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Case Laws
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1983 (8) TMI 312 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n to grant bail to an offender required to be arrested in other State, in connection with a case registered against him in that State. 10. It may be mentioned here that a similar question arose in Criminal Miscellaneous No. 3378-M of 1980. decided on August 12. 1980 by this Court, That case was also for anticipatory bail filed in this Court. The offender was required to be arrested in a case registered in the State of Rajasthan. S. S. Sidhu, J. dismissed the petition on the ground that it should have been presented in the Rajasthan High Court and was not maintainable in this Court. Though in that case, this question was not discussed in detail, but this Court has taken a view about want of jurisdiction when the case is registered in another State. 11. For the foregoing reasons. I hold that this Court has no jurisdiction to grant anticipatory bail to the petitioners against whom a case has been registered in the State of Madras. Consequently, the present petition is dismissed.
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1983 (8) TMI 311 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... in a property by virtue of section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, did not amount to ownership of the property. The Crown Flour Mills constituted immovable property of more than ₹ 100 in value and title thereto could not pass to the assessee in the absence of a registered sale deed. As admittedly no sale deed was executed in favour of the assessee during the previous year relevant to the assessment year, the title to the Crown Flour Mills did not pass to the assessee. Thus, the Crown Flour Mills was not the property of the assessee during the assessment year and, therefore, one of the conditions prescribed under the relevant provision of law was not satisfied and the assessee was not entitled to depreciation in respect thereof. On facts, the situation has not changed even for the assessment year 1962-63. Agreeing with the Bench decision referred to above, we answer the question referred to us in the negative against the assessee and in favour of the revenue.
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1983 (8) TMI 310 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... tended to these other persons also, The exclusion of a constitutional challenge under Articles 14, 19 and 31 which is provided for by Article 31A does not justify in equity the irrational violation of these articles. This Court did observe in Waman Rao 1981 2SCR1 that “It may happen that while existing inequalities are being removed, new inequalities may arise marginally and incidentally” but the legislature has to take care to see that even marginal and incidental inequalities are not created without rhyme or reason. The Government of J & K would do well to give fresh consideration to the provisions contained in Section 7(2) and modify the provisions regarding residence in order that they may accord with reason and common sense. Article 31A does not frown upon reason and commonsense. 10. For these reasons, we uphold the constitutional validity of the Jammu and Kashmir Agrarian Reforms Act, 1976 and dismiss these petitions. There will be no order as to costs.
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1983 (8) TMI 309 - PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... cation was published in the official gazette. The validity of the impugned notification, therefore, cannot be assailed on either of the two contentions raised by the petitioners. 25. For the reasons recorded above, with utmost respect to the learned Chief Justice. I regret my inability to agree with the proposed order and in my view this petition is liable to be dismissed. Iqbal Singh Tiwana, J. and S.S. Sandhawalia, C.J. 26. Having had the advantage of perusing the two judgments prepared by my Lord the Chief Justice and my learned brother Goyal, J., I entirely agree with the former and have nothing useful to add. ORDER OF THE COURT 27. In consonance with the order of majority, the writ petition is allowed and the impugned notification, annexure P. 3, is hereby quashed. This, however, would in no way preclude the respondents from issuing a fresh notification and proceed in accordance with law, if so advised. The parties are left to bear their own casts. 28. Petition allowed.
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1983 (8) TMI 308 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ion that the learned courts below have acted with material irregularity in the exercise of jurisdiction and the petitioner has been prejudiced thereby. There was no due service of summons and the application was not barred by limitation. The petitioner is entitled to succeed. 11. Having regard to the materials on record, we are of the view that the decisions of the learned courts below cannot be sustained. The revisional application is allowed on contest but without costs. The impugned orders of the learned courts below are set aside and the petitioner's application under Order 9, Rule 13 of the Code is allowed. The ex parte decree be set aside and the suit be restored to file. The defendant will file written statement within three weeks of the arrival of the records in the trial court or within such time as the learned Munsif may allow. The learned Munsif will try to dispose of the suit as early as possible. Let the records be sent below forthwith. A.K. Sen, J. I agree.
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1983 (8) TMI 307 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... xcise Commissioner was only pretending to protect the revenue. We are of the view that the High Court was in error in quashing the order of the Excise Commissioner. 7. The further direction of the High Court compelling the Excise Commissioner to accept the bid of the respondents is equally unsustainable. If the High Court thought that the Excise Commissioner's approach to the problem was wrong or that he had applied incorrect criteria or taken into account irrelevant considerations, the proper thing to do was to indicate the rightful approach, the correct criteria and the relevant considerations, and to direct the Excise Commissioner to reconsider the matter in proper perspective. But, as we are of the view that the High Court ought not to have quashed the order of the Excise Commissioner, we set aside the judgment of the High Court, dismiss the Writ Petition filed in the High Court and restore the order of the Excise Commissioner. The appellant is entitled to his costs.
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1983 (8) TMI 306 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ransactions. There are two conflicting views in this matter in the case of Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Kailash Trading Co., 1981 UPTC 821, a learned single Judge of this Court has taken the view that no dealer is entitled to exemption under Section 3-D (7) unless he produces the certificate prescribed in Form 3-D (7). A contrary view has been taken by another single Judge of this Court in the case of Abdul Ghani Banne Khan v. C. S. 7 , 1982 UPTC 665. The learned Judge in that case referred the decision in the case of Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Kailash Trading Co., (Supra) and held that even in the absence of the dealer furnishing Form III-C (2), the assessee could get exemption by furnishing other documentary evidence on the purchases made by him. 4. As the matter is of considerable importance, the controversy deserves to be decided by a larger Bench. Let the papers be laid before Hon'ble the Chief Justice so that he may constitute a larger Bench to decide the matter.
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1983 (8) TMI 305 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... nt of unequals as equals had resulted in an infringement of Art. 14 of the Constitution. It was also submitted that vehicles holding inter-State permits under inter-state agreements were still exempt from tax and this was also a violation of Art. 14 of the Constitution. Another contention raised was that there was some sort of promissory estoppel which prevented the State Government from withdrawing the exemption. Yet another argument was that the withdrawal of the exemption was arbitrary and therefore, judicial review was necessary. These and other like submissions which were made to us in our opinion, fall in the category of arguments which we mentioned earlier, have only to be stated to be rejected. The answers are self-evident., The submissions are totally without merit and we see no justification for increasing the length of our judgment by further futile discussion. All the Writ petitions are dismissed with costs and the interim orders are vacated. Petitions dismissed.
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1983 (8) TMI 304 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ing regard to the fact that exemption was granted with a view to encouraging consumers of electricity to become self-sufficient hence-forth and with the end in view to lessen the burden on the other source of generation prospectively. As against this those who had already acquired their own source for generating electricity were in need of no retroactive encouragement by way of concession or exemption for doing what they had already done. There would have been no augmentation of the existing resources by extending the exemption to them. Under the circumstances we are of the opinion that the High Court was fully justified in repelling the plea urged by the writ petitioners in this behalf. In the result the appeal preferred by the State of Uttar Pradesh (C.A. 1312 of 1977) is allowed, the judgement and order of the High Court are set aside, and the writ petition giving rise to the said appeal is dismissed with costs throughout. The rest of the appeals are dismissed with costs.
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1983 (8) TMI 303 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ade against the advocate by no less a person than his own-near relation and now he has filed an affidavit in this Court after the matter was heard for some time which we consider worthless. Miss Thomas urged that we must finally dispose of the matter because the appellant is being interviewed for some post in judicial service in the State of Uttar Pradesh and therefore she had moved for early hearing of the appeal. We are not disposed to accede to this request for the simple reason that the Advocates Act was a legislative response to the demands of the legal profession that a defaulting advocate shall be tried not by judges of sitting in courts but his own peers. We, therefore do not propose to interpose our-selves as the order under challenge is an order of remand and the 1 appellant can appear before the disciplinary committee of the State Bar Council and make good his defence. We accordingly find no merit in this appeal and the same is dismissed with no order as to costs.
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1983 (8) TMI 302 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... price to suit their greed. Now that we are dismissing these petitions and vacate the stay orders, the notification fixing the maximum prices will revive and can be enforced. But in the meantime the poor of Andhra Pradesh were made to pay by their nose for their simplest menu and the difference between maximum price fixed by the impugned notification and the prices charged by the hoteliers would be unjust enrichment of the hoteliers undeservedly enjoyed with the assistance of the court by the exercise of the constitutional power under Art. 32 of the Constitution, and there is no way of depriving this unjust enrichment The Court set up for justice, including socio-economic justice, unfortunately lent its assistance to such unjust enrichment and yet we are helpless. For the reasons herein discussed, we find no merits in any of the contentions canvassed on behalf of the petitioners and therefore, these petitions fail and they are dismissed with costs in each. Petition dismissed.
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1983 (8) TMI 301 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... powers are meant to be exercised sparingly and with circumspection when there is reason to believe that the process of law is being misused to harass a citizen. The present was not such a case. We find that the complaint had been filed after obtaining the previous sanction of the State Government or of such officer as the State Government may by general or special order specify in this behalf as required by the proviso to s. 4 of the Act. Mr. P.G. Gokhale who appeared for the second respondent, State of Maharashtra, was not in a position to tell us about what the exact stand of the State Government in this appeal is as to whether it supports or opposes the contention of the appellant that the allegation made in the complaint constitutes an offence under s. 4 of the Act. For the reasons stated above, we allow the appeal and direct the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class to take further proceedings on the complaint and dispose of the case according to law. Appeal allowed.
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1983 (8) TMI 300 - CEGAT MADRAS
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... ... ..... tation ‘planks broken’ or ‘band cut’. In the circumstances of this case, there is no conclusive evidence to show that the goods were not at all landed or were landed but were missing after the order for clearance was issued. If the goods were not available due to ‘loss’ as set out in Section 23, there may be a case for refund. As we have observed earlier, this is not so. A refund would be barred in terms of Section 13 of the Act if the goods were pilfered after landing as the relevant order for clearance by the proper officer had been issued earlier. It is for a claimant-in this case the appellant-to establish how he is entitled to a refund under the circumstances of each case. The possibility that the goods might not have been landed, or could have been lost, and hence not available for the appellant at the time of examination in July 1981 is not sufficient to establish a claim for refund. ln the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed.
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1983 (8) TMI 299 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... ars that the Tribunal has lost sight of the fact that either under Section 35G or 35L the expression “rate of duty” or “value of goods” has been used with reference to the order of the Tribunal passed under Section 35C and not with reference to the entire appeal or the case before the Tribunal. Therefore, where the order appealed against or the appeal to the Tribunal itself related to rate of duty or value of goods among other things, but the order of the Tribunal did not deal with the point concerning to rate of duty or value of goods but disposed of the appeal on other grounds such as, limitation, jurisdiction, maintainability etc., a reference is maintainable because in such circumstances the Tribunal’s order cannot be said to be dealing with the rate of duty or value of goods. In other words for the purposes of Sections 35G and 35L, what is material is the subject-matter of the Tribunal’s order and not the subject-matter of the appeal.
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1983 (8) TMI 298 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... y administered. We are satisfied in our mind that an exemption to amodiaquine is an exemption to amodiaquine hydrochloride. There is no extension of the terms of the exemption to encompass a stranger who is not entitled to it or one who is only partially entitled to it. We are of the view that amodiaquine hydrochloride is in every way entitled to the exemption, and are satisfied that this is the right view. We would be very loth otherwise to extend an exemption to a thing that does not fully fall in the category. We have seen the Government of India has removed amodiaquine from the list. What, then, is its fate? The answer is that it makes no difference because it can still get the exemption in amodiaquine hydrochloride. 13. We therefore direct that amodiaquine hydrochloride shall be given the exemption demanded by the appellant and that assessments of the disputed goods shall be done accordingly, and whatever action flows from this order shall be taken within 3 months.
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1983 (8) TMI 297 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... reason to disagree with the conclusion of the lower authorities that the appellants’ goods were covered by it. 16. The reference to the Indian Standard Specifications does not help the appellants’ case. To begin with, they have not indicated any specific parts of the specifications which support their claim. Secondly, it is a well-known fact that the ISI does issue more than one specification for different sectors of the same industry or different varieties of the same goods. Therefore, the fact that there is one specification for grinding wheels generally and other for diamond wheels, would not by itself show that two are mutually exclusive, as it can well mean that diamond wheels are a species of grinding wheels. 17. In these circumstances, we find that the view taken by the lower authorities in this case, classifying the goods under consideration under Item 51 of the Central Excise Tariff as it was then, was correct. We accordingly reject the appeal.
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1983 (8) TMI 296 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... y. It is thus manifestly a case of error or mis-construction on their part, in interpreting the scope of this notification. We are thus of our firm view, that Rule 10 would clearly apply to the facts of this case, and there was no justification or basis for invoking Rule 10A. The period provided by Rule 10 in such circumstances was only that of one year. Consequently, the demand made by means of notice issued after almost four years was not sustainable, and on this ground alone the order of the Appellate Collector who had held the notice to have been rightly confirmed with reference to Rule 10A, is liable to set aside. In the view, we have taken on the basic question of limitation which renders the impugned order liable to be quashed, we do not feel necessary to examine the question of applicability or availability of the notification. The appeal is accordingly allowed on account of the show cause notice having been barred by time. Consequential relief, if any, shall follow.
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1983 (8) TMI 295 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... re the items being manufactured by the appellant. We, therefore, are of the considered view that on the authority of the Gujarat High Court judgment, it will not be possible to treat these hosiery garments to be goods covered by Tariff Item 68 during the period prior to the amendment to this Tariff Entry by Finance Act, 1980. That being so, the goods will have to be taken as statutorily exempt from tariff, having been excluded from Entry 22D, and not being covered under any other Tariff Heading. Any other question regarding their entitlement to exemption from excisability would not, therefore, survive. We, therefore, think it a fit case to allow the appeal on the short ground that the goods are exempt from excise duty, having been excluded as articles of hosiery, from Tariff Item 22D, and appellants do not have to have recourse to any other Exemption Notification. The appeal is accordingly allowed, with all consequential relief by way of refund whatever may fall due to them.
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1983 (8) TMI 294 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... not improve rolitetracycline’s claim. If it does not claim the concession because it is a non-existent product or because it is a product that cannot appear as a claimant in the circumstances in which the exemption is given, there might well be a reason to look again at the question whether it should not, after all, be the product to which the concession can be or, perhaps, should be given, because denial would result in a position where the only product that can earn the concession is refused it and so leaving unused an exemption that reason would dictate should be given to that product. Such is not the case here and we have demonstrated as much. The denial of the concession to rolitetracycline was, therefore, correct. 6. The question about the lignocaine hydrochloride in the intramuscular injection is resolved now, because neither the intravenous nor the intramuscular injection can avail the exemption under Notification No. 116/69-C.E. This appeal is dismissed.
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1983 (8) TMI 293 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... prices as the value for assessment in terms of Section 14(a) of the Act are totally misconceived since they cannot in any view reflect the market price - the price at which the goods are ordinarily sold or offered for sale at the time and place of import-the price at which the imported goods are capable of being sold being irrelevant. 27. I agree, in the context of all the facts and circumstances of the case, that - (i) it is not possible to assess the deemed value of the goods either in terms of Section 14(a) of the Act or Rules 3(a)-(d) of the Rules. The assessment can only be a best judgment assessment under Rule 8; (ii) on the weight of evidence, there can be no doubt that the Appellant and OAK are mutually interested in the business of each other in the sense that they promote each other’s business. 28. Accordingly, if in a best judgment assessment, the invoice price is loaded as proposed by my learned brethren, I see no objection to it.
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