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Case Laws
Showing 161 to 180 of 205 Records
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1980 (7) TMI 45 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Agricultural Income, Exemptions ... ... ... ... ..... not think that the interest received on these deposits would do so. The effective source of the interest were the deposits and not agricultural land. Interest on deposits cannot be taken to be in lieu of the profits which the assessee might have received had he cultivated the land, nor can interest be said to be directly associated with the land. Interest on these securities would stand on the same footing as interest on rent in Kamakshya Narayan Singh s case 1948 16 ITR 325 (PC). Thus, although the assessee was entitled to exemption on the deposits as they were agricultural income, and not on the interest accruing thereon, but as the question about the interest was not canvassed before the Tribunal, on the frame of the question we have to answer the question in favour of the assessee. We, accordingly, answer the question as reframed in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the department. The assessee is entitled to its costs which are assessed at Rs. 200.
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1980 (7) TMI 44 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... otal income on which no income-tax is payable . It was sought to be urged that it was in this background, when the C. (P.) S.T. Act, 1964, was introduced, that the expression not includible in r. 4 of the Second Schedule to the said Act should be construed. We are, however, unable to accept this contention. Knowing the background of the Act, the Legislature deliberately amended the Act, subsequently, and the view that incomes which are mentioned in Chap. VI-A are not includible and not capable of being included in the total income of the assessee as contemplated under r. 4 of the Second Schedule to the C. (P.) S.T. Act, 1964. Therefore, in consonance with the views taken by the other High Courts, we are of the view that the Tribunal was right in its conclusion and both the questions must, therefore, be answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. In the facts and circumstances, however, each party will pay and bear its own costs. SUDHINDRA MOHAN GUHA J.-I agree.
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1980 (7) TMI 43 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Change In Constitution Of Firm, Firm, Registration ... ... ... ... ..... 8-69, to ascertain the shares of losses, if any, with regard to the seven partners of the firm as the partnership deed of 1966 is before him. It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the decision of the respondents on this fresh ground urged by Mr. Shelat. In the view we take, it is not necessary for us to consider if the ITO or for the matter of that the Addl. Commissioner or the Board of Direct Taxes were justified in refusing registration to the firm on the basis of the partnership deed of 1966 for the two assessment years. We have held that the petitioner-firm was entitled to the benefit of sub-s. (7) of s. 184 for these two years and, hence, the question of a fresh registration does not arise. In the result, the writ petition is allowed and the impugned orders are hereby set aside and the ITO is directed to continue the registration of the petitioner-firm for the assessment years 1967-68 and 1968-69. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
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1980 (7) TMI 42 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... unity of being heard as envisaged in s. 274(1) of the Act. This argument cannot hold good because of the fact that in the cases referred to above there were certain additions by the AAC and as such in such cases there was necessity for the assessee of being heard afresh but in the present case there was no addition of income but only the source of such income had been altered. In this view of the matter, no exception could be taken to the fact that after the disposal of the appeal the assessee was not given a further opportunity of being heard as envisaged in s. 274(1) of the Act. Thus, all the arguments advanced by Mr. Mukherjee cannot be sustained. Thus, on the basis of the findings of the Tribunal and on the principles of law discussed above, we answer the question No. 1 in the affirmative and in favour of the revenue. There will, however, be no order as to costs. Questions Nos. 2 and 3 are not pressed and as such we decline to answer them. SABYASACHI MUKHARJI J.-I agree.
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1980 (7) TMI 41 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Income Escaped Assessment, Reason To Believe, Reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... was right . Lord Scarman at p. 104 (of 1980 1 All ER) said that the ghost of Liversidge v. Anderson no longer flutters in the pages of our books and need no longer haunt the law. It was laid to rest by Lord Radcliffe in Nakkuda Ali v. Jayaratne 1951 AC 66, 75 (HL) and no one has sought to revive it. It is now beyond recall. The Supreme Court in a long line of decisions has held that the matter is justiciable. See ITO v. Madnani Engineering Works 1979 118 ITR 1 (SC) . We are, therefore, not satisfied on the affidavit of the ITO that there was any material before him on which he could have formed the required belief for reopening the assessment proceedings. The notice under s. 147(a) of the Act for the reopening of the assessment must in the circumstances be held to be void. We, accordingly, allow the writ petition and quash the notices dated March 24, 1971, August 7, 1974, and September 9, 1974, and the proceedings initiated thereunder. We, however, make no order is to costs.
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1980 (7) TMI 40 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Charitable Or Religious Trust, Exemptions, Revocable Trust ... ... ... ... ..... f the legal obligation under which the properties are held. This discussion effectively demolishes the ground on which the Tribunal held that the followers of Radhaswami Satsang, which was an association of persons was under a legal obligation to apply the income of the Satsang wholly for religious purposes. Counsel for the assesses drew our attention to the decisions of the Supreme Court in (1959 S.C. 95) (sic), AIR 1960 SC 100 (Narayan Bhagwantrao Gosavi v. Gopal Vinayak Gosavi), AIR 1970 SC 2025 (Goswami Shri Mahalaxmi Vahuji v. Shah Ranchhoddas Kalidas), AIR 1972 SC 1760 (State of Punjab v. Guru Nanak Flour and Oil Mills) and AIR 1974 SC 1123 (Bihar State Board of Religious Trusts v. Bhubaneshwar Prasad Chowdhary), but it is futile to look into these cases, for they have no relevance to the issue involved. We, accordingly, answer the question in the negative, in favour of the department, and against the assessee. In the circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs.
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1980 (7) TMI 39 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... le the residents of the district to come to know of the intended sale, so that they can participate in the auction and offer their bids and as a result thereof, the property put up for sale may fetch a good and proper price. Therefore, it was incumbent upon the TRO to issue the proclamation of sale notice in the Kannada language also. As no such notice is issued in the Kannada language as required by r. 52, it is not just, proper and legal to allow the TRO to proceed with the sale. In view of the fact that the date fixed for sale has already expired, the 2nd respondent is required to issue a fresh proclamation of the sale notice. Hence, it is not necessary to quash the notice dated October 1, 1975, produced as Ex. N. However, it is made clear that if the 2nd respondent is required to proceed to recover the tax arrears by sale of the immovable property, he shall have to publish the sale proclamation in the language of the district also as per r. 52, i. e., in Kannada language.
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1980 (7) TMI 38 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... it appears that in order to find out the distinction between capital and revenue expenditure, it is to be seen whether the expenditure would bring into existence an asset or advantage for the enduring benefit of a business. In the present case, the assessee did not appear to have acquired any new capital asset at all. But, only the existing assets were valued afresh and in the books of account the valuation was shown at higher figures for the purpose mainly to display the financial position of the assessee in a better way so that it may facilitate the carrying on of the business more efficiently and smoothly. In the above premises, we hold that the Tribunal was perfectly justified in holding the expenditure in question as revenue in nature and as such deductible under s. 10(2)(xv) of the Indian I.T. Act, 1922, and, accordingly, we answer the question in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. There will, however, be no order as to costs. SABYASACHI MUKHARJI J.-I agree.
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1980 (7) TMI 37 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Foreign Income, Resident, Total Income ... ... ... ... ..... ecision. Our attention was drawn to a decision of this court, which is unreported, in the case of CIT v. India Textile Agency in I.T. R. No. 80 of 1972, judgment delivered on the 14th January, 1977 , by Chief justice, Mitra. There, of course, the argument was that the position had changed after the Finance Act of 1965, in England. As the Division Bench found that the assessment year involved was prior to that Act, the change effected by the Finance Act did not affect the position. But actually the decision was that, before the Finance Act, only the net income of the assessee accrued was assessable. In that view of the matter and the principle, as we have said on the construction of the section, we are of the opinion that the Tribunal was right in its decision and the question must, therefore, be answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties will pay and bear their own costs. SUDHINDRA MOHAN GUHA J.-I agree.
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1980 (7) TMI 36 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Estate Duty, Goodwill ... ... ... ... ..... otwithstanding that the firm owns immovable property. It will be seen that this rule treats the share of a partner as an indivisible asset for purposes of determination of its nature and locality only. It does not concern itself with the method of valuation. We have seen earlier that the goodwill of a partnership is evaluated separately after taking into account the various features. Thus, we see no reason to hold, in view of r. 7(c), which is of limited operation, that the goodwill of the deceased s share in the partnership firm should not have been evaluated separately. The Tribunal was thus, right, and the answer to the third question must, therefore, be in favour of the department, in valuing the goodwill of the firm. In view of these conclusions, we answer all the three questions in the affirmative, in favour of the department and against the assessee. The department is entitled to its costs, which we assess at Rs. 200. Counsel s fee is also assessed at the same figure.
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1980 (7) TMI 35 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Depreciation, Developement Rebate, Technical Know-how Fees ... ... ... ... ..... e, we hold that the amount of Rs. 39,180 being the expenditure incurred in connection with the roads was available for depreciation on the basis that roads form part of the building of the factory and do not form part of the plant of the assessee s factory. Under these circumstances, we answer the questions referred to us as under Question No. 1. In the negative so far as half of the expenditure incurred in connection with the foreign tour of Rohit Chinubhai was concerned, but the remaining half of the expenditure in connection with Rohit Chinubhai and the entire foreign expenses in connection with H. P. Gupta, was not allowable as revenue expenditure. Question No. 2. In the affirmative. Question No. 3. In the negative. Question No. 4. Roads do not form part of the plant, but the item of Rs. 39,180, spent for the roads is available for depreciation on the basis that roads form part of the building of the assessee-company. There will be no order as to costs of this reference.
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1980 (7) TMI 34 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Notice, Reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... ,000 to M/s. Natwarlal Shamaldas and Company is not allowable expenditure. In these circumstances, the Tribunal rightly held that the failure to record reasons as contemplated by s. 148(2) of the Act vitiated the reassessment. Learned counsel for the department was unable to point out that the view taken by the Tribunal was not justified in the circumstance of the case. Our answer to the first question referred to this court is in, the affirmative and against the department. As regards the second question referred to this court, learned counsel for the parties conceded that it our answer to the first question was in the affirmative and against the department, it was not necessary to answer the second question. For all these reasons, our answer to the first question referred to us is in the affirmative and against the department. As regards question No.2, we decline to answer that question in the circumstances of the case. Parties s all bear their own costs of this reference.
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1980 (7) TMI 33 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
Appeals, Declaration, Firm ... ... ... ... ..... lay which affects jurisdiction of the authority. Where there is an ambiguity, it may be resolved in favour of the assessee, but where the law seems to be clear and a well-marked distinction has been maintained, we do not think, for the sake of maintaining unanimity in judicial opinion, we should take a different view from the reported decision of this court. We might reiterate that Mr. Mohanty was fair enough to indicate that the reported decision of this court in New Orissa Traders case 1977 107 ITR 553, cannot be said to be wrong. Our answer to the question referred, therefore, is On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, delay in the filing of the declaration under s. 184(7)(ii) of the Act could not be taken as a defect within the meaning of s. 185(2) of the Act and, consequently, the order of the ITO rejecting the declaration could not amount to an order under s. 185(3) of the Act. Parties are directed to bear their own costs of this reference. PANDA J.-I agree.
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1980 (7) TMI 32 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, New Industrial Undertaking, Year In Which Expenditure Allowable ... ... ... ... ..... us as follows Questions referred at the instance of the revenue. Question No. 1-In the affirmative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. Question No. 2-In the affirmative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. Questions referred at the instance of the assessee. Question No. 1-In the negative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. Question No. 2-In the negative, that is, favour of the assessee and against the revenue. Question No. 3-In the negative, because once it is held that the expenditure was of a revenue nature and was incurred in the previous year relevant to the assessment year 1969-70, the assessee was entitled to deduction as revenue expenditure at least under s. 28(1) if not under s. 37 of the I.T. Act. Under these circumstances, all the questions referred to us are decided in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. The Commissioner will pay the costs of these two references to the assessee.
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1980 (7) TMI 31 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Concealment, Penalty, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... been decided. On this basis, in our opinion, the appropriate manner in which question No. 3 should be disposed of in this case is to say that the Tribunal was not justified in law in confirming the order of penalties on the ground that the will was not genuine. But the Tribunal would be free to determine whether the order of penalty could be confirmed or not by consideration of the facts whether the deceased left any asset which could be covered by the will and in considering that question the Tribunal should consider whether the Tribunal was competent to take into consideration the remand report of the IAC of Wealth-tax and whether such finding of the IAC was based on evidence on record. After considering this aspect, the Tribunal will, accordingly, dispose of the appeal in accordance with law. The questions are answered in the manner indicated above. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties will pay and bear their own costs. SUDHINDRA MOHAN GUHA J.-I agree.
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1980 (7) TMI 30 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Estate Duty ... ... ... ... ..... which we have referred to hereinbefore thus in the conception of shebaitship although the elements of office and property, all duties and personal interest were mixed up and blended together, undoubtedly the duties of a shebait to be regarded as a primary thing from which flows certain rights and those rights are only as a holder of office and for performance of duties. In the view we have taken we answer question No. 2 as follows viz., that though the shebaitship is a property but in the facts and circumstances of the case the right or privilege of residence or dwelling being of the nature, as we have indicated, the value of such right was not includible in the principal value of the estate left by the assessee. Accordingly, we also answer, in the facts and circumstances of the case, question No. 3 in the negative and in favour of the accountable person. In the facts and circumstances of the case, each party will pay and bear its own costs. SUDHINDRA MOHAN GUHA J.-I agree.
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1980 (7) TMI 29 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... received after his death, should have been included in the income, which was received by the assessee during his lifetime. This submission has been based on view of the decision of the Madras High Court in CIT v. Estate of Late A. V. Viswanatha Sastri 1980 121 ITR 270. This contention is also without any merit. The question of law has already been reproduced. Nothing could be brought to our notice from the statement of the case to show that any income which had accrued to the deceased, which was received subsequently, was counted in the assessment order, which pertained to the income in the hands of the executor. This dispute was never raised before the Tribunal and is consequently not the subject-matter of the question of law referred to us. That being so, there is no merit in this contention. No other argument has been raised. For the reasons recorded above, this reference is answered in the affirmative, i. e., in favour of the assessee and against the revenue, with costs.
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1980 (7) TMI 28 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Appeal To AAC, Competency To Appeal, Firm ... ... ... ... ..... of s. 142 of the I.T. Act, we have no reason to differ from the view taken by the Tribunal that Sohan Lal who was affected by the impugned order of the ITO has a right to file an appeal before the AAC. Nothing could be shown by the learned counsel for the opposite side to take the contrary view. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in CIT v. Ambala Flour Mills 1970 78 ITR 256, held that if a person is fastened with the liability of tax, he has a right of appeal so as to challenge the liability with which he is sought to be fastened. In this view of the matter, we are of the opinion that question No. 1 in I.T Rs. Nos. 105 to 108 of 1975 has to be answered in the affirmative. We find that the Tribunal was right in upholding the order of the AAC setting aside the order of the ITO who has been directed to decide the case afresh in accordance with the directions given by the AAC. Accordingly, question No. 2 in I.T.Rs. Nos. 105 to 108 is also answered in the affirmative. No costs.
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1980 (7) TMI 27 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Surtax Reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... t on a point already adjudicated upon by the ITO while making the disputed assessment orders cannot be taken as a valid information in view of the clear observations (reproduced above) made by the Supreme Court in Indian and Eastern Newspaper Society v. CIT 1979 119 ITR 996. It is further obvious that the ITO had issued the impugned notices for a reconsideration of the decision already taken by him. He is not competent to do so. In view of the discussion above, we hold that in the absence of valid information under s. 8(b) of the Act, the ITO has no jurisdiction to reopen the assessments of the petitioner for the assessment years 1971-72, 1972-73 and 1973-74. The notices issued by the ITO to the petitioner for that purpose are liable to be quashed. In the result, all the three writ petitions detailed above are accepted and the notices, P-8, P-9 and P-10 in Writ Petitions Nos. 387, 821 and 819 of 1976, respectively, are quashed. No order as to costs. PREM CHAND JAIN J.-I agree
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1980 (7) TMI 26 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Offences, Prosecution ... ... ... ... ..... e to interfere with those proceedings. The questions whether there was suppression and whether the evidence established the alleged offence were matters to be considered by the trial court after an appraisal of the entire evidence. But, in this case, relied upon by Mr. Awasthy, there was no finding by the Tribunal. In Uttam Chand s case 1982 133 ITR 911, the High Court had declined to quash the criminal proceedings on the grounds, inter alia, that the findings of the Tribunal were not binding on the criminal courts, but the Supreme Court quashed the proceedings on the basis of the finding of the Tribunal. Therefore, the ratio of the decision relied upon by Mr. Awasthy is not applicable to the facts of the present case in view of the latest Supreme Court s observation in Uttam Chand s case 1982 133 ITR 909. Accordingly, this petition is allowed and the criminal proceedings pending against the petitioner before the learned Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sonepat, are quashed.
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