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Showing 81 to 100 of 130 Records
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1976 (2) TMI 50 - ITAT CHANDIGARH
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... ... ..... of Kumari Kumari (including Krishna Kumari s share of the investments in the aforesaid three firms). These last said two events at best affect the extent to which or the exact portion of the share income (from the three firms) that is assessable in the hands of individual Jai Parkash and do not have that much importance as regards the question of creation of over-riding title of others to portions of the said share income. In these circumstances, we have no hesitation in finding it that an over-riding title had been created in the instant case by operation of the principles of Hindu Law (as to partition of Joint family property. Law of interest succession to estates of females) as also by acts of the parties i.e. partial partition effected on 31st March, 1964 and relinquishment of their shares by Indu Kumari and Bina Kumari in the estate of their mother Krishna Kumari. 15. We therefore see no reason to interfere with the AAC s order. 16. The Departmental appeal is dismissed.
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1976 (2) TMI 49 - ITAT BOMBAY-B
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... ... ..... As we already noticed the amount added in these three assessments by the WTO to the net wealth disclosed by the assessee represents the difference in the valuation of the immovable property, and the cash of Rs. 8,000, the total of which comes to Rs. 19,000 only. The IAC also had considered levy of penalty only on the basis of these two amounts, and has ultimately levied the penalty of Rs. 8,000 only in regard to the item of cash omitted to be disclosed by the assessee in the return. In the circumstances, it is clear that even the amount determined by the WTO in respect of which he held that penalty was imposable was less than Rs. 25,000. In the circumstances, the reference made by him to the IAC, and the further proceedings continued by the IAC culminating in the levy of penalty are not in accordance with law, and, are, therefore, invalid. On this ground also the penalty for the three asst. yrs. 1965-66 to 1967-68 cannot stand. 8. In the result, all the appeals are allowed.
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1976 (2) TMI 48 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e recognition certificate, issue to the dealer are unassailable, but with effect from the date of the order of the Sales Tax Officer i.e., 2nd Dec., 1972 and not from 4th Dec., 1963. Similarly, we hold, that, the judgment of the Tribunal in Revision Applications Nos. 34, 35, 36 and 37 of 1974 in the case of this very appellant, decided on 17th Jan., 1975 needs no reconsideration, as it lays down the correct legal position. 23. In consequence, we answer the questions referred to us, as under (i) The old world postage stamps in question do not constitute goods required by the dealer for use in the manufacture of taxable goods for sale by him within the meaning of s. 25 of the Bombay Saes tax Act, 1959. (ii) The judgment of the Tribunal in Revision Applications Nos. 34, 35, 36 and 37 of 1974 decided on 17th Jan., 1975 in the matter of Calcutta Confectionery works is good law. 24. In the result, the matter is sent back to the 1st Bench for disposal, in the light of our findings.
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1976 (2) TMI 47 - ITAT BOMBAY
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... ... ..... nsaction. As such these judgments to our mind, are a complete answer to the arguments advanced on before of the Department in the above connection for rejection of the same. Accordingly we reject them. 19. In the result we hold that purchase tax is not attracted in respect of the purchase of machinery in question and also that the judgment of the Tribunal in Second Appeal No. 536 of 1974 ( Tata Mills Ltd. vs. The Sate of Maharashtra) decided on 30th June, 1975 requires no reconsideration, because what we are required to consider in this matter is s. 13 prior to its amendment w.e.f. 1st July, 1965 while the judgment of the Tribunal in the case of Tata Mills Ltd. involved s. 13 as amended, the period involved therein, having been from 1st Jan., 1969 to 31st March, 1969. Accordingly, we answer the question referred to us for our decision as reframed by us as above and send back the matter to the third bench of the Tribunal for disposal of the appeal in the light of our finding.
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1976 (2) TMI 46 - ITAT BOMBAY
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... ... ..... 1962 Allahabad 315. The judgment observes that Nyaya Panchayats have many short comings and have been subjected to criticism from various high quarters, but they are part of the hierarchy of Courts. The wryness on his part could be said to have due justification. But then, we, the members of this Tribunal, are so deeply ingrained in judicial discipline, that we simply cannot permit ourselves to entertain uneasiness on this account. 49. Since the present miscellaneous applications are being held as untenable on the above view, it is unnecessary to decide on the other contentions made before us during the arguments. The same are therefore left undecided. Before closing, we must place on record out sincere thanks to Shri B.C. Joshi, Advocate for the applicant and Shri T.R. Andhyarujina, Advocate for the Department, for their elaborate, very well worked out through and logical arguments. 50. The present miscellaneous applications are therefore untenable and are hereby dismissed.
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1976 (2) TMI 45 - ITAT BANGALORE
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... ... ..... g the basic principles of natural justice. Therefore, on the mere ground that there are no two parties before the ITO, as the AAC assumes, which assumption is not correct, we cannot say that the statement recorded by the ITO of the witness does not become evidence till he signed it. In any event s. 131(2) being a penal provision, the fine can be imposed only if the appellant had directly contravened that provision. That is, however, not the case here. We, therefore, find ourselves totally unable to sustain the fine imposed. 6. We allow the appeal and cancel the ITO s orders. PER. G.R. HEGLE, A. M. I entirely agree, but, only would like to add that in certain circumstances it may become necessary for an ITO to record the statement of a witness summoned under s. 131 in the absence of the assessee. Even in such a case if the witness refuses to sign the statement does not cease to be evidence and it cannot be said that the witness has not given evidence as required under s. 131.
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1976 (2) TMI 44 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... October, 1972 clearly says that a fresh survey ought to be made and that no action need be taken by the department on the basis of that survey, i.e. dated 27th October, 1972. I think that the department had enough opportunity to make a complete and thorough inquiry into the affairs of the assessee and if they have failed to do so since after 27th April, 1966 (which came up for consideration in the revision for the year 1966-67),it would be anything but just now to permit the case to be reopened by way of re-assessment and further inquiry. The appellate order of remands in my opinion, are not justified and the applicant s assessment for all these years must be annulled. ORDER All the revisions are allowed and the applicant s assessment for the year 1967-68, 1968-69, 1969-70 and 1970-71 are annulled. Tax paid, if any, shall be refunded to the applicant according to law. This judgement be placed on the file of Revision No. 172/75 and its copies be placed on the other revisions.
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1976 (2) TMI 43 - ITAT ALLAHABAD
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... ... ..... ely applies to the present case. It has, however, to be seen as to whether there were any unavoidable circumstances which compelled the assessee to make these payments in cash. Since the very beginning the assessee s case has been that its place of business is about 30 miles from Gorakhpur. He has to go to Gorakhpur to make the purchases. On the aforesaid three dates what happened was that he could not make the purchases and deposited these amounts with N.P.K. Fertilisers. Subsequently, those amounts were adjusted against the price of the goods supplied. The assessee could not take back the money to his house because of fear of highway robberies. It has not been disputed that the payments are genuine and so is the payee. The assessee could have had no ulterior motive to make the payment in cash. In the circumstances of the case, therefore, in my opinion, the AAC was justified in accepting the assessee s case and in deleting the additions. 6. I, therefore, dismiss the appeal.
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1976 (2) TMI 42 - ITAT AHMEDABAD-C
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... ... ..... was not a genuine payment must also govern the present proceedings. In this view of the matter we uphold the action of the authorities below in levying the penalty under the provisions of s. 271(1)(c) of the Act. However, we find that Shri Bhatt on stronger ground so far as the alternative contention is concerned, in the instant case the original return was filed on 28th July, 1968. Therefore, the basis of levy of penalty should be with reference to the provisions of s. 271(1)(c) of the Act as they stood prior 1st April, 1968. We accordingly direct that in the instant case the penalty should be levied at the rate of 20 per dent of amount of tax which could have been avoided if the income as returned by such person has been accepted as correct income. For this purpose the income returned should be taken at Rs. 30,958 and the assessed income at a figure determined after giving the effect to the order of the Tribunal, cited supra. 9. In the result, the appeal is partly allowed.
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1976 (2) TMI 41 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
Paper and paper boards - Exemption ... ... ... ... ..... n v. Thomas, 1862 31 L.J. Ch. 867). That being the position, the submission of the petitioners that they were entitled to both these notifications is well-founded. 7.Mr. Manjarekar, the learned counsel for the respondents urged that this is a disputed question of facts and this Court should not interfere in the findings recorded by the Central Excise authorities. He further urged that we should also take into consideration Notification No. 208/67, dated 8th September, 1967. It is not possible to accept any of these contentions of the learned counsel for the respondents. Notification No. 208/67 has absolutely no relevance to this case. In our view, the petitioners are entitled to the concessions granted under the notifications, and the orders passed by the Central Excise authorities are not well-founded and deserve to be set aside. 8.In the result, the petitions are allowed and the rules are made absolute. Under the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs.
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1976 (2) TMI 40 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
Demand - Limitation ... ... ... ... ..... d notices of demand and orders were issued and passed by the Superintendent, the Assistant Collector and the Collector of Central Excise in violation of the principles of natural justice. 18.In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed. As the appellants have partially succeeded in one of the contentions and have failed in the rest of the contentions, the fair order as to costs will be that each party shall bear its own costs of the appeal. Liberty to the appellants attorneys to withdraw the sum of Rs. 500/- deposited by the appellants as security for costs. 19.As the notices of demand as well as the orders are quashed by the order of the learned Judge and which we have confirmed on the ground of violation of the principles of natural justice, it will be open to the Company to contend that the amounts mentioned in the K.P.T. invoices were reflecting post manufacturing expenses and were not part of manufacturing cost, in case fresh action is taken by the Excise Department.
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1976 (2) TMI 39 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE, ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYD.
Adjudication - Bias ... ... ... ... ..... with each of these contentions. The petitioner s main contention related to the bias on the part of the adjudicating authority, and the replacement of 47 boroms. In addition to the said two specific contentions, it was generally argued that the irregularities are technical in nature and that, there was no evidence in the case to support the findings of the adjudicating authority. The appellate authority has dealt with both the contentions specifically and also held that, in view of the findings of the adjudicating officer, the violations cannot be said to be merely technical. The argument with respect to there being no evidence, could not be substantiated before the appellate authority, as it could not be done before this court. So is the case with respect to the argument that the violations are merely technical in nature. This contention also, therefore, fails. 11.In the result, the writ petition fails and is, accordingly, dismissed but, in the circumstances, without costs.
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1976 (2) TMI 38 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
Assessment - Incomplete assessment - Criteria for completion - Provisional assessment - Valuation - Statute - Rule of Construction
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1976 (2) TMI 37 - GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
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... ... ..... ct, 1944, that the three months period therein for filing an appeal should be construed to be 90 days. Consequently, the order-in-appeal, rejecting the appeal as time-barred, is bad in law and hence set side with directions to the Appellate Collector to consider the same on merits after giving suitable opportunities to the petitioners to put up their defence.
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1976 (2) TMI 36 - GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
Tyres and tubes, used on dumpers, earthmovers, draglines, excavators etc. ... ... ... ... ..... r carrying on moving very heavy loads. These are not designed for use on roads, on which trucks, buses and passenger vehicles ply. It is seen in the Central Excise Tariff that the term Motor vehicles has been defined to include all mechanically propelled vehicles adapted for use upon roads and the item regarding motor vehicles viz, item 34 specifically covers, tractors, including agricultural tractors and from the explanation thereunder, it is clear that motor vehicles fitted, mounted or fitted with weight lifting, earthmoving and similar specified material handling equipment also come under this item. Thus for interpreting Item 16(1) in Central Excise Tariff, if recourse is taken to turn to Item 34 of the tariff itself instead of referring to the Motor Vehicles Act, it will be apparent that tyres used on dumpers, loaders and other earthmoving equipments are also tyres for motor vehicles. The appellate decision is, therefore, correct. 4. The revision application is rejected.
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1976 (2) TMI 35 - GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
Fertilizers - Manufacture of urea out of Naphtha - Liability to duty ... ... ... ... ..... force the petitioners to avail of those provisions and not to have the exemption under the abovesaid relevant notification, if the requisite conditions of the notification are fulfilled. The order-in-appeal is based on the contention that the mixture of two or more fertilizers, envisaged in the relevant notification should be by physical action and without chemical reaction and the fertilizers, manufactured by the petitioners are definitely complex fertilizers, obtained by chemical reaction and hence they cannot be considered as simple mixtures to attract the exemption in the notification. The said notification does not lay down any such conditions and only requires that the mixture can be obtained with the aid of power and the mixed fertilisers should contain not more than one nutrient. Thus the Order-in-Appeal is not a proper speaking order on the issue involved and is set aside. The exemption under the said notification is allowed if the conditions thereof are fulfilled.
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1976 (2) TMI 34 - GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
Valuation - Motor Vehicles trailers-Determination of assessable value ... ... ... ... ..... material-handling equipment on the trailers and Tariff Item No. 34 indicates under its explanation that such material handling equipments fitted to the motor vehicles should not be taken into account. 2. The Government of India observes that the notification as quoted by the petitioners and the tariff item in question clearly indicate that the relief provided therein is in regard to motor vehicles only and not to the trailers. It observes that petitioners contention that the duty paid on the I.C. engines either be refunded them or the assessable value should be reduced to the extent of the duty paid on the I.C. engines is not valid. The Government of India observes that the assessable value has been correctly fixed in respect of the trailers fitted with the I.C. engines at the time of their clearance. It, therefore, sees no reason to interfere with the order-in-appeal which is correct in law and based on the facts of the case. 3. Revision Application is rejected accordingly.
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1976 (2) TMI 33 - GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
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... ... ..... ppellate Collector, does not pertain to the manufacture of the same class of goods. 2. The Government of India observes that under Item 4-II(2) of the Central Excise Tariff the excise duty is imposed on the item termed as cigarettes. This is a particular classification and includes all kinds of cigarettes whatsoever be the brand, trade name or description. These by converting Viscount cigarettes into Cavender cigarettes the petitioner did not in any manner change the class of the goods brought back in their factory. The Government of India, therefore, observes that Rule 173L(3) does not apply in this case. One brand of cigarette is not a class of goods separate from the other brand. In fact the Tariff Item does not distinguish between one brand and another. The Government of India observes that there is force in the arguments put forth by the petitioners and, therefore, it allows the revision application. It also orders the consequential relief be granted to the petitioners.
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1976 (2) TMI 32 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Valuation - Deduction for expenses incurred ... ... ... ... ..... ng cost incurred by them after the manufactured goods leave the factory gate and before they are actually sold. The petitioners relied on the decision in A.K. Roy v. Voltas Ltd. - 1977 E.L.T. (J 177) A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 225. This Court has recently in W.P. No. 2180 of 1972 The Madras Rubber Factory Ltd. v. The Superintendent of Central Excise, Madras and 2 Others, 1979 (4) E.L.T. (J 85) held after referring to the relevant decisions of the Supreme Court as well as other High Courts, that the excise duty under Section 3 read with Section 4 of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, can be levied only on the manufacturing cost plus the manufacturing profit and that no levy of excise duty can be made on the post-manufacturing expenses incurred by the manufacturer. In view of the said decision, these two writ petitions are allowed with a direction to the respondents to consider the petitioners revised price list in the light of the said decision. There will be no order as to costs.
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1976 (2) TMI 31 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Valuation - Post-manufacturing expenses to be excluded ... ... ... ... ..... l that the price charged for the goods when it first enters the stream of trade should be treated as the wholesale cash price without reference to the place of sale and the components of the safe price. In my view, the respondents are not justified in their stand that they are entitled to levy duty on the billing price without making allowance for the post-manufacturing expenses. 17. The petitioners claim seven items of expenses as post-manufacturing charges as earlier detailed. The respondents have rejected the petitioners claim for exclusion in toto on the erroneous basis that they cannot be excluded. Now that it has been held that the petitioners are liable to pay excise duty only in relation to the manufacturing cost plus manufacturing profit, all the writ petitions are allowed and the Superintendent of Central Excise in each of the Writ Petitions is directed to determine the excise duty after excluding the post-manufacturing expenses. There will be no order as to costs.
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