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Showing 61 to 80 of 304 Records
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1993 (3) TMI 331
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... ... ..... of the view that exhibit P5 has been passed without adverting to relevant facts and circumstances of the case. I am therefore inclined to interfere with the order exhibit P5. However, an expeditious disposal of exhibit P4 is called for. 11.. Ordinarily the quashing of exhibit P5 will entail a direction to the second respondent to reconsider the application for stay. However, I feel that the interests of justice in this case will be subserved with a direction to dispose of the application exhibit P4 itself with all expedition. Accordingly I allow the original petition and quash exhibit P5. I also direct the second respondent, Deputy Commissioner, to deal with and dispose of the application evidenced by exhibit P4 with all expedition, and at any rate within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. Pending disposal of the said application, exhibit P4, recovery of the amount demanded as per exhibit P1 will be kept in abeyance. Petition allowed.
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1993 (3) TMI 330
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... ... ..... e in the pleadings. Accordingly, the application is allowed. The impugned order or notice dated February 12, 1993 marked exhibit D at page 37 of the main application regarding sealing of the godowns of the applicant at 89, Netaji Subhas Road, Calcutta-1, is quashed. Respondent No. 1, Commercial Tax Officer, Strand Road Charge, is directed to unseal the godowns of the applicant at the said premises within forty-eight hours from now. The applicant or his representative will appear before respondent No. 1 at 12.00 noon on Friday, the March 26, 1993 at his office and then respondent No. 1 will unseal the godowns on that day and make over the godowns to the applicant or his representative as the case may be. If however communication of our order is not possible on Friday, the unsealing must be made on Monday, the March 29, 1993 without any fail. The main application is thus disposed of without any order as to costs. P.C. BANERJI (Technical Member).-I agree. Writ petition allowed.
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1993 (3) TMI 329
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... ... ..... at least 15 per cent. The proposition notice nowhere states that the rate of profit in this line of business would normally be 15 per cent. In fact the proposition notice issued by the Deputy Commissioner does not even say that in similar business the normal gross profit would be 15 per cent. If such an assertion had been made by the Deputy Commissioner, probably, the assessee could have placed proper material to disprove the assertion. The revisional authority has just stated that the assessing authority should have determined the sales turnover by adding normal profit of 15 per cent over the purchase. The basis of such assertion also is not forthcoming in the notice. In such a situation, it cannot be said that the Deputy Commissioner acted within the scope of section 21 of the Act. For the reasons stated above, the order of the Deputy Commissioner as well as that of the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal are set aside. Revision petition is allowed accordingly. Petition allowed.
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1993 (3) TMI 328
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... ... ..... f the view that if the respondent No. 2, wanted to make any deductions in the capital investment of the petitioner, it should have informed the petitioner in time to enable it to file appeal-before the Sales Tax Tribunal and to recover sales tax from purchasers, but neither the respondent No. 2, nor the respondent No. 3 informed the petitioner in this connection. The petitioner is seriously prejudiced on account of arbitrary action of the respondents Nos. 2 and 3. Consequently, I allow the writ petition, quash the order dated February 15, 1991, passed by respondent No. 3, asking the petitioner to deposit excess sales tax beyond sales tax exemptions and in case the petitioner fails to deposit the same, he shall be further liable to pay penalty. Anyhow, the petitioner will be liable to pay sales tax on the goods which it sold to other persons after the receipt of letter dated February 15, 1991, issued by respondent No. 3. Parties to bear their own costs. Writ petition allowed.
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1993 (3) TMI 327
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... ... ..... Bengal for the first time. So, the question of resale of cement does not arise at all. If there is no resale of cement, there can be no concessional rate of tax for purchase of bags as containers or packing materials under section 5(1)(aa). As regards bags being treated as basic goods, the question of resale does not arise in West Bengal, because those are subsequently sold only together with cement packed therein and after certain things done thereto, thereby not in the same or substantially the same condition of new bags. Amendment of registration certificate under rule 11(3)(b) of the 1941 Rules is not automatic. Commercial Tax Officer will make it only when he is satisfied that the purchases are intended for resale . As the officer was not so satisfied, he rightly declined to make the amendment. 15.. In the result, the application is dismissed. No order is made for costs. S.P. DAS GHOSH (Chairman).-I agree. P.C. BANERJI (Technical Member).-I agree. Application dismissed.
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1993 (3) TMI 326
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... ... ..... he statutory proceedings pertain to tax liability. Technically, the assessee would be aggrieved only when there is an enforceable assessment order by the authority. If such an order is made, all other orders made earlier could be treated as orders made at intermediary stages. If so, certainly the higher authority before whom the matter comes up at a subsequent stage could examine the correctness of the order made by the earlier appellate authority who was subordinate to the second appellate authority. In these circumstances, we are of the view that the Appellate Tribunal was not justified in rejecting the appeals of the petitioner before us. Accordingly, the petitions are allowed. The order of the Appellate Tribunal is set aside. The matter is remanded to the Appellate Tribunal to consider the question raised by the assessee. Sri C.V. Kumar, learned High Court Government Pleader, is permitted to file memo of appearance for the respondents within six weeks. Petitions allowed.
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1993 (3) TMI 325
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... ... ..... n. It is not therefore possible to uphold the petitioners contention that the retrospective levy of the turnover tax from April 1, 1992 to July 29, 1992, is unconstitutional or void. 9.. It is true that the Advocate-General had in Hotel Elite v. State of Kerala 1988 69 STC 119 (Ker) conceded that levy concerned in that case will not be imposed retrospectively. But the Government Pleader who appears in these cases is not prepared to make any such concession. This Court cannot issue any direction to make the levy prospective, so long as there is no illegality in the retrospective levy. It will be for the petitioners to represent before Government about the hardship, if any suffered by them by the retrospective levy, and it will be for the Government to consider the matter with all the sympathy that it deserves. 10.. The notices and demands impugned in these original petitions are therefore quashed. The original petitions are allowed to this extent. No costs. Petitions allowed.
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1993 (3) TMI 324
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... ... ..... at which the petitioner will have all his opportunities to put forward his pleas on law and on fact. The process of detention of the goods at the check-post, cannot be resorted to in such cases when there is a bona fide dispute regarding the very existence of a sale and the exigibility for tax. Section 29A is not intended to subserve such an object. 9.. In Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Jyothi Liquors 1992 84 STC 509 this Court held that unless there is an attempt at evasion of tax on the goods under transport, detention at the check-post is not warranted. The finding that there is attempt at evasion of payment of tax should not be based on mere guesses, but should be founded on concrete facts. No such facts have been disclosed in this case. I am therefore of the opinion that exhibit P9 is an order without jurisdiction and it has got to be quashed. The original petition is therefore allowed and exhibit P9 is quashed. There will be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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1993 (3) TMI 323
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... ... ..... rder to be passed by the Tribunal. 10.. The petitioner could therefore, have approached the Tribunal for interim relief regarding the recovery proceedings initiated pursuant to the revised order of assessment exhibit P8. When such a remedy is available, it is not for this Court to step in with an interim order to avail pending the appeal before the Tribunal. That will be highly incongruous. I decline to entertain this writ petition. 11.. The petitioner seems to have entertained a genuine doubt about the competence of the Tribunal to pass such interim orders having regard to the absence of any specific power in section 39 and the language of sub-section (6) thereof. 1 therefore, grant the petitioner one month s time to move the Tribunal for such orders as are necessary. The proceeding for recovery of the amount as per exhibit P8 will be kept in abeyance for a period of 6 months from today. The original petition is dismissed subject to the above directions. Petition dismissed.
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1993 (3) TMI 322
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... ... ..... anufacture of stands as claimed by it. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the assessee contended that in the past the assessee was never assessed on any turnover of angle iron and there was no material available to the tax authorities for the finding that a part of the iron angle was sold as such. I do not feel it necessary to enter into this controversy for essentially it is a question of fact which could appropriately be determined by the fact-finding authority constituted under the Act. As the Tribunal has not addressed itself on these aspects of the matter, there is no option except to set aside the order of the Tribunal to the limited extent with a direction to it to decide the appeal giving rise to this revision, afresh in the light of the observations made above and in accordance with law. I order accordingly. For what has been stated above, the revision succeeds in part and is allowed, accordingly. There shall be no order as to costs. Petition partly allowed.
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1993 (3) TMI 321
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... ... ..... the contractor is required to pay tax on sales effected by the GEB, even though, he gets only the net realisation after deducting such sales. This may raise equitable consideration, but so far as the questions referred to us are concerned, such an inquiry will be beyond the scope of our consideration. Once we hold that the sales tax is leviable on the price of concrete poles supplied by the applicant to the GEB, the question of deducting the value of cement and steel supplied by GEB cannot arise. If the applicant-contractor has any equity in his favour he may agitate the same before the Tribunal by referring to the relevant clauses of the agreement between the parties, which are not on record before us. In law, therefore, the question No. 2 has to be answered in the negative. 13.. Both the questions, therefore, are answered in the negative, and against the assessee. 14.. There will be no order as to costs in the circumstances of the case. Reference answered in the negative.
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1993 (3) TMI 320
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... ... ..... ses and sales effected by the licensees and is occasioned thereby. The fact that it is paid by virtue of a compounding provision does not make it any the less sales tax. If the contention of the petitioners was accepted, the consequence will be that the compounding itself cannot be sustained under the legislative powers of the State, a contingency which could not have been contemplated while enacting sub-section (14) of section 7. The amount paid as compounding fee under the agreement is only sales tax, though as stated earlier, the amount is fixed without going through the complicated process of assessment. It is therefore futile for the petitioners to contend that what is paid under section 7(14) is not sales tax on which no surcharge is payable. The letter sent by the Board of Revenue to the Deputy Commissioner, Kannur reflects the law on the point correctly. The petitioners contentions are unsustainable. The original petitions are therefore dismissed. Petitions dismissed.
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1993 (3) TMI 319
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... ... ..... d not to pay the amount stated in the notices to the petitioner No. 1 company but to credit it towards sales tax dues with the Sales Tax Officer. These actions are clearly covered under the term proceedings for execution, distress or the like against any of the properties of the industrial company used in section 22(1) of Act. 8.. For the aforesaid reasons, this petition deserves to be allowed and notices, annexures P4 to P7 and garnishee orders P8 to P11 deserve to be quashed. We, therefore, allow the petition and quash the garnishee orders P8 to P11 and prohibit the respondents from employing coercive process of recovery pursuant to demand notices, annexures P4 to P7. It is however, clarified that the respondents shall be free to approach the BIFR for permission to proceed with the recoveries as under section 22(1) of the Act itself such execution, distress, etc., can be proceeded further with the consent of the Board. There shall be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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1993 (3) TMI 318
Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in holding that the receipt of Rs.1,38,577 realised @1 per bilty per customer through the bills and credited to a separate account called ’DHARMADA’ was not assessable to tax as revenue receipt?
Held that:- Appeal allowed. This was a proper case where the High Court ought to have directed the Tribunal to state the said question under Section 256(2) of the Act - the judgment and order of the High Court is set aside and the application filed by Revenue under Section 256(2) is allowed.
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1993 (3) TMI 317
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... ... ..... ificate. 51. emsp In the circumstances of the case, we find that in the assessable values, based on the Chartered Accountant rsquo s Certificates, which took into account the cost of the steel drums and the fabrication charges, separately for painted and unpainted drums, customer rsquo s profit was not includible. On the same grounds, we consider that the transportation charges, which already stood included in the fabrication charges claimed by the ap shy pellants from the HPCL, and the cost of wrapping material, whose cost formed part of the cost of the steel sheets and which already stood included in the cost of the drums as per Chartered Accountant rsquo s Certificate, were not liable to be included again in the as shy sessable values, arrived at in this case and on whose basis the assessments were made. 52. emsp In the result, we set aside the order passed by the Collector, Central Excise (Appeals), Bombay, and allow the appeal with consequential relief to the appellants.
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1993 (3) TMI 316
Whether the respondents-assessees were entitled to the benefit of rule 9(f) of the Kerala General Sales Tax Rules, 1963?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. The assessee in these appeals was a dealer of firewood and had contracted for the purchase and sale of firewood. The High Court, on the basis of the material before it, gave the benefit of rule 9(f) of the Rules to the assessee no ground to interfere with the reasoning and the conclusions reached by the High Court as relying on Kutty & Co. v. State of Kerala [1978 (3) TMI 192 - KERALA HIGH COURT]
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1993 (3) TMI 315
Whether for the purchases and sales made by the respondent-assessee, was he liable to tax under the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. Relying upon the exemption notification issued under section 10 of the Act the High Court came to the conclusion that the synthetic gems were exempt from the payment of tax under the Act.
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1993 (3) TMI 312
Whether goat/ sheep and the meat got after slaughtering the animal are the same category of goods for the purposes of sales tax under the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963?
Held that:- Appeal allowed. High court order that both goat/sheep and the meat were the same goods for the purposes of sales tax under the Act set aside.
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1993 (3) TMI 311
Was the Appellate Tribunal justified in law in holding that trade discount allowed by the assessee to their customers is not the part of the sale price within the meaning of section 2(h) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 and so not includible in the taxable turnover?
Was the Appellate Tribunal justified in law in directing the deletion of the amounts of trade discount from the taxable turnover of the assessee for all or any of the reasons stated by it?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. High Court answered the questions against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee
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1993 (3) TMI 310
Sales tax application made on behalf of the Commissioner of Sales Tax, Maharashtra rejected to direct the Sales Tax Tribunal to refer to the High Court the following question - Whether the Tribunal was correct in holding that in purchasing materials for the construction of the barges intended for use in the business of sea transport the opponent-company was not carrying on the business of buying goods and hence was not a dealer as defined by clause (11) of section 2 of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959?
Held that:- Appeal is allowed. The order of the High Court rejecting the sales tax application, passed on January 24, 1977, is set aside. The sales tax application is made absolute. The Sales Tax Tribunal shall refer the aforementioned question to the High Court for decision. The High Court shall consider the reference in the light of the judgments aforementioned as also such other judgments as may appear to it to be relevant.
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