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Case Laws
Showing 221 to 240 of 276 Records
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1992 (7) TMI 56 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Order Or Intimation U/S 143(1)(a), Writ ... ... ... ... ..... recovery which is sought to be made from the petitioners by the Department should remain stayed with regard to the assessment year in dispute. Mr. Vaish, learned counsel for the petitioner, accepts the suggestion and the concession offered by learned counsel for the respondents and submits that the writ petition may be dismissed as premature with liberty to the petitioners to approach this court as and when required. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed as premature with directions to the Department not to effect recovery till the decision of the appeal and revision by the Commissioner of Income-tax and the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals).
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1992 (7) TMI 55 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Initial Compensation, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... ision in Khorshed Shapoor Chenai (Mrs.) v. Asst. CED 1980 122 ITR 21. In our opinion, the said judgment of the Supreme Court has no application to this case. There, the court was concerned with the right of a person to receive enhanced compensation at the time of his death. We are here concerned with different question, viz., whether the amount of Rs. 23,309 was due to the petitioner or was an asset of the petitioner as on the valuation date. The answer to this can only be one, that is in the affirmative. Learned counsel for the petitioner is unable to bring to our notice any provision of law which deprives the petitioner of the amount of Rs. 23,309 after the acquisition has become final. The answer to question No. 1 is, therefore, self-evident and, therefore, the question need not be referred. For the aforesaid reasons, this application is partly allowed and the Tribunal is directed to state the case and refer question No. 2 to this court. There will be no order as to costs.
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1992 (7) TMI 54 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Forest Contractor ... ... ... ... ..... in the nature of intimation to the assessee about the infractions made. The liability was crystallised only when there was quantification and at no point of time earlier to that. Where a scheduled rate is prescribed, the liability can be fixed with precision. When there is no quantification by the concerned authority, the situation may be different. There must be an actual liability and not one which may arise in future. Contingent liability which may or may not arise cannot be allowed as a deduction. The service of the report in terms of rule 26 of the Rules do not straightaway create any liability in the person on whom the reports are served. As indicated above, they are in the nature of an intimation about infractions. In that view of the matter, we are of the considered opinion that the view of the Tribunal is in accordance with law. The question referred is answered in the negative, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. No costs. D. M. PATNAIK J. -I agree.
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1992 (7) TMI 53 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
Income, Interest ... ... ... ... ..... e dispute relates to the taxability of interest received by an assessee in relation to an arbitration award. Taxability of such interest came up for consideration of this court in several cases. In Govinda Choudhury and Sons v. CIT 1977 109 ITR 497, this court held such interest to be of capital nature and, therefore, not taxable as a revenue receipt. We are in agreement with this view expressed in Govinda Choudhury s case 1977 109 ITR 497 (Orissa) and the answer to the question referred to us is in the negative, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. The reference is, accordingly, disposed of. No costs. D. M. PATNAIK J. -I agree.
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1992 (7) TMI 52 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Disallowance, Firm ... ... ... ... ..... irm ? Pursuant to the direction, the Tribunal has stated a case. The dispute relates to the assessment year 1981-82. The only question which received the attention of the Tribunal in the second appeal was whether the provisions of section 40(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, are attracted when a Hindu undivided family is a partner in a firm and the karta in his individual status has been paid interest on amounts advanced to the firm. This question has received the attention of this court in several cases including one in S.J.C. No. 71 of 1980 (CIT v. Onkarmal Nanakram (No.1) 1993 200 ITR 193 (Orissa)) disposed of on July 26, 1990, relating to the assessee itself. In the said case it was held that the provisions of section 40(b) were not attracted. The reference in the said case related to the assessment year 1977-78. Following the aforesaid decision of this court, we answer the question referred to us in the negative in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. No costs.
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1992 (7) TMI 51 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Income From Property ... ... ... ... ..... relevant to the assessment year in question, whether factually the amount of interest is paid or not, it is a permissible deduction under section 24(1)(vi) of the Act in computing the income chargeable to tax under the head Income from house property . In other words, deduction in respect of interest on the borrowed capital is permissible on accrual basis unlike where the admissibility for deduction of certain other claims like those falling under clauses (ii) and (vii) of section 24(1) have been made dependent on actual payment of the amount sought to be deducted. In our opinion, the Tribunal did not commit any error of law when it allowed the deduction claimed by the assessee. As the answer to the question proposed is self-evident on a plain reading of the relevant provision itself, in our opinion, the order of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal does not give rise to any statable question of law. Accordingly, we reject this application. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1992 (7) TMI 50 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Income From Undisclosed Sources ... ... ... ... ..... of suppressed sales. In confirming the order of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals), the Tribunal has discussed the matter at length and has found that the additions made by the Income-tax Officer cannot be sustained on the material that existed on the record. Nothing was brought to our notice, as a result of which, the findings recorded by the Tribunal could be held to be vitiated. Whether the production shown in a given case is adequate or not is essentially a question of fact which does not involve any question of law. In so far as the second addition is concerned, the Tribunal has accepted the explanation furnished by the assessee that part of the stock pledged with the bank was that of a third party. The Tribunal having believed the version of the assessee and the evidence placed before it, in our opinion, it again does not give rise to any question of law. This application is without any substance and is, accordingly, rejected. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1992 (7) TMI 49 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
Business, Firm ... ... ... ... ..... ised manner with a set purpose and with a view to earn profits is business . Similarly, when the assessee took a plot of land on lease, constructed some structures thereon and let them out to shop-keepers and stall-holders, the apex court construed the activity to be business. (See S. G. Mercantile Corporation P. Ltd. v. CIT 1972 83 ITR 700 (SC). Keeping in view the decisions of the apex court in Karnani Properties case 1971 82 ITR 547 and S. G. Mercantile Corporation s case 1972 83 ITR 700 and also the decision of this court in Narasingha Kar s case 1978 113 ITR 712 (Orissa), the Tribunal held that the activities carried on by the assessee amounted to business. The conclusion is essentially one of fact, and, in our considered opinion, does not give rise to a question of law. Accordingly, our answer to the reframed question is in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. The reference is, accordingly, disposed of. No costs. D. M. PATNAIK J. -I agree.
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1992 (7) TMI 48 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Firm Registration, Minor ... ... ... ... ..... ties, i.e., the father, the second son and the third being described as the names of the three minor sons by their guardian mother . The minors were not shown as partners and the share of each of the three partners was shown as being equal and being one-third each. On the facts of that case, it was held that it was the widow who became the partner representing her minor sons and the deed of partnership was in conformity with section 26A (of the 1922 Act) and did not suffer from any defect which would entail non-registration of the partnership. The facts and circumstances in that case are different from the instant case. Similarly the facts and circumstances in Ram Laxman Sugar Mills v. CIT 1967 66 ITR 613 (SC), were different and will have no application to the instant case. In the view we have taken above, we answer the question referred by the Appellate Tribunal in the negative, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. These references are disposed of accordingly.
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1992 (7) TMI 47 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
Best Judgment Assessment, Firm ... ... ... ... ..... could not be also explained whether payment of interest was a new feature. It is true that each assessment year is separate unit, and strictly speaking, principles of res judicata are not applicable. But results of past years certainly provide a basis for assessment, when a best judgment of assessment is made. The Tribunal came to an abrupt conclusion that the net income estimated took into consideration all probable expenses which included interest paid to the partners. No material has been referred to in support of this conclusion. Therefore, instead of answering the question referred to us, we feel that the interest of justice would be best served if the matter is reheard by the Tribunal. It shall consider whether in the earlier years the aspect of payment of interest to the partners was taken note of, while net income from each bus was fixed at Rs. 8,000, and shall reconsider all relevant aspects relating to the question. Reference is, accordingly, disposed of. No costs.
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1992 (7) TMI 46 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Business, Business Income ... ... ... ... ..... upon the aforesaid Allahabad decision. This court, while considering the scope and ambit of the legal fiction under section 32(2) has held that, in construing the scope of a legal fiction, it would be proper and even necessary to assume all those facts on which alone the fiction can operate. These observations would obviously apply to posterior facts after the fiction is found to have legally arisen. As discussed earlier, the facts of the present case are entirely different. The basic facts for raising the legal fiction are non-existent on record or at least they are not found to be proved as aforesaid and, with respect, have been wrongly assumed by the Tribunal to have existed. As a result of the aforesaid discussion, it must be held that the Tribunal was in error in invoking section 41(1) on the facts of the present case. The question referred for our opinion must be answered in the negative, that is, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. No order as to costs.
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1992 (7) TMI 45 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
Firm, Previous Year ... ... ... ... ..... he previous year for the assessment of the income of the firm is statutorily made the previous year of the partner in respect of his share in the income of the firm even if the partner has income from other sources for which he may have a different previous year. A view similar to ours has been expressed by the Kerala High Court in CIT v. M. S. Sheik Rowther 1962 46 ITR 259 while considering a case under section 2(11)(ii) of the 1922 Act. The provisions of the said section are almost pari materia with the provisions of section 3 of the Act. The Bombay High Court in CIT v.. Mckenzies Ltd. 1980 121 ITR 458 has also expressed a similar view. In view of the analysis made by us above, we find that the Tribunal was justified in its conclusion that section 3(1)(f) applied to the facts Of the case. Our answer to the question referred is in the negative, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. The reference is, accordingly, disposed of. No costs. D. M. PATNAIK J. -I agree.
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1992 (7) TMI 44 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Disallowance ... ... ... ... ..... ever, he reduced the disallowance to Rs. 7,825. Being aggrieved the assessee came up in second appeal before the Tribunal. The Tribunal following the decision of the Ahmedabad Bench in the case of ITO v. K. S. Lokhandwala 1989 31 ITD 305, held that section 43B would not be applicable if the outstanding liability is cleared before the due date of submission of return for the relevant assessment year. The Tribunal accordingly directed the Assessing Officer to verify the date of payment of sales tax liability and allow relief to the assessee in the light of the decision in the case of K. S. Lokhandwala 1989 31 ITD 305 (Ahmedabad). It is not in dispute that these questions are now concluded by the decision of this court in the case of CIT v. Sri Jagannath Steel Corporation 1991 191 ITR 676. Following the said decision, we answer both the questions in this reference in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. There will be no order as to costs. SHYAMAL KUMAR SEN J.-I agree.
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1992 (7) TMI 43 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... at a similar question came up for consideration before this court in CWT v. B. K Sharma 1977 110 ITR 902 and there this court answered such question in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. Similar question was considered by the Supreme Court in Ahmed Ibrahim Sahigra Dhoraji v. CWT 1981 129 ITR 314 and there the Supreme Court approved the view taken by this court in the case of B. K Sharma 1977 110 ITR 902. Following the said decision, we decide the aforementioned question in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. The reference is answered accordingly. No order as to costs.
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1992 (7) TMI 42 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Interest, Sugar Industry ... ... ... ... ..... nterested. On such advances, no interest was charged from the directors. The assessing-authority held that the amount was advanced to the directors and the firms by the assessee-company from the overdraft for non-business purposes and, therefore, the interest paid by the assessee-company to the bank was disallowed to that extent. This question also came up for decision before this court in the case of the assessee itself in the immediately succeeding assessment year and then this court decided such question in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. (See CIT v. Saraya Sugar Mills (P) Ltd. 1992 193 ITR 575 ). Following the said decision, we answer question No. 2 in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. Question No. 3. -As this question is interlinked with question No. 2 which has been decided by us in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee, no separate answer need be given on this question. The reference is answered accordingly. No order as to costs.
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1992 (7) TMI 41 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
Depreciation, Initial Depreciation, Installed Tools Or Instruments Placed In Position For Use, New Industrial Undertaking, Special Deduction
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1992 (7) TMI 40 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Interest, Penalty ... ... ... ... ..... ent year or more than one assessment year. It is not as if the power under sub-section (1) is available only for one assessment year. The true meaning of subsection (3) is that the power shall be exercised only once in the case of a given person and not more than once. Thus, we are of the view that, as one application has been filed in respect of the assessment years in question, there is no question of considering the same separately for each assessment year. The application has to be considered only once as the power under sub-section (3) of section 273A(3) can be exercised only once in respect of an assessee and there can be one application relating to one or more assessment years. Hence, we are of the view that the Commissioner is not right in holding that the appellant is entitled to the relief under section 273A of the Act only in respect of the assessment years 1981-82 and 1982-83. Accordingly, we agree with the view of the learned single judge and dismiss this appeal.
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1992 (7) TMI 39 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Carry Forward And Set Off, Loss, Question Of Law, Return ... ... ... ... ..... ce of similar question. Mr. Monga, however, has brought to our notice an order of the Supreme Court dated July 19, 1991, whereby, in the special leave petition being SLP (Civil) No. 10790 of 1991, CIT v. Vizianagaram Press and Mills Co Ltd., the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court which had rejected a reference application on an identical question. In view of this order of the Supreme Court, the question of calling for a reference cannot arise. We, therefore, dismiss this application.
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1992 (7) TMI 38 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Disallowance ... ... ... ... ..... ee under the agreement. Mr. Gupta has contended that, in fact, there was no proof of the expenses having been incurred by the assessee. It is not open to counsel for the petitioner to raise this contention as this was not raised before the Tribunal and furthermore the disallowance by the Income-tax Officer was also not on the basis that the expenses had not been incurred but was on the premise that the expenditure was in excess of what was permissible under the provisions of section 37, read with rule 6D, of the Income-tax Act. In our opinion, in view of the aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court, reimbursement of expenses can, under no circumstances, be regarded as revenue receipt and, therefore, even though the question involves the interpretation of the agreement, the answer to the proposed question No. 2 is self-evident and covered by the aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court while question No. 1 is clearly a question of fact. This application is, therefore, dismissed.
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1992 (7) TMI 37 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Accrual, Income, Interest ... ... ... ... ..... ear of account, the claim for interest cannot be stated to have been given up so as to call for exclusion from the total income. Once the income accrues, it continues to remain as income accrued and, therefore, income assessable to tax. It is by now well-settled that waiver or relinquishment of income after it has accrued or has become due is of no effect. In our view, the income by way of interest in the facts and circumstances of this case had already accrued from day to day and, in any event, on March 31, 1971, being the last day of the previous year relevant to the assessment year 1971-72. Therefore, the passing of resolutions subsequently on May 10, 1971, and/or on August 21, 1971, in the meeting of the board of directors of the assessee-company is of no effect. In this view of the matter, we answer the first question in the negative and the second question in the affirmative and both in favour of the Revenue. There will be no order as to costs. K. M. YUSUF J. - I agree.
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