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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 278 Records
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1987 (4) TMI 481
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... ... ..... hat the hearing contemplated is not required to be oral and can be by inviting objections and disposing them of in a fair way. 6. Mr. Thakur for a State advanced an argument that a few interested people were trying to resist the move of the State to constitute the notified area. Once we have held that the requirements of natural justice have not been fulfilled, it is not for us to examine whether the petition before the High Court was the outcome of efforts confined to a small group of the inhabitants of the area. At any rate there is no clear material before us also to support of Mr. Thakur's stand. 7. The appeal is allowed and the impugned notification of 31st March, 1982 constituting the particular notified area is quashed. We make it clear that it is open to the State Government to make a fresh notification after complying with the law and this judgement of ours would not stand in the way of the State Government to do so. Parties are directed to bear their own costs.
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1987 (4) TMI 480
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... ... ..... me of the Governor in the proper form. We are conscious of the fact that the learned Judges felt that there was a deliberate attempt to act against their order. We are not unmindful of the indignation shown by them at the notings in the file. The only reason why we feel constrained to disagree with the High Court’s order is our anxiety to delineate the limits of judicial power while dealing with files of the Government and also of the Public Service Commission, a high Constitutional authority. It is necessary to have mutual respect among the various wings of the administration, in the process of disposal of justice. We allow these appeals and discharge the contempt orders passed by the High Court with utmost reluctance in view of the far reaching consequences that would flow if the judgment was allowed to stand. We are happy that the appellants have tendered their regret and apology to the High Court and have reiterated their regret in this Court also. Appeals allowed.
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1987 (4) TMI 479
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... ... ..... ult we find no merit in the appeal and accordingly it will stand dismissed. Mr. Sampath, learned counsel for the appellant made a request that in the event of the appeal being dismissed, the appellant should be given sufficiently long time to secure another godown and shift his stock of goods to that place. Mr. Padmanabhan learned counsel for the respondents very fairly stated that the respondents are agreeable to give time to the appellant till 31.12.87 to vacate the leased portion. Accordingly we order that in spite of the dismissal of the appeal the appellant will have time till 31.12.87 to vacate the ground floor premises in his occupation and deliver peaceful and vacant possession to the respondents subject however to the appellant filing an under-taking in the usual terms in this behalf within 4 weeks from today failing which the respondents will be entitled to recover possession of the building forthwith. The parties will bear their respective costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1987 (4) TMI 478
Notifications issued under the Drugs (Prices Control) Order, 1979 questioned on several grounds by the manufacturers and they have been quashed by the Delhi High Court on the ground of failure to observe the principles of natural justic
Held that:- High Court granted stay of implementation of the notification fixing the prices were issued fixing the maximum prices of bulk drugs and the retail prices of formulations. We think that in matter of this nature, where prices of essential commodities are fixed in order to maintain or increase supply of the commodities or for securing the equitable distribution and availability at fair prices of the commodity, it is not right that the court should make any interim order staying the implementation of the notification fixing the prices. We consider that such orders are against the public interest and ought not to be made by a court unless the court is satisfied that no public interest is going to be served. No doubt that the appeal must be allowed and the writ petition in the High Court dismissed.
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1987 (4) TMI 477
Whether the period of parole has to be excluded in reckoning the period of detention under sub-section (1) of section 3 of the Act?
Held that:- The legislative scheme, keeping the purpose of the statute and the manner of its fulfilment provided thereunder, would not justify entertaining of an application for release of a detenu on parole. Since in our view release on parole is not a matter of judicial determination, apparently no provision as contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure relating to the computation of the period of bail was thought necessary in the Act. But we would like to point out to the Government the desirability of inserting a provision like sub-s.(4) of s. 389 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 that when an action is taken under section 12 of the Act and the appropriate Government makes a temporary release order, the period of such temporary release whether on bail or parole has to be excluded in computing the period of detention. Either the statute or the rules made thereunder should provide for this eventuality.
In the premises, it must accordingly be held that the period of parole has to be excluded in reckoning the period of detention under sub-section (1) of section 3 of the Act. The only contention advanced by Shri Jethmalani in course of the hearing, namely, that the period of parole from May 15, 1986 to February 28, 1987 could not be added to the maximum period of detention of the detenu Shital Kumar for one year as specified in the impugned order of detention passed under sub-s.(1) of s. 3 of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange & Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974, must fail.
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1987 (4) TMI 476
Whether the respondents in their written statement have raised the necessary pleading that the license was irrevocable as contemplated by Section 60(b) of the Act and, if so, is there any evidence on record to support that plea?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. The appellant should have known that the institution was occupying the property and it was rendering public service in imparting education to the students and it would be difficult to get possession, in spite of that, the appellant purchased the property. The school has been occupying the property since 1939 and it has made permanent constructions without any demur from any quarter, in this situation it is not possible to grant any relief to the appellant. To evict the school may result into closure of the institution and that would certainly be against public interest. Having regard to these facts and circumstances, we gave opportunity to the parties to evolve settlement to adjust equities without disturbing the cause of education. We regret to say that the parties could not settle the matter, we have therefore decided the appeal on merits.
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1987 (4) TMI 475
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... ... ..... s washed cotton seed oil is taken away. This residue is usually sold and is used in the manufacture of soap as oil. The mere fact that it is a residue left after the refined cotton seed oil is taken away, or that it contains some residuary additives it does not cease to be vegetable oil . Having regard to the wide language used it is not possible to restrict it only to edible vegetable oils. Apart from this, groundnut oil which is also an edible oil is shown as a separate entry 24. This also negatives the contention that entry 128 relates to edible oils. For the aforesaid reasons, we hold that cotton seed sludge oil and cotton seed acid oil fall under entry 128 of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, and are liable to be taxed accordingly in the relevant assessment year. We confirm the conclusion of the Tribunal though we have adopted a slightly different reasoning. Tax revision case is dismissed. We make no order as to costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 250. Petition dismissed.
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1987 (4) TMI 474
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... ... ..... ct of these appeals on behalf of the State. Proper steps were not taken for obtaining certified copy. An affidavit was caused to be affirmed by an employee of the office of the Advocate-onrecord which later on was admitted to have contained wrong statements. Details of these would be found out from our orders made from time to time. We express our regret that the court cases are conducted in such a negligent fashion by those who are responsible for the same on behalf of the State. Let a copy of the operative portion of this judgment along with our observations, be sent to the learned Advocate-General for his information and necessary action. Prayer for stay of the operation of the order is rejected. Oral prayer is also made for a certificate under article 134A of the Constitution. This is not a fit and proper case where, in our opinion, the question involved need be decided by the Supreme Court. Accordingly, the same is rejected. SATYABRATA MITRA, J.-I agree. Appeal allowed.
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1987 (4) TMI 473
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... ... ..... withdrawn from a back date, it will upset his position. 4.. It is well-settled that the power to legislate with retrospective effect is not exercisable by a delegate unless specifically empowered by some statute. Nothing has been brought to our notice that such power was conferred upon the State Government to issue the notification in question (annexure-3) from a retrospective date. In that view of the matter, we allow the writ applications and hold that the said notification (annexure-3) shall have its effect only from the date of its publication in the Gazette, i.e., 5th July, 1976. Consequently, the impugned orders of assessment (annexure-2 to each of the writ applications) are hereby quashed and the matter is remitted back to the Sales Tax Officer (opposite party No. 1) to make fresh assessments in view of our decision with respect to the liability under the Central Sales Tax Act for the period in question. There shall be no order as to costs. Writ applications allowed.
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1987 (4) TMI 472
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... ... ..... ases. A Bench of this Court in State of Tamil Nadu v. Sasman and Company 1984 57 STC 160, has also, on the ground of mutual mistake, held that the levy of penalty was not warranted. The ratio of the Bench is certainly attracted to the facts of the present cases. Under these circumstances, these three writ petitions are allowed. No costs. I am told that pending the writ petitions, the petitioner was obliged to furnish bank guarantees for the amounts of penalty demanded. Now these writ petitions having been allowed, the said bank guarantees shall stand cancelled. Mr. G. Narayanan, learned counsel for the petitioner, would submit that his client is duty bound to and shall refund to its stockists the amounts of surcharge collected by it by mistake for the years in question, irrespective of any question of limitation, as and when the petitioner gets refund of surcharge already passed on to the Revenue. This statement of the learned counsel stands recorded. Writ petitions allowed.
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1987 (4) TMI 471
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... ... ..... We need hardly observe that all this is totally irregular and should have been avoided. We cannot help putting on notice all the authorities concerned that this Court would not hesitate to take stern action for contempt if decisions of this Court are disregarded unless the operation of the judgments of this Court is suspended by the Supreme Court. 17.. As far as the present case is concerned, there could be little doubt that the first respondent, Commercial Tax Officer, is clearly guilty of committing contempt in observing in the assessment order dated 2nd March, 1987 that he cannot implement the order of this Court. We have referred to the counter filed by him wherein the first respondent owned his mistake and expressed an unqualified apology. We take a lenient view of the matter, accept the apology tendered by the first respondent and drop further proceedings in the matter. 18.. The contempt case is accordingly disposed of. No costs. Contempt case disposed of accordingly.
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1987 (4) TMI 470
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... ... ..... rovisional assessment. It will be open to the sales tax authorities to make a a final assessment at the appropriate time following the decision in Singh Trading Co. case 1979 44 STC 1 (AP) and for the purpose of making final assessment it will be open to the Commercial Tax Officer to require the petitioner to produce agreements/orders for the export of cashew-nut kernel to territories outside India in order to factually support the claim of exemption under section 5(3) of the CST Act. 14.. In the result, all the three writ petitions are allowed, but without costs. Government Pleader s fee Rs. 250 in each. Immediately after the judgment was pronounced, the learned Government Pleader on behalf of the respondents made an oral request for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. We do not find any substantial question of law of general importance which requires to be settled by the decision of the Supreme Court involved in these cases. Hence, leave rejected. Writ petitions allowed.
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1987 (4) TMI 469
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... ... ..... ssuing form No. XXXIV to the purchasing registered dealers for proving the sales to them by furnishing form No. XXXIV. The Sales Tax Officer was not justified in stating that the rule being mandatory, the prayer of the petitioner could not be allowed. 7.. Language of section 21 of the Act authorises the assessing officer to exercise the power of a court trying a suit under the Code of Civil Procedure to summon and enforce attendance of witnesses and also to compel production of documents. The Sales Tax Officer (opposite party No. 1) failed to exercise the power vested in him as has been indicated in the earlier paragraphs which is an error of law apparent on the face of the record. 8.. In the result, the order of assessment is quashed and the Sales Tax Officer is directed to assess the petitioner No. 1 afresh under section 12(4) of the Act in the light of the observations made in this judgment. There shall be no order as to costs. R.C. PATNAIK, J.-I agree. Order accordingly.
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1987 (4) TMI 468
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... ... ..... here is no infirmity in the conclusion of the Board of Revenue. Admittedly, the assessee pays sales tax on the amount actually charged from the customer while replacing the old tyre with a new tyre, in addition to the payment of sales tax on the entire sale price of the initial transaction. There is no occasion to require the assessee to pay tax on an amount which is not charged from the customer as sale price while replacing the tyre. It is not as if the department reduces the sale price of the first transaction by the amount for which the adjustment is given to the customer while making the replacement with a new tyre. The sales tax charged on the entire sale price of the initial transaction is not reduced. There is no occasion in such a situation to demand sales tax from the assessee on any amount in excess of that paid by the customer to the assessee at the time of replacement of the tyre. Consequently, the revision is dismissed. No order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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1987 (4) TMI 467
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... ... ..... of the privilege and it would be cumbersome and expensive to monitor and scrutinise the sale turnover of outstill liquor, rule 90-B was introduced as a mode of computing the turnover of sale. The appellate authorities, therefore, went wholly wrong in relying upon and utilising rule 90-B for the purpose of excluding mohua flower from the tax net. If outstill liquor was the same as mohua flower but under different name, the arguments and reasonings urged by the counsel for the opponent and the Appellate Tribunal would be valid. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the dealer in outstill liquor is liable to pay purchase tax on the turnover of purchase of mohua flower notwithstanding the fact that the turnover of sale of outstill liquor in the manufacture of which mohua flower is one of the ingredients is exigible to tax. 4. The reference, therefore, is answered in the negative. There would be no order as to costs. H.L. AGRAWAL, C.J.-I agree. Reference answered in the negative.
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1987 (4) TMI 466
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... ... ..... cer is not required to determine the taxable turnover under section 5(2) of the Act. Rule 90-B is the special mode of computation which has full application to the facts of the case. Taxable turnover as provided in section 5(2) of the Act is that part of the gross turnover after deductions. Gross turnover is the aggregate of the sale turnover and purchase turnover. When the legislature has provided a special mode of computation in respect of taxable turnover in rule 90-B, the same shall prevail and the purchase turnover is not to be dealt with separately. 4.. In conclusion, my answer to the question is that the Sales Tax Tribunal was correct in holding that the dealer is not liable to pay purchase tax on his turnover of purchase of mohua flower in addition to the compounding tax payable under rule 90-B for sale of outstill liquor. 5.. In the result, the reference is answered in favour of the dealer. No costs. H.L. AGRAWAL, C.J.-I agree. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1987 (4) TMI 465
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... ... ..... n of any article cannot be upheld. It is significant to note that in a subsequent notification dated 16th October, 1986 issued under section 12 of the Act, blending of tea is one of the industrial units specified, to whom exemption under the notification would not be available. This shows that but for this provision, exemption would have been available. Such a provision was not incorporated in the notification dated 23rd October, 1981. Under the circumstances, it must be held that the refusal to issue eligibility certificate to the petitioner was not justified. 5. For all these reasons, this petition is allowed. The respondents are directed to issue an eligibility certificate to the petitioner in accordance with the provisions of the notification dated 23rd October, 1981 (annexure 3). In the circumstances of the case, parties shall bear their own costs of this petition. The outstanding amount of security deposit, if any, shall be refunded to the petitioner. Petition allowed.
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1987 (4) TMI 464
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... ... ..... t should have been raised before the Additional Commissioner so that the facts could be investigated and a decision could be taken on this aspect of the matter. The petitioner will be at liberty to apply to the Additional Commissioner for a review of the order passed on 19th May, 1986 within a period of one month from date. If such an application is made, the Additional Commissioner is directed to consider the review application and pass an order within a period of four months from the date of receipt of the application after giving a hearing to the petitioner. The Additional Commissioner will consider whether there was substantial compliance of the condition and the breach of the conditions committed by the petitioner is of so trivial in nature as to merit condonation. I make it clear that the Additional Commissioner will be at liberty to pass such order in accordance with law as he thinks fit after investigating the facts of the case. Writ petition disposed of accordingly.
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1987 (4) TMI 463
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... ... ..... iming the exemption under this sub-section. After the aforementioned amendment in the Constitution, the Bihar Finance Act, 1981 was suitably amended by the Bihar Finance Act, 1984 which came into force with effect from 1st April, 1984. The said relevant amendment is contained in section 2(t)(vi) and section 60A(2)(b). Section 60A for all intent and purpose reproduces section 6 of the Constitution (Forty-sixth Amendment) Act. In terms of the aforesaid amendment, there cannot be any doubt that the taxes which were illegally assessed in view of the aforementioned decision of the Supreme Court as also of this Court as referred to hereinbefore now have got the statutory sanction in terms of section 60A(2)(b) of the Bihar Finance Act, 1981 read with section 6(2)(b) of the Constitution (Forty-sixth Amendment) Act. In the result, this writ application is allowed. Annexures 1 series as referred to above are hereby quashed. There will be no order as to costs. Writ application allowed.
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1987 (4) TMI 462
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... ... ..... d prevent evasion of tax. In other words where the goods liable to tax under the Act are not taxed for one or the other reason, then the purchaser is made liable to pay the tax provided the other requirements under the section are satisfied. In this case, the person who purchased, i.e., the assessee, is a dealer. He purchased the same in the course of business and he purchased it from a registered dealer who did not collect the tax because of the particular circumstance, namely, that he was acting as the agent of the agriculturist producer. We may also mention that in this case, clause (c) of section 6-A is also satisfied because the goods have been despatched by the petitioner to a place outside the State for sale. In our opinion therefore the Tribunal was right in holding that the goods have been properly subjected to tax under section 6-A of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act. The T.R.C. is accordingly dismissed. No costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 200. Petition dismissed.
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