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Showing 101 to 118 of 118 Records
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1975 (8) TMI 18
Original Assessment ... ... ... ... ..... e revenue has discharged the onus which was on them to establish their case that the facts have come to the knowledge of the revenue subsequent to the original assessment order from which it can be said that there was omission or failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly material facts necessary for the assessment as a result of which income chargeable to tax escaped assessment. In that view of the matter, the impugned notice must be quashed and the rule must be made absolute. In the premises, the impugned notice issued on 30th March, 1972, under section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, is hereby quashed and the respondents are restrained from taking any proceeding in respect thereof. If any assessment has already been made pursuant to the impugned notice, the same is also quashed and set aside. The rule is made absolute to the extent indicated above. There will be no order as to costs. Operation of this order shall stand stayed for six weeks from today.
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1975 (8) TMI 17
Reassessment Of Firm ... ... ... ... ..... ubsidiary is effecting sales of its products on its own account in India through its head office and its branches at several places in India and, what is more, the Indian subsidiary is taxed on the profits so made by it on its turnover in India. It is, therefore, clear that the transactions between the non-resident company and the Indian subsidiary company must be regarded as transactions between principal-and-principal and not as between principal and agent and that the Indian subsidiary could never be regarded as effecting the sales in India as an agent of the non-resident company. In this view of the matter, it seems to us clear that in view of the illustrative instances and guidelines furnished by the Board under its aforesaid circular, there is no scope for applying the provisions of section 42(3) of the Act. In the result, the question referred to us is answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee. Revenue will pay the costs of this reference to the assessee.
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1975 (8) TMI 16
Adventure In The Nature Of Trade, Capital Receipt, In Part, Partnership Deed ... ... ... ... ..... gne on March 25, 1958. Secondly, the circumstance in which Bretagne voluntarily made the statement before the Income-tax Officer also clearly suggests that not much weight could be attached to that statement and the Tribunal, in our view, was right in not attaching much importance to this part of the statement of Bretagne. Having regard to the several relevant material facts and aspects, which we have discussed above, it seems to us clear that the Tribunal was right in taking the view that the total effect of all the relevant factors and circumstances on record is clearly indicative of the fact that the transaction in question was not entered into as an adventure in the nature of trade and that, therefore, the surplus realised as a result of the sale of the dry dock was only a capital accretion. In this view of the matter, the question that is referred to us is answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee. Revenue will pay the costs of the reference to the assessee.
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1975 (8) TMI 15
Actual Cost, Capital Asset, Market Value ... ... ... ... ..... e assessees were the lessees of the leasehold interest under the indenture of lease which was later on executed on May 12, 1954,and got registered on January 24, 1955. In view of this indenture of lease, having regard to the retrospective operation being given to the commencement of the lease, the assessees became the owners of the leasehold interest much prior to January 1, 1954, and they will be entitled to exercise the option in computing the capital gains having regard to the market value of the leasehold interest on January 1, 1954, subject to such adjustment as may be permises sible in law. Thus, the Tribunal was justified in holding that the assessees were entitled to the substitution of the market value of the leasehold interest as on January 1, 1954, for the purpose of computation of capital gains in the present case. Thus, the answer to the question referred to us is in the affirmative and in favour of the assessees. The revenue shall pay the costs of the assessees.
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1975 (8) TMI 14
Capital Expenditure, Mining Lease, Revenue Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... e. Now, the material facts found and stated by the Tribunal are as follows The assessee was carrying on business in mining and also in taking over the mining leases Rs. 1,63,832 was spent as preliminary expenses for prospecting marl the assessee had no right to win or carry away the mineral under the prospecting license the mining lease was acquired long after the said prospecting and after that the mining areas were developed with a view to transfer them to a newly floated company. Further, the case of the assessee before the Tribunal was that this expenditure was incurred in the course of acquiring the leasehold rights , vide page 31 of the paper book. Hence, on these facts, it must be held that Rs. 1,63,832 was a capital expenditure and, therefore, a capital loss. In the premises, we return our answer in the affirmative and in favour of the revenue. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, we do not propose to make any order as to costs. HAZRA J.--I agree.
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1975 (8) TMI 13
Chargeable To Tax, Insurance Policies ... ... ... ... ..... ere not sold, transferred or discarded by the assessee. In the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (volume I) several meanings are assigned to the word destroy and they are as follows To pull down or undo, as a building to demolish. To lay waste to ruin. To undo, break up, reduce into a useless form, consume or dissolve. To render useless. To deprive of life to kill. To put an and to to do away with. To counteract. And in Chambers Dictionary (1939 Edn.) the meanings ascribed to the word destroy are as follows To unbuild or pull down to overturn to ruin to put an end to. Therefore, in view of the ordinary meaning of the word destory , we are of the opinion that this section does not cover the items that were not fully destroyed in fire and has been retained by the assessee. Hence, the contention of Mr. Pal must fail and we return our answer in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. As no one has appeared for the assessee, we make no order as to costs. HAZRA J.---I agree.
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1975 (8) TMI 12
Business Expenditure, Income Tax Act, Income Tax Authorities ... ... ... ... ..... was any basis or material before the Appellate Tribunal to hold that no contumacious conduct on the part of the assessee was shown for levying penalty under section 271(1)(a) of the Income-tax Act ? 2. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal is justified in holding that by levy of interest under section 139 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the Income-tax Officer must be deemed to have granted time up to the date of filing the return of income ? 3. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal was correct in holding that even if the return was filed under section 139(4) no penalty was leviable ? 4. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal was justified in cancelling the penalty levied under section 271(1)(a) ? We, therefore, direct the Appellate Tribunal to state a case and refer the above questions to the High Court under section 256(2) of the Income-tax Act.
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1975 (8) TMI 11
Burden Of Proof, Capital Receipt, Income Tax, Revenue Receipt ... ... ... ... ..... ing and the sale of the sandalwood trees the assessee had recovered a part of capital which he had invested and that, therefore, in the special circumstances of the case, the court took the view that the receipt by way of sale proceeds of sandalwood was in the nature of a capital and not in the nature of a revenue. In our view, therefore, both these cases are clearly distinguishable on facts and do not assist Mr. Patil in furtherance of his contention. Having regard to the above discussion, we are clearly of the view that the entire sale proceeds of the trees that had spontaneously grown on the forest land will have to be regarded as revenue receipts in the hands of the assessee and, in this view of the matter, the question will have to be answered thus On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, no part of the receipts on account of sale of forest trees could be excluded from the assessee s total income. The assessee will pay the costs of the reference to the revenue.
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1975 (8) TMI 10
... ... ... ... ..... ing much turns on this observation made by the Tribunal against which Mr. Dastoor has levelled his attack. Having regard to the above discussion, we cannot say that the finding recorded by the Tribunal that Champaklal had retained his interest in the profits of the new partnership firm was without any material on record whatsoever and, therefore, the finding that the so-called new partnership was not genuine also could not be said to be based upon no evidence at all. It is true that there is no direct evidence to show that Champaklal had agreed to share the profits of the new partnership business but the inference in that behalf is drawn by the Tribunal by relying upon the other facts and aspects which have emerged on record to which we have already referred. In the result, we feel that registration was rightly refused by the Tribunal. The question is, therefore, answered in the affirmative and against the assessee. Assessee will pay the costs of the reference to the revenue.
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1975 (8) TMI 9
A Partner, One Partner ... ... ... ... ..... s Champaklal who will be beneficially interested in the share of Ashokkumar, but such a conclusion by itself will not be sufficient to come to the conclusion that the agreement of partnership is not a genuine deed. That such position is clear is also apparent from a subsequent decision of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Bagyalakshmi and Co. 1965 55 ITR 660 (SC). In our opinion, it is not possible for us to doubt the genuineness of the partnership entered into under the deed dated January 8, 1958, simply because it is found that Ashokkumar is a nominee or a benamidar of his father, Champaklal. Such benami status of Ashokkumar will not come in the way of the partnership being registered under the Act. Thus, in our opinion, the Income-tax Officer and the Tribunal were in error in refusing registration of the assessee-firm. Thus, the question referred to us is answered in the negative, in favour of the assessee. The revenue shall pay the costs of the assessee.
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1975 (8) TMI 8
Business Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... xpenditure incurred in connection therewith by the vendor-firm. Ordinarily it is not possible to allocate any value to the intangible assets in the form of benefits under the pending contracts, nor was there any attempt made by the assessee-company to measure the expenditure incurred in relation to the pending contracts by the vendor-firm. That payment of the commission of 10 will depend upon the contract being completed is of no consequence. Thus, the Tribunal was right in taking the view that the commission payments formed a part of the purchase price of the business as a whole and its capital nature was not changed by the mere mode of ascertainment which had reference to the invoice value of the contracts executed. Thus, the taxing authorities and the Tribunal were right in disallowing the deductions claimed by the assessee-company for the two assessment years. Our answer to the question referred to us is in the affirmative. The assessee shall pay the costs of the revenue.
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1975 (8) TMI 7
In Part, Partnership Deed, Registered Firm ... ... ... ... ..... by it in the black market according to the instrument of partnership. The Supreme Court held that the application for renewal of registration made by the assessee-firm did not comply with the conditions prescribed in paragraph 3 of rule 6 of the Indian Income-tax Rules, 1922, and the firm was not entitled to renewal of registration for the assessment year 1948-49. Precisely the same is the position in the instant case. According to the findings of the Tribunal the sum of Rs. 3,100, which was admittedly the Income of the firm, had not been credited to the partners accounts or divided outside the books, and, as such, the certificate in clause 3 of Form No. 11 was a false certificate. As a result, the firm became a non-genuine firm and its registration was rightly cancelled under section 186 of the Act. We, accordingly, answer the question in the affirmative, in favour of the department and against the assessee. The Commissioner is entitled to costs which we assess at Rs. 200.
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1975 (8) TMI 6
In Part, Partnership Deed, Registered Firm ... ... ... ... ..... f clause (a) of section 147 of the Act. The fact that there is an additional privilege given to the assessee under sub-section (4) of section 139 of the Act, in my opinion, would not defeat the right of the Income-tax Officer to issue the notice on the failure of the assessee to file the return within the time mentioned under sub-section (2) of section 139 of the Act. In the premises, I am of the opinion that the impugned notice in this case was issued properly and the return was filed in pursuance of the said notice. For the reasons mentioned above, this application fails and the rule is accordingly discharged. There will be no order as to costs. Interim order is vacated. No affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondents and the allegations made by the petitioner are not agreed to. The amount of Rs. 2,916 deposited as security lying with the Allahabad Bank may be handed over to the authority concerned for appropriation against the dues for the assessment year 1963-64.
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1975 (8) TMI 5
Income From House Property, Previous Year ... ... ... ... ..... ned. This question does not really arise because it is the case of the revenue that the reopening was done under clause (a) of section 147 of the Income-tax Act. Counsel also drew my attention to a decision in the case of Commissioner of Income-tax v. Manna Ramji and Co. 1972 86 ITR 29 (SC). As I am not concerned with the question whether the income, if any, was a capital receipt or a revenue receipt this case is also not of any assistance to him. In the view I have taken, the notices for the assessment years 1963-64, 1964-65 and 1965-66, issued under section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and all dated 25th of May, 1971, are hereby quashed and the respondents are restrained from proceeding in pursuance of the said notices. The rule is made absolute to the extent indicated above. If the respondents have already made the assessments pursuant to the said notices the said assessments are also set aside. There will be a stay of operation of this order for six weeks from to-day.
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1975 (8) TMI 4
1961 Act, Assessment Year, Change Of Law ... ... ... ... ..... w of the share allocation, the rectification proceeding was started against the assessee and it was upheld by the court on the ground that the power of rectification could be exercised in these circumstances. We do not find anything in this case which can lend any assistance to the contention of Mr. B. L. Pal. The case of Jain Brothers v. Union of India 1970 77 ITR 107 (SC) relates to a penalty proceeding which can only be initiated after the assessment is completed and the tax officer is satisfied that the defaults have been committed by the assessee. Therefore, this case has no bearing on the question involved before us, for we are concerned with the substantive law of the year of assessment. Hence, we return our answer to question No. 1 in the negative and in favour of the assessee and question No. 2 in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, we do not propose to make any order as to costs. HAZRA J.--I agree.
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1975 (8) TMI 3
Capital Expenditure, Depreciation ... ... ... ... ..... production. Under these circumstances, the amount of Rs. 11,900 incurred for test and trial can properly be considered as part of the cost of fixed assets to the assessee and hence can be taken into consideration as part of the capital expenditure which would qualify for depreciation and development rebate. In view of the above discussion, we hold that the Tribunal was right in law in holding that Rs. 9,000 being the expenditure on cement factory lighting and Rs. 11,000 being electrical expenses on test and trial runs for the cement plant, which had not started working, should be considered as capital expenditure. It should be added to the cost of construction of cement plant for purposes of depreciation and development rebate. We, therefore, answer the question referred to us in the affirmative and against the revenue. In view of the fact that prior to the decision of the Supreme Court, the legal position was not settled, there will be no order as to costs of this reference.
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1975 (8) TMI 2
Agricultural Income Tax, Notice To Produce Accounts And Documents ... ... ... ... ..... o order of assessment was passed in respect of the income which the family had derived. The Agrl. ITO, therefore, issued a notice to the petitioner calling upon him to produce the account books of the family in order to take action under s. 37 of the Act. The petitioner has questioned the validity of that notice in this writ petition. Section 37 provides for the rectification of mistakes in the orders of assessment already passed by the Agrl. ITO. It does not provide for making a fresh assessment when the income in question has escaped assessment. In the statement of objections filed on behalf of the Agrl. ITO, it is admitted that in so far as the undivided family was concerned, no order of assessment had been made in respect of the income derived by it until the date of partition in the year 1973-74. In the facts and circumstances of this case, the action taken by the respondent under s. 37 to rectify the order of assessment is not tenable. The notice is, therefore, quashed.
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1975 (8) TMI 1
Whether the income of the Loka Shikshana Trust was entitled to exemption under section 11 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, read with section 2(15) - object was not " education " within the meaning of section 2(15) but an object of general public utility- trust was therefore not exempt from tax
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