|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 355 Records
-
1995 (1) TMI 400 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... subsidy from the cost of assets for the purpose of the depreciation/investment allowance" ? 3. Arguments of the learned counsel have been heard. The matter stands concluded by the decision of the Apex Court in the case of CIT vs. P.J. Chemicals Ltd. (1994) 121 CTR (SC) 201 (1994) 210 ITR 830(SC) wherein it has been held by the apex Court that the amount of subsidy is not to be deducted from the cost of the assets for the purpose of depreciation/investment allowance. Since the matter stands already covered by the decision of the apex Court we do not consider that any useful purpose would be served by directing the Tribunal to refer the above question to this Court. 4. Consequently, the Reference Application is dismissed.
-
1995 (1) TMI 399 - DELHI HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... riod of limitation prescribed by the various Articles in the Schedule to the Limitation Act. This is because we do not even find in Rules i.e. the subordinate legislation any provision purporting to extend the period of limitation prescribed by the Limitation Act, 1963. Counsel for the appellant could not but concede that S. 5 of the Limitation Act did not apply to the filing of the plaints. In fact, that is so elementary to admit of any doubt. Rules 1 and 2 of (O.S.) Rules 1967, extracted above, do not even remotely suggest that the refiling of the plaint after removal of the defects as the effective date of the filing of the plaint for purposes of limitation. The date on which the plaint is presented, even with defects, would, therefore, have to be the date for the purpose of the limitation act. We are, therefore, of the view that the learned Single Judge was absolutely right in rejecting the contention of the defendants that the suit was not within time. Appeal dismissed.
-
1995 (1) TMI 398 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... for 24 years the public purpose, was delayed. As a consequence execution of the project has been delayed and the costs now stand mounted. The courts in the cases where injunction are to be granted should necessarily consider the effect on public purpose thereof and also suitably mould the relief. In the event the plaintiffs losing ultimately the suit, they should necessarily bear the consequences, namely, escalation of the cost or the damages the Corporation suffered on account of injunction issued by the courts. Appellate court had not adverted to any of the material aspects of the matter. Therefore, the High Court has rightly, though for different reasons, dissolved the order of ad interim injunction. Under these circumstances, in the event of the suit to be dismissed while disposing of the suit the trial court is directed to assess the damages and pass a decree for recovering the same at pro rata against the appellants. 16. The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs.
-
1995 (1) TMI 397 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... and a Sewadar of a Gurudwara has been crying hoarse that in the premises of an oil mill near the Gurudwara at Ratangarh in Madhya Pradesh various smuggling and illegal activities relating to narcotic and psychotrophic drugs are being carried on. Even if the petitioner has not been able to precisely give particulars of such illegal activities concerning narcotic and psychotrophic drugs, we feel that it is only desirable that the Director General of Police, Madhya Pradesh should cause enquiry to be made by some superior police officials of the State about the truth or otherwise about the allegations of smuggling and illegal activities being carried on in the premises of an oil mill near the Gurudwara at Ratangarh in the State of Madhya Pradesh concerning narcotic and psychotrophic drugs and take appropriate action on the basis of the enquiry report. The Registrar General of this Court is directed to convey only this direction to the Director General of Police, Madhya Pradesh.
-
1995 (1) TMI 395 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... of the case serves no useful purpose. More so when the Tribunal had earlier deprecated the remand and set aside the order of the first Appellate Authority and directed it to decide the appeal on merit on the material available on the record. That had been done. 13. The above legal aspect leaves no doubt in my mind that the remand order passed by the Tribunal is materially illegal and is liable to be set aside, 14. I, therefore, allow the revision. The impugned order dated April 29, 1989, passed by the Tribunal is hereby set aside and the Tribunal is directed to decide the Second Appeals itself and if it is required and it will subserve the interest of the parties, then the Tribunal will itself direct the Department to file decision of the Income Tax Authority if it has become final and taken judicial account of, it will dispose of the Second Appeals in accordance with law. 15. This judgment will govern the Sales Tax Revision Nos. 640 of 1989 and 641 of 1989. 16. Costs easy.
-
1995 (1) TMI 394 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... course of action to enforce the legal right. It indicates the prescribed mode in which the judicial business is conducted. The execution is a step in the judicial process. It seeks to enforce the final order to realise the result of the adjudication. Therefore, it is an integral part of the order passed by the Tribunal which was abolished and that new Tribunal came to be constituted under the Act. Therefore, the Tribunal constituted under the Act gets jurisdiction and power to enforce the orders passed by the Tribunal and which attained finality. o p /o p The High Court, therefore, is right in its conclusion though for different reasons that the execution Petition before the Civil Court would not lie. o p /o p The S.L.P. is accordingly dismissed. It is open to the petitioners to approach the A.P. Administrative Tribunal to have the order passed by the erstwhile Administrative Tribunal enforced in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the Act and the Rules. o p /o p
-
1995 (1) TMI 393 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ce they had longer length of service as Readers than the appellant. This contention also proceeds on the basis that Respondents 4 and 5 were validly promoted to the grade of Professor on 9-11-1984 and the said contention would have no validity if it is held that promotion of Respondents 4 and 5 to the grade of Professor under the Personal Promotion Scheme could only be legally effected from 21-2-1985. 16. For the reasons aforementioned, it must be held that the appellant should have been treated as senior to Respondents 4 and 5 in the cadre of Professor in Physics and the Executive Council was not justified in placing him junior to the said respondents. The appeal is, therefore, allowed, the judgment of the High Court dated 6-1-1994 is set aside and the writ petition filed by the appellant is allowed and it is directed that the appellant should be treated as senior to Respondents 4 and 5 as Professor in the Physics Department of the University. There is no order as to costs.
-
1995 (1) TMI 392 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... afresh in accordance with law under sub-section (3) of Section 4-A of the Act in case he decided to invoke his powers under that provision." It is held in the said case that this power is exercisable by the Commissioner, Sales Tax which was earlier exercisab'e by the State Government. The said decision further held that earlier in view of Section 4-A (3) such a power could have been exercised by the Divisional Level Committee, respondent No. 2 in exercise of its inherent powers in view of General Clauses Act. To the similar effect is the decision in the case of M/s. Arora Box Industries, Varanasi v. Divisional Level Committee, Varanasi and others, 1993 UPTC 204, which also held that after granting eligibility certificate, the Divisional Level Committee has no power to reduce the period. In view of this the impugned order dated 6th October, 1989 (Annexure-19 to the writ petition) is unsustainable and is hereby quashed. The writ petition is hereby allowed with costs.
-
1995 (1) TMI 391 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... d irregularities. From the report of the judgment, the nature of the charges concerned therein also do not appear. We do not know whether the charges there were grave as in this case. Probably, they were not. There is another distinguishing feature in the case before us by the date of the judgment of High Court, the major part of the enquiry was over. This is also a circumstance going into the scales while weighing the factors for and against. As stated hereinabove, wherever delay is put forward as a ground for quashing the charges, the court has to weigh all the factors, both for and against the delinquent officer and come to a conclusion which is just and proper in the circumstances. In the circumstances, the principle of the said decision cannot help the respondent. 15. The appeal is allowed in the above terms. No costs. 16. A copy of this order shall be communicated immediately to the Chief Secretary, Home Secretary and Inspector General of Prisons, Government of Punjab.
-
1995 (1) TMI 390 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ned Counsel for the appellants to the said submission. 22. Sri Muralidhar also submitted that no notification was issued under Section 134 of the Act with respect to Circle VIII-A in which the respondents' holding is situated. The High Court has declined to entertain the said plea on the ground that it can always be raised in the appeal and other remedies provided by the statute. We are in agreement with the High Court. We too have confined our attention only to the validity of the rules and the notifications as the High Court had done, leaving other questions to be agitated in an appropriate forum at the appropriate stage. 23. For the above reasons, the appeal is allowed and the judgment of the High Court is set aside. No costs. The High Court to have noticed that tax on the said holding at the rate of nine per cent (tax on holding, water tax and latrine tax together) would be ₹ 13,996.80p., a fact set out in the counter filed by the corporation in the High Court.
-
1995 (1) TMI 389 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... idently in view of the rise in prices and approached the High Court more in the nature of a gamble than for vindicating her legitimate rights. The explanation given by her for her seventeen years' slumber was that she had filed a revision before the Administration and was awaiting its result. The appellants have denied the receipt of any such revision. The respondent is not able to substantiate her plea. Moreover, if indeed she had filed a revision, she has not explained why did she wait for seventeen years without making any enquiry about its progress and without making any efforts to have it disposed of. It is evident that the said plea is a false one, invented for the purpose of the writ petition. It, therefore, follows that the High Court was in error in allowing this writ petition as well. Accordingly, this appeal too is allowed and the judgment under appeal set aside. The appellants shall be entitled to their costs from the respondent, quantified at ₹ 10,000.
-
1995 (1) TMI 388 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ad not made any record under the proviso to Section 42(1). He also did not adhere to the provisions of Section 50 of the Act in that he did not inform the person to be searched that if he would like to be taken to a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate, a requirement which has been held to be mandatory. In Balbir Singh's case, it has been further stated that the provisions of Sections 52 and 57 of the Act, which deal with the steps to be taken by the officer after making arrest or seizure are mandatory in character. In that view of the matter, the learned Counsel for the State was not able to show for want of material on record, that the mandatory requirements pointed out above had been adhered to. The accused is, therefore, entitled to be acquitted. 4. In the result, we allow this appeal, set aside the order of conviction and sentence and acquit the appellant-accused of the charges leveled against him. He will be set at liberty at once unless required in any other matter. .
-
1995 (1) TMI 387 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... tled to refund of over-charge or excess payment in respect of animals or goods carried by railway unless his claim to the refund has been preferred in writing by him or on his behalf to the railway administration to which the animals or goods were delivered to be carried by railway etc. within six months from the date of the delivery of the animals or goods for carriage by railway. The proviso has no application to the facts of this case. An over charge is also a charge which would fall within the meaning of s.78-B of the Act. Since the claims were admittedly made under s.78-B itself but beyond six months, by operation of that provision in the section itself, the claim becomes barred by limitation. Therefore, the Tribunal and the High Court have rightly concluded that the petitioner is not entitled to the refund of the amount claimed. 5. We do not find any ground for our interference with the orders challenged in S.L.Ps. The Special Leave Petitions are accordingly dismissed.
-
1995 (1) TMI 386 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... he terms of the contract for- refund of earnest money. The Trial Court had rightly decreed the' suit for return of the earnest money. The district Judge refused the relief on the ground that he was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. As stated earlier, his readiness and willingness is not relevant after the notification under s.4(1) and declaration under s.6 were published. Under those circumstances, the District Judge had taken an erroneous view in reversing the decree of the trial court. The High Court did not apply its mind nor did it advert to any of these relevant circumstances. It simply dismissed the second appeal in limine, as if it was a routine. Therefore, we hold that the decree of the High Court and that of the District Judge are vitiated by manifest gross errors of law. They are set aside accordingly. The decree of the trial court is restored. 4. The appeal is allowed. In the circumstances, parties are directed to bear their own costs.
-
1995 (1) TMI 385 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ld that because of the admission of Swarup Kailash, the son-in-law of Ganpat Roy, as a partner in the business, there has been a deemed vacancy of the premises within the meaning of sub-sections (2) and (4) of Section 12 and it shall amount to subletting within the meaning of Section 25, Explanation (i), which is a ground for eviction under sub-section 2(e) of Section 20 of the Act. The judgment in Mohd. Azeem case9 does not lay down the correct law and on the other hand we hold that H. C Pandey case 10 lays down the correct law. 27.In the result, the appeal is allowed. The judgment of the High Court allowing the writ petition of the respondent- tenants is set aside and the orders of the Rent Controller and Eviction Officer are restored. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. 28.However, respondents shall not be evicted from the premises in question up to 30-6-1995, if they file usual undertaking before this Court within four weeks from today.
-
1995 (1) TMI 384 - SUPREME COURT
Whether a banking company which renders service within meaning of clause (g) of Section 2 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 is liable to compensate its customers for loss of service due to illegal strike by its employees?
Held that:- The provisions of Section 14(1)(d) are attracted if the person from whom damages are claimed is found to have acted negligently and such negligence must result in some loss to the person claiming damages. In other words, loss or injury, if any, must flow from negligence. Mere loss or injury without negligence is not contemplated by this Section. The bank has not been found to be negligent in discharge of its duties. Therefore, even if any loss or damage was caused to any depositor but it was not caused due to negligence of bank then no claim of damages under the Act was maintainable. Appeals dismissed.
-
1995 (1) TMI 383 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... to tax at the reduced rate only when the raw material for extracting groundnut oil is groundnut only but not otherwise. If that be the intention then on the ground that the raw material used for extracting groundnut oil has suffered tax, the reduced rate of tax under entry 24(b) cannot be made applicable. We have also support for this view from the judgment of division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Chhatar Chemicals Ltd. v. State of Haryana 1994 93 STC 215. In that case the notification of Government of Haryana granted concession in the rate of tax payable on sales of oil extracted from sarson, etc. The learned Judges held that the concessional rate did not apply to sales of oil extracted from oil-cakes which was a different raw material. 3.. For the above reasons, the order under revision is set aside. The order of the Deputy Commissioner is confirmed and the tax revision case is allowed but, in the circumstances of the case, without costs. Petition allowed.
-
1995 (1) TMI 382 - SUPREME COURT
Whether person who has completed the age of 45 years on the date on which he submits his application for his enrollment as an advocate to the State Bar Council shall not be enrolled as an advocate?
Held that:- On the plain language of the said clause it seems clear to us that under the said provision the Bar Council of India can lay down the ’conditions’ subject to which ’an advocate’ shall have the right to practise These conditions which the Bar Council of India lay down are applicable, i.e., a person who has already been enrolled as an advocate by the concerned State Bar Council. The conditions which can be prescribed must apply at the post - enrolment stage since they are expected to relate to the right to practise. By the impugned rule, the entry of those who have completed 45 cars at the date of application for enrolment is sought to be barred. The rule clearly operates, at the pre-enrolment stage and cannot, therefore, receive the shelter of clauses (ah) of Section 49(1) of the Act. Under the said clause conditions applicable to an advocate touching his right to practise can be laid down, and if laid down he must exercise his right subject to those conditions. But the language of the said clause does not permit laying down of cautions Am entry, into tic profession. We have, therefore, no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that clause (ah) of Section (1) of the Act does not empower the Bar Council of India to frame a rule barring persons who have completed 45 years of age from enrolment as an advocate. The impugned rule is, therefore, ultra vires the said provision.
We are unable to subscribe to the view that all those who have completed the age of 45 years and an: otherwise eligible to be enrolled as advocates constitute a class or category which can be disqualified as single block from entering the profession. Besides, as stated above clause (ag) identification and specification of a class or category of persons ’entitled’ to be enrolled as advocates and not ’disentitled’ to be enrolled as an advocates. We, therefore, are of the opinion the impugned rule is beyond the rule making power of the Bar Council of India and is, therefore, ultra vires the Act. It is unreasonable and arbitrary as the choice of the age of 45 years is made keeping only a certain group in mind ignoring the vast majority of other persons who were in the service of government or quasi-government or similar institutions at any point of time. Thus, in our view the impugned rule violates the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution. These petitions succeed. The new rule 9 inserted in Chapter III extracted in the opening paragraph of this judgment is struck down as ultra vires the Act and opposed to Article 14 of the Constitution.
-
1995 (1) TMI 381 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... medicine. He only indicated that it was purchased for eradication of malaria under a scheme and, therefore, exempt from payment of sales tax. The opinion expressed is not an expert opinion on something connected with medicine, but an expert opinion on the interpretation of law. The view taken by the Joint Director of Health Services cannot certainly be of any value in interpreting the provision of law. It is relevant only to show that the consignments of benzene hexachloride were sold to an office of the Government for use in eradicating malaria under a National Scheme. Rule 24 is not applicable in this case. 17.. In the result, the question is answered in the negative, i.e., in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. There will be no direction as to costs. 18.. The reference is answered accordingly. 19.. A copy of this judgment under the signature of the Registrar and seal of the High Court be forwarded to the appellate authority. Reference answered in the negative.
-
1995 (1) TMI 380 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the proviso to Section 4(1)(a) can be made applicable after taking out the consideration of interest free advance made by Ponds (I) Limited to the appellant?
Held that:- Tribunal was in error in taking the view that as trade discount was uniformly not given to all its customers by the assessee, it was not a permissible deduction and it had to be reloaded in the price of the excisable goods. We, therefore, accept the last contention. In the result these appeals are partly allowed, the order of the Tribunal will stand confirmed insofar as period of limitation applicable herein and reloading of the purchase price by the notional value of interest on advances made by wholesale buyer Ponds (I) Limited to the assessee is concerned and to that extent Assistant Collector's order will stand untouched. However, to the extent of the disallowance of the trade discount offered to the wholesale buyers Ponds (I) Limited by the assessee, the decision of the Tribunal is set aside and accordingly the original order passed by the Assistant Collector to that effect will also stand set aside. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
........
|
