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Showing 21 to 40 of 271 Records
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1987 (11) TMI 384 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... al court or interfering under Article 227 of the Constitution over such decision. In the aforesaid view of the matter, we are clearly of the opinion that in view of the intention of the parties in the document and the facts and circumstances of this case, it was a licence and not a lease. We need not detain ourselves with the question of estoppel upon which very interesting arguments were advanced before us by Mr. Nariman is noted above. In the aforesaid view of the matter this appeal must fail as we find no ground to interfere with the decision of the High Court. The appeal fails and is dismissed. In the facts and circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. In view of the fact that the appellant has been carrying on business for some time, we give the appellant time upto 31st March, 1988 to give up and deliver vacant possession provided the appellant files the usual undertaking with the Registrar of the Court of Small Causes, Bombay within three weeks from this date.
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1987 (11) TMI 383 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... iage cannot be asked to pay additional tax under section 8 of the Act merely because he has carried on some occasions more passengers than the maximum number of passengers that he is permitted to carry under the permit. The tax which he is liable to pay is limited by the maximum number of passengers he is entitled to carry under the permit. We, therefore, do not agree with the decision of the High Court in Noorullha Khan's case (supra). We overrule it The judgment of the High Court against which this appeal is filed is liable to be set aside. It is accordingly set aside. The respondents are directed not to levy additional tax on the appellant under section 8 of the Act for carrying more passengers than what he was permitted to carry on some occasions during the period in question. But we however impress upon the authorities the need to enforce the provision in section 60 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 strictly. The appeal is accordingly allowed. No costs Appeal allowed.
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1987 (11) TMI 382 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the application made by the United Bank of India for recalling the appellant for further cross- examination, in the absence of any exceptional circumstance, could not be considered as a ground for setting aside the award. The principles of natural justice had not, therefore, been violated by the Tribunal in passing the award. We, therefore, set aside the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court and also of the learned Single Judge. It is, however, mentioned before us that the United Bank of India had some other grounds to urge before the learned Single Judge and the case may be remanded to the learned Single Judge for considering those grounds. We, therefore, remand this case to the learned Single Judge to consider any other relevant ground that may be urged by the United Bank of India and to dispose of the writ petition in accordance with law. This appeal is accordingly allowed. The United Bank of India is directed to pay the costs of the appellant. Appeal allowed.
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1987 (11) TMI 381 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... nation in favour of corporations created by British Parliament, will not apply to corporations formed or created by any special Indian law which, in the instant case, is the Banking Companies Act. In our opinion, therefore, the Banking Companies Act is quite legal and valid. No other point has been urged by either party in this appeal. In view of the discussion made above, we hold that the provisions of the Act are not applicable to the appellant Bank and, therefore, there is no question of scaling down the debt due to the Bank by the respondents. For the reasons aforesaid, the judgment and decree of the High Court in so far as the same direct the scaling down of the debts due to the Bank by the respondents, are set aside. The Bank will be entitled to realise the amount decreed in its favour by the High Court without any scaling down of the same under the provisions of the Act. The appeal is allowed. There will, however, be no order as to costs in this Court. Appeal allowed.
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1987 (11) TMI 380 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... in the absence of report he could not effectively cross-examine Shri A.C. Das, Dy. S.P. Of Special Police Establishment, the investigating officer, is not sustainable. A copy of the statement as recorded by the enquiry officer has been placed before us by the appellant on a perusal of the same we find that Shri A.C. Das, was cross-examined at length in detail. His examination-in-chief is confined to one page while his cross-examination runs into six full scape typed pages. The appellant has failed to point out as to how he was prejudiced. In our opinion the appellant was not handicapped in cross-examining Shri A.C. Das, his grievance that he was not afforded reasonable opportunity of defence is without any merit. In view of the above discussion we hold that the High Court was right, in holding that the enquiry was fair and the principles of natural justice had not been violated. The appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed. There will be no order to costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1987 (11) TMI 379 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ading Accent 6 / w LsdException Locked false Priority 72 SemiHidden false UnhideWhenUsed false Name Colorful List Accent 6 / w LsdException Locked false Priority 73 SemiHidden false UnhideWhenUsed false Name Colorful Grid Accent 6 / w LsdException Locked false Priority 19 SemiHidden false UnhideWhenUsed false QFormat true Name Subtle Emphasis / w LsdException Locked false Priority 21 SemiHidden false UnhideWhenUsed false QFormat true Name Intense Emphasis / w LsdException Locked false Priority 31 SemiHidden false UnhideWhenUsed false QFormat true Name Subtle Reference / w LsdException Locked false Priority 32 SemiHidden false UnhideWhenUsed false QFormat true Name Intense Reference / w LsdException Locked false Priority 33 SemiHidden false UnhideWhenUsed false QFormat true Name Book Title / w LsdException Locked false Priority 37 Name Bibliography / w LsdException Locked false Priority 39 QFormat true Name TOC Heading / /w LatentStyles /xml endif -- -- if gte mso 10 endif --
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1987 (11) TMI 378 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... substitution necessarily or always connotes two severable steps, that is to say, one of repeal and another of a fresh enactment even if it implies two steps. Indeed, the natural meaning of the word "substitution" is to indicate that the process cannot be split up into two pieces like this. If the process described as substitution fails, it is totally ineffective so as to leave intact what was sought to be displaced. That seems to us to be the ordinary and natural meaning of the words 'shall be substituted'." The underlying fallacy of the argument is that lies in the assumption that Regulation 8(3) had been 'substituted'. What had been substituted is the new Regulation 8(1), and Regulation 8(3) is newlyadded by way of amendment to remove an existing anomaly. We therefore find no justification to interfere with the judgment of the High Court. The appeal must accordingly fail and is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1987 (11) TMI 377 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ctive from 5.7.76. At least, if the 1985 Act had been made retrospective from 5.7.76, one could have thought it was a clarificatory piece of legislation. But the Legislature has advisedly given these enactments effect only from 18.5.1983. This means that the amendment of 1976 was intended to be effective between 5.7.75 and 18.5.83 and it also means that the amendment of 1983 onwards is not intended to be read back for that period. Lastly, in any event, the interpretation given by us will create no lasting difficulties for the Government and other organisations which are tenants only, since after 18.5.1983 they will be in a position to claim all the immunities available to other tenants under the Act. For the reasons discussed above, we overrule the decision of the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Punjab National Bank v. Sugan Chand, 1985 1 A.R.C. 214 on this point. In the result, this appeal is dismissed. We, however, make no order regarding costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1987 (11) TMI 376 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... her methods in which the case may legally be dealt with is suitable". The sessions court has invoked the proviso and has held that appellant was so depraved a character that none of the other methods in which the case could legally be dealt with is suitable in her case. An examination of the legality or propriety of the procedure adopted in the case in the matter of the trial of a ’child’ under the East Punjab Children’s Act 1949 and as to the correctness of the view of the sessions court in appealing to the proviso to Section 27 and in sentencing appellant to imprisonment for life may not be necessary in this case, in view of our finding that appellant is entitled to the benefit of doubt. 19. In the result, this appeal is allowed and while the conviction and sentence of the other non-appealing accused is left undisturbed, the conviction and sentence of the appellant is set aside and appellant is directed to be set at liberty forthwith. Appeal allowed.
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1987 (11) TMI 375 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... lent. But the evidence must be clear both as to the fact of fraud and as to the bank's knowledge. It would certainly not normally be sufficient that this rests on the uncorroborated statement of the customer, for irreparable damage can be done to a bank's credit in the relatively brief time which must elapse between the granting of such an injunction and an application by the bank to have it discharged." From the above discussion, what appears to me is this The sound banking system may, however, require more caution in the issuance of irrevocable documentary credits. It would be for the banks to safeguard themselves by other means and generally not for the court to come to their rescue with injunctions unless there is established fraud. In the result, this appeal must be allowed. The judgment and order of the Allahabad High Court dated February 20, 1987 must be set aside and the order of learned Civil Judge, Lucknow dated August 8, 1986 restored. Appeal allowed.
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1987 (11) TMI 374 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ordingly, for the reasons given in our judgment in R. C. No. 315 of 1982, we hold that the proper course to be adopted in such cases is to set off the interest earned against the interest paid by the assessee and capitalize the balance interest paid. Accordingly, while we do not wish to express any opinion on the question whether the said interest amount received represents a capital receipt or not, we are of the opinion that it cannot be taxed as income from other sources, and that the proper course to be adopted is the one indicated by us hereinbefore. Accordingly, we re-frame the question in the following terms " Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal is justified in holding that the bank interest received during the stage of construction of the factory cannot be treated as income from other sources and should go towards reducing the actual cost of capital assets ?" and answer the question in the affirmative. No costs.
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1987 (11) TMI 373 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... tance by the High Court of the case of the alleged gift from the mother is wholly unsupported by the evidence. There are also other possible errors in the calculations in regard to point(e). The finding becomes inescapable that the assets were in excess on the known sources of income. But on the question whether the extent of the disproportion is such as to justify a conviction for criminal misconduct under Section 5(1)(e) read with Section 5(2), we think, we should not, in the circumstanees of the ease, interfere with the verdict of the High Court as, in our view, the difference would be considerably reduced in the light of the factors pointed out by the High Court. A somewhat liberal view requires to be taken of what proportion of assets in excess of the known sources of income constitutes "disproportion" for purpose of Section 5(1)(e) of the Act. We think that the respondent should have the benefit of doubt. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. Appeal dismissed.
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1987 (11) TMI 372 - SUPREME COURT
Whether on the facts and in the circumstances, the Corporation was not justified in selling the property by private negotiations in favour of M/s. Gumraj Plantations at the instance of P.M. Jacob?
Held that:- Here is a case where the Corporation invited tenders for the sale of the property under notification dated January 18, 1983. The appellant submitted the highest tender in response to the said notification. He was given all concessions for payment of the tender amount. But he did not. He negotiated with the Managing Director of the Corporation for facilities for payment by instalments. That was also granted to him. There again he failed. If the appellant could not act according to his tender, we fail to see why the property should not be offered to the person who was next in order. The Corporation, in our opinion, did not do anything unfair with P.M.Jacob. The Corporation got the tender amount raised from ₹ 4,16,550 to ₹ 4,50,000. It shows the fairness with which the Corporation dealt with the property.
On a consideration of all the facts and circumstances of the case, we are satisfied that the action of the Corporation in offering the property to P.M.Jacob and selling the same at his request to M/s. Gumraj Plantations was perfectly justified and cannot be found fault with In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed.
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1987 (11) TMI 371 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ax Act reads thus 3. Dairy products Milk products, including milk powder, baby food, ghee, cheese and butter. 3.. The sole question that arises for consideration is whether the turnover relating to kattimore can be brought to tax under the above entry. It will depend upon the decision as to whether kattimore is a milk product. The Appellate Tribunal held that kattimore is an item left after taking butter from the curd and so it is only a by-product of milk. In this view of the matter, it cannot be said to be an item of milk product. We are unable to accept this reasoning of the Appellate Tribunal. Kattimore is certainly a product of milk. Product in the context can only mean a thing produced out of milk or from milk. In this view, we reverse the decision of the Appellate Tribunal. We hold that kattimore is a product of milk under entry 3 of the First Schedule to the Kerala General Sales Tax Act. This revision is allowed. There shall be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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1987 (11) TMI 370 - SUPREME COURT
Detention orders - Held that:- Appeal dismissed. The impugned order of detention was clamped on 28th November, 1985 and the period of one year as provided in Section 13 of the National Security Act has also expired. Moreover, as already upheld the finding of the High Court that the order of detention is illegal and bad for non-supply of vital documents to the detenus to enable them to make an effective representation against the grounds of detention and as such their right to make an effective representation as contemplated under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India has been infringed rendering the impugned order as illegal and bad. Furthermore, the nonproduction of relevant materials i.e. the statement of the under-trial prisoners in their application in the court that the detenus had been falsely implicated in the crime case No. 450 of 1985 under section 307;34 I.P.C. and also the statement to that effect in the bail petition and the police report thereon, before the detaining authority for his consideration before passing the order of detention, renders the order of detention invalid and illegal.
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1987 (11) TMI 369 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Notification dated 12th April, 1979, has altered the position is a misconception. 5.. Learned Government Advocate would also say that the petitioner could as well resort to the statutory appellate remedy. Here, we find a case in respect of which the rulings of this Court squarely come to the rescue of the petitioner. As the impugned assessment order by the second respondent has come to be made in total ignorance of the rulings of this Court, it will not be proper and fair to drive the petitioner to resort to the statutory appellate remedy, and that too at this stage. In this view, W.P. No. 4965 of 1987 is allowed. No costs. In view of the allowing of W.P. No. 4965 of 1987, which has served the purpose of the petitioner no independent order is necessary in W.P. No. 13079 of 1986 where only the pre-assessment notice is being impugned. In this view, W.P. No. 13079 of 1986 is dismissed. No costs. Writ petition No. 4965 of 1987 allowed. Writ petition No. 13079 of 1986 dismissed.
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1987 (11) TMI 368 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... to this extent that the impugned orders in so far as they purport to hold that the printing and supply for consolidated payment of annual audit reports and financial statements in book form to be circulated to the members of the co-operative societies and the printing of the pamphlet entitled Jabalpur Zila Me Nalkoop Yojna or similar other pamphlets, if any, are quashed. In regard to the turnover of the remaining articles falling within categories (1) to (7) specified in the opening part of this judgment, however, the writ petition is dismissed. The Additional Sales Tax Officer, Jabalpur (respondent No. 1) is directed to pass a fresh order or orders, as the case may be, of assessment in respect of the various periods in question referred to above, in the light of the observations made above. In view of their divided success, the parties, however, shall bear their own costs. The outstanding amount of security shall be refunded to the petitioner. Writ petition partly allowed.
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1987 (11) TMI 367 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... narayan Jagatnarayan 1978 42 STC 315 and Commissioner of Sales Tax, M.P. v. Prahalad Das Ramdas 1983 52 STC 224. 4.. In the result, this writ petition succeeds and is allowed in part and the impugned orders are quashed in so far as they have refused exemption from sales tax to the petitioner with regard to such transactions in respect of which even though declaration in form No. E-I Was produced, but declaration in form No. C was not produced. The writ petition, in so far as it challenges the impugned orders refusing exemption with regard to such transactions in respect of which declaration in form No. E-I was not produced, fails. 5.. The Additional Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax, Raipur, the respondent No. 1, is directed to pass a fresh order of assessment in the light of the observations made above. In view of the divided success, the parties shall bear their own costs. The outstanding amount of security may be refunded to the petitioner. Writ petition partly allowed.
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1987 (11) TMI 366 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... anner. it means transfer of goods from one to another see State of Tamil Nadu v. E.C. Constructions and Industries 1968 61 STC 337 (Mad.), State of Kerala v. Ocean Wealth 1987 65 STC 16 (Ker), Goodyear India Ltd. v. State of Haryana 1983 53 STC 163 (P and H) and Cheyyabba v. State of Karnataka 1980 45 STC 1 (Kar) . Since the petitioners are using the material in the construction of a building or other structure, it cannot be said that there is disposal of such material, even though the building/structure is being constructed for another. In the circumstances, we are inclined to follow the decision in Nandanam Construction Company s case 1983 53 STC 42 (AP) and, accordingly, allow the writ petitions upholding the third contention urged by the learned counsel, mentioned at the inception of this judgment. The writ petitions are, accordingly, allowed to the extent indicated above. There shall be no order as to costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 250 in each. Writ petitions partly allowed.
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1987 (11) TMI 365 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... resaid decision. 5.. In view of the foregoing discussion, our answer to question No. (3) referred to us is that on the facts and in the circumstances of the case See Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. v. Nirankari Engineering, Kanpur 1982 51 STC 197 (All.) App. . mentioned above, sales tax was not leviable on the sale of iron scrap by the assessee-applicant in view of the fact that iron scrap constituted declared goods under section 14 of the Central Sales Tax Act and the applicantassessee had already paid tax at the stage of purchasing the iron scrap which was subsequently sold by him. This would be so in view of the restriction placed in this behalf by section 15(a) of the Central Sales Tax Act and consequently the order of the Tribunal is not legally correct. 6.. In view of our answer to question No. (3), we find it unnecessary to answer questions Nos. (1) and (2). In, the circumstances of the case, the parties shall bear their own costs. Reference answered accordingly. nbsp
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