Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 203 Records
-
1981 (8) TMI 234
... ... ... ... ..... ith this contention any further. 28. In the result, therefore, rule is made absolute with cost. Orders passed by the respondent No. 1 dated December 12, 1980 and confirmed in appeal by respondent No. 2 on April 20, 1981, under Section 78 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, are quashed and set aside and the administrator is directed to restore the control and management of the karkhana to the board of directors forthwith. 29. At this stage Shri Sawant orally prays for leave to appeal to Supreme Court under Article 134-A of the Constitution of India. However, since we have only applied the well established principles of law as laid down by the Supreme Court to the facts and circumstances of the present case, this is not a fit case for grant of such leave. Hence leave refused. Shri Sawant also prays for stay of operation of this order for 6 weeks. In view of the findings recorded by us, we do not think it fit to grant such time. Hence prayer for time is also refused.
-
1981 (8) TMI 233
... ... ... ... ..... egories of excepted debts but to make those clauses mutually exclusive will be to impair unduly the efficacy of the very object of taking away a certain class of debts from the operation of the Act. We are not therefore, inclined to accept the submission made by the learned counsel that section 2 (4) (a) (ii) is exhaustive of all circumstances in which a subsidiary bank can claim the benefit of the exceptions to section 2 (4). For these reasons we affirm the view of the High Court that the exclusion provided for in clause (1) of section 2 (4) of the Act can be availed of if the debt is due to a banking company at the time of the commencement of the Act. We have already indicated that the other condition which must be satisfied in order that clause (1) may apply is that the debt must have been incurred from a banking company before the commencement of the Act. For these reasons we dismiss the appeal. Appellant will pay the costs of the respondent throughout. Appeal dismissed.
-
1981 (8) TMI 232
... ... ... ... ..... ase. Nor do we think that the Court intended any wide construction of their observation. As already observed by us the weight to be given to the interview test should depend on the requirement of the service to which recruitment is made, the source material available for recruitment, the composition of the interview Board and several like factors. Ordinarily recruitment to public services is regulated by rules made under the proviso to Art. 309 of the Constitution and we would be usurping a function which is not ours, if we try to redetermine the appropriate method of selection and the relative weight to be attached to the various tests. If we do that we would be rewriting the rules but we guard ourselves against being understood as saying that we would not interfere even in cases of proven or obvious oblique motive. There is none in the present case. The Writ Petition is therefore dismissed but in the circumstances there will be no order regarding costs. Petition dismissed.
-
1981 (8) TMI 231
... ... ... ... ..... appellant had not been proved to be in possession in that year. The finding was confirmed in revision by the Director of Consolidation on 22nd Aug. 1969, and it was that order which was under challenge before the High Court. 3. The finding above mentioned being one of fact is not open to challenge before us unless it can be shown that it is perverse or based on no evidence at all, which is not the ease here. Both the Deputy Director and the Director have given cogent reasons to negative the claim of the appellant that he was in possession of the land in dispute in Fasli year 1359. Consequently, we see no reason for interference with the impugned order and dismiss the appeal with costs throughout.
-
1981 (8) TMI 230
- scope, ambit and meaning of the word ’judgment’ - the power under s. 104 read with order 43 Rule 1 - Application of the Code to Revenue Courts:
-
1981 (8) TMI 229
... ... ... ... ..... 3 and stored at the godown. The petitioners were unable to produce any record to substantiate this claim and the authorities below rightly turned down this contention. The petitioners made an alternate plea that even assuming that the goods seized were removed from the factory subsequent to March 1, 1973, those were removed after payment of duty. The petitioners were also unable to produce any material to substantiate its claim and in these circumstances, the authorities below were justified in relying upon the statement of the driver and the owner of the tempo that the goods seized were those which were removed from the factory. In my judgment, unless the petitioners establish their contention by appropriate material, it is futile to claim that the impugned orders in any way suffer from infirmity. In these circumstances, I do not find any reason to disturb the order of the authorities below and the petition must fail. 8. Accordingly, the rule is discharged with costs.
-
1981 (8) TMI 228
... ... ... ... ..... ted to be cleared in the current financial year) that such value is not likely to exceed ₹ 5 lakhs. 14. The Board also observes that had the appellants written a simple letter satisfying the requirements of the declaration Notification No. 80/80-CE, dated 19-6-1980, their clearances would have been entitled to the said exemption. 15. Thus, the Board observes that though a declaration as required under Notification No. 80/80-CE, dated 19-6-1980 was not filed by the appellants, the declaration contained in Item 6 of the Schedule in their letter dated 15-7-1980 (which has been received in the concerned financial year) could be taken to serve the purpose of such a declaration. 16. The Board, therefore, takes a lenient view and allows the appeal. 17. The Board, however, warns the appellants that such lenient attitude will not be repeated and they should be careful in future and ensure that the requirement of the law and procedures are satisfied by them.
-
1981 (8) TMI 227
... ... ... ... ..... hey had once again mentioned about the return of the books and records for their “study” and “making the correct statement”, for had they received the letter dated 26/27-12-1980, they would not have again made the above request. This aspect could at least have been covered by the communication dated 27-1-1981 from the Collector’s Office (which this time was sent by Registered Post Ack. Due) when the extension for filing a reply to the show cause notice was intimated to the appellants. 15. In view of this area of doubt about the receipt of the letter dated 26/27-12-1980, the Board is constrained to uphold that the principles of natural justice have not been observed in this case. The Board, therefore, sets aside the Collector’s order under appeal and remands the case to the Collector for de novo adjudication after affording full opportunity to the appellants to put up their defence and after observing the principles of natural justice.
-
1981 (8) TMI 226
... ... ... ... ..... ls that it is splitting technical hairs to judge whether formulation" and manufacture" are one and the same or different. The Board considers that this difference is without any worthwhile distinction. 16. It has been already admitted by the Chemical Examiner in his report which formed the very basis of this case that Benzene and Toluene were used as solvent medium in the manufacture formulation of Malathion (Technical). Further, the appellants with their Al-6 application itself has given the process outlining the intended use of Benzene and Toluene which was also accepted by the Department. As such Board holds that the intended use of benzene and toluene was as a solvent medium. 17. In view of above, the Board considers that this case is fully covered under the provisions of Notification No. 34/73-CE, dated 1-3-1973 and the appellants were entitled to avail of the concession granted under the said notification. 18. The appeal is accordingly allowed.
-
1981 (8) TMI 225
... ... ... ... ..... o be duly realised during the time of clearances of fabrics made from yarn in question and for that monthly D. 12 returns were submitted and assessments made by the proper officer. There is no evidence to establish or hold that the quantity found unaccounted for to the extent of 1.5% was surreptitiously removed by the applicants or was not so consumed. Government also appreciate the petitioners difficulty in correlating that quantity of yarn with the fabrics manufactured and cleared out of it because of lack of detailed accounts in view of the relaxation in maintenance of RG. 1 account for yarn. Under the circumstances, Government do not see any justification for demanding duty on the quantity of yarn contained in such incident unless it was established that the yarn was not used for manufacture of fabrics or was somehow simultaneously cleared. Government see no basis for such adverse conclusion in this case. 5. Government accordingly allow the revision application.
-
1981 (8) TMI 224
... ... ... ... ..... er and centrifugal fan are similar and there is no clear demarcation as fans or otherwise between an air compressor and a centrifugal blower. 4.3. The Government hold that technical demarcation is not relevant once it is seen that the goods in question fall within the broad classification of Industrial fans as commercially understood. The applicants’ citation of the judgment of the Gujarat High Court (vide S.l.M. Maneklal Industry vs. Union of India)-1979 E.L.T. (J 150) (Guj.) does not hold good in this context as the goods under consideration by the High Court were Lobe compressor whereas the goods manufactured by the petitioners are described and sold as multi-stage pressure blower which is nothing but a fan. 5. The Government accordingly hold that the subject goods known as multi-stage pressure blowers are correctly classified as industrial fans under Tariff Item 33(2) of the Central Excise, Tariff. 6. The revision Application is accordingly rejected.
-
1981 (8) TMI 223
... ... ... ... ..... gned order-in-appeal is not speaking order. Government, therefore, consider that it deserves to be set aside on this ground alone. Government accordingly set aside the order-in-appeal with direction to the Appellate Collector to dispose of the appeal de novo after due compliance with the principles of natural justice so as to issue a speaking order which should deal with all the points urged by the petitioners. The Appellate Collector should thereby give his findings on different points such as whether or not deduction should have been allowed on account of sales tax and octroi (which are in the nature of admissible deduction) in computing the assessable value with reference to the sale price of ENPI Distributor upon which he has not touched at all in the impugned order-in-appeal. The petitioners have also raised several other points in their appeal which likewise ought to be dealt with by Appellate Collector in his order. The revision application is disposed of accordingly.
-
1981 (8) TMI 222
... ... ... ... ..... e read as “Rayon and Synthetic Fibres and Yarn including Textile Yarn... (1) Fibre and Yarn other than Textile Yarn” and that there was no separate sub-item in respect of the waste of yarn in question. The Govt. further observe that the rayon yarn waste falling under Tariff Item 18(1) was to pay a lower effective rate of duty by virtue of Notification No. 53/72 and that the petitioners have been paying duty on the yarn waste in question accordingly. The Govt. therefore, considers that since Notification No. 198/76 as amended by Notification No. 249 of 76 extends the benefit of the concessions to rayon and synthetic yarn of above 1100 deniers falling under Tariff Item 18(1) and since the waste in question also was classifiable only under Item 18(1) of the Central Excise Tariff, i.e., as rayon and synthetic yarn, the benefit of the Notification should be available to the waste also, and hold accordingly. 6. The Govt. dispose of the revision application accordingly.
-
1981 (8) TMI 221
... ... ... ... ..... notification. 4. Government observe that the petitioners receive rolls of paper which are subjected to a series of processes resulting in the final product. The final product has a distinct name, character, and use different from the base paper and therefore the final product could be said to be resulted on account of a process of manufacture. Sub-item (2) of Tariff Item 17 of Central Excise Tariff covers papers board and all other kinds of papers (including paper or paper boards which have been subjected to various treatments such as coating, impregnating, corrugation, creping and design printing) not elsewhere specified. It is wide in its scope. It is not disputed that the paper is waxed and thereafter cleared for sale. Government consider that the goods under consideration would be nothing but waxed paper and would fall under sub-item (2) of Tariff Item 17 of Central Excise Tariff. Government accordingly uphold the order-in-appeal and reject the revision application.
-
1981 (8) TMI 220
... ... ... ... ..... that the impugned goods are nothing but a stack of stamping which have been cleated and rivetted together by aluminium and are, therefore, nothing but stampings within the meaning of Item 28A of the First Schedule to the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. Government however, observe that the impugned goods are a new product having a name, character and use distinct from that of stampings and are therefore, beyond the scope of Item 28A of the Central Excise Tariff. Further, since other manufacturing operations are required before the impugned goods can be termed as rotors they are also not excisable under Item 30(4) of the Central Excise Tariff. In the circumstances the impugned goods are rightly classifiable under the residuary Item 68 of the Central Excise Tariff. 4. In view of the above, Government set aside the impugned order-in-appeal and restores the Order-in-Original C. No. V/30/30/144/72 passed by the Asstt. Collector of Central Excise, Bangalore - II Division.
-
1981 (8) TMI 219
... ... ... ... ..... o the notification uses the expression ‘the total weight of the said vegetable product’. As expressed as the tentative view of the Govt. in the show cause notice Govt. hold that a reading of Sl. No. 1 of the Table to the notification with the main body of the notification leads to the conclusion that for determining the ‘total weight of the vegetable product’, the total quantity of vegetable product cleared during the relevant period is to be taken into account irrespective of whether or not in a particular batch there was any cotton seed oil or not. 4. In view of the above the Govt. in exercise of the powers under Section 36(2) of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 set aside the impugned Order-In-Appeal Nos.- V(13)2-9-/77, dated 17-6-1978 passed by the Appellate Collector of Central Excise, Bombay and restore the Order-in-Original No. V(13)CSO-NC/ 2/76/4071, dated 6-7-1977 passed by the Asstt. Collector of Central Excise, Division-V, Bombay.
-
1981 (8) TMI 218
... ... ... ... ..... 44 and the appellants must pay duty on the job charges collected by them, vide notification No. 119/75-CE, dated 30-4-1975, then in force curing the material period, but for the purpose of valuation under Notification 176/77 not only the value of job charges but also the value of tanks/vessels was to be considered. 8. Regarding the other two categories, since the original manufacturers of naked tanks/vessels had cleared the same on payment of the appropriate duty, their subsequent rubberlining or re-rubberlining would not be directly relevant as in that case even after this process tanks/vessels continue to be the same commodity excisable under the same Tariff Item the process of rubberlining or re-rubberlining does not bring into existence of goods of different taxable description. Thus, in the case of the categories mentioned at (b) and (c) above, process of rubberlining or re-rubberlining would not amount to manufacture. 9. The appeal is disposed of accordingly.
-
1981 (8) TMI 217
... ... ... ... ..... t to add the similar words ”in any capacity" or “in all capacities” at the end of sub-sections (1) and (3) of section 16 of the Act which deal with the requirement of making a declaration. But it has not been so provided with a clear intention not to club the two. 11. As the petitioner is getting the relief on the first contention discussed above, it is therefore, not necessary for us to go into the other ground whether or not the ornaments seized from the Bank-locker belonged to the daughter of Late Amolakchand and by reason of which he was not responsible to make the declaration. 12. For the reasons stated above, the petition succeeds and is hereby allowed. The impugned orders (Annexures VI, VIII and XI) are quashed. The confiscated ornaments seized from the Bank-locker weighing 1500.00 grammes be released and returned to the petitioner. There will be no orders as to costs of this petition. The security amount be refunded to the petitioner.
-
1981 (8) TMI 216
Whether the detention is to be continued beyond a period of three months or not?
Whether there was unreasonable delay on the part of the State Government in considering the representation of the detenu?
Held that:- The only inhibition on the detaining authority is that it cannot lawfully continue the detention for a period longer than three months unless the Advisory Board has, before the expiration of the period of three months, reported that three is in its opinion sufficient cause for such detention. We must therefore hold that the State Government did not commit any breach of its constitutional or legal obligation in making a reference to the Advisory Board without first determining the period for which the detenu was to be detained.
The affidavit of C. V. Karnik shows that the representation of the detenu was immediately put up before the Minister of State for Home for consideration, in the light of the comments received from the Customs Authorities and the representation was considered and rejected by the Minister of State for Home on 23rd February, 1981 and necessary intimation to that effect was conveyed to the detenu by a letter dated 25th February 1981. It is impossible to hold in these circumstances that there was any unreasonable delay on the part of the State Government in considering the representation of the detenu . Petition dismissed.
-
1981 (8) TMI 215
... ... ... ... ..... erein above we are unable to agree that taking aid of the amendment in the entry cooked food since 31st August, 1974, it should be held that earlier to this ice-cream and icecandy were included within the ken of cooked food . 23.. As a result of the foregoing discussion, in our opinion, the view taken in Mahavir Ice Cream Factory s case (Misc. Petition No. 214 of 1976 decided on 9th April, 1980-Madhya Pradesh High Court) is a correct view. We, therefore, answer the question referred to us in the negative. For clarification the question referred and our answer are set out herein below Question Whether, under the facts and circumstances of the case, icecream, ice-candy is cooked food and is covered by item 8 of Part I of Schedule II appended to the M.P. General Sales Tax Act, 1958. Answer In the facts and circumstances of the case, ice-cream and icecandy are not cooked food and are not covered by item 8 of Part I of Schedule II appended to the M.P. General Sales Tax Act, 1958.
........
|