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Showing 41 to 60 of 304 Records
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1993 (3) TMI 351
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... ... ..... ints to the year 1989. But Mr. F.S. Nariman, leanred counsel for the Respondent-Company says that the said order has been extended from time to time for the subsequent years as well. Mr. Salve points out that in the body of the Judgment of the High Court no reasons are given in support of the aforesaid direction. We are, however, of the opinion that the said direction cannot be construed and shall not be understood, as calling upon or directing the Government to do anything, or to make any supplies, contrary to the Provisions of the Molasses control order or any other law governing the supply of molasses. The supply of molasses to the Respondent shall be made in accordance with law. Mr. Salve raised certain other contentions but we did not allow him to do, so in view of the fact that those contentions were not urged before the High Court. We need express no opinion thereon. Special Leave Petition is accordingly dismissed subject to the above observations. Petition dismissed.
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1993 (3) TMI 350
Whether the two permissions given by the State Government to the firm on 6.3.1987 and 18.4.1987 to sell land admeasuring 16194 sq.mtrs. and 3444 Sq. mtrs. respectively under Section 20 (1) of Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 are legal?
Held that:- If the vacant lands which have vested in the State are also to be disposed of strictly keeping in view the spirit and object of the Act, how under section 20(1)(b) exemption can be granted to holders of such lands to dispose of such lands in the manner they like, the persons they prefer, the price they dictate, for clearing their debts? If it is conceded that indebtedness amounts to an undue hardship, then it may cover the debts incurred even after the commencement of the Act. Thus provisions of Section 20 [1] (b) of the Act do not permit the State Government to give exemption to the vacant in excess of the ceiling limit for the purposes of transferring the same.
As concluded that the State Government has no power to grant permission to sell the land under Section 20 [1] (b), the orders dated 6.3.87 and 18.4.87 granting exemption and permission to the firm for sale of the land are void ab initio having been passed without jurisdiction. Accordingly, the sale-deed dated 30.9.1987 executed by the 2nd respondent firm in favour of the 3rd respondent-builders is held invalid and inoperative, as the respondent-firm had no legal right to transfer the land in favour of the builders. We accordiigly allow the appeals and set aside the impugned order of the High Court. The respondents State of Karnataka, M/s. Narayanaswamy & Sons and M/s. Reevajethu, Builders & Developers will pay the costs to the appellants in one set.
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1993 (3) TMI 349
Whether or not the expression arbitration or 'arbitrator' or 'arbitrators' has been used in the agreement?
Held that:- In the instant case, the original agreement signed between the parties does not contain any clause for arbitration. It is not the case of the applicant that the applicant had no occasion to know the terms of the agreement since singed by the parties and there was any clear representation that the copy of agreement was to be followed by the parties and terms contained in the copy were to be treated as the terms of agreement between the parties. Hence, it cannot be held that after the signed agreement the parties had clearly intended to include arbitration clause in the standard specifications. In the absence of clear intention of both the parties, agreement for arbitration cannot and should not be inferred more so when the specific case of the respondents is that by mistake the clause relating to arbitration crept. in the copy of agreement. In our view, the High Court was justified in holding that in the facts of the case, only the original agreement, and not the copy, was binding between the parties. Hence, no reference to arbitration could be made. In the aforesaid circumstances, no interference is called for in the instant appeal and the appeal therefore, fails and is dismissed
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1993 (3) TMI 348
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... ... ..... hs in the purchase of machinery. The plant itself, was erected on March 31, 1990 and has commenced production on May 11, 1990. The delay of four days could be for any reason including the electric installation and since all the effective steps were taken before May 7, 1990 it would be unjust to deny the exemption which was announced in accordance with the Scheme of 1987/ 1989 and the notification of May 7, 1990 would not come in the way of the assessee in claiming the exemption. Although we agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that there was no necessity for quashing the notification of May 7, 1990 which was not applicable as all the effective steps were taken by the assessee before this date and, therefore, while not approving this part of the order it is held that the petitioner is entitled for the benefit of Sales Tax Incentive Scheme for Industries, 1987/1989. The appeal is accordingly, dismissed with no orders as to costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1993 (3) TMI 347
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... ... ..... he credited in the so-called amanat khata as if those amounts had been kept by him in trust (sic) only. 6.. Section 2(f) of the Act defines dealer to mean any person who sells or purchases any goods whether for commission, remuneration or otherwise. Therefore the petitioner while making purchases even for commission on behalf of his principals was a dealer within the meaning of the Act and had made himself liable for paying tax on such purchases. 7.. For the foregoing reasons in our considered opinion, the Tribunal has rightly held that the petitioner was liable to pay purchase tax in respect of purchases of chillies during the period under assessment and therefore, the question as referred is answered in the affirmative on the basis that the petitioner has acted only as an agent of the purchasers and thus liable to purchase tax. But keeping in view the facts and circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. Aftab Alam, J.-I agree. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1993 (3) TMI 346
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... ... ..... is of investigation and a process of fact-finding will have to be undertaken on an appreciation of such evidence. This cannot possibly be done by the Tribunal exercising writ jurisdiction. This has to be done by the appropriate Assistant Commissioner. 22.. In the circumstances, the order of the Assistant Commissioner dated August 1, 1990 is set aside and the matter is remanded back to him for fresh disposal in the light of this judgment particularly keeping in mind the observations made in paragraph 17 and in accordance with law after giving an opportunity to the applicant of being heard. The matter may be disposed of early, preferably within four months, if possible. The interim order passed by this Tribunal on May 13, 1991 will, however, continue till the disposal of the said matter. 23.. The application is disposed of accordingly. There will be no order for costs. S.P. DAS GHOSH (Chairman).-I agree. L.N. RAY (Judicial Member).-I agree. Application disposed of accordingly.
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1993 (3) TMI 345
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... ... ..... ntitled to mould the relief which is couched in very wide terms in the original petitions and to quash exhibits R1(a) and R1(b). 13.. There is also a prayer to quash the demand for payment of demurrage by the first respondent-Indian Airlines. The question of liability for demurrage will depend upon the terms and conditions of the carriage. They have not been placed before me. At any rate it is a matter relating to the contract of carriage between the parties. It is best adjudicated in a properly framed civil suit and not in a proceeding under article 226 of the Constitution, particularly when this Court has not been enlightened regarding the terms and conditions of the contract of carriage. The original petitions are therefore allowed in part. Exhibits R1(a) and R1(b) are quashed. The first respondent shall not detain the goods consigned to the various petitioners or others on the basis of exhibits R1(a) and R1(b). There will be no order as to costs. Petition partly allowed.
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1993 (3) TMI 344
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... ... ..... section 8 with effect from November 3, 1988 and, therefore, we are not entering into the other questions raised in this application. The ends of justice will be sufficiently met if a registration certificate under section 8 is granted to the applicant with effect from November 3, 1988 after cancelling the registration certificate already granted under section 7. Accordingly, the application is allowed. The registration certificate granted on March 9, 1990, with effect from February 17, 1989, is quashed. The revisional orders dated December 19, 1990, passed by the Assistant Commissioner and dated May 7, 1992, passed by the Additional Commissioner are set aside. Respondent No. 4, Commercial Tax Officer, Salkia Charge, is directed to grant a registration certificate under section 8 of the 1941 Act to the applicant with effect from November 3, 1988. The main application is thus disposed of. No order is made for costs. P.C. BANERJI (Technical Member).I agree. Application allowed.
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1993 (3) TMI 343
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... ... ..... g on the mining operation, though such cess is calculated on the basis of the extracted ore. In absence of a finding that the sale price has been agreed upon by adopting a subterfuge and the price at which goods are sold is not the actual consideration received or receivable by the seller from the purchaser, it cannot be said that cess is a part of the sale price merely because it has been paid earlier to the sale. If the assessing authorities were suspicious about the agreement between the parties, they could have examined the purchasers to find out the materials in support of it. Sales Tax Officer has made no such enquiry in the present case. Accordingly, merely because cess is collected as a percentage of the royalty it cannot be said to be sale price to be given within the scope of tax. 6.. In result, the question is answered in favour of the assessee in this particular case. There shall be no order as to costs. A.K. PADHI, J.-I agree. Reference answered in the negative.
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1993 (3) TMI 342
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... ... ..... es Tax Act without having any limitation with regard to the kind of pesticides, it is difficult for us to give a limited meaning to the aforesaid expression pesticides . In our considered opinion, insecticide being also a species of pesticides would be entitled to the exemption from levy of tax in view of the notification of the State Government under section 6 of the Orissa Sales Tax Act and since the appellate authority has come to the conclusion that the goods manufactured by the assessee are insecticide , the said item is entitled to exemption in question. We would accordingly set aside the orders passed by the assessing authority as also the appellate authority in relation to assessment years 1989-90 to 1991-92 and direct that the assessing officer should make a fresh assessment bearing in mind the law laid down by us in this judgment. The writ application is accordingly allowed. There will, however, be no order as to costs. B.N. DASH, J.-I agree. Writ petition allowed.
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1993 (3) TMI 341
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... ... ..... ent and the actions of the various authority but has not created the offence retrospectively nor has mentioned that the returns submitted earlier before the validating Act shall be deemed to be valid returns. A person can be penalised for an offence which was an offence in accordance with the law prevailing at the time when the offence was committed. No doubt the provisions of section 16(1)(e) were existing and it would have been an offence to submit a return which was false or having inaccurate particulars warranting therein but such return was required to be submitted to the prescribed authority and the return submitted to any person other than the prescribed authority cannot be considered to be valid return. Since there was no valid return, therefore, no penal action can be taken on the basis of such return. In these circumstances the judgment of the Board of Revenue does not require any interference and the revision is dismissed. No order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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1993 (3) TMI 340
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... ... ..... ory estoppel cannot be invoked to compel the State to act contrary to the statutory prohibition contained in Act 20 of 1987. In the preamble to Act 20 of 1987 it was stated that in the sixth plan a limited provision of rupees twenty crores was only provided for the grant of interest-free sales tax loan for any industry and therefore, Expert Committee, on a consideration of the facts and circumstances and taking into consideration the budget provision, recommended maximum limit of rupees ten lakhs for each industry for the grant of interest-free sales tax loan. It is not necessary to go into this aspect in the view we have taken in this case. No argument was advanced with regard to the constitutional validity of Act 20 of 1987. Having regard to the above and in the circumstances, the petitioner-company is not entitled to invoke the principles of promissory estoppel . Accordingly, this writ petition is dismissed, but in the circumstances without costs. Writ petition dismissed.
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1993 (3) TMI 339
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... ... ..... nt. The taxable rates as per our books of account is worked out as under We are herewith pay the tax of Rs. 2,36,474 on above turnover, vide cheque No. 981177 dated 21st February, 1983 . In respect of the petitioner in W.P. No. 2444 of 1993 also, a similar statement was recorded. In other words, they have admitted that the transactions recorded in the books of account have not been reported in the returns filed by them. Having accepted before the authority that they have suppressed the inclusion of the transaction in the returns and having paid the tax by way of cheques, to avoid the seizure of stocks and seal of the business premises, it is now not open to the petitioners, to seek for a direction not to encash the cheques issued by them. It is open to the petitioners to raise the objection before the assessment authorities. Both the writ petitions are, therefore, devoid of any merits and are accordingly dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Writ petitions dismissed.
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1993 (3) TMI 338
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... ... ..... the aforesaid legal defect. Once the demand notice is quashed, the right of appeal against the assessment order which accrues from the date of service of demand notice under section 20(1) of the 1941 Act revives to the applicant, as soon as a fresh demand notice is served on him. 7.. In the result, the application is allowed. The demand notice received by the applicant on May 8, 1980, is set aside. Certificate Case No. 230-S.T.(B.T.)/ 84-85 initiated by Certificate Officer, 24 Parganas, respondent No. 4, is quashed. The respondents will be at liberty to serve a fresh notice of demand on the applicant in terms of the assessment order dated April 9, 1980, for the period of four quarters ending Chaitra, 1383 B.S. in accordance with law. In case a fresh demand notice is served, the applicant will be at liberty to file an appeal against the aforesaid assessment order in accordance with law. No order is made for costs. P.C. BANERJI (Technical Member).-I agree. Application allowed.
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1993 (3) TMI 337
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... ... ..... plied by the dealer are without any basis. On the basis of the above findings, the Appellate Tribunal set aside the order of the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) and restored the order passed by the assessing authority. 5.. We are of the view that the finding of the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal to the effect that the dealer has failed to show that the purchases made by it were made from registered dealers, is a finding of fact. The plea advanced by the assessee was not substantiated. On the other hand, it was evident that the entire consignment despatches were acquired by the assessee from unregistered dealers. On these premises, the conclusion of the Appellate Tribunal that such purchases made from unregistered dealers are exigible to purchase tax under section 5A of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, is unassailable. 6.. The order passed by the Appellate Tribunal does not disclose any error of law to merit interference in revision. The tax revision case is dismissed. No costs.
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1993 (3) TMI 336
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... ... ..... ich assessment has been completed, if he considers that the proviso to section 6B(3) of the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941, was not taken into account at the time of assessment. Such recalculation of the amount of turnover tax should be made within sixty days from this day upon giving to the assessee an opportunity of being heard on that question alone. Let it be made clear that we are not giving any liberty to reopen the completed assessments. We are merely allowing the assessing authority to recalculate the amount of turnover tax in terms of the proviso to section 6B(3) which is intended to give some marginal relief to assessees. The sum of Rs. 20,000 deposited as security by each of the applicants in these two cases in terms of interim order granted by this Tribunal will be adjusted against unpaid turnover tax of the respective applicants. No order is made for costs. S.P. DAS GHOSH (Chairman).-I agree. P.C. BANERJI (Technical Member).-I agree. Applications dismissed.
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1993 (3) TMI 335
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... ... ..... tax under entry 24 and the assessing authorities were also proceeding accordingly and to reopen such an assessment would cause great hardship because the petitioners are deprived of an opportunity to pass on the tax burden to the purchasers of the goods. The fact that in individual cases there is a likelihood of hardship resulting from the application of the law in a particular manner, is no ground to give a go-by to the true meaning attributable to the relevant law. If really the assessees suffered hardship the remedy is elsewhere. In view of the above, we are of the view that acrylic yarn and synthetic spun yarn are to be taxed only under entry 24 and other types of yarns involved in these writ petitions are to be taxed under entry 147 of the Second Schedule. Consequently, all the writ petitions are allowed with a direction to the assessing authorities to pass fresh orders of assessment in the light of the observations made in these writ petitions. Writ petitions allowed.
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1993 (3) TMI 334
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... ... ..... should be refunded to them. 10.. Exhibit P11 has not so far been considered by the first respondent. It is therefore only necessary to direct the first respondent to deal with the said application in accordance with law and pass appropriate orders. I accordingly allow the original petition and direct the first respondent to deal with the petitioner s application evidenced by exhibit P11, and to grant refund to the petitioner of the amount of tax, if any, paid by them under section 5A of the Act on the purchase of materials effected by them for use in the execution of works contracts. The orders of assessment exhibits P1 to P10 will be modified accordingly. The first respondent shall pass orders in the matter with opportunity to the petitioner to be heard, making necessary modifications in exhibits P1 to P10 and granting refund, if any due, within a period of four months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. There will be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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1993 (3) TMI 333
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... ... ..... nregistered dealers. These hawkers in turn had collected the bottles from consumers or otherwise. There was no dispute that the bottles were secondhand bottles which had earlier been sold to customers by the earlier dealers or the manufacturers. It is in these circumstances a Bench of this Court held that there was earlier sales of the bottles which must have suffered tax. The decision is based entirely on the special facts of the case. The learned Government Advocate is right in relying on section 6A of the Act whereunder the burden is on the petitioner to prove that the sale or purchase of kerosene and diesel had already been subjected to tax under the Act. The statutory presumption arising under section 6A(2) has not been displaced by the petitioner in the instant case, by showing that these articles are only controlled commodities. In these circumstances, we are of the view that the petition has to fail. The revision petition is accordingly dismissed. Petition dismissed.
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1993 (3) TMI 332
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... ... ..... n be said to be secured debts when the assessee fails to pay the same, whereas in the case of amounts other than land revenue and public revenue, they stand on a different footing, and therefore, the dues other than the land revenue and public revenue cannot be said to be secured debts when compared to the public revenue and land revenue. Therefore, the sales tax amount to be recovered from the assessee by the State Government is unsecured debt. It prevails over the unsecured debt of other creditors as per the doctrine of the priority of the Crown debt. But in the case of secured creditors, they prevail over the unsecured debt of the Crown. Therefore, the secured right of the petitioner prevails over the unsecured right of the State Government. Thus, the order of the lower court directing payment of the amount credited to the suit to the State Government is set aside. Consequently, the civil revision petition is allowed. There shall be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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