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Showing 81 to 100 of 203 Records
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1981 (2) TMI 123
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... ... ..... e of the assessee. Apart from the falsity of the explanation, the Department must have before it cogent materials or evidence from which it could be inferred that the assessee has consciously concealed particulars of his income, before levying penalty. Under the circumstances, the applications under s. 256(2) was also rejected by the Hon ble Court. 8. In the instance case, as could be seen from the penalty order the explanation of the assessee was rejected. But no further material was brought on record to establish a case against the assessee in respect of the above sum of Rs. 25,000. 9. Having regard to the facts of the case and having taken into account the ratio of the decisions of the Hon ble Gauhati High Court and of the Hon rsquo ble Supreme Court, we are of the view that the penalty imposed in the instance case cannot be sustained. In this view of the matter, penalty order and the order of the ACC are set aside. 10. In the result, the appeal by the assessee is allowed.
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1981 (2) TMI 122
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... ... ..... sessee has either concealed any asset or has furnished inaccurate particulars of any asset. 7. The ld. Deptl. Rep. has submitted that the penalties in this case should be sustained under s. 18(1)(c) r/w the Explanation thereto. We are afraid we cannot accept the submission because on the facts and circumstances of this case, the assessee cannot be held to be guilty of any fraud or gross or wilful neglect. The Expln. to s. 18(1)(c) is a rebuttable presumption and the presumption against the assessee should be considered to be rebutted by filing the returns voluntarily, by getting the property valued from a Registered Valuer, which valuation was handed over to the Valuation Officer and by filing the revised returns for both the years. 8. For the aforesaid reason we hold that no penalty is exigible in this case either under s. 18(1)(c) or under s. 18(1)(c) r/w the Explanation thereto. The penalties levied are, therefore, cancelled. 9. In the result, both the appeals are allowed.
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1981 (2) TMI 121
Rule 1BB, Valuation Officer ... ... ... ... ..... r enacted ? whether rule 1BB(5) applied to those cases, and he would not have applied mind in that direction. Hence, hearing by the Valuation Officer in such cases will be premature. Instead the valuation should be resorted to by the WTO to consider whether all or any of the circumstances mentioned in rule 1BB(5) exist. If not, he will value the property in accordance with rule 1BB. Only if he considers it necessary to get the assets valued again by the Valuation Officer, in cases covered by rule 1BB(5), it will be necessary to hear the Valuation Officers at the time of an appeal against such valuation. 5. Whether the assessee having returned a The assessee can claim higher valuation, cannot take advantage benefit of rule 1BB even if of rule 1BB to claim reduction in the valuation ? he has returned a higher valuation. 6. Whether benefit of rule 1BB can be availed of by an Yes.assessee whose case falls under section 7(4) ? 7. Whether rule 1BB binds the Valuation Officer ? Yes.
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1981 (2) TMI 120
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... ... ..... ions of additions for unexplained investment etc. do not arise at all. The assessee in his objections to the draft assessment explained that there is no such unexplained purchase and investment as was thought of by the ITO. The IAC in his directions has not disputed the case of the assessee. He has not given any directions about the unexplained purchase or investment. He has not even said that the case of the assessee is not true and that even then no addition need be made because of the other additions. So, in the absence of any directions by the IAC to that effect, it cannot be now raised at this stage. The IAC seems to have been quite satisfied that there is unexplained purchase or investment. That is why, perhaps he did not give any directions or make any finding about it. So we are not sending the case back for further additions on the basis of unexplained investment and purchases. 17. Therefore, the departmental appeal is dismissed and the assessee s appeal is allowed.
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1981 (2) TMI 119
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... ... ..... is not acceptable. For the detailed reasons giving in our order of even date in ITA No. 497/Chi 79, and making that order as the basis, we allow the assessee s appeal and cancel the assessment in the status of individual. 3. We also find no merit in the Revenue s alternative argument and, therefore, reject the same, the directions should be given that the return filed in the HUF status should be processed irrespective of the statutory limitations. The question before us is whether the assessment made in the individual assessment can be said to be valid and such question we are deciding assessee s favour by holding that such assessment is void ab initio because there was neither a return filed by the assessee in such status nor was it required to be filed by the Revenue through any notice. 4. On the view which we are taking in the matter, it is considered unnecessary to deal with the eight grounds taken in the memorandum of appeal. 5. In the result, assessee s appeal allowed.
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1981 (2) TMI 118
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... ... ..... l. Authority s order as also we have derived with, utmost respect, the maximum benefit from the decisions of various Hon ble High Courts since relied upon before us, by the parties. No material has been placed before us, to warrant by the parties. 5. No material has been placed before us to warrant or justify any departure from the conclusions arrived at by the Tribunal in the case of this very assessee in ITA No. 614/JP/1979 relating to asst. yr. 1972-73 and which order is dt. 30th June, 1979 and whereby, on very identical facts it has been held that there was no cessation of liability and the amounts could not be added as income of the assessee while computing the total income of the assessee for the purposes of its being charged to income-tax under the provisions of IT Act. Since the first appellate authority has afforded relief to the assessee relying upon the order of the Tribunal, we follow suit. 6. In the result, both the appeals by the Revenue fail and are dismissed.
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1981 (2) TMI 117
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... ... ..... M.C.T. Trust and Ors. (1976) 102 ITR 138 (Mad) Jammu and Kashmir High Court in the case of Shri Krishen Chand Charitable Trust (1975) 98 ITR 387 (J and K) allowed the assessee s claim. He held that the rule cannot describe a time limit for permission to apply for accumulation He also held that accumulation can be for the purposes of future capital expenditure also. The Revenue is in appeal 2. The ld. Deptl. Rep argued in the absence of strict compliance we with the rules the assessee was no entitled to exemption. He further urged that violation of the provisions would frustrate the purposes of the Act. 3. After having heard the rival submissions we agree with the findings of the AAC and dismiss the appeals. It is, therefore, not necessary for us to consider the alternative contention advanced on behalf of the assessee that there was compliance with the terms of r. 17 as the assessee had submitted returns under s. 148 which is tantamount to submission of returns under s. 139.
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1981 (2) TMI 116
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... ... ..... 5,000. We also do not find any basis for estimating the cost of furniture and fittings on the difference between the value shown by the approved valuer and the withdrawal made by the assessee. There was no relationship between these two items. It is also true that the assessee has not given any details about the furniture purchased by him. In these circumstances a reasonable estimate has to be made. We are of the view that a reasonable estimate would be at Rs. 8,000. That the total investment made in the additions and alterations as well as furniture would come to Rs. 83,000. The difference between the withdrawals and the above investment would be only Rs. 3,119. A part of this additional amount must have been incurred in earlier year when a part of the additions to the building were made. The estimated expenditure on additions and alterations in this year is, therefore, limited to Rs. 1500. The assessee will thus get a relief of Rs. 14,200. 7. The appeal is allowed in part.
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1981 (2) TMI 115
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... ... ..... as the balance expenditure in each of the years is concerned, the CIT (Appeals) has agreed with the ITO. 5. We have heard both the ld. counsel for the assessee, Mr. Ranka and the Deptl. Rep. Admittedly, providing of tea, coffee, snacks, etc. by the assessee to its customers in each of the years under consideration is nothing but the ordinary customary courtesy shown by the assessee to its customers in each of the years under consideration visiting it for the purpose of its business. The said expenditure has been consistently held by the Tribunal to be not an expenditure in the nature of entertainment expenditure disallowable under s. 37(2B) of the Act. This view of ours finds support from the recent decision of the Supreme Court in SLP No. 3781 of 1978 dt. 13th Oct., 1979. We accordingly hold that the disallowances upheld by the assessee under this head in each of the years under consideration merit deletion. 6. In the result, the appeals by the assessee are partly allowed.
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1981 (2) TMI 114
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... ... ..... e miserably failed to place any material on record to substantiate the same, instead, the club has been called upon to prove the negative which does not stand to reason. Sec. 17 of the Act postulates a situation, whereby the WTO has reason to believe that the net wealth of a person has escaped assessment/under-assessed/assessed at a Sow rate, either by reason of the omission or failure on the part of the said person to make a return under s. 14 of the Act, or in consequence of any information in possession of the WTO. Either way reason to believe has to be based on some material on record which vital common ground is found wanting in the present cases, when read in the context of a specified denial of the assessee to own or possess any net wealth . 10. As a result of our discussion as above, we do uphold the impugned order of the first appellate authority of course with the additional reasonings as above with the result, all the appeals by the Revenue fail and are dismissed.
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1981 (2) TMI 113
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... ... ..... n and if there is manufacture or production of these articles and things, then, the initial depreciation is to be allowed. Since the retreading of rubber tyres is nowhere in the list, as such, no initial depreciation is to be allowed to the assessee u/s 32 (1) (vi) of the Act. Hence, the claim of the assessee is also liable to be rejected on this score and the authorities below have rightly rejected it on this criterion. 13. Therefore, in view of our above discussion and reasons thereto, we hold that the retreading of tyres is not at all a production of tyres or production of things rather it is a repairing of the tyres or its restoration after decay hence no initial depreciation u/s 32 (1) (vi) of the Act is allowable and being so, we hold that the authorities below were justified in not accepting the assessee s claim for initial depreciation for the year under consideration. Hence, we confirm their respective orders on this issue. 14. In the result, the appeal is dismissed
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1981 (2) TMI 112
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... ... ..... idered the rival contentions advanced by both the sides. It is not denied by the Department that Shri Anil Chandarana had rendered services to the assessee company and played a dominant role in its affairs. If this is accepted as also the fact that he was not remunerated by the company, the assessee s plea that this small facility was given to the director on the grounds of commercial expediency cannot just be brushed aside. It would be open to the ITO assessing Shri Anil Chandarana to take this fact into account in his individual assessments. So far as these appeals are concerned, it stands to reason that the facility extended by the company to Shri Anil Chandarana in list of remuneration was not unbusiness like or imprudent and was, on the contrary, justified by commercial considerations. It is on this ground that we would delete the additions sustained by the Commr. (Appeals) in respect of the interest claim made by the assessee. 6. In the result, the appeals are allowed.
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1981 (2) TMI 111
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... ... ..... ltaneously debited the account of M/s D.C. Metha and Others on one hand and credited the account of Trade Impex P. Ltd, the sister concern, on the other hand, there is no difference in the amount of interest whatsoever for any of the two years under consideration. When these are the facts, it cannot be treated in solitude that the amount of interest receivable by the assessee from D.C. Metha and Others is taxable in the hands of the assessee without any deduction on account of interest payable by the assessee to M/s. Trade Impex Pvt. Ltd. We are not repeating clause 5 of the agreement between the assessee and the purchasers M/s. D.C. Metha and Others, because it also finds a place in para 5 of the CIT(A) s order, though it is very relevant and by perusal of facts only it is clear that the amount of interest in both the years could not be added in the re-assessment proceedings of the assessee under s. 143(3) r/w s. 147(a). 5. In the result, the assessee s appeals are allowed.
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1981 (2) TMI 110
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... ... ..... ailable before us, we are of the opinion that the assessee company s case would fall under the above explanation and, therefore, the disallowance of interest at 15 per cent made by the authorities below was not justified. The said disallowance is, therefore, deleted. 12. We now turn to the appeal relating to asst. yr. 1978-79. The first question which arises for consideration relates to disallowance of depreciation on car at Rs. 30 per cent of the total claim as made by the assessee. For the reasons given in para 5 above, we hold that disallowance of depreciation would be restricted to 1/10th of the total claim as made by the assessee. 13. The next ground relates to disallowance under s. 40A(8). It was pointed out that no such disallowance was made by the ITO and, therefore, the ld. representative of the assessee did not press this ground, though raised in the memo of appeal. This ground is, therefore, treated as withdrawn. 14. In the results, the Appeals are partly allowed.
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1981 (2) TMI 109
Charitable Or Religious Trust ... ... ... ... ..... ncome for the purpose of section 11(2). It is difficult to divorce grant-in-aid from income particularly when the grant-in-aid is granted with a view to meet the expenditure incurred by the institution. Now coming to the two authorities reported at Sri Dwarkadheesh Charitable Trust v. ITO and CIT v. Bal Utkarsh Society, we find on a close reading that the High Court was concerned with the provisions of section 12 as they stood prior to the amendment and, therefore, these decisions would not be of much assistance in resolving the controversy. The decision in Crook s case is founded on the general principle and would not be of much assistance to the assessee when a specific provision is made in the statute by virtue of section 12 read with section 2(24)(iia) and these provisions have to be given effect to in determining the income for the purpose of application of income towards the objects of the trust. 9. In the result, the appeal as well as the cross-objection are dismissed.
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1981 (2) TMI 108
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... ... ..... from a Company would take in only such benefit or perquisite which the company had agreed to provide and which the person concerned could claim as of right based on such agreement. A mere advantage derived from the company without its authority or knowledge will not amount to a benefit or perquisite obtained . The word Obtained occurring in the said section must be agreement oriented and cannot merely mean taken . Therefore, following our own decision and that of the Hon ble Madras High Court, we hold that no disallowance is to be made for the claim of expenditure on cars and depreciation thereto in the case of the company if the cars are used by the Directors of the company and being so, we further hold that the authorities below were not justified in making and sustaining the disallowance for both the years under consideration. Hence, we delete the disallowance sustained by the CIT (A) for both the years under consideration. 7. In the result, both the appeals are allowed.
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1981 (2) TMI 107
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... ... ..... ing to these expenses were not produced before him. He contended that the vouchers were available with the assessee and could have been easily produced before the CIT if he wanted them. He explained that the presentation articles had to be given to the customers or prospective customers as a matter of custom on the beginning of a new year and as such the expenses were incidental to the business carried on by the assessee. Shri A.K. Nagpal, the ld. Rep. for the Department, on the other hand, supported the order of the CIT(A). 5. We have considered the contentions of both the parties as well as the facts on record. In our opinion, there is force in the contentions raised for the assessee. Considering the nature and volume of the expenses in relation to the total turnover, we hold that they were incidental to the business carried on by the assessee and should have been allowed as such. We, therefore, delete the disallowance of Rs. 4,000. 6. In the result, the appeal is allowed.
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1981 (2) TMI 106
Gratuity Liability, Mercantile System ... ... ... ... ..... l difference in the case of an assessee following mercantile system of accountancy with regard to its gratuity liability whether he makes a provision in the books for that liability or forgets or deliberately omits to make such a provision but claims it as a deduction on the basis of accrual of liability. In the circumstances, we have no difficulty in holding that section 40A(7) prohibits deduction of gratuity liability in all cases except those which are covered by section 36(1)(v) or section 40A(7)(b). 16. We may state that the Tribunal has already taken similar decisions to the effect that the Special Bench of the Tribunal in the case referred to above has laid down the correct law, requiring no reconsideration and, therefore, binding on us, in ITA No. 1627 (Bom.) of 1979 and IT Appeal No. 1907 (Bom.) of 1979 to both of which, one of us (the Accountant Member) was a party. 17. For the above reasons, we uphold the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) and dismiss this appeal.
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1981 (2) TMI 105
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... ... ..... ed this contention and held that this could be no ground for levy of penalty. 6. It is admitted position that the assessee had purchased the running business of a tailoring shop. In the premises thus acquired, the assessee had started retail business in stationery goods, toilet requirements, exercise books, etc. Thus, the business which was being run in the premises earlier and the present business are entirely different. No doubt, the assignment deed mentions stock-in-trade worth Rs. 5,000 as transferred. But reading between the lines, it is clear that this is only a disguise in order to get a payment for transfer of tenancy. It is quite probable that no such stock at all was found which was sold by the assessee. Taking the probabilities of the case, I think there could be no penalty in respect of such alleged suppression of sales. 7. In the result, the entire penalty would stand vacated. The departmental appeal is dismissed, while the assessee s cross objection is allowed.
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1981 (2) TMI 104
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... ... ..... under appeal levied interests on the assessee on the ground that the tax deducted at source was not paid within the prescribed time, but paid only after the prescribed dates. The CIT (A) considered the circumstances which prevented the assessee from deducting and depositing the tax within the prescribed dates and found that the assessee was prevented by genuine difficulties from doing so. In our opinion, the decision of the CIT(A) is based on sound reasoning and good evidence. Besides, we find the penalty proceedings, started under s. 201(1) for these very four years, which are now under our consideration, were dropped under identical facts and circumstances on the ground that the explanation given by the assessee in its letter dt. 28th July, 1979 was quite satisfactory. 7. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, we, therefore, agree with the conclusions of the CIT (A) and uphold his orders for all the four years. 8. In the results, the departmental appeals are dismissed.
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