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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 295 Records
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1992 (9) TMI 384 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... also misconceived. Delay by itself in view of the wordings of Section 311 of the Code can, for obvious reasons never be a good ground to refuse a prayer for recalling of a witness where the same is necessary for a just decision of the case. The aforesaid facts and circumstances clearly warrant recall of these two witnesses to enable the prosecution to put questions to them in the nature of cross-examination for a just decision in the trial. 6. In result, the petition is allowed. Setting aside the impugned order dated 10.7.1992 of the trial Judge, it is hereby directed that the aforesaid two witnesses be recalled without delay and the prosecution be afforded opportunity to cross-examine them and in case request in made to that effect they may be further cross-examined by the defence and after their re-examination, if any, the arguments of parties be heard and judgment delivered as expeditiously as possible. The parties are directed to appear before the trial Judge on 9.9.1992.
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1992 (9) TMI 383 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... urt for holding that the cheque must be deemed to have been issued on the date it bears but not the actual date on which it was in fact delivered are not sound. So, adopting the above referred decisions of the Madras and Punjab and Haryana High Courts and not following the Kerala High Court judgment, I am of the clear opinion that a postdated cheque for the purpose of Clause (a) of the proviso appended to S. 138 of the Act has to be treated to have been drawn on the date it is delivered to the payee and not to be treated as drawn on the date it bears. 6. Since the registered notice issued by the first respondent shows that the cheques in question were issued on 23-6-1990 and was the same were presented for encashment under date 18-1-1992, far beyond six months period contemplated under S. 138 of the Act, the C.C. 128/92 filed against the petitioner by the 1st respondent is quashed under S. 482, Cr.P.C. 7. In the result, the Criminal petition is allowed. 8. Petition dismissed.
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1992 (9) TMI 382 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the Ceiling Act. The only fact that the 1st petitioner had accumulated large amount of tax arrears is no reason to hold that he is entitled to exemption on grounds of public interest. Admittedly he had assets out of proportion to his liabilities. Again the fact that the petitioner did not or could not effectively utilise the offer made by the State Government on an earlier occasion which resulted in the withdrawal of that offer is no reason to hold that the public interest justifies grant of exemption for the purpose of encouraging urban housing. 55. In this view, we dismiss W. P. Nos. 4513/91 and 14942/91. Writ Appeal No. 1220/91 is disposed of in view of the dismissal of the writ petitions. It will now be open to the State Government to proceed with implementation of the impugned decisions and other consequential orders issued in furtherance thereof. Petitioners will pay the costs of the respondents including Advocate's fee of Rs. 1000/- one set. 56. Order accordingly.
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1992 (9) TMI 381 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... rties under the garb of public interest litigants. (Emphasis supplied) In that case besides the advocate litigant certain political parties like the Janata Dal, the C.P.I. (Marxist), the India Congress (Socialist) and one Dr. P. Nalla Thampy Thera also approached this Court questioning the High Court's rejection of their request for impleadment/intervention. It was in this context that this Court was required to examine the question whether third parties had any 'locus standi' in criminal proceedings and answered the same as stated above. This decision clearly negatives the submission made by Mr. Sodhi in support of the maintainability of this petition. We are, however, in respectful agreement with the view expressed in the observations extracted hereinbefore. 9. For the above reasons we hold that the petitioner has no 'locus standi' to invoke this Court's jurisdiction under Article 32 of the Constitution. We, therefore, summarily reject this petition.
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1992 (9) TMI 380 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... to send one of the part of the samples to the Director. Central Food Laboratory, can not turn round and complain that he has been prejudiced. We respectfully dissent from the contrary decisions of some of the High Courts referred to earlier. We hold that She three decisions of the learned Single Judges of this court and the decision of a Division Bench of this court holding Rule 7(3) to be mandatory, does not lay down good law. There has been some delay in the present case in the despatch of the report by the public analyst to the Local (Health) Authority. The accused, however, did not try to show at any stage that the delay has caused prejudice to them. They did not even file an application before the trial court to cause one of the parts of samples to the Director, Central Food Laboratory for analysis in the circumstances we find no infirmity in the conviction entered and sentences imposed on the the revision petitioners. 44. The revision petition is accordingly dismissed.
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1992 (9) TMI 379 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... gh, JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
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1992 (9) TMI 378 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... el for the defendant No. 3 to the effect that no relief can be granted in the applications filed by the plaintiffs for interim reliefs as the suits are not maintainable. He contended that the premises in question are public premises covered under the provisions of the Act. It was urged that the Act being a self contained code the jurisdiction of this court is barred from entertaining the suit. On the other hand learned counsel for the plaintiffs submitted that the question of evaluation of the shed cannot be decided by the Estate officer and is beyond the scope of the Act. Upon consideration of the respective submissions of the learned counsel for the parties, I am prima facie of the opinion that the jurisdiction of the civil court is not barred in so far as the question relating to the price of sheds is concerned. 29. Any observations made hereinabove will not be taken as an expression of opinion affecting the final decision of the case. 30. The applications are disposed of.
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1992 (9) TMI 377 - CESTAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... t followed the ruling of the M.P. High Court as the same is having a binding effect in this matter. The evidence produced by the appellants has also been of similar nature as the one placed before the Hon’ble M.P. High Court. There is no reason to differ from this ruling. The learned Collector's reasoning is not sustainable and is liable to be set aside. In the result, the appeals are allowed with consequential relief, if any.” 6. In view of the ratio of the above two rulings, the appellants succeed in these appeals and the same are allowed with consequential relief subject to the provisions of Section 11B of Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. The learned Advocate submitted that they are entitled to the refund of the amounts deposited by them in these appeals and requested for a direction to the lower authorities to refund the same. The claim of the appellants may be examined for refund of these amounts and consequential relief may be granted as per law.
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1992 (9) TMI 376 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... f filing of Special Leave Petition in this Court. Nor we express any opinion if the appellants were guilty in contempt for non summoning of DPC for promoting to the post of Joint Director or Additional Director. But we are satisfied that the Tribunal having not taken any action on earlier occasion and granted one more opportunity to the appellants to implement the order and that having been done the facts and circumstances did not justify the sentence awarded to the appellants. We hasten to clarify that we may not be understood as saying that if the DPC has not followed the directions of the Court or the Tribunal its orders are not liable to scrutiny. Since we are not laying down or declaring any law and deciding the validity of the order on facts of case we do not consider it necessary to say any further. 7 . In the result this appeal succeeds and is allowed. The order sentencing the appellants to pay fine is set aside. The fine, if paid, shall be refunded to the appellants.
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1992 (9) TMI 375 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... , learned Counsel for the respondents that the prior award before enhancement was unsuccessfully questioned in SLP (C) 4298 of 1984 by the Union; that having been dismissed, it would constitute res judicata as far as the original award is concerned. However, the enhanced award is illegal and that alone is set aside. The appeal is allowed only to that extent. Civil Appeal Nos. 1320-1322 of 1990 73. The impugned judgment has been upheld with reference to the decision in SLP (C) Nos. 4291-4348 of 1984. Therefore, that having become conclusive, it cannot be reopened. The appeals will stand dismissed accordingly. Civil Appeal No. 1742-56 of 1986 74. The award was made in the year 1961. Since we have settled the question of law and taking into consideration the peculiar circumstances of the case at this distance of time of 31 years, we are not inclined to disturb the award. Hence, the appeals will stand dismissed. 75. There shall be no order as to costs in any one of these appeals.
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1992 (9) TMI 374 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... 1.7.1989 with which he was aggrieved nor did he make an application for review before the High Court. The judgment, in the circumstances, became final. It was only after the lapse of a period of about two years that the respondent made the belated claim. The High Court, in the circumstances was not, in our view, justified in entertaining the claim and allowing the same. The appeal, is therefore, allowed, the impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside and the aforesaid claim of the respondent is rejected. There will be no order as to costs. 5. The respondent also claimed some monetary relief for the period subsequent to 1.8.1989 on the ground that immediately after the delivery of the judgment in the writ case he was entitled to the same. The Corporation has denied the claim on the ground that the respondent did not promptly join his post as directed. This dispute has been left open by the High Court to be resolved later. We do not propose to say anything on this aspect.
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1992 (9) TMI 373 - ITAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... s of expenses incurred by dealers/stockists on product advertisement clearly amounts to suppression on their part--we do not accept the argument of bona fide belief that these expenses would not form part of the assessable value as the Hon'ble Supreme Court had already laid down the law in 1983 in the Bombay Tyre International case 1983 ELT 1896 1983 ECR 1627D (SC) ECR C 663 SC that advertisement charges form part of the assessable value for the purpose of assessment of excise duty as it is a component which has enriched the value of an article-in fact, the bona fide belief is clearly belied by the existing well settled legal position. 4. Having held that the demand is sustainable on merits and is not time barred, we further hold that penalty of ₹ 5,000/- is justified under Rule 173Q(1) CE Rules for contravention of Rules 9(1), 173C and 173F. Thus all three issues are answered against the appellants. In the result, we uphold the impugned order and reject the appeal.
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1992 (9) TMI 372 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... h were artificial and the denture was complete. Only three teeth of the denture were broken. The Doctor even did not say that the injuries cumulatively were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. There is no injury on any of the vital organs. This only shows that the common object of the unlawful assembly was only to belabour the deceased, the Manager of the Raja who was getting the land ploughed and according to the accused the ploughing was being done high-handedly. Under these circumstances we are of the view that it is not safe to convict the appellants under Section 302/149 I.P.C. Accordingly we set aside their conviction under Sections 302/149 I.P.C. and sentence of imprisonment for life. Instead we convict them under Section 304 Part II I.P.C. and sentence each of them to undergo seven years R.I. The other convictions and sentences awarded by the High Court are confirmed. The sentences are directed to run concurrently. The appeal is partly allowed.
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1992 (9) TMI 371 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... t and also on the gandasi of the appellant could not be explained by the appellant. Such existence of blood stain on the said articles corroborates the testimony of the eye-witnesses. In our view, simply on the score that the deceased was related to the eye-witnesses or previously there were some disputes between the appellant and the eye-witnesses, their testimonies do not deserve to be discarded because in our view, the testimony of the said eye-witnesses was otherwise convincing and the same also stood corroborated by other facts established by the prosecution. 8. In the aforesaid circumstances, the conviction of the appellant and sentence of the life imprisonment imposed by the learned Sessions Judge since upheld by the High Court do not appear to be improper or based on surmise and conjecture thereby warranting interference by this Court. The appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed. The bail bond stands cancelled and the appellant is directed to serve out the sentence.
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1992 (9) TMI 370 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ne of us (S. Ratnavel Pandian, J) was a party holding that the "question whether the delay is unreasonable and stands unexplained depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. 11. Coming to the second contention, it has been explained that the two years' period of acquaintance of the detenu with Tushar Shah was reckoned from the date of recording of the statement; but the 4 years' period mentioned in the counter relates only his indulging in several acts of FERA infraction activities and this period is calculated from the date on which the reply was filed on April 1992. According to Mr. Tulsi, the detenu is making much ado about nothing and this statement in no way affects the validity of the order. We are in quite agreement with this explanation and reject this contention as an unmerited one. 12. For the aforementioned reasons, we dismiss the appeal as devoid of any merit. Consequently, the Writ Petition filed regarding the same matter is also dismissed.
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1992 (9) TMI 369 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... as 346, where the cheque was returned with the endorsement "suit field by bank against account-holder". The court held that the reason apart, the dishonour had been occasioned because of insufficiency of funds, and further that the criminal proceedings under section 138 were justified regardless of the plea that civil action for recovery had been initiated. In our considered view, if the object of introducing section 138 on the statute book is to be achieved, it will have to be meaningfully enforced, brushing aside technical and frivolous pleas. 31. In the result, the petition succeeds. The order of the learned Magistrate dated August 9, 1991, issuing process against the petitioner who is the original accused is set aside and as a necessary consequence, the criminal proceedings are quashed. The bail bond executed by the petitioner to stand cancelled. The security deposit provided by him to the trial court is ordered to be refunded to him. Rule absolute accordingly.
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1992 (9) TMI 368 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... me when the bail of another accused was heard and rejected, cannot be prejudiced in any other manner by such rejection. Hence it is not necessary for the accused to disclose in his application that the bail has already been refused to another accused earlier. 61. My answer to the points referred to is that if on examination of a given case it transpires that the case of the applicant before court is identical, similar to the accused, on facts and circumstances who has been bailed out, then the desirability of consistency will require that such an accused should also be released on bail. (Exceptional cases as discussed above apart). As regards the second part of the question, answer is that it is not at all necessary for an accused to state in his bail application that the bail application of a co-accused has been rejected previously. 62. The record of this case be sent ex-peditiously to the learned single Judge with the above answers for the disposal of the bail application.
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1992 (9) TMI 367 - COMPANY LAW BOARD
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... ... ..... we do not think that it is necessary to continue our interim orders passed on February 20, 1992. 32. Accordingly, we stay the present proceedings before us, and vacate the interim orders issued on February 20, 1992. We also simultaneously appoint a representative of the petitioners' group, Shri Ranjit Singh Gaekwad, as director of GICPL in addition to the existing directors and Justice C.T. Dighe, retired judge of the Bombay High Court as independent chairman. Justice Dighe has already given his concurrence. He will be paid a remuneration of ₹ 2,500 per meeting in addition to travelling, stay and other incidental expenses. We also direct, that as we are not disturbing the present directors of GICPL, similarly, the present directors of the subsidiary of GICPL, i.e., Alaukik, should also not be disturbed. All these orders will be in operation till the petition before the Gujarat High Court is disposed of. A copy of this order may be also sent to Justice C. T. Dighe.
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1992 (9) TMI 366 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... y notice cannot be faulted with on such a hypothetical ground. The learned Counsel for the debtors distinguished the judgment of Court of Appeal in the case of In re Wheeler and relied on the reasoning of Court of Appeal in the case of In Re Low Ex-parte The Argentine Gold Field Ltd. This submission of the learned Counsel for Debtors is liable to be rejected on three grounds i.e. (a) This is the case of a single decree in favour of both the creditors and not the case of judgment debts obtained in several separate action. (b) The ground urged is hypertechnical and is therefore, without any merit. (c) The ground urged is beyond the scope and ambit of section 9(5) of the Act. 20. In the result the notice of motion fails and is dismissed with cost. 21. The learned Counsel for the debtor applies for stay of the operation of the order pronounced today. The operation of the order passed today is stayed for a period of four weeks from today. 22. Issue of certified copy is expedited.
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1992 (9) TMI 365 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ken in State of J & K v. Mohd. Yaqoob Khan. 6. In the present case, under the threat of proceedings of contempt, the Appellants had to comply with the order of the learned Single Judge notwithstanding the pendency of their appeal and the application for stay. The Petitioners are confronted with a position where their stay application is virtually rendered infructuous by the steps they had to take on threat of contempt. 7. We, accordingly, direct that all further proceedings in the contempt proceedings be stayed. It will be appropriate for the High Court to take up and dispose of the application for stay without reference to the developments in the interregnum, namely, that the Respondent had to obey the order of the learned Single Judge under pain of proceedings of contempt. Depending upon the outcome of the Appellants' application for stay, the further question whether or not the reinstatement should be reversed would arise. 8. The appeal is disposed of accordingly.
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