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1982 (3) TMI 116
A Firm, Minor Child, Share Income, Total Income ... ... ... ... ..... nder the provisions of section 64(iii). The Supreme Court decision in the case of Prem Bhai Parekh has also been followed by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of G. Ethirajulu. The facts of that case are also similar to those of the assessee where gifts were made by the assessee to his minor son who was admitted to the benefits of the partnership in which the said gifts were invested and in that case their Lordships held . . . that the share income of the assessee s minor sons from Ranganatha Silk House did not arise as a result of the transfer by the assessee but arose as a result of the admission to the benefits of partnership and as such it was not liable to be included in the total income of the assessee under section 64(iv) of the Act. 12. For the reasons given by the AAC in her order and on the basis of facts of the instant case and in the light of the discussion above, we hereby confirm the order of the AAC. 13. In the result, the revenue s appeal is dismissed.
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1982 (3) TMI 115
Assessment Year, Civil Court, Land Acquisition, Right To Receive Compensation, Valuation Date
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1982 (3) TMI 114
Charitable Purpose ... ... ... ... ..... p was open to all and the main objects were to afford its members and the public at large facilities for development of interests in drawing, painting, drama, dance, music and other fine arts, etc. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Surat Art Silk Cloth Mfrs . Assn. is clearly applicable to the facts of the present case and the assessee is entitled to exemption under section 11. It is noted that the AAC has carefully considered the various objects and activities of the assessee-society, kept in view the findings of the Tribunal for the assessment year 1972-73, and has given detailed reasons for coming to the conclusion that the main objects of the assessee-society having been charitable and of general public utility, it was entitled to the exemption provided under section 11. We, therefore, find no reason to interfere with the order of the AAC on this point. 7. In the result, the departmental appeal is dismissed.
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1982 (3) TMI 113
Net Wealth, Debt Owed ... ... ... ... ..... the modes of recovery of tax. There is no question of disputing by way of appeal, revision or other proceedings as not payable, so far as the tax deducted at source from the salaries of the employees is concerned. Similarly, the time limit of 12 months outstanding on the valuation date is not applicable in respect of tax deducted at source inasmuch as such tax is bound to be paid within the specified time under rule 30 of the Income-tax Rules, 1962. It is only for the recovery of the tax deducted at source or failure to do so that the person responsible is treated as an assessee in default and the amount is sought to be recovered from him. There is no scope for extending the deeming provision contained in section 201 of the Act for the purpose of section 2(m)(iii) of the Wealth-tax Act. In this view of the matter, the decision of the AAC is quite justified and consequently does not call for any interference. 8. In the result, all the six appeals by the revenue are dismissed.
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1982 (3) TMI 112
Assets, Property Of Every Description ... ... ... ... ..... mpensation, which right would arise only on the publication of the compensation roll, as rightly held by the Tribunal. We should say that the position of the present case is worst inasmuch as the assessee had no ray of hope in getting any compensation from the Government of Bangladesh in respect of her property that were taken over and declared as enemy property. It is on account of compassionate view taken by the Government of India that the assessee received compensation of Rs. 63,050 on 18-6-1976. On a consideration of this fact and keeping in view the decision of the Calcutta High Court in the case of U.C. Mahatab, we are of the opinion that the AAC was justified in his direction to exclude the value of the compensation from the net wealth of the assessee receivable by the assessee after the valuation dates relevant to the assessment years under appeal, in respect of her assets seized and possessed by the Bangladesh Government. 6. In the result, the appeals are dismissed.
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1982 (3) TMI 111
Reference To Valuation Officer, Reversionary Value ... ... ... ... ..... t rent of the premises in question would be forthcoming in perpetuity. The said finding of the learned DVO is yet to be tested on facts in the proper forum and it would be entirely inappropriate for us to express any opinion on it without the assessee getting an opportunity to assail it, if possible, in the appropriate forum. The Commissioner has also refrained from making any observations on merits as pointed out by us above nor shall we make any at this stage. Suffice it to say, as we have already said in para 3 supra that prima facie the method of valuation adopted by the departmental valuer is not against logic and established practice. If what he says is correct his method is correct. But whether or not what he has said is correct is yet to be adjudged let it be adjudged in the normal course. 41. Accordingly, we refuse to interfere with the orders of the learned Commissioner. His orders are valid in law and, therefore, we affirm them. 42. In the result, the appeals fail.
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1982 (3) TMI 110
... ... ... ... ..... a given amount would not vest in the assessee till such court s decree is passed. The ld. CIT(A) was, therefore, in our opinion, justified in holding that in the intervening period, the relationship of landlord and tenant itself is in question and so no income can be said to be accruing or arising to the assessee when it does not accept the status of landlord, vis-a-vis the persons against whom eviction suits have been filed by the assessee. The assessee has already given in writing that it may be taxed with regard to the damage to be awarded to it by the courts in the years in which decree in question would be passed. Though for bringing to assessment a certain income, the consent of an assessee is not necessary, yet it goes to show that the assessee does not want to challenge its assessability as and when decree is passed. For the reasons given above, I do not find that the order of the ld. CIT(A) is erroneous. Accordingly, I uphold it. 11. In the result, the appeals fail.
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1982 (3) TMI 109
Business Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... of the services but one has also to find out as to whether the payee had acquired the right to enforce the payment of the said amount. Till this right crystallises, it would not be possible to say that the expenditure in question has been incurred or that the liability to pay it has accrued and arisen. Vide terms of clause (6) of the agreement referred to above, it is clear that the agent in question could not have asked the assessee to make the payment until full realisation of the sale proceeds of the exported materials had been made and conversely speaking if there is no realisation, no commission would at all be payable. When this is the position, it cannot be said that the liability to pay commission had accrued and arisen during the previous year merely because the agents had rendered services during the previous year. The order of the learned Commissioner (Appeals) appear to be correct and I confirm it. 7. This para is not reproduced here as it involves a minor point.
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1982 (3) TMI 108
Capital Gains, Computation Of ... ... ... ... ..... cy rights as on 1-1-1954 is to be deducted while computing the capital gains arising on the sale of the property on 14-3-1974 ? 2. The facts of the case, as also the reasons that impelled the members of the original Bench to come to the different conclusions, have been very ably set out by both of them in their respective orders. I do not, therefore, consider it necessary to reiterate them over again in the present order. Suffice it to say that having carefully considered the matter in the light of the opinions expressed by my two learned brothers, as also the able arguments of the representative of both the sides, I find myself in agreement with the views expressed by my learned brother, the Judicial Member. I would, accordingly, answer the two questions that have been referred to me, in the following manner Question No. 1 In the affirmative. Question No. 2 In the negative. The matter will now go back to the original Bench for passing orders conformably to the majority view.
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1982 (3) TMI 107
Deductions, Long-term Capital Gains ... ... ... ... ..... two views are possible on the construction of section 80T and it is significant that the Gujarat High Court in its decision which is the latest decision and which takes into account the earlier decisions has granted leave to the concerned assessee to appeal to the Supreme Court noting that there is a conflict of decisions between the High Courts on the point involved and that both sides rely upon different judgments of the Supreme Court in support of their respective contentions. 8. It is well settled that when two views are possible, the view in favour of the taxpayer rather than the view in favour of the revenue should be preferred. On this principle, we hold that the assessee before us is entitled to succeed. 9. We direct that the amount of deduction under section 80T shall be allowed in proportion to the amount of the long-term capital gain determined before setting off the loss allowable against the income chargeable as long-term capital gains. 10. The appeal is allowed.
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1982 (3) TMI 106
... ... ... ... ..... . 1976-77. On the other hand, Shri L. N. Joy supported order of the CIT. 9. We have considered the contention of both the parties as well as the facts on record. We find that the CIT himself has considered the interest on the loan acquired for purchasing the revenue expense. For the reasons already given earlier in this order, we see no justification in treating the road tax and insurance charges in respect of the new tanker as capital expense. That reason is that these expenses were incurred in the course of carrying on the existing business of the assessee. Hence, there was no mistake in the assessment order passed by the ITO. It was not erroneous to the prejudice of the revenue. Hence, the CIT erred in assuming jurisdiction u/s 263. Order dt. 3rd March, 1981. of the CIT is set aside an we restore the original assessment orders passed by the ITO. 10. In the result, the first appeal filed by the department is dismissed and the second appeal filed by the assessee is allowed.
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1982 (3) TMI 105
... ... ... ... ..... ction of tax) Rs. 84, 000 (2)Dividend on 8, 000 equity shares of Rs. 100 each at Rs. 20 per share (subject to deduction of tax) Rs. 1, 60, 000 Rs. 2, 44, 000 This shows how the mind of the Directors was working and that their reluctance to declare a larger dividend was not with the object of avoidance of tax but was attributable to their anxiety to plough back the profits of the company for use by it in as profitable a manner as possible. 13. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case of the assessee, we find that the profits of the assessee were so small that the declaration of a dividend larger than that declared was unreasonable. As stated earlier, in this view of the matter, we do not find it necessary to go into the other contentions of the assessee and, in fact, we have not heard rival submissions on those other points as it is unnecessary to do so. 14. For the reasons stated above, we direct that the order u/s 104 is cancelled. 15. The appeal is allowed.
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1982 (3) TMI 104
Foreign Company, Computation Of Royalty Income ... ... ... ... ..... percentages mentioned in the section prior to the amendment will be applicable and not the new percentages. If the principle is applied to the present case, the assessee is entitled to succeed in its contention. Further, as pointed out earlier, some significance has to be given to the fact that the section was brought into force not on the first day of any assessment year but from the first day of June. We are, therefore, inclined to accept the contention of the assessee that the effect of the amendment is that it will apply only to expenditure incurred for the period subsequent to the amendment and not during the period prior to the amendment. We, therefore, hold that the assessee is entitled to claim expenses at 50 per cent up to 31-5-1976 and that the expenses will be reduced to 20 per cent only from 1-6-1976. The ground is decided in favour of the assessee. 7. This para is not reproduced here as it deals with a minor issue. 8. In the result, the appeal is allowed in part.
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1982 (3) TMI 103
Draft Assessment Order ... ... ... ... ..... 144B and if so done, it will be clear that the last portion of the clause obviously refers to cases where no objections have been received within time or within extended time. We, therefore, reject the alternative contention of the assessee that in the present case, the ITO should have forwarded the draft and the objections to the IAC and that he should have treated the case as one in which no objections have been filed. In view of the findings above, the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) cannot be sustained and has to be set aside. 17. The order of the Commissioner (Appeals) shows that he has dealt with only the grounds relating to the validity of the assessment order. It is not indicated that there were no other grounds in the appeal before him. The matter will, therefore, be restored to the Commissioner (Appeals) for the limited purpose of disposing of the remaining grounds, if any. Ordered accordingly. 18. The appeal will be treated as allowed for statistical purposes.
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1982 (3) TMI 102
In Part, Set Off, Total Income, Trading Liability, Unabsorbed Depreciation ... ... ... ... ..... excluded from the assets of that trust for the purposes of computing the assessee s interest as a remainderman in that trust if those loans are found to be irrecoverable. As stated earlier, we have directed that the assessee s interest in the Sheth Hargovindas Jiwandas Family Trust should be valued under rule 1B. In consonance with the aforesaid direction, we hereby direct that the WTO will take only those factors into consideration as may be permitted under rule 1B and none other. Incidentally, we find that rule 1B does not provide for deduction of bad debts from the value of the assets of the trust for determining the value of life interest of a beneficiary. Therefore, the order of the AAC giving such a direction is erroneous and is, therefore, vacated. 11. In the result, the appeals filed by the revenue for the first five years, namely, the assessment years 1968-69 to 1972-73 are dismissed whereas the appeals for the assessment years 1973-74 and 1974-75 are partly allowed.
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1982 (3) TMI 101
Exemption, Agricultural Land ... ... ... ... ..... ia). We agree with the departmental representative that section 5(1)(iva), in the context of the other sub-sections, would only cover agricultural land not growing crops, grass or standing trees on such land because they are dealt with separately by means of section 5(1)(viiia) and (viiib). The overall limit mentioned in section 5(1)(iva) originally and now read with section 5(1A) do not apply to growing crops covered under section 5(1)(viiia) or trees standing on agricultural land or trees in an orchard or plantation covered by section 5(1)(viiib). In this view of the matter, we hold that the assessee is entitled to exemption of coconut trees in the coconut garden under section 5(1)(viiia). We uphold the order of the AAC on a different ground, viz., that the trees are exempt under section 5(1)(viiia) and not under section 5(1)(iva). In this view of the matter, we uphold the order of the AAC though for a different reason. 8. The departmental appeals are accordingly dismissed.
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1982 (3) TMI 100
Revision, Orders Prejudicial To Revenue ... ... ... ... ..... inquiry and the Commissioner has jurisdiction under section 33B of the 1922 Act to revise the assessment order. It was further held that the assessee had not in any way suffered from the failure of the Commissioner to indicate the results of the enquiries to the assessee as the assessee would have full opportunity of showing to the ITO whether the income assessed in the assessment order, which was originally passed, was correct or not. The ratio laid down in the above cases squarely applies to the facts of the instant case. 10. The decisions relied upon by the assessee s counsel in CIT v. Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd. 1973 91 ITR 8 (SC) and CIT v. A. Raman and Co. 1968 67 ITR 11 (SC) have no application to the facts of the instant case. In our view, the Commissioner s action in invoking the provisions of section 263 and passing the order dated 20-11-1979 under section 263 is perfectly valid. Accordingly, we uphold his order. 11. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed.
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1982 (3) TMI 99
Salaries, Perquisite ... ... ... ... ..... gh Court in the above case that the interest that was chargeable during the relevant years, which has been fixed at 10 per cent, is a benefit that had accrued to the assessee without cost, attracting the definition of the term perquisite under section 17(2) and failing under section 17(2)(iii)(a). The above ratio squarely applies to the instant case. 4. An identical question had come up for consideration before this bench of the Tribunal in IT Appeal No. 234 (Bang.) of 1980. The Tribunal, by its order dated 29-7-1981, held that the interest-free loan granted by the employer to its employee is a benefit and amounts to a perquisite. The above ratio squarely applies to the instant case. 5. In our view, the concessional rate of interest granted by the employer to the assessee is a benefit and amounts to a perquisite. Thus, the ITO was perfectly justified in adding Rs. 1,727 in each or the year under appeal. We uphold the same. 6. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed.
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1982 (3) TMI 98
... ... ... ... ..... customary bonus. In the case of National Litho Printers, the Tribunal (Hyderabad Bench) held that section 36(1)(ii) deals with the situation where any sum is payable to an employee as bonus in terms of the Payment or Bonus Act, 1965 but the said provision has got nothing to do with any payment made by an assessee on any other occasion to its employees. In that case bonus paid on the silver jubilee celebrations, which was in excess of 20 per cent of the salary, was allowed as a deduction. The ratio laid down in the above cases squarely applies to the instant case. This is a customary bonus paid by the assessee to its employees and so it is allowable as a deduction. The provisions of section 36(1)(ii) will have no application so far as the customary bonus is concerned. Thus, customary bonus paid is allowable as a business expenditure. Thus, the Commissioner (Appeals) was right in allowing the same, Thus, we uphold his order. 4. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed.
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1982 (3) TMI 97
... ... ... ... ..... is brought in findings of the past years may be various. In our view, the matter should go back to the CIT who is to record his finding afresh in light of the approved valuer s report relied on by the assessee. For this reason, we vacate the finding of the CIT (A) and restore the appeal on this issue to his file. 8. There is the last issue regarding the claim for rebate under s. 80G. CIT has dealt with this issue in para 8 of his order where he had referred to the fact that ITO had already caused the rectification. It is brought out before us on behalf of the assessee that no such rectification had been made by the ITO. The DR who represented on behalf of the Revenue agreed that no such rectification had been made. Therefore, the finding of CIT cannot be sustained. The appeal on this issue is to go back once more to CIT who will verify and then record a finding on this ground of appeal. We order accordingly. 9. In the result, appeal filed by the assessee is allowed in parts.
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