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Case Laws
Showing 61 to 80 of 202 Records
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1994 (5) TMI 225
Winding up - Company when deemed unable to pay its debts ... ... ... ... ..... urity which he had deposited for the due performance of a works contract whereas in the present case there is no question of any deposit but the money had been paid to the company for the use of the petitioner for allotting the shares in his name. The question of the applicability of article 62 of the old Act which is equivalent to article 24 of the 1963 Act did not arise for the consideration of the learned judges. This judgment is, therefore, of no help to the petitioner. I, therefore, hold that the claim in the instant case is governed by article 24 of the 1963 Act and the same is barred by time. It is well settled that in a winding up petition it is a good defence for a company that the amount claimed from it for the non-payment of which it is sought to be wound up, is barred by time. Consequently, in view of my finding that the claim of the petitioner herein is barred by time, I am left with no option but to dismiss the petition. Parties are left to bear their own costs.
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1994 (5) TMI 218
Since the relevant provisions of the Haryana General Sales Tax Act, 1973 are analogous to those of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1954 this petition must also succeed. Thus direct that the amount of interest levied and collected from the petitioners under the Haryana General Sales Tax Act as well as the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 shall be refunded to the petitioners within three months from today with interest at 12 per cent per annum from the date of actual recovery till refund.
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1994 (5) TMI 213
Taxability of turnover relating to ice-cream - Held that:- Review petition allowed. The exemption granted to ice-cream by notification dated 21st May, 1974, was undone by the notification dated 4th November, 1974 as well as by the Notification dated 30th May, 1975. The order of the assessing authority holding the turnover relating to ice-cream as taxable is restored.
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1994 (5) TMI 199
Amalgamation ... ... ... ... ..... lease with restriction on the transfer or sub-letting of such property, the sanction of the relevant authority is sought before the transfer. (2). If, as a result of the transfer of any assets or shares of the transferor- company to the transferee-company, a liability to the capital gains tax may arise against any company or its shareholders, this order shall not absolve such company or the shareholders from payment of taxes which may be leviable under the existing tax laws and as such, the taxing authorities shall be free to proceed in the matter of tax, irrespective of the present order of amalgamation. (3). The present order of amalgamation will not absolve any of the companies or its directors from the liability for breach of any law or control order which might have been committed before the order of amalgamation. 17. With the aforesaid directions and restrictions, the scheme of amalgamation filed before this Court in Company Petition Nos. 1 to 4 of 1994 are sanctioned.
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1994 (5) TMI 198
Directors - Validity of acts ... ... ... ... ..... any open to challenge at the hands of the liquidator, in the event of the winding up order being passed. Sometimes dispositions would be necessary in the interest of the company and thus in the ultimate interest of the creditors of the company during the pendency of the application for winding up. The company court must have jurisdiction to protect such transactions. 13. Be that as it may, in view of the fact that the sale deed in question was executed and registered much before the presentation of the winding up petition, there does not arise any question of this court exercising any discretion in the matter. 14. Having come to the conclusion that the managing director, Mr. Roop Singh Singhal, was competent to sell the land of the company, I allow this application and declare that the land in question has been validly sold to the petitioners and was not the asset of the company at the time of the presentation of the winding up petition. The application is, thus, disposed of.
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1994 (5) TMI 197
Winding up – Avoidance of transfer, etc., after commencement of ... ... ... ... ..... f the company open to challenge at the hands of the liquidator, in the event of the winding up order being passed. Sometimes dispositions would be necessary in the interest of the company and thus in the ultimate interest of the creditors of the company during the pendency of the application for winding up. The company court must have jurisdiction to protect such transactions. Be that as it may in view of the fact that the sale deed in question was executed and registered much before the presentation of the winding up petition, there does not arise any question of this court exercising any discretion, in the matter. Having come to the conclusion that the managing director, Mr. Roop Singh Singhal, was competent to sell the land of the company, I allow this application and declare that the land in question has been validly sold to the petitioners and was not the asset of the company at the time of the presentation of the winding up petition. The application is thus disposed of.
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1994 (5) TMI 196
Deficiency in service ... ... ... ... ..... to be further computed is the loss caused to the appellant by the missed opportunities of the rights offer as also for mental harassment and the financial expenses for persuing the matter. We are of the view that on a fair calculation a sum of Rs. 5,000 would meet the ends of justice herein. 7. In the light of the above, we direct that the respondent - Unit Trust of India shall complete the allotment of 700 units to the appellant and further pay Rs. 8,570 in all being the admitted amount of dividend of Rs. 570 plus the compensation amount of Rs. 5,000 only. The appellant is also entitled to his costs, which are assessed at a sum of Rs. 500 only. 8. This appeal is consequently allowed and the relief granted is enhanced in the terms recorded above. The respondent shall comply with the order within two months from today, failing which compliance will be enforced by the District Forum, Hissar itself under section 27 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. Appeal allowed with costs.
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1994 (5) TMI 195
Compensation - For deficiency in service ... ... ... ... ..... for Rs. 70,000. 2. We have heard Shri Goenka, Advocate for the appellants, respondent remained absent. In our view, there is no substance in this appeal and it is liable to be dismissed, for the simple reason that complainants failed to place material on record before the District Forum for claiming Rs. 70,000 as compensation. According to Shri Goenka, transfer of shares were not made in the joint names of the complainants within a period of 2 months from the date of receipt of the transfer application. However, the learned Advocate failed to satisfy as to how the 2 months period is prescribed in the transfer of shares. The Opposite Parties may be having some difficulties in transfer of the shares, since the work involves lot of manual work. Under these circumstances, failures on the part of com-plainants in justifying the claim of compensation, in our view, the compensation of Rs. 1,000 granted by the District Forum is reasonable. Hence this appeal is liable to be dismissed.
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1994 (5) TMI 168
Whether the prospective investor could be a consumer within the meaning of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986?
Whether the appellant-company "trades" in shares?
Does the Consumer Protection Forum have jurisdiction in matters of this kind?
What are the guiding principles in relation to the grant of ad interim injunctions in such areas of the functioning of the capital market and public issues of the corporate sectors
Whether certain "venue restriction clauses" would require to be evolved judicially as has been done in cases such as State of West Bengal v. Swapan Kumar Guha and Sanchaita Investments [1982 (2) TMI 301 - SUPREME COURT]?
What is the scope of section 14 of the Act?
Held that:- The appellant has suffered immensely because it has not even been served with a copy of the order of injunction. The application of the respondent is clearly actuated by mala fides. The Forum should have examined whether ex parte injunction without notice to the opposite side could ever be granted at all. The grounds urged in the injunction application were insufficient for the grant of such a relief.
There is an increasing tendency on the part of litigants to indulge in speculative and vexatious litigation and adventurism which the for a seem readily to oblige. We think such a tendency should be curbed. Having regard to the frivolous nature of the complaint, we think it is a fit case for award of costs, more so, when the appellant has suffered heavily. Therefore, we award costs of ₹ 25,000 in favour of the appellant. It shall be recovered from the first respondent.
the writ petition has rightly come to be rejected though, in our view, it would have been better had the High Court given reasons instead of dismissing it summarily
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1994 (5) TMI 167
Amalgamation, compromises, etc. ... ... ... ... ..... consumers interest. 3. In the event in HLL is unable to comply with any of the aforemen- tioned assurances given in 1(a) and (b), HLL shall inform consumer organisations and consumers in general through various media, the reasons for the same. 4. If any disputes arise with regard to any trade practice or policy adopted by HLL in this regard they shall be resolved by a Committee consisting of two representatives of trade and industry nominated by HLL and two representatives of consumers to be nominated by CERC, preferably from the consumer representatives on the Central Consumer Protection Council and a Chairman to be appointed by mutual consent of the nominees, or in the absence of such consent, by drawing of lots with respect to names recommended by four representatives mentioned above. The decision of this Committee of 5 arrived at unanimously or by majority vote, shall be binding on HLL. 43. To conclude, the appeals are disposed of in the above terms. No order as to costs.
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1994 (5) TMI 166
Further issue of capital ... ... ... ... ..... the petitioners that for raising the funds for the working capital, no company had any legal right to raise such funds by issuance of shares and funds for working capital must be raised only by raising loans from the banks. It is not disputed before me that raising of funds by issuance of the shares would not involve any payment if interest, while by raising bank loans, the company had to pay interest at quite a high rate of 21 per cent p.a. or so. 15. In view of the above discussion, I find that there is no mala fide act on the part of the company in trying to raise the funds by issuance of right shares in question. The mere fact that the company had earlier tried to raise funds by issuance of right shares in 1993, does not mean that the present decision of the company in issuing the right shares is actuated by any ulterior motives and is not bona fide exercise of the discretion in the interest of the company. I find no merit in this application, which I, hereby, dismissed.
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1994 (5) TMI 165
Unfair trade practice ... ... ... ... ..... ions made were in the nature of unfair trade practice with potentiality of causing loss or injury to the investors in case he was unable to get the return on his investment as promised. The respondent in that case was directed to desist from making such representations inviting offers whether for debentures or for equity shares, etc., and the costs of the proceedings were also imposed on the respondent. The present case is fully covered by the ratio of this decision. Accordingly, both the issues are decided against the respondent. 9. In the net result, we pass a cease and desist order directing the respondent to desist from making any representation in any form by advertisement in paper or otherwise making such or similar misleading representation. The respondent shall file an affidavit of compliance with an undertaking not to issue such or similar advertisements in future. The respondent shall also pay Rs. 2,500 as cost of the proceedings to the Director General. Pronounced.
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1994 (5) TMI 164
Discharge of liabilities - Held that:- Appeal dismissed. Power to order payment of amounts due from a 'notified person' 'to any bank or financial institution or mutual fund' presupposes and proceeds on the existence of obligations inter se between the parties based on contractual, statutory or other legally recognised rights and that such vinculumjuris is absent as between the appellant, on the one hand, and the Fairgrowth Financial Services Ltd., on the other. What is further implicit is that the appellant which is a stranger to the consideration respecting transactions between the Andhra Bank Financial Services Ltd. and the Fairgrowth Financial Services Ltd., cannot seek to enforce the obligations thereunder. The remedy of the appellant against its debtor which itself is not a notified person, lies in the ordinary courts of the land. This reasoning is not shown to be unsound.
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1994 (5) TMI 162
Unfair trade practice ... ... ... ... ..... simple claim to superiority by reason of technological break- through and the like. The expression, in our view, implied discrediting or running down or painting the products or others in black or grossly unfavourable light, directly or by necessary implication by making false and misleading assertions. 21. Judged from this angle, we do not think the respondents have not transgressed the limits of fairness or propriety in the context of the provisions of section 36A(1)(x). 22. Before concluding we must add that the Commission has already ordered upon another complaint an enquiry against the impugned public issue. Any observations made herein should not, therefore, be construed as a pronouncement on the transparency or otherwise of the public issue - an aspect we were not invited to pronounce upon as the learned counsel for the complainant confined her submissions solely to the product. 23. In the premise, the complaint fails and is dismissed but we make no order as to costs.
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1994 (5) TMI 134
Notification - Amendment of - Effect ... ... ... ... ..... cts and circumstance of this case. The Hon rsquo ble Calcutta High Court in the case of P.R. Parekh v. Collector of Customs (supra) has clearly concluded in Para 16 as extracted above that Foley Balloon Catheters are also Suction Catheters. It has also been held but for the explanation introduced by amending notification, there can be no doubt that Foley Balloon Catheters would have continued to be exempted from duty under that notification. It has been further held that Explanation was added to exclude what could otherwise have been covered for the benefit of exemption from payment of duty. This finding of the Calcutta High Court clinches the issue and makes it very clear that the amending notification is not a clarificatory notification to have any retrospective effect. In that view of the matter, we do not find any merits in the arguments raised by the ld. SDR and we reject the same. This appeal is, therefore, deserve to be allowed and we order accordingly. Appeal allowed.
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1994 (5) TMI 132
... ...
... ... ..... ior to such amendment. 9. emsp Thus, following the ratio of the said decision we hold that the subject goods may be removed only on payment of duty as prevalent at the time of the clearance of the goods during November, 1989 as demanded in the Show Cause Notice. The case of Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. and I.T. Commr., Kanpur, supra, do not advance the case of the respondents as no body is extending the legal fiction beyond the legitimate filed in the instant case. 10. emsp In the result, we set aside the impugned order-in-appeal so far as it relates to the setting aside of the demand and restore the order of the Additio- nal Collector so far as it relates to the demand of Central Excise duty amounting to Rs. 43,535.94 and pass no order regarding personal penalty as neither in the Memorandum of Appeal nor during the course of arguments it was contended by the Revenue that the personal penalty should be imposed on the respondents. 11. emsp The appeal stand disposed of accordingly.
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1994 (5) TMI 130
... ...
... ... ..... he packing has been opened by M/s. Ceramic Decorators to carry out printing, the condition of original packing is not fulfilled and further there is every likelihood that the entire quantity of the bottles was not received in the appellant rsquo s factory due to the nature of the goods and their propensity to breakage. 3. emsp We agree with the learned Counsel that the facts of this case are similar to the Amritsar Bottling case (supra). After printing the bottles had been supplied to the appellants under cover of the original gate-passes duly endorsed in the name of the appellants. Further, there is no clear finding that the entire quantity of bottles was not actually received. Therefore, following the ratio of the Tribunal rsquo s order (supra) we hold that the appellants are entitled to avail of modvat credit on glass bottles used in the manufacture of aerated drinks, set aside the impugned order and allow the appeal with consequential relief, if any due to the appellants.
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1994 (5) TMI 128
Demand - Limitation ... ... ... ... ..... provision for making such disclosures in the RT 12. Further, the fact that they did not obtain the permission under Rule 57H should be known to the Departmental Officers. When in spite of not having obtained the said permission they had taken Modvat credit which fact was disclosed in their RT 12 and R.G. 23A Part I and Part II statements, they had kept the Department informed of such a position. If it was irregular taking or availment of credit, the notice should have been issued in the normal time limit of six months. The notice was issued very late in this regard and the longer time limit is not applicable in this case. I, therefore, allow the Appeal on the time bar question. 8. emsp As the Appeal is being allowed on the question of time bar, the other contention based on their earlier declaration of August 1987 which plea was not raised by them and the factual aspects relating to which had not been considered by the authorities below, has not been taken into account by me.
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1994 (5) TMI 127
Appeal by Department ... ... ... ... ..... which are totally different from the Headings and Section under which the items are classified. 22. emsp The Tribunal has erred in seeking to limit the meaning of the word inputs rsquo to those items which go into the steel ingot completely overlooking the phrase in relation to rsquo in the definition in the major clause of the explanation. 6. emsp Acceptance of the Appellants rsquo plea in the present case that the goods in question are not apparatus or appliance will be in line with the above decision of the Calcutta High Court. I respectfully follow the same and uphold the contention raised by the Appellants in this regard. 7. emsp Thus, both on the question that the appeal filed before the Collector (Appeals) was not maintainable as the questions raised therein were not those that had arisen from the Assistant Collector rsquo s Order which was sought to be set aside and on merits the present Appeal succeeds. I accordingly allow the Appeal and set aside the impugned order
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1994 (5) TMI 126
Penalty - Machines assembled for own use in the factory ... ... ... ... ..... owards the duty. In the circumstances, the entire issue appears to have been blown out of proportion. The procedural infractions committed by the appellant with regard to the method of payment of duty could have been and ought to have been regularised by the Dept. under suitable caution to the assessees for future. Rule 173Q can come into play, when there is a deliberate violation of rules with an intention to evading duty. In this case, when the admitted position is that duty payments have been made under TR 6 challans before their removal for captive use and such payments are also intimated to the Range Officer, there is hardly any case for alleging duty evasion. In the result we set aside the order of confiscation and imposition of penalty. The duty paid under TR 6 challans are to be regularised by accounting in RG 1 register and showing the date of removal for captive use. In view of the disposal of appeal itself, stay petition does not survive for separate consideration.
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