before us that the move was made by the Superintendent, Delhi Special Police Establishment, by requesting the Secretary, Law Department of the Government of Madhya Pradesh and the decision was taken by the State Government as it appears from the letter- of the Under Secretary dated January 28, 1969, to the Advocate General, Madhya Pradesh. The appeal was thereafter filed in the name of the State of Madhya Pradesh. No objection, therefore, can be taken about the competency of the appeal being filed by the State of Madhya Pradesh in this case. As a matter of procedure it will be even permissible for the appeal against acquittal to be filed by the public prosecutor under the direction of the State Government or the Central Government without impleading either as a party. The objection of the appellant is, therefore, devoid of substance. We may mention that no such objection was even taken in the High Court. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed.
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1975 (11) TMI 172 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ttempt was made to sustain the attack under Arts. 14 and 26 (d) of the Constitution but finally hardly any arguments were addressed worth noticing on these points... The High Court has rightly left open the question whether the Turner's choultry is a private or a public charitable institution. This the Municipal Council is entitled to agitate before the Deputy Commissioner under S. 77 of the Act... Before the High Court some of the writ petitioners had claimed that their institutions were religious denominations within Art. 26 and were therefore entitled to the protection guaranteed by that Article. "The High Court has, quite rightly, observed that these matters should be agitated in a proper forum and they have been left open for determination if and when so desired. This indisputably was the correct course to follow." No other point has been argued before us. The appeals fail and are dismissed. The parties shall pay and bear their own cots. Appeals dismissed.
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1975 (11) TMI 171 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... y would have passed the order oh the basis of the relevant and existing grounds, and the exclusion of irrelevant or non-existing grounds could have affected the ultimate decision see State of Maharashtra v. B.K. Takkamore (Supra), State of Orissa v. Bidyabhushan Mahapatra (3). 20. For the foregoing reasons, we are of opinion that the High Court was right in holding that there was no justification for interference with the impugned orders in the exercise of Certiorari jurisdiction. Accordingly, we dismis this appeal but without any order as to costs. 21. Before we part with this judgment, we would like to observe that if the appellants are landless tillers and one of them is an ex-servicemen, than their claims for allotment of land from the surplus pool in this revenue estate or elsewhere should be given due consideration and priority by the authorities concerned under any scheme relating to the allotment of surplus area framed in pursuance of the Act, Rules or any other law.
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1975 (11) TMI 170 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... refore fail. 40. Now remains the case of Ranglal. The case against this appellant is that a large number of ornaments including Ex. 18, Ex. 19, Ex. 22. Ex. 23, Ex. 28, belonging to Smt. Nazarbai, have been recovered either from his possession or from the possession of other persons, including PW 1, Shrilal, Fateh Mohammed, PW 3, Chishulal, PW 8, Jagdish Chandra PW 16, to whom he had transferred them by way of pledge or otherwise. 41. Here again, there is no evidence on record that the possession of these ornaments had been acquired or transferred by theft or extortion etc. In short it had not been established that these ornaments were 'stolen property' as defined in Section 410, Penal Code. Thus the sine qua non for a charge under Section 411, Penal Code was non existent in this case. 42. For all the reasons aforesaid, we allow the appeal of Chandmal and Ranglal, set aside their convictions and acquit them. They be set at liberty forthwith, if not otherwise required.
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1975 (11) TMI 169 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... tter when he observed that the Government servant is not to be penalised and cannot be deprived of the safeguards provided by rule 3.14 because of the fact that the competent authority had not taken the necessary steps. As the Governor has deconfirmed the appellant from the post of Block Development and Panchayat officer, the suspended lien of the appellant on the post of Agricultural Inspector would stand revived with effect from February 26, 1969. The promotion of the appellant in the parent Agricultural Department from the post of Agricultural Inspector to that of District Agricultural officer by the impugned order cannot in the circumstances be held to suffer from any legal infirmity. We accordingly accept the two appeals, set aside the judgments of the learned single Judge and the Full Bench and dismiss the writ petitions filed by Prithvi Singh, Bhale Ram and Teja Singh respondents. The parties in the circumstances shall bear their own costs throughout. Appeals allowed.
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1975 (11) TMI 167 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... fused admission to the appellant to LL.B. Part III or for that matter to refuse permission to appear at the examination on a ground which was not mentioned in the impugned order. Having gone into the circumstances mentioned above, we are of the view that the impugned order suffers from errors of law patent on the face of the record, and in any event this was not a case which should have been dismissed by the High Court in limine. The appeal is accordingly allowed and the order of the University dated June 26, 1973, is hereby quashed by a writ of certiorari. The respondent is directed to declare the result of LL.B. Part II Examination in which the appellant had appeared on May 19, 1973 and also to give him an opportunity to appear in the three subjects in which he had failed in LL.B. Part I Examination, at the next examination which may be held by the University. In the peculiar circumstances of this case, however, we leave the parties to bear their own costs. Appeal allowed.
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1975 (11) TMI 166 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ery order passed by the Collector under the Act, subject to an order passed in appeal under section 16 would be final. If successive applications under section 3 are permitted to be made, the finality attaching to the order of the Collector as provided in section 13 would become meaningless, apart from the uncertainty and confusion that would result. That there should be finality in litigation and a person should not be vexed twice for the same cause are well established principles of general application. If any authority is needed, we may refer to two decisions of this Court where this matter has been elaborately considered Daryao & Ors. v. The State of U.P. & Ors.(1) and Burn & Co. v. Their Employee(2). The Additional Collector was therefore right in dismissing the application made on October 17, 1965 and the reasons given by the High Court for setting aside that order, in our opinion, are not sound. The appeal is accordingly allowed with costs. Appeal allowed.
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1975 (11) TMI 165 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... Court in favour of Smt. Indira Gandhi are amply borne out by the evidence to which our attention was drawn briefly by the learned Counsel for the parties. The expenses incurred by the political party, together with the expenses incurred by her are not shown to exceed t 695. Finally, there is no merit in the contention that the constitutional amendment is bad because it was passed when some members of the Parliament were in detention. The legality of the detention orders cannot be canvassed in these appeals collaterally. And from a practical point of view, the presence of 21 members of the Lok Sabha and 10 members of the Rajya Sabha who were in detention could not have made a difference to the passing of the amendment. 696. In the result, I hold that clauses (4) and (5) of Article 329A are unconstitutional and therefore void. But for reasons aforesaid I allow Civil Appeal No. 887 of 1975 and dismiss Civil Appeal No. 909 of 1975. There will be no order as to costs throughout.
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1975 (11) TMI 163 - COLLECTOR OF CENTRAL EXCISE, NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... k . The Asstt. Collector has demanded duty on the Sodium Silicate from the appellants because they issued Sodium Silicate from the tanker without any supervision by the Central Excise Officers. The Asstt. Collector has not quoted any authority under which such supervision was necessary. On the other hand the appellants have recorded the clearances of these goods from their store room in their R.G.I. and R.T. 12. These entries have not been disputed by the Asstt. Collector. It, therefore, appears to me that the subject quantity of Sodium Silicate has been properly accounted for and therefore no duty should be charged thereon. I, therefore, quash the order of the Assistant Collector and accept the appeal.
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1975 (11) TMI 162 - COLLECTOR, CENTRAL EXCISE, NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... from the market. They admit that they are selling their product under the trade mark “Autoring” by fixing an aluminium foil lable but they add that this marking is given only to differenciate their shock absorvers from that of their repairers in Jama Masjid, who also install their markings and dates on the shock absorvers reconditioned by them. It is also seen that the Asstt. Collector has not disputed in his order that the shock absorbers are those which have been repaired by the appellants. The Assistant Collector contends that after reconditioning they assume a distinct form and are re-saleable in the market as fully manufactured new goods. This argument of the Asstt. Collector is not sustainable on facts. There are a number of other articles which are reconditioned and then sold in the market but this reconditioning does not make them new manufactured goods. In the above view of the matters I set aside the order of the Asstt. Collector and accept the appeal.
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1975 (11) TMI 161 - APPELLATE COLLECTOR OF CENTRAL EXCISE, NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... redominantly made of plastic material both in quantity and value and the metal sleeve used is a non-essential part fixed only to decorate the plastic container. I find from the samples of the product in dispute that these containers are actually plastic containers and the metal sleeve is not intended to hold its contents. These containers, therefore, cannot be classified as metal containers contemplated under Item 46 of the Central Excise Tariff and the resultant demand raised and confirmed cannot be sustained. Having regards to the above facts, I set aside both the orders appealed against and accept the appeal. Demands raised against the appellants shall be withdrawn.
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1975 (11) TMI 160 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the provisions of the Luxury Tax on Tobacco (Validation) Act, 1964 (Act 9 of 1964) enacted by the State Legislature of Kerala are void on the grounds that (1) the State Legislature lacked the legislative competence to enac that Act, and (2) the provisions of the Act contravened article 301 of the Constitution and were not protected by article 304?
Held that:- The fact that the levy of excise duty is in the form of licence fee would not detract from the fact that the levy relates to excise duty. It is, however, essential that such levy should be linked with production or manufacture of the excisable article. The recovery of licence fee in such an event would be one of the modes of levy of the excise duty. Where, however, the levy imposed or tax has no nexus with the manufacture or production of an article, the impost or tax cannot be regarded to be one in the nature of excise duty.
The charging section 3 of this Act creates a liability for payment of luxury tax on the stocking and vending of tobacco. There is no provision of this Act which is concerned with production or manufacture of tobacco or which links the tax under its provisions with the manufacture or production of tobacco. The same is the position of the rules issued on August 3, 1950 and January 25, 1951 and Mr. Krishnamurthy Iyer on behalf of the appellants has frankly conceded that those rules are in no way concerned with the production or manufacture of tobacco. It would, therefore follow that the levy of tax contemplated by the provisions of section 3 of the Act has nothing to do with the manufacture or production of tobacco and, as such, cannot be deemed to be in the nature of excise duty. Argument that the provisions of the Act fall under entry 84 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution must, therefore, be held to be bereft of force.
We agree with the learned Judges of the High Court that such levy directly impedes the free flow of trade and as such is violative of article 301 of the Constitution. The requirement of the proviso regarding the sanction of the President has been satisfied. It is no doubt true that the assent of the President was given subsequent to the passing of the Bill by the legislature but that fact would not affect the validity of the impugned Act in view of the provisions of article 255 of the Constitution. section 6 of the impugned Act is invalid because it provides for payment of an amount which had been refunded in pursuance of the order of this Court is bereft of force. Appeal dismissed.
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