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Case Laws
Showing 81 to 100 of 209 Records
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1989 (5) TMI 135 - ITAT MADRAS-A
Assessment Order, Assessment Year, Limitation For Reassessment, Time Limit For Completion ... ... ... ... ..... be determined with reference to the provisions of section 153(3)(i). Under those provisions, because it leaves out of consideration the cases to which section 153(2A) applies, a fresh assessment u/s 146 can be made at any time. The present is a case to which the provisions of section 153(2A) do not apply and, therefore, under the provisions of section 153(3)(i), the re-assessment can be made at any time. 9. Our final findings are (a) The application filed by the assessee u/s 146 on 20-2-1982 should be deemed to have been allowed in the assessee s favour on 20-5-1982 and (b) Since in the view that we have taken, the provisions of section 153(3)(i) apply there is no limitation for making a reassessment in accordance with law. We, therefore, hold that the CIT(A) has not committed any error in directing a reassessment to be made in accordance with law, since on the date when the CIT(A) passed his order, limitation had not set in. 10. In the result, the appeal is allowed in part.
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1989 (5) TMI 134 - ITAT MADRAS-A
Assessment Year ... ... ... ... ..... was holding the funds in trust for the pious purposes intended by the devotees. The trust deed executed by the assessee was only a vesting declaration and did not amount to a transfer of any property. It only invested him with legal ownership of the property and declared the beneficial interest of the charitable purposes. Thus the assessee was neither owner of the amount nor was there any transfer by him to another so as to constitute a gift. (See Suleman Isubji Dadabhai v. Naranbhai Dahyabhai Patel AIR 1980 Guj. 165). In fact, the GTO has inadvertently observed the correct position namely that there was only an application of the funds entrusted to the assessee for charitable purposes. Such an application on behalf of the devotees of the funds entrusted to him can only be expenditure and cannot amount to a gift by any stretch of imagination. We are, therefore, satisfied that this assessment was baseless and untenable and we, therefore, annul the same. The appeal is allowed.
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1989 (5) TMI 133 - ITAT MADRAS-A
Assessment Year, Carrying On Business, Investment Allowance ... ... ... ... ..... laji Metal Finishers. 16. As rightly contended on behalf of the assessee, the decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of Minocha Bros. (P.) Ltd. dealt with the question of an industrial company under sec. 2(6)(c) of the Finance Act and is therefore clearly distinguishable on facts from the present case. 17. We would, therefore, respectfully follow the decision of the Madras High Court in Perfect Liners case and the two Special Bench decisions of the Tribunal in the cases of First Leasing Co. of India Ltd. and of Thiagaraja Industries and the Third Member case in the case of Sri Balaji Metal Finishers and hold that the assessee-firm is entitled to investment allowance in respect of its machinery used by it for sand blasting in the course of its business under sec. 32A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and that the CIT (Appeals) had rightly allowed the assessee s claim in this regard. Accordingly, we confirm the order of the CIT (Appeals). In the result, the appeal is dismissed.
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1989 (5) TMI 129 - ITAT JAIPUR
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... ... ..... marriage of Shanti Kumar no child is born then how the 30 per cent share will be distributed. The clauses are apparent and provided no discretion to the Trustees. Therefore, in my view Dy. CIT(A) has gone wrong in holding that trust is not specific. Considering the facts stated above and the law relied on by Shri Ranka, I hold that the trust is specific and the share-income should be assessed in the hands of respective beneficiaries available or in the instance on the year ending of previous year. In this case the child was not even born in the previous year. His share should be distributed in proportionate amongst the other beneficiaries, namely, Shri Shanti Kumar and his wife. The alternative argument of Shri Ranka was not dealt with by the Dy. CIT(A) therefore, does not arise from the order of the Dy. CIT(A) and I do not feel it necessary to deal with the issue which does not arise out of the order of the Dy. CIT(A). 4. In the result, the appeal of the assessee is allowed.
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1989 (5) TMI 127 - ITAT JAIPUR
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... ... ..... and for electric installation 5 per cent had been added by the Approved Valuer. All these defects taken cumulatively, would remove the difference in the estimate. Therefore, in whatever manner, the matter is looked at, on a consideration of all the facts, no addition by way of unexplained investment in the construction could be found. In this connection, the decisions relied upon on behalf of the assessee are also relevant. The principle underlying those decisions is that the mere difference between the estimated value and the cost of investment cannot be added as the assessee s income. Therefore, the addition is deleted. In passing, we may point out that the ITO had deleted an apparent error in the figure of Rs. 37,476 and had vide his order dt. 15th Feb., 1988 under s. 154, reduced the unexplained investment addition from Rs. 37,476 to 32,130. However, as already stated earlier, no addition was warranted at all. 7. In the result the appeal filed by the assessee is allowed.
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1989 (5) TMI 125 - ITAT INDORE
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... ... ..... under s. 271(1)(b) we hold that it cannot be sustained and in that regard we maintain the order of the AAC but for the reasons other than recorded by him. The order of the ITO simply mentions that notices under s. 142(1) and 143(2) have been served time to time on the assessee and the assessee has not complied with the same. This description of the charge is so general that one cannot be certain about the facts on which the charge of failure to comply with the notice has been founded upon. An order levying penalty under s. 271(1)(b) must clearly mention as to which notice the assessee failed to comply with and when it was served upon the assessee. It is not at all clear from the order of the ITO as to which notice he meant for failure of compliance of which he wanted to penalise the assessee. The order of the AAC cancelling the penalty of Rs. 4,000 under s. 271(1)(b) is, therefore, maintained. 6. In the result, ITA No. 61/Ind/85 is allowed and ITA No. 62/Ind/85 is dismissed.
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1989 (5) TMI 124 - ITAT INDORE
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... ... ..... 8. On the same hypothesis the ITO took in asst. yr. 1981-82 that the new firm had not come into existence and as such the applications in Form No. 11 and 11-A were premature. On the same reasoning, he did not permit the assessee firm to adopt the previous year relevant to the asst. yr. 1981-82 of 15 months from 28th July, 1979 to Diwali of 1980 and thereby assessed the income of three months from 28th July, 1979 to Diwali, 1979 on protective basis. Since we have held that there was dissolution of the old firm and the new firm had come into existence on 28th July, 1979., the applications in Form No. 11 and 11-A were not premature. The ITO should have allowed registration to the new firm if there was no other defect in the applications. No defect has been pointed out before us by the Department. We, therefore, sustain the order of the AAC of IT though for the reasons other than recorded by him. 9. In the result, ITA No. 99/Ind/85 is allowed and ITA No. 145/Ind/85 is dismissed.
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1989 (5) TMI 123 - ITAT HYDERABAD-B
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... ... ..... pay the duty in four equal yearly instalments or eight equal half-yearly instalments. Therefore, s. 70(2) comes into operation only when a notice of demand under s. 73(1) is issued and the date on which the first instalment is payable would not be the date of death but the date mentioned in the notice under s. 73(1) or the date statutorily fixed under s. 73(2) (Nawab Ghazi Jung vs. Asstt. CED (1965) 56 ITR (ED) 8 (AP)). Such a situation will arise only after the estate duty is determined on the value of the estate of the deceased and not before. At any rate, it cannot arise at the stage of assessment itself, because the payment of duty in instalments will arise only when demand is raised against the accountable person. In the case before us, interest under s. 70(2) has been levied on the face of the assessment order itself from the date of death, which is palpably wrong. Therefore, we delete the levy of interest under s. 70(2). 9. In the result, the appeal is partly allowed.
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1989 (5) TMI 122 - ITAT HYDERABAD-B
Appeal Before AAC, Appellate Orders, Assessment Order, Assessment Year, Excise Duty, Orders Prejudicial To Interests, Previous Year, Subject Matter
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1989 (5) TMI 121 - ITAT HYDERABAD-A
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... ... ..... countries for which they arranged trips to their wholesellers and retailers. Otherwise, in our opinion there is no reason why they provided air tickets to only those foreign countries. However we cannot subscribe to the view canvassed before us that each wholeseller and retailer would spend his or her whole time only in acquiring the in higher marketing techniques of the product. Equally, we do not subscribe to the view expressed by the learned CIT(A) that a passive partner acquiring knowledge in higher techniques of marketing could not be of any help to the business. Therefore, we feel that instead of remanding the matters once again to the lower authorities to examine how much expenditure out of Rs. 20,206 is business expenditure, we feel it just to disallow 1/10 (one tenth) of the same as representing expenditure spent for pleasure trips and the rest 9/10th should be allowed as business expenditure. 3. In the circumstances, the appeal is allowed to the extent noted above.
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1989 (5) TMI 120 - ITAT HYDERABAD-A
Account Books, Additions To Income, Assessment Year, Chargeable To Tax, Contribution To Gratuity Fund, Income From Business, Income From Property, Income Returned, Religious Trust, Supreme Court
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1989 (5) TMI 119 - ITAT HYDERABAD
Account Books, Assessment Year, Delay In Filing Return, Late Filing, Penalty Proceedings, Settlement Commission
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1989 (5) TMI 118 - ITAT DELHI-E
Penalty, For Concealment Of Income ... ... ... ... ..... the total income of such person as a result thereof shall, for the purpose of clause (c) of this sub-section, be deemed to represent the income in respect of which particulars have been concealed Provided that nothing contained in this Explanation shall apply to a case referred to in clause (B) in respect of any amount added or disallowed as a result of the rejection of any explanation offered by such person, if such explanation is bona fide and all the facts relating to the same and material to the computation of his total income have been disclosed by him. There is nothing in this case to show that the explanation offered by the assessee was false nor the explanation offered was not bona fide and that all the facts relating to the same were not disclosed. This appears, therefore, to me a case where no penalty for concealment of income ought to have been levied. The matter will now go before the regular Bench to dispose of the appeal in accordance with the majority opinion.
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1989 (5) TMI 117 - ITAT DELHI-E
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... ... ..... generalia specialibus non derogant does not arise. As there was no difference of opinion on the other direction given, I must hold that the direction given by the learned Judicial Member following the order of the Tribunal for the earlier year holds good, survives and must be given effect to. By a careful reading of the orders of the learned Judicial Member and learned Accountant Member, I conclude that both of them have agreed that expenses relatable to sections 30, 31 and 32 should not be allowed in the face of section 37(4) for different reasons. While the learned Judicial Member followed the earlier order of the Tribunal, the learned Accountant Member has given his own reasons which happen to tally with the reasons adduced by the earlier Benches of the Tribunal on this point. There is thus a concurrence on this aspect rather than a difference of opinion. 6. The matter will now go before the regular Bench for the disposal of the appeal in accordance with majority opinion.
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1989 (5) TMI 116 - ITAT DELHI-E
Assessment Year ... ... ... ... ..... there was implied gift either to the son or to the grand daughters to the extent of the expenses incurred in the marriages. There was no transfer of property either to the son or to the grand daughters none of them had any control over the expenditure made by the assessee. It may be assumed that the son and the grand daughters were indirectly benefited by the expenditure incurred by the assessee but thereby it cannot be said that any of them acquired any property positively. It is, therefore, held that there was no gift of Rs. 40,000 by the assessee. 6. However, it cannot be gainsaid that cost of air-ticket in the sum of Rs. 7,840 incurred by the assessee for her grand daughter, Ms. Sushma, was a gift to Ms. Sushma. The air-ticket was a property. It was transferred by the assessee to her grand daughter. It is, therefore, held that the total value of the gift was Rs. 7,840 only. The assessment order shall be modified accordingly. 7. In the result, the appeal is partly allowed
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1989 (5) TMI 115 - ITAT DELHI-D
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... ... ..... . It is his duty to ascertain the truth of the facts stated in the return when the circumstances of the case are such as to provoke an inquiry. It is because it is incumbent on the ITO to further investigate the facts stated in the return when circumstances would make such an inquiry prudent that the word erroneous in s. 263 includes the failure to make such an enquiry. The order becomes erroneous because such an inquiry has been made and not because there is anything wrong with the order if all the fats stated therein are assumed to be correct. 6. As the ITO did not make any enquiry in this case though the circumstances of the case clearly suggested that proper enquiries should have been made, the CIT was fully justified in setting aside the assessments and directing the ITO to reframe the same after making necessary enquiries. There is, therefore, no warrant of justification for intefering with the impugned order of the CIT. 7. In the result, both the appeals are dismissed.
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1989 (5) TMI 114 - ITAT DELHI-D
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... ... ..... rred on food or beverages provided by the assessee to its employees in office, factory or other place of their work was allowable under Expln. 2 to s. 37(2A). It was further pointed out to the CIT(A) that in subsequent years the AO had considered 20 per cent of the expenses after allowing the statutory deduction as pertaining to expenses incurred on the employees. In these circumstances the learned CIT(A) directed the assessing officer to re-determine the amount to be added back out of entertainment expenses in accordance with the allowance made for the subsequent years. It is seen that for the asst. yr. 1981-82 also a similar allowance of 20 per cent was made by the ITO, which was confirmed by the CIT(A). The assessee came to the Tribunal and the Tribunal vide its order dt.19th Jan., 1987in ITA Nos. 2599 and 3106 (Del)/85 confirmed the order of the CIT(A). For the above reasons we confirm the order of the CIT(A) on this point. 20. In the result, the appeal is partly allowed.
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1989 (5) TMI 113 - ITAT DELHI-D
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... ... ..... the Karta could make gift even of ancestral immovable property, within the reasonable limits for pious purposes. According to Hindu notion, giving gifts to daughter or her children is, in a way, pious purpose. Similarly reasonable gifts of movable property for pious purposes were held to be in order in that case. These are the observations in the said case. This is seen that even in the case relied upon by the Revenue there is no total bar for making reasonable gifts of movable property for pious purposes. 16. In the light of the proceeding discussion, we are satisfied that the gifts made to the children of the Karta rsquo s daughters could not be considered void and thus, nothing could be includible in the hands of the assessee on account of interest on the gifted amount. We hold accordingly. 17. Still another ground was against the levy of interest under s. 215 of the Act. This ground is rejected, as not pressed. 18. In the result, the appeal is allowed to the above extent.
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1989 (5) TMI 112 - ITAT DELHI-D
Allowance Of Bad Debt, Assessment Year, Development Allowance, Expenditure Incurred, Weighted Deduction
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1989 (5) TMI 111 - ITAT DELHI-D
Assessment Order, Assessment Year, Time Limit For Completion ... ... ... ... ..... to have been filed in response to notice under section 148. Even if it is assumed that the return filed by the assessee was under sec. 139(4) and was not in response to notice under sec. 148, the ITO could have proceeded to make an ex parte assessment, because he could have as well come to the conclusion that the assessee had not filed any return pursuant to notice under sec. 148. But the fact remains that the ITO had the power to pass an order of assessment, once the notice under sec. 148 had been validly issued and that assessment could be made up to 31-3-1984. Mentioning of sec. 143(3) instead of sec. 147 would not take away the jurisdiction of the ITO or render it invalid. 9. In view of the foregoing discussion, we hold that the ITO, in this case, had the power to pass an order of assessment up to31-3-1984. The order passed by him on28-2-1983was, therefore, within time, as contemplated by section 153(2)(a) of the Income-tax Act. 10. In the result, the appeal is dismissed
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