Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 121 to 140 of 157 Records
-
1979 (9) TMI 38
A Partner, Family Arrangement, Partner In Firm ... ... ... ... ..... settlement and have always tried to uphold it and maintain it. The central idea in the approach made by the courts is that if by consent of parties a matter has been settled, it should not be allowed to be reopened by the parties to the agreement on frivolous or untenable grounds. Considering the present case from both the aspects, that is, as a partition or as a family arrangement we are of the opinion that the Tribunal was right in law in accepting the claim of the assessee as to partial partition. Thus, the answer to question No. 1 is in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. As regards question No. 2, in view of our answer to question No. 1, the answer to this question is also that the Tribunal was right in law in deleting the addition of Rs. 6,300 made to the income of the assessee-HUF, for the assessment year 1970-71, Both the references are answered accordingly. However, there will be no order as to costs. B. S. DHILLON J.--I agree.
-
1979 (9) TMI 37
... ... ... ... ..... uit pipe in receiving the aforesaid cheque for Rs. 4 lakhs and passing on the same, by making endorsement thereon in favour of his daughter. If the amount represented by the cheque for Rs. 4 lakhs did not belong to the assessee, then the mere fact of an endorsement thereof by the assessee in favour of his daughter could not constitute a gift of the said amount by the assessee to Princess Pratap Kumari. It appears that there was no conscious act on the part of the assessee of transferring his assets voluntarily to his daughter, which alone could have constituted a transaction of gift. In view of the finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, which is binding upon us, we hold that the act of the assessee in endorsing the cheque for Rs. 4 lakhs dated February 24, 1960, in favour of his daughter, Princess Pratap Kumari, did not constitute a gift, which could be chargeable to gift-tax under the G.T. Act, 1958. We, accordingly, answer the question referred to us in the affirmative.
-
1979 (9) TMI 36
Assessment Year, Indian State, Textile Mill ... ... ... ... ..... e Collector becomes payable. Cases of compensation of cases for unliquidated damages stand on a different footing. In such cases there is no debt due until the amount is ascertained or admitted to be due. In case of remuneration, which is payable at a certain percentage of sales or profits, the remuneration as a debt becomes due in accordance with the terms of the agreement notwithstanding the fact that it is yet to be ascertained. The principle of the cases relating to compensation, therefore, cannot be applied to cases relating to income under the head Salary . For the reasons given above, agreeing with Sohani J., I will answer question No. 1 in the affirmative, in favour of the department and against the assessee and agreeing with Oza J., I will answer question No. 2 in the negative, in favour of the assessee and against the department. The case shall now go back to the Division Bench for final disposal. In the circumstances, I make no order as to costs of this reference.
-
1979 (9) TMI 35
HUF Property, Income Of HUF, Individual Income ... ... ... ... ..... m as individual. Because of the view we have taken above, it is not necessary for us to deal with the alternative submission, made on behalf of the assessee, that even if it be held that the property received by the assessee on partition could not be impressed by him with HUF character, it could be taken that he made a gift of it to the HUF and anyhow since the firm has been accepted as genuine and registration has been granted to it, the assessee being a partner as karta of his family, the income of his share is to be treated as the income of his family. Therefore, so far as the share income from the firm, M/s. Arjun Das Banarsi Lal is concerned, we answer the question in the negative, in favour of the assessee and against the department while in regard to the income from property we return the question unanswered because of absence of any material in regard to the same. The assessee is entitled to his costs which are assessed at Rs. 200 and counsel s fee in the like amount.
-
1979 (9) TMI 34
A Partner, Being Heard, Previous Year ... ... ... ... ..... tive deed in the year of account relevant to the year under appeal and hence the order passed by the ITO for continuance of registration was not in accordance with law. As regards the second question, it is not disputed that notice to show cause was issued by the Addl. Commissioner before passing the final order. If the assessee did not appear on the date of hearing, it cannot be said that no reasonable opportunity of being heard was given to the assessee. No provision of law has been brought to our notice which obliged the Addl. Commissioner to grant the adjournment as prayed for by counsel for the assessee. Under the circumstances, it must be held that the Tribunal was justified in holding that reasonable opportunity of being heard was granted by the Addl. Commissioner to the assessee. For all these reasons, both the questions are answered in the affirmative and against the assessee. In the circumstances of the case, the parties shall bear their own costs of this reference.
-
1979 (9) TMI 33
Property Reverting To Disponer ... ... ... ... ..... uty Act, 1953 ? As we have already pointed out, Mr. Kolah has conceded that as far as the house at Jalgaon is concerned, the same is liable to be included in the estate of Anandibai. We, therefore, answer question No. 1 as reframed as follows The agreement of April 18, 1931, amounts to a disposition of the watan lands referred to earlier within the meaning of the said expression in section 24 of the said Act, and assuming that this is not so, the agreement of December 22, 1934, amounts to a disposition of the said lands within the meaning of the said expression in section 24 of the said Act. As far as question No. 2 is concerned, we hold that the value of the aforesaid watan lands is not liable to be included in the estate of Anandibai by reason of s. 24(1) of the said Act. As the entire arguments have been advanced on the question of watan lands, in substance it is the applicant who has lost the reference. The applicant will pay to the respondent the costs of this reference.
-
1979 (9) TMI 32
Subject Matter ... ... ... ... ..... any benefit originally reserved to the deceased or otherwise) possession and enjoyment of the property was bona fide assumed by the beneficiary at least two years before the death and thenceforward retained by him to the entire exclusion of the deceased or of any benefit to the deceased by contract or otherwise. The material conditions which must be satisfied before property, the subject-matter of the disposition, can be excluded from the principal value of the estate of the deceased under s. 22 are the same as those required to be satisfied under s. 10 of the E.D. Act. Since these conditions are the same as those of s. 10, the ratio of the above Supreme Court cases would govern the present case and question No. 2, must also, therefore, be answered in favour of the accountable person. In the result, we answer the aforesaid questions as follows Question No. 1 In the negative. Question No. 2 In the negative. The respondent will pay to the applicants the costs of this reference.
-
1979 (9) TMI 31
Entire Exclusion, Partner In Firm, Share Benefit ... ... ... ... ..... th of the deceased, more than two years after the date of the gift, the question arose whether s. 10 of the said Act applied on the ground that the deceased was not entirely excluded from the possession and enjoyment of the subject-matter of the gift. It was held by a Division Bench of the High Court of Assam and Nagaland that the Tribunal was justified in holding that the donor was entirely excluded from the possession and enjoyment of the subject-matter of the gift, viz., a half share of the partnerships business, and, accordingly, the provisions of s. 10 of the said Act were not attracted. In our view, question No. 3 must also be answered in favour of the accountable person. In the result, we answer the questions referred to us as follows Question No.1--We decline to answer this question for the reasons which we have already given. Question No. 2-In the negative. Question No. 3-In the negative. The department must pay to the accountable person the costs of this reference.
-
1979 (9) TMI 30
Subject Matter ... ... ... ... ..... r of the partnership firm by allowing the firm to make use of the property gifted for the purposes of the partnership. Incidentally, we may point out that in the present reference the first sum of Rs. 75,000 gifted to the grand children was deposited with the firm within two months of the date of the gift, and the second sum of Rs. 75,000 was deposited with the firm within about nineteen days of the making of the gift. In the result, so far as question No. 1 is concerned, in view of the statement made by Mr. Munim on behalf of the applicant, we decline to answer that question. So far as question No. 2 is concerned, we answer it in the negative, that is, in favour of the accountable person and against the department. As the entire hearing of this reference has been taken up by the arguments on the second question and in view of the length of time which the hearing of this reference has taken, the respondent will pay to the applicant the costs of the reference fixed at Rs. 600.
-
1979 (9) TMI 29
Reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... or knowledge as to law. That being so, unless the information as to law is received from a formal source, it cannot constitute an information within the meaning of s. 147(b) so as to justify the ITO to reopen the assessment. The ITO framing the original assessment did not apply his mind to the legal aspect applicable to the facts which had been disclosed by the assessee and that being so, the successor ITO could not reopen the assessment on the pretext that he informed himself of the correct legal position from the assessment of the firm, which cannot be regarded as a formal source. It would only amount to a fresh look on the facts already on record and hence the proceedings were invalid. We are, thus, in agreement with the view taken by the Tribunal. Our answer, therefore, to the question referred is in the negative, in favour of the assessee and against the department. The respondents are entitled to their costs which are assessed at Rs. 200 and counsel fee in like figure.
-
1979 (9) TMI 28
Income From House Property, Self-Occupation ... ... ... ... ..... where the Legislature wanted to exclude income under s. 64, it has expressly said so. The argument cannot be reasonably interpreted to mean the total income chargeable under s. 5 is equivalent to the amount of gross total income as defined in s. 80B(5). If at all the Tribunal meant that, we must say at once that it has fallen into an error. For this we rely upon the discussion hereinbefore appearing which clearly shows that the total income and gross total income are not synonymous. They are mutually exclusive. The concept of each is different from the other. In this view the total income chargeable under s. 5 is not the same as gross total income defined in s. 80B(5) of the Act. Therefore, question No. 2 is liable to be answered in the negative. The result is that question No. 1 is answered in the affirmative and question No. 2 in the negative. In view of the divided success, the parties are left to bear their own costs. Counsel s fee is assessed at Rs. 150. MIR J.-I agree.
-
1979 (9) TMI 27
Annual Value, Business, Entertainment Expenditure, Industrial Undertaking, Property ... ... ... ... ..... the agreed rent was not the fair and reasonable rent. In our opinion, therefore, where the letting out of a property is subject to the limitation provided under the rent control enactment, and there is nothing on the record to show that the agreed rent is not fair and reasonable, then the actual rent received by the assessee should be regarded as the fair annual letting value of the property concerned. That being so we agree with the view taken by the Tribunal. Our answers to the questions referred, therefore, are 1. Question referred at the Against the assessee and in favour of instance of the assessee the department. 2. Question referred to at 1. In the affirmative, in favour of the instance of the Commissioner assessee and against the department. 2. In the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the department. 3. In the negative, in favour of the assessee and against the department. In view of the divided success, we direct the parties to bear their own costs.
-
1979 (9) TMI 26
Accounting, Business Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... r in para. 7 of his order that while, rejecting the book profit the entire gamut of the facts as disclosed in paras. 19 to 23 had been taken into consideration and the conclusion had been arrived at that the proviso to s. 13 of the Act of 1922 was applicable. It would appear, therefore, that both the learned members while disposing of the assessee s application for rectification agreed that the finding recorded in the appellate order that the proviso to s. 13 of the Act of 1922 was applicable had been arrived at after a consideration of all the facts of the case. That is a pure finding of fact which cannot be questioned in reference before this court. In view of the above discussion our answer to question No. 1 is in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the department, and our answer to question No. 2 is in the negative, in favour of department and against the assessee. In view of the divided success and failure of the parties, we make no order as to costs.
-
1979 (9) TMI 25
... ... ... ... ..... o the conclusion that this application deserves to be allowed. The question as to whether the failure on the part of an assessee to substantiate the claim for deductions would, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, amount to concealing the particulars of his income as contemplated by the provisions of s. 271(1)(c) of the Act, arises in this case. Thus, in our opinion, the following question of law arises out of the order passed by the Tribunal Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was justified in holding that the assessee was guilty of concealing the particulars of his income and was liable to pay penalty under the provisions of section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 ? For all these reasons, this application is allowed. The Tribunal is directed to state the case and refer the aforesaid question of law to this court for its opinion. In the circumstances of the case, parties shall bear their own costs of this application.
-
1979 (9) TMI 24
Capital Loss, Revenue Loss ... ... ... ... ..... revenue are distinguishable. The criteria which the Tribunal has taken into consideration for arriving at the finding of fact and which it ought to have taken into consideration for doing so have already been given above, and it is not necessary to refer to them again. No finding has been given by the Tribunal as to whether the amount of loan was utilized by the assessee as a fixed capital or working capital in the relevant assessment year which is necessary for determining the question referred to the court. In the circumstances, it would be proper that the case is sent back to the Tribunal to dispose of the matter in accordance with the observations made above. A similar view was taken by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Sutlej Cotton Mills case 1979 116 ITR 1. For the aforesaid reasons, we send the case back to the Tribunal with the direction that it should dispose of the case in the light of the observations made above. No order as to costs. J. V. GUPTA J.-I agree.
-
1979 (9) TMI 23
... ... ... ... ..... led in the original assessment proceedings even if there was a concealment in the revised return. Now, penalty is imposed on account of the commission of a wrongful act, and it is well settled that it is the law in force on the date on which the wrongful act is committed which determines the penalty (see Addl. CIT v. Hiralal Munnalal-MCC No. 171 of 1976, decided by this court on 23rd August, 1979, 1980 124 ITR 728). In the instant case, the wrongful act took place on 21st December, 1969, when the return in response to the notice under s. 148 of the Act was filed by the assessee. The Tribunal, therefore, erred in holding that the law applicable for the imposition of penalty in the instant case would be that contained in s. 271 (1)(c) prior to its amendment on 1st April, 1968. For all these reasons, our answers to the two questions referred to us are in the negative and against the assessee. In the circumstances of the case, parties shall bear their own costs of this reference.
-
1979 (9) TMI 22
Business Expenditure, Management Expenses ... ... ... ... ..... y on its own lands, it was purchasing sugarcane grown by other ryots in the adjacent area as the sugarcane grown from its own lands was not sufficient to run the assessee-sugar factory. In the circumstances, it cannot be said that the cultivation of sugarcane and the manufacture of sugar by the assessee do not constitute one single and indivisible business. We have, therefore, no hesitation to hold that the assessee is entitled to succeed in the present reference as the department has no legal basis to disallow either Rs. 3,92,600 or any portion of it on the assumption that it represents management overhead expenses towards the agricultural activity. The expenses incurred by the assessee towards agricultural operations have not been claimed in the present reference as a revenue expenditure. For all these reasons, we answer the question re-framed by us, in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. The assessee will have its costs of the reference. Advocate s fee Rs. 300.
-
1979 (9) TMI 21
Capital Gains ... ... ... ... ..... capital gain under the provisions of section 45 of the said Act. We find that the facts in this case are in all material regards similar to the facts in the case of CIT v. Jehmi Jal Cooper (Income-tax Application No. 59 of 1977). In that case, the Commissioner had made a similar application under s. 256(2) of the said Act to this court for directing the Tribunal to state a case and to refer the question set out in that application to this court for determination. The said application was summarily rejected by a Division Bench of this court on 20th June, 1977. The Commissioner applied for special leave to appeal against this decision to the Supreme Court of India and even that application was rejected by the Supreme Court on 20th November, 1978. In these circumstances, we see no reason to direct the Tribunal to state a case and refer the aforestated questions as applied for by the Commissioner. In the result, the application is dismissed and the rule is discharged with costs.
-
1979 (9) TMI 20
Income From House Property, Self-Occupation ... ... ... ... ..... 2, would sufficiently satisfy the requirements of law regarding the existence of a written instrument to obtain registration. Accordingly, the departmental authorities were not justified in refusing registration. The Tribunal was right in holding that the registration had been unjustifiably refused, and in directing that the same be accorded to the firm for the year 1972-73. In what we have stated above, we have assumed that the words, during the previous year , used in s. 186 imply that the partnership should have come into existence at the inception of the relevant accounting year and not any subsequent time before the year is out. We, however, leave this question open. For these reasons, we are of the opinion that the question referred to us must be answered in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the department and we hereby do so. As the assessee has not appeared, we make no order as to costs. Counsel s fee is assessed at Rs. 150. G. M. MIR J.-I agree.
-
1979 (9) TMI 19
Question Of Law ... ... ... ... ..... w that the statement of law enunciated in Saharaj Tea Company 1978 114 ITR 805, in so far as it relates to the question of remand and competence of the Tribunal to make a reference does not apply on the facts and in the circumstances of the case. Herein, a decision has been given by the Tribunal which is final and the matter has been remitted only to recompute the deduction without reference to r. 19A(3) of the I.T. Rules , which is a matter of routine, more or less ministerial function of arithmetical calculation. We have strong doubt that the ratio of the decision is not applicable to the instant case. However, we do not propose to dwell on the point and leave it open for final determination at the hearing of the reference. For the foregoing reasons, we direct the Income-tax Appellate, Tribunal, Gauhati Bench, Gauhati, to state the case and to refer the aforesaid question of law to this court in accordance with the provisions of law. In the result, the petition is allowed.
....
|