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1993 (3) TMI 371
... ... ... ... ..... w that Shri Karam Singh had ceased to hold the office of the Chairman of the Board having resigned from the said office on January 31, 1990, and the said resignation became effective from that date itself and that on the date of scrutiny, i.e., February 5, 1990, he was not holding an office of profit. For that reason, it has been rightly held that the nomination of Shri Karam Singh was improperly rejected by the Returning Officer. Since we are in agreement with the view of the High Court that the nomination of Shri Karam Singh had been improperly rejected for the reason that he was not holding the office of the Chairman of the Board on the date of scrutiny, we do not consider it necessary to go into the question whether the office of Chairman of the Board held by Shri Karam Singh had ceased to be an office of profit after January 8, 1990. The appeals, therefore, fail and are, accordingly, dismissed But in the circumstances with no orders to costs. B.V.B.D. Appeals dismissed.
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1993 (3) TMI 370
... ... ... ... ..... s to be dealt with severely but in view of the provisions of Section 27, we are unable to hold that the small quantity found with the appellant was not meant for his personal consumption and that on the other hand it was meant for sale or distribution. Therefore, the appellant is liable to be punished as provided under Section 27 of the Act. From the records it appears that the appellant has been in jail for more than three years but that may not be relevant since the sentence prescribed under Section27 is only six months. We are only just mentioning it as a fact. In the result the conviction of the appellant under Section 20(b)(ii) of the Act and sentence of 10 years R.I. are set aside. Instead he is convicted under. Section 27 of the Act and is sentenced to undergo 6 monghs' R.I. and to pay a fine of ₹ 1 lac in default of payment of which to further undergo 6 months' R.I. Subject to the above modifications, the appeal is disposed of N.P.V. Appeal disposed of.
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1993 (3) TMI 369
... ... ... ... ..... iff bank on 15-2-1971. Suit was filed for recovery of the outstanding amount on 4-2-1980. Issue No. 1 framed by the trial Court was with regard to the question whether the interest claimed by the plaintiff bank is usurious and excessive. However, no specific defence or argument was advanced before the trial Court with reference to the provisions of Usurious Loans Act or the provisions of Act IV of 1938. The trial Judge held that the interest claimed is not usurious or excessive. Against the said judgment, this appeal is filed by the defendants. 91. Having regard to the opinion expressed by the Full Bench today, the transaction between a banking company and its debtor cannot be re-opened on the ground that the interest claimed is usurious notwithstanding the provisions of Act 10 of 1918 or the other provisions of Debt Laws prevailing in the State. No other argument was advanced in this appeal. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed. No order as to costs. 92. Order accordingly.
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1993 (3) TMI 368
... ... ... ... ..... ceed in the suit although it cannot be predicated what would be her precise share in the joint family properties. Taking all these facts and circumstances into consideration, we are of the view that the following direction would be just and proper in the circumstances of the case During the pendency of the suit, the defendants shall deposit every year a sum of Rs. l2,000/-with effect from the date of filing of I.A.No. 182 of 1990 and continue to deposit the same amount every year pending disposal of the suit. The trial court shall keep the amount so deposited in fixed deposits in any nationalised bank. Within one month from the date of receipt of this order, the arrears shall be deposited. The amount pertaining to the year 1993 shall be deposited on or before 31st January, 1994 and for future years, the deposit shall be on or before 31st January of the succeeding year. 16. With the aforesaid directions, both the Letters Patent Appeal and the C.M.A. are disposed of. No Costs.
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1993 (3) TMI 367
... ... ... ... ..... of eligibility certificate granted under Section 4-A of the Act. Further the goods in question were components for the use of manufacture of T.V. etc. and being the raw material were not liable to tax otherwise under the Act. 4. The findings of the Tribunal have not been questioned in these proceedings by any independent question. In these circumstances it cannot be held that the Tribunal has committed any error of law when it deleted the penalty on the ground that the mens rea having not been established no penalty under Section 15-A(l)(o) read with Section 28-A could be sustained. This view finds support from decisions of this Court in the case of Jain Shudh Vanaspati Ltd., Ghaziabad and others v. State of U.P. and others, 1983 U.P.T.C. 198; M/s.Prakash Pipes Industries, New Delhi v. Commissioner Sales Tax, U.P., Lucknow, 1997 U.P.T.C. 328 and many other decisions which need not be referred in this judgment. 5. The revision is devoid of merit and is, accordingly rejected.
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1993 (3) TMI 366
... ... ... ... ..... (3) of the said Section would be by way of confirming, modifying or annulling the decision or order appealed against or referring the case back to the adjudicating authority for a fresh adjudication or decision. An order for the deposit of certain amount is not an order of the above type and is only an interlocutory one. It may even be modified by the Collector (himself). Only when that authority passes an order disposing of the appeal, does a cause of action arise for filing an appeal to the Tribunal. As validity pointed out by Shri Sarkar, there cannot be an anticipatory appeal. Here, the April 1992 Appeal has preceded the Order-in-Appeal issued in August, 1992. WE, therefore, have to dismiss the Appeal as premature. It will be open to the appellants to file a fresh Appeal against the Collector's appellate order and supplement the same with an application for condonation of delay setting out the reasons therefor. Order announced in the Court at the end of the hearing.
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1993 (3) TMI 365
... ... ... ... ..... precisely does that and for that reason is liable to be and is herewith set aside. On behalf of the appellant reliance has been placed upon the decision of this court in Mahesh Chandra v. Regional Manager, U.P. Financial Corporation & Ors., (1992) 2 J.T. 326. We have perused the decision. That was a case where the debtor was anxious to pay off the debt and had been taking several steps to discharge his obligation. On the facts of that particular 'case it was found that the corporation was acting reasonably. In that context certain observations were made. The decision also deals with the procedure to be adopted by the Corporation while selling the units taken over under Section 29. That aspect is not relevant in this case. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the said decision is of no help to the appellant herein. The appeal is accordingly allowed. The respondents shall pay the .costs of the appellant assessed at ₹ 10,000 consolidated. T.N.A. Appeal allowed.
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1993 (3) TMI 364
... ... ... ... ..... ma facie evidence on record connecting the employees with the misconduct in question. In the present case, before the preliminary report was received, the Director was impressed by the 1st respondent-employee's representation. However after the report, it was noticed that the employee could not he innocent. Since this is the conclusion arrived at by the management on the basis of the material in their possession, no Conclusions to the contrary could be drawn by the Court at the interlocutory stage and without going through the entire evidence on record In the circumstances, there was no justification for the High Court to revoke the order of suspension. 11. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the order of the High Court revoking the suspension of the 1st respondent is hereby set aside. This will result in revival of the order of suspension dated 10th March, 1992. The appellants should, however, conclude the inquiry expeditiously. 12. There will be no order as to costs.
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1993 (3) TMI 363
... ... ... ... ..... ed to decide that writ petition also on merits, in accordance with law-, (5) The interim order staying the order of disqualification in writ petition No.48 of 1991 is revived. However, the parties would be at liberty to apply to the High Court for modification or cancellation of the said interim order or for any other interim relief or direction, if so advised; (6) The High Court should hear and dispose of the writ petition No.48 of 1991 itself on merits as expeditiously as possible, preferably by 30th April, 1993; (7) Writ Petition No321 of 1990 filed by Ratnakar M. Chopdekar and Sanjay Bandekar pending in the High Court be also heard and disposed of as expeditiously as possible, preferably by 30th April, 1993. (8) Parties are directed to appear at the Goa Bench of the Bombay High Court on 6th April, 1993, without any further notice, for obtaining further directions in this behalf. (9) In the circumstances of the case, the parties will bear their own costs. Appeals allowed.
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1993 (3) TMI 362
... ... ... ... ..... de before him claiming certain lands or immovable properties as 'shamilat deh' vesting in Panchayats ignoring the judicial orders or decrees, by which any right, title or interest of private parties in such lands or immovable properties are recognised, are unconstitutional requires to be upheld. Consequently, the provisions of the Amendment Act of 1981, insofar as they are intended to operate retrospectively for nullifying the adjudications made by civil courts prior to that Amendment Act, are invalid, inoperative and unconstitutional. However, the provisions in the Amendment Act of 1981, can undoubtedly operate prospectively for adjudicating upon claims to 'shamilat deh' in proceedings initiated subsequent to the commencement of that Act, if they do not, in any way, disturb the finality of adjudications made earlier. For-the foregoing reasons, all these Civil Appeals and Special Leave Petitions fail and are accordingly dismissed. No costs. Appeals dismissed.
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1993 (3) TMI 361
... ... ... ... ..... rnative remedy is not a bar for this Court to entertain writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 16. Having held that the orders of adjudication in these cases cannot stand, the next question will be as to what will be the order to be passed in these cases. Since the respondent-Department has not considered about giving an option to redeem by paying a penalty, considering the peculiar facts and circumstances of these cases, I set aside the impugned orders and remit the matters to the Collector of Customs to consider about the quantum of redemption fine to be imposed on the importers--the petitioners herein, to redeem the confiscated goods and for considering the levy of penalty to be imposed. The respondents are directed to pass an order afresh in both cases, within a period of two weeks from to-day after giving notice to the petitioners. These writ petitions are allowed and the impugned orders are set aside. However, there will be no order as to costs.
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1993 (3) TMI 360
... ... ... ... ..... L made up to 22nd Dec., 1989 filed with the ROC 111-123 - Approval of PICUP & SBI for transfer of controlling interest to Crompton Greaves Ltd. and other supportive investors 788-789 - Agreement for sale of shares in August, 1990 between Majestic, Debikay Technologies Ltd. and Crompton Greaves Ltd. 790-793 - Bills & Receipts of DTL and Majestic on CGL for sale of shares 794-797 - Deed of Guarantee & Indemnity between Crompton Greaves Ltd. (CGL) and Mr. Duruv Kumar Khaitan (DKK) 798-802 - Assessment order under S. 143(3) for asst. yr. 1989-90 of Debikay Information Technology Ltd. 803-808 - Another note on Technical know-how 809-814 10. Since we have remitted the matter to the file of the Assessing Officer in respect of the assessment of sum of ₹ 1,64,70,000, the other issues raised before us are also restored to the file of the Assessing Officer to be decided afresh in accordance with law. 11. For statistical purposes, the appeal of the assessed is allowed.
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1993 (3) TMI 359
... ... ... ... ..... 84 Previous year ending S.Y. 2038 COMPUTATION OF TOTAL INCOME Business Income Net Profit as per Profit & Loss Account ₹ 27,611 Add Interest paid to partners ₹ 31,059 Income-tax ₹ 3,575 TDS ₹ 702 Donation ₹ 171 ₹ 35,507 Less Income-tax refund as per P & L Account ₹ 477 ₹ 35,030 ₹ 62,641 Add Lump sum addition, as per para 11. ₹ 1,50,000 Total income ₹ 2,12,641 Rounded off to ₹ 2,12,640 Less Tax payable by the firm ₹ 40,737 ₹ 1,71,903 Less Interest paid to partners ₹ 31,059 Divisible income ₹ 1,40,844 Order under section 158 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The above income is allocated amongst the partners as under - Sr. No. Name of the partner Share Profit Interest Total Rs. Rs. Rs. (1) R.G. Brud 40 56,338 5,393 61,731 (2) Ugamben Gulraj 20 28,169 8,775 36,944 (3) Sushilaben Sohanraj 20 28,169 7,713 35,882 (4) C. Ladhaji 20 28,168 9,178 37,346 Total 100 1,40,844 31,059 1,71,903
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1993 (3) TMI 358
... ... ... ... ..... 8377; 5,000/- (Rupees five thousand only) it is not necessary to interfere. The question of law can be decided in a more appropriate matter. Hence the Civil Appeal is dismissed.
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1993 (3) TMI 357
... ... ... ... ..... nd further whether the changed method of stock valuation is followed consistently year after year. Change in the method of stock valuation cannot be restricted to a particular year. If the new method of stock valuation is followed consistently year after year, the tax authorities have no option but to accept such method notwithstanding the fact that in the initial year when the changed method is brought about, it may result in a prejudice or detriment to the revenue. The change of method must be bona tide and must not be restricted to a particular year. The Tribunal has not recorded any finding to the effect that the new method of stock valuation is being followed by the assessee-company year after year. This aspect has to be examined by the Tribunal. 9. We, therefore, decline to answer the question in this reference and remand the matter to the Tribunal for fresh disposal in the light of the foregoing observation. There will be no order as to costs. Chowdhury, J. - I agree.
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1993 (3) TMI 356
... ... ... ... ..... cient to say that the claim of the respondent to additional 5 CCS is denied by the appellants and the controversy has to be finally decided by the High Court in the writ petition. 5. In the facts and circumstances of this case we are of the view that it was not appropriate for the High Court to have directed the payment of ₹ 99.50 lakhs to the respondent-mills by way of interim order. We, therefore, allow the appeal, and set aside the impugned order of the High Court dated July 30, 1992. We, however, request the High Court to decide the writ petition expeditiously, if possible, within three months. The impugned order in favour of the respondent-mills having been set aside, it would not be obligatory for the respondent to give the bank guarantee. We further direct that during the pendency of the writ petition before the High Court further proceedings consequent upon the notice dated February 6/7, 1992 shall remain stayed. The cross appeal is dismissed as withdrawn.
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1993 (3) TMI 355
... ... ... ... ..... roceedings and principles apply And the courts have to act firmly but with certain amount of circumspection and self restraint, lest proceedings under Article 32 or 226 are misused as a disguised substitute for civil action in private law. Some of those situations have been identified by this Court in the cases referred to by Brother Verma, J. In the facts of the present case on the findings already recorded, the mode of redress which commends appropriate is to make an order of monetary amend in favour of the petitioner for the custodial death of her son by ordering payment of compensation by way of exemplary damages. For the reasons recorded by Brother Verma, J., I agree that the State of Orissa should pay a sum of ₹ 1,50,000 to the petitioner and a sum of ₹ 10,000 by way of costs to the Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee Board. I concur with the view expressed by Brother Verma, J. and the directions given by him in the judgment in all respects. Petition allowed.
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1993 (3) TMI 354
... ... ... ... ..... is perspective we are constrained to conclude that the Arbitrator cannot proceed with the probate suit to decide the dispute in issues Nos.1 and 2 framed by him. Under these circumstances the only course open in the case is that the High Court is requested to proceed with the probate suit No.65/85 pending on the probate jurisdiction of the High Court of Bombay and decide the same as expeditiously as possible. The learned Judge is requested to fix the date and proceed day-to-day at his convenience till it is concluded and decide the matter according to law preferably within six months. Till then the Arbitrator is requested not to decide issue Nos.1 and 2. He may be at liberty to proceed with the other issues. He is requested to await the decision of the Probate Court; depending upon the result thereon, he would conclude his findings on Issues Nos.1 and 2 and then make the award and take the proceedings according to law. The application is accordingly ordered but without cost.
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1993 (3) TMI 353
... ... ... ... ..... l candidate to a Class III post and having put in a continuous service of one year prior to October 1, 1970, was eligible to be appointed under the said special rules of recruitment and the respodent was given such appointment with effect from October 26, 1971 under the said special rules of recruitment of 1970. The said respondent was entitled to be treated as direct recruit properly made under the said special rules of 1970 only from October 26, 1971 and the service rendered by him prior to the said date was only on the basis of ad hoc employment not made in accordance with the rules of recruitment. In the aforesaid circumstances, the decision of the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court appears to be clearly erroneous and we have no hesitation in setting aside the same. Learned Single Bench of the Karnataka High Court, in our view, has rightly dismissed the Writ Petition and we affirm the said decision. The appeal is accordingly allowed without any order as to costs.
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1993 (3) TMI 352
... ... ... ... ..... rvices examination. We make it clear that once recruited to the lowest level of the service the visually handicapped persons shall not be entitled to claim promotion to the higher posts in the service irrespective of the physical requirements of the jobs. If in the hierarchy of promotional-posts it is found by the Government that a particular post is not suitable for the visually handicapped person he shall not have any right to claim the said post. In the light of the above discussion we partly allow the writ petition and direct the Government of India and the Union Public Service Commission to permit the visually handicapped (blind and partially-blind) eligible candidates to compete and write the civil services examination which is ordinarily held yearly by the Union Public Service Commission. We further direct that they shall be permitted to write the examination in Braille-script or with the help of a Scribe. There shall be no orders as to costs. Petition allowed partly.
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