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Showing 141 to 160 of 234 Records
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1982 (3) TMI 96
Additional Income-Tax On Undistributed Profits ... ... ... ... ..... ve agreed with the learned counsel for the assessee and the same can be taken at Rs. 10,34,427 and after deducting the current income-tax liability, we are left with Rs. 3,01,763. No part of the arrears of tax liability have to be made out of this surplus as the provision for taxes was sufficient to meet the liabilities known on the date of declaration of dividend. Our attention has not been drawn to any other liabilities of any kind which the directors could have taken into consideration at the time of declaration of dividend. The amount available to the assessee could not be considered to be small and the directors should have declared larger dividend as the funds permitted it. In view of this, we agree with the learned Commissioner (Appeals) that this was a fit case for imposition of additional tax under section 104. It has not been contended that the working of the additional tax is wrong. We, therefore, upheld the orders of the lower authorities. The appeal is dismissed.
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1982 (3) TMI 95
Firm, Registration, Validity Of Partnership ... ... ... ... ..... the Madhya Pradesh High Court have taken a contrary view that simply because no business was carried on during the relevant previous year, it cannot be said that a valid partnership was not in existence and registration could not be refused on this ground alone. However, with great respect to their Lordships of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, we are more inclined to follow the rulings of the Bombay High Court and the Mysore High Court. We, therefore, hold that since the partnership did not carry on any business whatsoever till it ceased to exist on 6-1-1976 when it was dissolved, it cannot be said that there was a firm as contemplated by the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, and, therefore, the claim of registration was rightly refused by the revenue authorities. The appeal against the order under section 154 passed by the AAC, therefore, becomes infructuous and no more survives for consideration. 8. Both the appeals filed by the assessee, therefore, fail and are hereby dismissed.
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1982 (3) TMI 94
... ... ... ... ..... Enterprises referred to on behalf of the assessee and we are in respectful agreement with the said view. Accordingly, we are of the view that the IT authorities were not justified in holding that the 4 minors admitted to the benefits of the partnership should be taken into account for determining whether or not the limit of 20 for persons provided in s.11(2) of the Companies Act, 1956 has been exceeded and in thereby holding that the registration of the partnership firm deserved to be cancelled under s. 186(1). In view of the above, the matter will now go back to the ITO in the light of the view expressed by the CIT (Appeals) (and which we uphold) to the effect that an opportunity shall be afforded to the assessee to have the partnership deed amended in accordance with law to provide for the signature of the guardians of the minors admitted to the benefits of partnership. 8. In the result, the appeals filed by the assessee are allowed in the light of our above observations.
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1982 (3) TMI 93
Income From House Property, Deductions ... ... ... ... ..... of business or profession, section 37(1) of the Act is a section under which the assessee-company claimed deduction which do not fall in any of the sections preceding that section, namely, sections 30 to 36 of the Act. In a recent decision in a case of CIT v. Kalyanji Mavji and Co. 1980 122 ITR 49 the Hon ble Supreme Court had an occasion to consider the assessee s claim for deduction of repairs, which were accumulated over many years. In that case, the Hon ble Supreme Court has held that merely because such repairs would not fall under section 30(a), that fact by itself would not prevent the assessee to claim deduction on account of accumulated repairs under section 37(1). Since similar provisions are not available in computing the income from house property, we are of the view that the assessee would not be entitled to claim deduction on account of repairs and the income-tax authorities have, therefore, rightly rejected its claim. 10. In the result, the appeal is dismissed.
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1982 (3) TMI 92
Rectification Of Mistakes, Apparent From Record ... ... ... ... ..... case has to be decided on its own facts. Therefore, we are of the view that the aforesaid decisions would not be of much help to the assessee. In the instant case, it is an admitted fact that the assessee had neither claimed deduction of Rs. 1,800 nor had placed relevant materials before the ITO in this regard at the time of original assessment proceedings. It is also clear from the order of the AAC (reproduced above) that he had simply stated that a sum of Rs. 1,800 relates to the preceding year is obviously to be disallowed. It is a trite law that in order to claim deduction from the total income, it is for the assessee to lead proper evidence and material. As already stated above, this was not done by the assessee and, therefore, a mere observation without any material on record would not justify the assessee to move an application under section 154. We have, therefore, no hesitation in upholding the order of the AAC under appeal. 8. In the result, the appeal is dismissed.
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1982 (3) TMI 91
Firm, Registration, Validity Of Partnership ... ... ... ... ..... erred to on behalf of the assessee, and we are in respectful agreement with the said view. Accordingly, we are of the view that the income-tax authorities were not justified in holding that 4 minors admitted to the benefits of the partnership should be taken into account for determining whether or not the limit of 20 persons provided in section 11(2) of the Companies Act, has been exceeded, and in thereby holding that the registration of the partnership firm deserved to be cancelled under section 186(1). In view of the above, the matter will now go back to the ITO in the light of the view expressed by the Commissioner (Appeals) (and which we uphold) to the effect that an opportunity shall be afforded to the assessee to have the partnership deed amended in accordance with law to provide for the signature of the guardians of the minors admitted to the benefits of partnership. 8. In the result, the appeals filed by the assessee are allowed in the light of our above observations.
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1982 (3) TMI 90
... ... ... ... ..... lty involved when he observed that the amount received by the assessee on his retirement from the firm was not in the nature of goodwill and it could be construed as compensation in respect of the lands belonging to the firm. No sooner it is held that the amount was received in respect of an asset of the firm, such as, the lands or even the goodwill, it follows that there is no question of any transfer involved and what the assessee was receiving was merely his own share in the assets of the firm and such a transaction could not give rise to any taxable income. I feel that when the position is so clear, there is no question of judging the issue from the angle of capital gains on the footing of goodwill received by the assessee. The description given by the assessee in the return cannot change the legal position about the true nature of the amount of Rs. 18,000 received. The addition of Rs. 18,000 made by the ITO is deleted and the appeal is allowed. 4. The appeal is allowed.
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1982 (3) TMI 89
... ... ... ... ..... e of the firm is the undisclosed income of the respective partners in their profit-sharing ratio. It is thus the undisclosed income of the firm which has come to the partner and which has been invested by him in various assets. Therefore, in our view, the assessee is entitled to the relief which he has claimed in his returns to the extent of the amounts which represented his proportionate share in the undisclosed income of the firm. There is a clear case of double taxation of the same amount and the ITO was not justified in including the proportionate share of the firm in the order under section 143(3) read with section 147(a). In our view, the AAC was justified in allowing the claim of the assessee. We, therefore, uphold the order on this issue. 7. The assessee has filed cross-objections against the order of the AAC for the years 1970-71 to 1975-76. The assessee did not press these cross-objections. 8. In the result, the appeals as well as the cross-objections are dismissed.
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1982 (3) TMI 88
... ... ... ... ..... essee could have paid the tax even by borrowing the money. The assessee has not done that and no efforts have been made for the payment of tax. All these go to show that the assessee was well aware of his obligation to file the return on 30th June, 1976. As regards the assessee s contention that the return was ready before the said date, we cannot accept such plea unless there is some proof. The assessee has not furnished any proof in support of his claim and secondly the return could have been filed without payment of tax and thirdly no efforts have been made to pay the tax in spite of knowing that that is a statutory requirement. In these circumstances, we are of the view that the assessee has failed to file the return without any reasonable cause and is therefore guilty of conduct contumacious or dishonest or has acted in conscious disregard of his obligations. In the result, the penalty imposed by the ITO and sustained by the AAC is confirmed. 4. The appeal is dismissed.
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1982 (3) TMI 87
... ... ... ... ..... the ground that the said amount represented refunds made by the assessee during the year under appeal. Before us no material was placed to controvert the finding of the CIT(A), therefore, his decision is upheld. 15. The next contention is for the asst. yr. 1973-74 and it related to the payment of Rs. 10,000 to staff welfare fund. For the reasons stated in para 14 of our order in ITA No. 1972/Ahd/80 dt. 22nd March, 1982, we uphold the decision of the CIT(A). 16. The next contention is common to both the years under appeal and it relates to relief u/s 36(1)(viii)of the Act. For the reasons stated in paras 10 and 11 of the order of the Tribunal, cited supra, we uphold the decision of the CIT(A). 17. The last contention relates to the asst. yr. 1974-75 is in regard to the gratuity paid to LIC amounting to Rs. 28,928. For the reasons stated in para 13 of our order, cited supra, we decline to interfere with the decision of the CIT(A). 18. In the result, the appeals are dismissed.
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1982 (3) TMI 86
Revision, Orders Prejudicial To Revenue ... ... ... ... ..... o the claim of partial partition and, if required, make any changes in the wealth computed in those assessment years. In other words, if the WTO finds that the assessee s claim for partial partition was justified, the assessments will need no modification but if the claim is rejected, the WTO can include the value of movable assets in the assessments of the HUF. 9. As for the assessment years 1970-71 and 1971-72, the only ground for the Commissioner to act under section 25(2) has failed and his action is found to be unsustainable, we set aside his order for those two assessment years and restore the impugned orders of the WTO and fully allow the appeals of the assessee. In regard to the assessment years 1972-73 to 1975-76, the assessee succeeds partly and the action of the Commissioner is upheld only to the limited extent of dealing with the claim of partial partition of movable assets on 30-11-1970. For those years, the assessee s appeals may be treated to be partly allowed.
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1982 (3) TMI 85
Capital Gains ... ... ... ... ..... f the tenancy rights was determined and partner Shri Premshankar C. Mehta paid the amount and it was that amount which was taken into account for working out of share of loss of the partners. Lastly, it is clear from the tenor of goodwill account that first the value of tenancy rights was determined and realised and then only the profit and loss account of the year was worked out. This is not a case of preparation of any realisation account on dissolution of a partnership firm. In view of this, the amount paid of Rs. 28,000 will have to be treated as the sale price paid for tenancy rights by partner Shri Premshankar C. Mehta and it is not a case of a partner taking over the assets of the firm on its dissolution. From this, it follows that the assessee-firm realised capital gains of Rs. 55,800 on the sale of tenancy rights and it is correctly held by the AAC that the amount is liable to tax as such in the hands of the firm. 6. The appeal of the assessee fails and is dismissed.
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1982 (3) TMI 84
Rectification Of Mistake, Apparent From Record ... ... ... ... ..... that the grounds already taken up before the AAC (reproduced above) were wide enough and, therefore, there was nothing wrong in the order of the AAC made under section 154. 8. We have considered the rival submissions of the parties and we find considerable force in the submissions made on behalf of the revenue. When neither a ground nor a plea was raised before the AAC at the time of original hearing regarding the spread over of the unexplained investment on pro rata basis, we fail to appreciate how the AAC could accept such plea on an application made by the assessee under section 154. Again, the issue regarding the investment in the house property in question was a subject-matter of appeal before the Tribunal and, therefore, in our considered opinion, the AAC had no jurisdiction to entertain the application made by the assessee under section 154. In this view of the matter, we set aside the order of the AAC passed under that section. 9. In the result, the appeal is allowed.
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1982 (3) TMI 83
... ... ... ... ..... ly fall within the mischief of Explanation to s.271(1)(c) of the Act and therefore, we come to the conclusion that on the facts found the levy of penalty was fully justified. Accordingly we uphold the decision of the IAC for asst. yr. 1971-72. 17. Now Shri Shah has made another submission before us to the fact that the entire order imposing penalty was bad as the IAC had not levied the penalty but had directed the ITO to do so. There is no dispute about the fact that the IAC has jurisdiction to levy penalty proceedings with which he was seized. Though the ultimate part of the order is not happily worded if we may say so it does not affect the present proceedings. At worst it could be said to be a procedural irregularity which cannot be said to be fatal to the penalty proceedings. We, therefore, reject the contention challenging the validity of the order. 18. In the result, the appeal for the asst. yr. 1970-71 is partly allowed and that for the asst. yr. 1971-72 is dismissed.
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1982 (3) TMI 82
... ... ... ... ..... same was drawn up on a later date then the question of condoning the delay will not arise because the assessee could not have filed the application along with the deed on the late date. In other words the delay could be condoned only if the deed was in existence on the last day of the previous year but could not be filed to reasons beyond the control of the assessee. But the power to condone the delay could not extend to a case in which the deed of partnership itself was drawn up beyond the last date of the previous year. In the above circumstances, therefore, the delay in drawing up the document of partnership could not be executed and provisions of s. 184(4) do not contemplate such a contingency. This view was also taken by the Kerala High Court in CIT vs. Joseph and George (1970) 77 ITR 292 (Ker). 5. In view of the above facts, therefore, we agree with the authorities below in regard to the decision to refuse registration to the assessee firm. 6. The appeal is dismissed.
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1982 (3) TMI 81
... ... ... ... ..... turns were filed on 20th Feb., 1978. Thus, the assessee miserably failed to show that there were reasonable causes which prevented him from filing the returns within the time. 16. Looking to t he aforesaid facts, entirety of circumstances, preponderance of probabilities and hard facts of life in t he present case, the Department has fully established that the assessee has without any reasonable causes failed to file the returns within the time. On the other hand, the assessee miserably failed to establish that there were reasonable causes which prevented him from filing the returns within t he time. 17. For the reasons discussed above, we are of the view that in the present case penalty under s. 271(1)(a) of the Act is leviable. On behalf of the parties, no arguments were advanced regarding the quantum of penalty. In our opinion, the finding of the ld. AAC is quite correct and no interference is called for. 18. In the result, both the appeals fail and the same are dismissed.
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1982 (3) TMI 80
... ... ... ... ..... ting but at the time of argument before me it was stated that the company in fact did not do so. Then, it could be clearly inferred that the Act of not making of the entries in the accounts was motivated by an oblique purpose. In other words, according to me by not providing for gratuity liability with a view to get over the statutory prohibition set out in s. 40A(7) of the Act, the company cannot now be heard to say that it should be allowed the claim based on general commercial principles. Even the decision in case of Nagri Mills without considering the application of s. 40A(7) would not help the assessee s case in light of the above facts. 15. In light of the above discussion, I agree with the ld. J.M. that the assessee is not entitled to deduction of Rs. 20,03,560, as claimed by it as gratuity liability. 16. The matter may now be placed before the divisional bench which income heard the appeal for final disposal of the above point in accordance with the majority opinion.
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1982 (3) TMI 79
... ... ... ... ..... it. 5. The ld. Deptl. Rep. supported the order of the AAC. 6. I have heard the parties and perused the entire evidence on record. The Aforesaid facts were not disputed by the parties. So from the facts discussed above it comes out that the assessee came to know about its liability when M/s. Pack Well issued debit note to the appellant on 31st Dec., 1977 for Rs. 13,436. There is no evidence on record to show that prior to this date the assessee could know about this liability. In the absence of any other evidence on record it is proved that the liability was ascertained only on 31st Dec., 1977 when M/s. Pack Well issued debit note to the appellant. Under the circumstances the assessee has every right to claim this expenditure in the year of account. Accordingly the claim is allowable in the previous year relevant to the assessment year under consideration as business expenditure. The finding of the ld. AAC to the contrary is incorrect. 7. In the result, the appeal is allowed.
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1982 (3) TMI 78
Executors, Assessment Of ... ... ... ... ..... under section 147(a) read with section 148, in respect of assessment years 1974-75, 1975-76 and 1976-77. In respect of assessment year 1977-78, the ITO was of the view that income which accrued to the assessee under the will was to be included and accordingly he included the same in the assessment. The learned AAC agreed with the said finding. For the reasons discussed above, the initiation of proceedings under section 147(a) was bad in law because in the present cases the assessments were to be made in the hands of the executor, under section 168. So in law there was no escapement of income and as such initiation of proceedings under section 147(a)/148 were bad in law, and as such all the assessment orders are illegal and deserve to be set aside. Accordingly, they are set aside. In the assessment year 1977-78 also, the assessment was to be made under section 168 on the executor. So this assessment is also set aside. 21. In the result all the appeals are decided accordingly.
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1982 (3) TMI 77
Firm, Registration, Application For ... ... ... ... ..... year, but the same was drawn up on a later date, then the question of condoning the delay will not arise because the assessee could not have filed the application along with the deed on the last date. In other words, the delay could be condoned only if the deed was in existence on the last day of the previous year but could not be filed due to some reasons beyond the control of the assessee. But the power to condone the delay could not extend to a case in which the deed of partnership itself was drawn up beyond the last date of the previous year. In the above circumstances, therefore, the delay in drawing up the document of partnership could not be excused and the provisions of section 184(4) do not contemplate such a contingency. This view was also taken by the Kerala High Court in Joseph and George. 5. In view of the above facts, therefore, we agree with the authorities below in regard to the decision to refuse registration to the assessee-firm. 6. The appeal is dismissed.
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