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Showing 21 to 40 of 226 Records
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1982 (4) TMI 277 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nt Commissioner, there is no question at all of an enhancement having to be made by the Tribunal subsequently. Alternatively, if the Appellate Assistant Commissioner had dropped the idea of enhancing, the fact that he had considered the matter, does not improve matters for either party. The real question, therefore, is whether the power of enhancement conferred on the Tribunal by section 36 is shackled by any condition. The text of the section, which we have summarized above, does not contain any limitation or restriction on the power of the Tribunal to make an enhancement of assessment if the appeal relates to an order of assessment. This position is also covered by the authority of a Bench of this Court in Deputy Commissioner v. Panayappan Leather Industries 1981 47 STC 88. The result is that the Tribunal will have to entertain the enhancement petition on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law. The revision is accordingly allowed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 250.
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1982 (4) TMI 276 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rt, as well as function, is to act as an abrasive belt or tool, being operated by an electric motor. It is quite appropriate, therefore, to describe this item of machinery as one which is worked by electricity, rather than to describe it is as an electrical machinery in its very nature. In its very nature it is only an abrasive machinery. The Tribunal was in error in holding that the article dealt in by the assessee was either electrical machinery or that it fell within the meaning of entry 41 or that it came within the sub-classification of electrical grinder under entry 41-B. The article ought, properly, to be taxed for the purpose of single point taxation only under entry 81, as machinery worked by electricity . Therefore, we modify the Appellate Tribunal s order to the extent that the turnover in question ought to be taxed at the rate of 5 per cent single point under entry 81. The assessee having succeeded in this revision is entitled to his costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 250.
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1982 (4) TMI 275 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... and purposeful only because of his examination of the order. Section 32 does not require the Deputy Commissioner to undertake a meaningless and purposeless examination of the assessing authority s order. On the contrary, the examination has to be for the purpose of revision. For the reasons stated above, we reject the assessee s contentions in the same way as they were rejected by the Tribunal. The result is that revision fails and is dismissed. The assessee will pay costs of the State Government counsel s fee Rs. 250. The learned counsel for the assessee makes an oral application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. We do not think that this case is of such a kind that it needs the time and attention of the Supreme Court to be spent on the determination of the question on which we have found no doubt whatever. Nor do we think this is a matter of great public importance to merit deliberation of the highest Court in the land. The oral application is accordingly rejected.
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1982 (4) TMI 274 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ,265.40. This should be paid within three days from the date of receipt of this notice and objections if any should be filed on the same date. 4. Section 6B of the Act provides for levy of additional tax on the turnover, as provided in the said section. There is no provision in the Central Sales Tax Act providing for the levy of additional tax. The notice, however, states that the additional tax payable under the Central Act comes to Rs. 7,265.40. The demand to this extent is plainly unsupportable in law. 5.. In the result I make the following order (i) Writ petition is allowed (ii) The impugned notice dated 17th February, 1982 (annexure B), is set aside (iii) The respondent shall, however, be at liberty to issue fresh notice for the purpose of recovery of additional tax legally recoverable under section 6B of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957. 6.. Smt. Vanaja, the learned High Court Government Pleader, is permitted to file her memo of appearance within two weeks from today.
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1982 (4) TMI 273 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... urchasers within India and K.G. Khosla and Co. (P.) Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes 1966 17 STC 473 (SC) AIR 1966 SC 1216 wherein the dealer had entered into an agreement with the Director General of Supplies and Disposals, New Delhi, for supplying axle-box bodies after getting them manufactured in Belgium and importing them into India. The sale was held to have taken place in the course of import of goods for the movement of goods from Belgium to India was in pursuance of the conditions of contract between the dealer and the Director General of Supplies. On facts, the applicant s case is indistinguishable from that of Mod. Serajuddin 1975 36 STC 136 (SC) AIR 1975 SC 1564. It was rightly held governed by the dictum of that decision. It differs, on facts, from Hanuman Trading Co. s case 1979 43 STC 408 1979 UPTC 809. The principle of that case is, therefore, not attracted. The revision fails and is dismissed though the parties are left to bear their own costs.
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1982 (4) TMI 272 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... but the appeal had been disposed of on merits after taking the relevant facts into consideration. The answer to the question is available in the very proviso to rule 59(2) which clearly recites that such an application is competent. The significant words used in the said proviso are or decided ex Parte . It is obvious that it is immaterial as to whether the decision is made either summarily or after taking into consideration the facts of the case. We would, therefore, answer question No. (1) in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. 4.. As regards question No. (2), we find that the matter to which this question relates was never considered by the Tribunal at all, nor was any finding recorded in respect of the same. The reference of such a question for opinion of this Court is, therefore, not competent. Accordingly, we leave the question unanswered. 5.. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs of this reference.
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1982 (4) TMI 271 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... should be precise and explicit as to the grounds of attack. Vagueness and ambiguity should be meticulously avoided. In the absence of specification with exactitude and clarity as to the grounds of attack, this Court will be justified in declining to entertain the writ proceedings and issue rule nisi. In matters in the nature of highly prerogative writs, it is absolutely essential that the party seeking the same sets forth precisely the grounds of attack, so that the opposite party may be called upon to answer the same with equal specification. Neither this Court nor the opposite party, when called upon to answer, should be obliged to spin around in a labyrinth of vague and nebulous allegations to find out the exact grievance of the petitioner. I am not able to persuade myself to admit this writ petition on the basis of the affidavit filed in support of the same, which is nothing but a net-work of confused and irresponsible allegations. Hence, this writ petition is dismissed.
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1982 (4) TMI 270 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... result for which the blame must lie fairly and squarely at the door of the administration. We fail to understand why the administration should not have amended rule 26 and the form of the declaration until 29th March, 1973, when the amendment in section 5(2)(a)(ii) was made as far as back as 28th May, 1972. The lethargy and inaction on the part of the administration are inexplicable and it is a matter of regret that the Union Territory of Delhi should have lost a large amount of revenue entirely due to gross negligence and default on the part of the administration. In view of the above, the attempt of the learned Advocate-General to distinguish the Polestar Electronic (Pvt.) Ltd. s case 1978 41 STC 409 (SC) must necessarily fail. 6.. Affirming the ratio of the Full Bench in Punjab Khandsari Udyog v. State 1972 30 STC 414 (FB), we direct that the writ petition be now placed before a Single Bench for adjudication on merits. PREM CHAND JAIN, J.-I agree. SHARMA, J.-I also agree.
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1982 (4) TMI 269 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... points (1) Requires the attendance of the dealer in person or by any agent (2) Requires the production of the accounts and documents specified (3) Grants liberty to raise any objection which the dealer may wish to prefer (4) Grants liberty to produce any evidence the dealer may wish to adduce in support of his objections and (5) Grants liberty to show cause why a penalty should not be imposed upon the dealer under section 11(6) of the Act. Out of the above directions, the assessee had complied with the first three directions fully, whereas he complied with the fourth direction partly. In view of the aforesaid observations, it cannot be held that the dealer complied with the notice under section 11(2) fully. Thus, the order of assessment dated 24th July, 1961, was an order under section 11(4) of the Act. Consequently, we reply to the question in both the references in the negative, that is, in favour of the petitioner-assessee and against the department. No order as to costs.
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1982 (4) TMI 268 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... hen ultimately the civil suit was dismissed as withdrawn and the appointment of the receiver came to an end, the liabilities left undischarged by him would have to be discharged by the principal. The petitioners claimed themselves to be proprietors of this business and certainly the liability could be enforced against them. We are not concerned here to see as to what remedy they would have against the receiver if as a result of any act of omission or commission the receiver did not discharge this liability. On the undisputed facts of the case, therefore, when the assessments became final, a demand created as a result of the same is enforceable against the proprietors of the business, that is, the petitioners. The action taken by the tax authorities, therefore, in attaching the properties of the petitioners could not be said to be illegal or unjustified. In the result, the petition fails and is dismissed. In the circumstances, the parties are directed to bear their own costs.
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1982 (4) TMI 267 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... article which, by itself, is enough to cure a human ailment. This Court has accepted departure from the traditional concept of medicine for purposes of the U.P. Sales Tax Act when it held that tartaric acid which, in the broader sense, is a chemical, is medicine (see Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. v. Fadral Chemical Works Ltd. printed at page 425 infra 1980 UPTC 552) and is taxable as a medicine and not as a chemical. Viewed in any light, water for injection is taxable at the lower rate as comprised within the entry medicines and pharmaceutical preparations and not as an unclassified item. In taking a view to the contrary the Tribunal has committed an error in law. Its order cannot be upheld. The revision succeeds. The order of the Tribunal is set aside and it is held that water for injection is a commodity of which turnover was assessable to tax at the lower rate as a medicine within the entry medicines and pharmaceutical preparations . Parties shall bear their own costs.
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1982 (4) TMI 266 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... og Karyalaya 1979 44 STC 270 1979 UPTC 884, and similarly in Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Murari Brothers reported at page 1091 in the same volume (1979 UPTC) 1980 46 STC 88 bhimseni kajal was treated as Ayurvedic medicine and not as a cosmetic or a toilet article. It would thus be seen that in these cases the meaning attributed to the articles concerned was not what is construed in the scientific or technical sense but was as understood in common parlance and by persons dealing with the same and that is the cardinal principle of interpretation in this behalf see Porritts Spencer (Asia) Ltd. v. State of Haryana 1978 42 STC 433 (SC) 1979 UPTC 866 (SC) in which dryer felts made out of cotton or woollen yarn were held to be textiles. To conclude, therefore, in my opinion tartaric acid has been rightly treated as a medicine by the appellate and the revising authorities. The revision hence fails and is dismissed with costs to the respondentassessee, which are assessed at Rs. 200.
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1982 (4) TMI 265 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of the sale, that is, whether it is an inter-State sale or an intra-State sale, does not depend upon the circumstances as to in which State the property in the goods passes. It may pass in either State and yet the sale can be an inter-State sale. Applying these principles, we are clearly of opinion that the sales in the instant case were inter-State sales. Indeed, on similar facts, the same view was taken by a Division Bench of this Court in Commissioner of Sales Tax, M.P., Indore v. C.P. Manganese Ore Co. (Misc. Petition No. 405 of 1976 decided on 11th September, 1980) 1983 54 STC 145. 3.. For the reasons given above, we answer the questions referred as follows (1) The sales made by the assessee to the buyers, the names of which have been mentioned above, were inter-State sales as defined in section 3(a) of the Central Act. (2) The sales in question occasioned the movement of goods as an incident of the contract of sale. There will be no order as to costs of this reference.
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1982 (4) TMI 264 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he levy under section 6 is on the transaction of purchase or sale, as the case may be, and not on mere manufacture of goods. For instance, if a person were to purchase goods not in the course of his business even under circumstances under which no tax was leviable under section 5 of the Act and manufactured goods out of them for his own consumption and not for sale, he would not become liable to pay tax under the said section. Therefore, the levy under section 6 of the Act cannot be construed as being of the nature of excise duty as contended for the petitioners. As the levy, as held in Cheyyabba s case 1980 45 STC 1, is in the nature of tax on sale or purchase, as the case may be, and in respect of transactions carried on by a dealer in the course of business, the levy is perfectly within the legislative competence of the State Legislature under entry 54 of List II. 8.. For the above reasons, I do not find any ground to entertain these petitions. The petitions are rejected.
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1982 (4) TMI 263 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e order form holding that the order form truly reflected the nature of the transaction between the printer in that case and his customers. When the matter was brought before this Court at the instance of the State Government, this Court was not prepared to go behind the finding of the Tribunal on the factual issue, viz., that the order form truly reflected the nature of the bargain between the parties as a two-in-one transaction, the one for supply of paper and the other for the execution of the printing contract. If we were to follow the pattern of the decision in this unreported case we should have made this judgment much shorter than what we are making of it, and disposed of this revision by holding that the order of the Tribunal is correct. However, for the more elaborate reasons which we preferred to render in the earlier paragraphs, we think this petition deserves to be dismissed, and we hereby do so. The assessee will pay the costs of the State. Counsel s fee Rs. 250.
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1982 (4) TMI 262 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tinuous with the perimysium of a group of muscle fibres, and the sarcolemmal sheaths of the fibres are continued as collagen bundles. Where the tendon reaches its attachment to bone, the interfascicular tissue blends with the periosteum, but the collagenous fibres pass through the cortical bone as the perforating fibres of sharpey. (page 550). We have carefully perused the above extracts from Gray s Anatomy. We are unable to accept the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners that these extracts support his contention that bone sinews are not different from bone and fall within the description of bone powder. 9.. For the reasons given above, we are of opinion that the Sales Tax Officer and the Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax were right in holding that bone sinews did not fall within entry No. 9 of Part I of Schedule II. 10.. The petition fails and is dismissed but without any order as to costs. Security amount be refunded to the petitioners. Petition dismissed.
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1982 (4) TMI 261 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... at this idea had been expressed in the earlier decision as well, i.e., Deputy Commissioner v. Travancore Rubber and Tea Co. 1967 20 STC 520 (SC). As in all these Supreme Court cases, so too in the present case, the taxing department has not established positively that the assessees are carrying on an activity for profit which may be properly regarded as a business in selling latex. All that the Tribunal and the other authorities were able to find is that the assessees own a considerable acreage of lands in which rubber trees are grown from which latex is extracted and sold after it is processed into sheets. As the Supreme Court pointed out, these facts, by themselves, are not enough to render the assessees dealers within the meaning of the Central Sales Tax Act. For the reasons aforesaid, we allow this revision and set aside the orders of the Tribunal and the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. The assessees are entitled to their costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 250. Petition allowed.
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1982 (4) TMI 260 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... or the same. But the mere fact that the profit is to some extent adversely affected by the impugned provision does not amount to imposition of unreasonable restriction on the right of the petitioner to carry on trade or business. Indeed that profit at any point of time is reduced with the imposition of higher or further tax. If the contention of the petitioner is accepted it would mean that the taxing power would have to be obliterated or mutilated to a great extent. Such is not the position under our constitutional scheme. It has not been shown that the impact of the surcharge is such as to make it impossible for persons in drug business to carry on trade or business because of the impugned imposition. The argument of the learned counsel cannot, therefore, be accepted. 18.. In my view, therefore, the challenge to the impugned provision fails. These writ applications are accordingly dismissed but in the circumstances without costs. SHARMA, J.-I agree. Applications dismissed.
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1982 (4) TMI 259 - HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT
Managing director – Tenure of appointment, Winding up - Appeals from orders, Inherent powers of Court
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1982 (4) TMI 250 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Applicability of Code of Civil Procedure, Cost and expenses payable out of assets in a winding-up by Court
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