|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 410 Records
-
1998 (12) TMI 642 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... on proposed is as to whether the sale of pistons known as shim at a discount, was to the extent of the discount allowed, as sales promotion expense for the purpose of disallowance under Section 37(3A) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Tribunal has held that the expenditure was not on sales promotion but it was only an instance of sale of the product at a discount and the coupons which the customer was required to send back to claim the discount were only meant to ensure that the discount reached the ultimate buyer and was not pocketed by the middle man. The discount so given cannot be treated as sales promotion expense. The sales promotion normally refers to an activity which is intended to promote the sale of all the products by way of advertisement or special campaigns. Offering a discount on the price in effect is only an instant of the sale of the company's product at a lower price and cannot be regarded as expenditure on sales promotion. 2. This petition is dismissed.
-
1998 (12) TMI 641 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... t; 16. There is no finding as to the viability of the scheme at all by the learned single Judge. 17. The order under appeal therefore cannot be sustained. There would be no useful purpose served in keeping the appeal alive which is accordingly treated as on the days list and the stay application and the appeal disposed of by setting aside the order under appeal. This however would not preclude the trial court from reconsidering the scheme as far as the unsecured creditors are concerned or also ascertaining the wishes of the other classes of creditors of the company if the prayer is duly made before him. 18. In view of out finding that the scheme could not validly include clauses affecting the right of classes of creditors in respect of whom no notice was given and no meeting was held, the cross objection filed by the respondent No. 2 cannot survive and accordingly his cross objection is dismissed. The appeal Itself is allowed without any order as to costs. 19. Appeal allowed.
-
1998 (12) TMI 640 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... the final decision rendered by the High Court in the impugned judgment to the effect that the advertisement dated 10th May, 1977 has to be quashed when it sought to fill up the post of Professor in the Department of Ophthalmology by direct recruitment, has to be sustained. The final decision of the High Court is upheld by us entirely on a different reasoning centering round the consideration of the new alternative point No. 3, though the reasoning adopted by the High Court for coming to the said conclusion is not accepted by us while deciding point No. 1 as seen in earlier part of this judgment. It is, therefore, held that the impugned advertisement was unauthorised and illegal as it was in connection with roster point No. 16 which in substance was roster point No. 11 and was to be filled in only by a departmental promotee. Point No. 4 18. In the result, this appeal fails and is dismissed. However, on the facts and circumstance of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
-
1998 (12) TMI 639 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ution of the said award decree would result in injustice to the respondent so as to persuade us not to interfere under Article 136 of the Constitution of India with the impugned order of remand. In the fact situation of this case, it must be held that there is no equity in favour of the respondent which would require us not to interfere with these proceedings when under law and also in equity the appellant decree holder is entitled to get the fruits of his award decree especially when despite the award granting installments and interest at 24 per cent per annum, the award decree grants interest only at 8% per annum from the date of the decree till realisation. 15. In the result, these appeals are allowed, the impugned judgment and order date 10.02.1998 of the Division Bench of the High Court are set aside and the decision rendered by the learned Single Judge of the High Court dated 23.12.1997 is confirmed. In the circumstances of the case. There would be no order as to costs.
-
1998 (12) TMI 638 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... unsel for the appellant do not relate to amendment of procedural law, as such those cases are not applicable and finally further, no doubt the learned Counsel for the appellant made reference to a Single Judge decision of this Court in the case of D.P. Divakar v Chairman and Personnel Managing Director, Kudremukh Iron and Ore Company Limited, is not on the point involved in this case, and further in view of the latest decision of the Supreme Court referred above, it has to be taken that the law declared by the Supreme Court is also binding on him, and may be said to have the effect of rendering nugatory the decision of learned Single Judge of this Court referred to above even if it touches point herein involved. 31. Thus considered on both the grounds the appeal can be said to have got no merits, is liable to be dismissed and it is hereby dismissed with costs to respondent. Let the amount deposited be sent to Workmen's Compensation Commissioner for being paid to claimant.
-
1998 (12) TMI 637 - KERALA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ntion. 12. The result, therefore, is that the appeal is allowed; the judgment and decree of the court below are set aside; and a decree for the amount claimed in the plaint with interest at 6% per annum from the date of suit is granted in favour of the 1st plaintiff against the defendants, the liability of the 3rd defendant being restricted to that of the agent of the 2nd defendant. The appellants-plaintiffs are entitled to their costs both in this court and the trial court. 13. Carbon copy of this judgment may be granted to the parties to the appeal on usual terms if applied for in that behalf. 14. Immediately after the judgment was pronounced the counsel for the 2nd respondent made an oral submission for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 134-A (b) of the Constitution of India. This case does not involve any subtantial questions of law of general importance which, in our opinion, require to be settled by the Supreme Court. Hence leave prayed for is rejected.
-
1998 (12) TMI 636 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... rs under sub-section (6) of section 11 of the Act. Having regard to the nature of the dispute, I am of the opinion that a technical person will be a fit person to act as a sole arbitrator. The respondents have furnished a list of 10 persons, any one of them, in their opinion, can be appointed as arbitrator to decide the disputes and differences arising in this case. In that list, one of the person is Mr. M.C. Desai, retired Chief Engineer of the Gujarat State. Miss Munim, learned Counsel for the petitioners, has also no objection to the appointment of Mr. M.C. Desai as the sole arbitrator. 6. Accordingly, Mr. M.C. Desai, retired Chief Engineer, B-14, River Drive Society, Adajan Road, Surat-395 009 is appointed as the sole arbitrator to decide the disputes and differences between the parties in this case. 7. This arbitration petition stands disposed of accordingly. 8. The Prothonotary and Senior Master to communicate this order to the learned arbitrator. 9. Order accordingly.
-
1998 (12) TMI 635 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... vices useful to the community, namely, maintenance of water works, lighting or filling of water troughs for cattle. It also protects any land taken under management by a civil, revenue or criminal court as set out therein. There is a further safeguard ensuring that the income from such lands is appropriated for the purposes of a trust covered by Section 129(b). The explanation provides for the grant of a certificate by the collector after holding an inquiry, thus, the clear intention of Section 129 is to protect certain lands from tenancy legislation where the lands or income from such lands is being utilised for public purposes set out there. In this context, if the tenancy of such lands are not made heritable, this would clearly be in furtherance of the purpose of exempting such lands under Section 129. 17. We, therefore, allow these appeals and set aside the impugned judgment and order of the High Court in each of the appeals. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.
-
1998 (12) TMI 634 - ITAT MUMBAI
... ...
... ... ..... Mir Osman Ali Khan (supra) holds the field. Therefore, applying the tests as laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Nawab Sir Mir Osman Ali Khan (supra), it cannot be said that the land in question belonged to the assessee as on the respective valuation dates. We accordingly hold that the land allotted to the assessee by CIDCO under the licence to construct a housing complex did not belong to the assessee as on the respective valuation dates within the meaning of section 40 of the Finance Act of 1983. The Assessing Officer was, therefore, not justified in including the market value of the land in question in wealth-tax assessments of the assessee for assessment years 1984-85 and 1985-86. The addition for the respective assessment years is accordingly deleted. 20. In the light of our above finding, it is not necessary for us to consider the third issue, as the same is rendered purely academic. 21. For statistical purposes, the appeals of the assessee are partly allowed.
-
1998 (12) TMI 633 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... the Supreme Court was of the view that the principle of unjust enrichment is not applicable to a case, where the goods have not been sold as such and are instead captively consumed for manufacturing some other goods, and what is sold is the new product. This is precisely the situation here, and hence the decisions in Bhadrachalam's case (supra) squarely applies to the present case. 10. In the circumstances, this application is allowed. The refund as prayed for shall be granted, and the respondents are directed to refund the amount to the applicant within three months from the date of production of a certified copy of this order before the authority concerned. 11. Learned Additional Advocate-General has prayed for leave to approach the Supreme Court. In our opinion, this is not a fit case where leave should be granted because the point has already been decided by the Supreme Court in the case of Bhodrachalam Paperboards (supra). The prayer for leave is therefore rejected.
-
1998 (12) TMI 632 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... stice in the facts of a particular case. As I have already noted in a case where the minority share-holder complains of acts of oppression by the majority, and that is what generally happens in most of the cases, the ends of justice may require that the minority share-holder should be directed to leave the company on payment of proper compensation to him. To ask a majority share-holder who is normally entitled to run the affairs of the company to go out of the company, will not, generally speaking, meet the ends of justice, as it will indeed be unfair and unjust to deprive the majority share-holder of his valuable right for all time to come." 57. Having regard to the observations as above, we do find the user of discretion by the learned single Judge to be in accordance with the known concept of justice and cannot, by any stretch, said to be perverse warranting interference by the Appellate Court and as such both the appeals fail and are dismissed. No order as to costs.
-
1998 (12) TMI 631 - DELHI HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... Company Law Board has come to a finding of fact that the appellant was fully aware of the dealings and that the respondent No. 1 had furnished all the information in respect of the same. The Company Law Board held that the respondent No. 1 was able to furnish every information that was needed to adjudicate on the issues before the Company Law Board and, Therefore, no ground has been made out for an investigation. 20. The said finding of the Company Law Board is a finding of fact and cannot be interfered with by me exercising powers and jurisdiction under Section 10F of the Companies Act. No other issue and/or contention is raised by the Counsel appearing for the appellant. On consideration of the records, I am of the considered opinion, that the findings and the order of the Company Law Board do not suffer from any infirmity in any manner and, Therefore, the appeal stands dismissed, but, in the facts and circumstances of the case, I leave the parties to bear their own costs.
-
1998 (12) TMI 630 - DELHI HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... judgment are applied to the facts of this case, the irresistible conclusion is that the defendant has failed to raise any triable issue in this case, The defense taken by the defendant by no stretch of imagination can be said to be fair, bona fide or reasonable. The defense which the defendant has set up is totally frivolous, false, illusory or sham or practically a moonshine. 12. On consideration of the totality of the fact and circumstances, the defendant's application of leave of defendant is liable to be rejected. The transaction between the plaintiff and the defendant is purely a commercial transaction. The parties have evolved their own terms including the rate of interest and no inference by the court is warranted. Consequently, the plaintiff's suit is liable to be decreed alongwith the interest at the agreed rate of 22 per cent (as per agreement) from the date of filing of the suit until realisation. The plaintiff is also entitled to costs from the defendant.
-
1998 (12) TMI 629 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... sfer warrant is to be given effect to immediately, which is likely to happen as a result of my judgment in this case, then the prisoner would be transferred to the respective Courts without any further delay and in that event, his appeal before the Honourable Supreme Court of India would become infructuous. Therefore the learned senior counsel submitted that the prisoner transfer warrants concerned in the cases before me, shall be kept in abeyance till 4-1-1999 so as to enable the petitioner to move the Honourable Supreme of India and obtain appropriate orders. The learned Government Advocate opposed stating that any further delay is likely to hamper the investigation in the crimes registered outside the city of Chennai. Applying my mind, I do find some force in the submission made by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner. Accordingly I am inclined to direct the prisoner transfer warrants concerned in this order, be kept in abeyance till 4-1-1999. Petition dismissed.
-
1998 (12) TMI 628 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... n deposit of the aforesaid amount in time by the respondent-company, the company petition shall stand dismissed. (iii) Upon deposit of the said amount by the respondent company before this Court the Prothonotary and Senior Master shall invest the said amount in fixed deposit of any Nationalised Bank initially for a period of 3 years and renewable thereafter, if necessary. The amount deposited and interest acquired thereon shall be credited in the account of the suit that may be filed by the petitioners for recovery of the said amount against the said company of if the counter-claim is filed by the petitioners in the suit already filed by petitioners in the suit already filed by the respondent-company in that suit. (iv) On the other hand if the aforesaid amount is not deposited by the respondent-company within time this company petition shall stand admitted with liberty to the petitioners to apply for advertisement and further directions. 8. Petition disposed with directions.
-
1998 (12) TMI 627 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... presence could have been procured and they could have been produced before the Enquiry Officer to prove the charge framed against the appellant. He has acted so arbitrarily in the matter and has found the appellant guilty in such a coarse manner that it becomes apparent that he was merely carrying out the command from some superior officer who perhaps directed "fix him up". For the reasons stated above, the appeals are allowed. The judgment and order dated 28th February, 1997, passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, is set aside. The order dated 3rd of May, 1991, passed by Deputy Commissioner of Police by which the appellant was dismissed from service as also the order passed in appeal by Addl. Commissioner of Police are quashed and the respondents are directed to reinstate the appellant with all consequential benefits including all the arrears of pay up-to-date which shall be paid within three months from today. There will, however, be no order as to costs.
-
1998 (12) TMI 626 - KERALA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... o be dismissed. In O. S. No. 723 of 1992 the decree declaring the meeting held on August 18, 1992, and August 29, 1992, as illegal and void is upheld for the reasons stated in this judgment. The decisions to lease the hospital and purchase the equipment taken on August 18, 1992, will not bind the plaintiffs and the company. In O. S. No. 41 of 1993, the declaration granted that there was no valid forfeiture or transfer of the shares held by the first plaintiff in O. S. No. 723 of 1992 and that she continues to be a shareholder is upheld so also the validity of the meeting held on November 6, 1992, and the election of the plaintiffs in O. S. No. 41 of 1993 and others as directors. Consequential injunctions granted will also stand. Thus, the other appeals will also stand dismissed. A. S. No. 688 of 1994 is dismissed for non-prosecution. The appellants in A. S. No. 757 of 1994 will pay costs of the contesting respondents one set. Parties to bear their costs in the other appeals.
-
1998 (12) TMI 625 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... is favour. 12. No action can be termed as bona fide if it lacks due care and caution. The respondent was making its claim under statutory provisions which were clear and unambigouous. Therefore, it cannot be said that its claim that the purchases were exempt from tax was bona fide. It was nothing short of gambling and the dealer having lost must compensate the State for withholding the money that was due to it. 13. In my view, therefore, the Tribunal's order holding that the dealer's claim was bona fide, was erroneous and is hereby reversed. I hold that the dealer's appeal on this point lacked merit and was liable to be dismissed. 14. In the result, the revision petition is partly allowed and the Tribunal's order, in so far as it relates to the question of leavy and interest under Section 8 (1) of the Act, is hereby set aside and it is ordered that the dealer's appeal on the aforesaid point shall stand dismissed. 15. The parties will bear their own costs.
-
1998 (12) TMI 624 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ions involving personal liberty "since such a case stands on a different footing altogether. o p /o p We have no doubt that the above rule of public policy, for the very same reasoning, should apply to special leave petitions filed under Art.136 of the Constitution also. o p /o p Even otherwise, the order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court on 3.5.1998 does not warrant interference on merits as the learned judges of the High Court have taken into account all the relevant facts and came to the correct conclusion. o p /o p We also agree with the Division Bench of the High Court that the order dated 3.5.1996 does not require any clarification. In fact the attempt of the petitioner was to get the order reviewed. Since there was no error apparent on the face of the record the petitioner termed his petition as one for clarification. The Division Bench of the High Court has dismissed it rightly. o p /o p Accordingly we dismiss these Special Leave Petitions. o p /o p
-
1998 (12) TMI 623 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... the instance of a party which does not fulfil the requisite criteria itself and whose offer is higher than the offer which has been accepted, It is also obvious that by stopping the performance of the contract so awarded, there is a major detriment to the public because the construction of two thermal power units, each of 210 MWs., is held up on account of this dispute. Shortages of power have become notorious. They also seriously affect industrial development and the resulting job opportunities for a large number of people. In the present case there is no overwhelming public interest in stopping the project. There is no allegation whatsoever of any mala fides or collateral reasons for granting the contract to M/s. Raunaq International Ltd. In our view the High Court has seriously erred in granting the interim order. The appeals are, therefore, allowed and the impugned order is set aside. M/s IVR Construction Ltd. shall pay to the appellants herein the costs of the appeals.
........
|
