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Showing 21 to 40 of 432 Records
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1999 (10) TMI 744 - COMPANY LAW BOARD, NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... on 9-2-1996 and on his insistence the 3rd respondent was reinstated in the board meeting on 17-2-1996. It was done without consulting the petitioner who was the Chairman and who had dismissed the 3rd respondent. Thus, his role, instead of being constructive, led to the widening of the differences between the parties. Further, he also seems to have allowed allotment of shares without specific approval from the IDBI as is evident from the letter of IDBI at Annexure-K. Further, when the board decided to take action to regularise the import of second hand equipment in its meeting on 16-2-1996, he did not seem to have followed up this decision. Being the nominee of the Institution which had lent a substantial amount of money, his objective should have been to ensure proper functioning of the management which would enable the company to refund the loans but the facts reveal otherwise. 42. We dispose of this petition with the above directions and observations. No order as to cost.
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1999 (10) TMI 743 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... isions of the Supreme Court we have no doubt in our mind that the deduction under section 80-I is limited in respect of the profits derived from industrial undertaking and the income derived from investing money in banks, be it out of the borrowed money or otherwise, is an independent source of income and it is not an income derived from the industrial undertaking. Similarly, the income from commission is not derived from the industrial undertaking. That again is an independent source of income. It may fall within the category of income from business but not an income derived from the industrial undertaking. We are therefore of the considered view that the revenue was justified in not taking into account the interest income in all the four assessment years and income from commission in Assessment year 1993-94 in the computation of deduction under section 80-I. We therefore confirm the disallowance. 14. to 21. These paras are not reproduced here as they involve minor issues .
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1999 (10) TMI 742 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ted by the Revenue at the time of hearing as observed by the Tribunal. One has to bear in mind that the assessee was engaged as a supervisor. Investment in land, investment in construction work which would be of huge amount is not shown to have been made by the assessee. The Tribunal opined that the undisclosed income of ₹ 30 lakhs declared by assessee is not less than the net profit calculated at 1.31 per cent. The Tribunal also considered the fact that no material on record has been placed to indicate the investment of huge amount by assessee. Considering all these facts, the Tribunal has rendered its decision on appreciation of material placed on record. 6. Thus the Tribunal on appreciation of evidence has found that no referable question of law has arisen. After going through the decision rendered by the Tribunal we are also of the view that no referable question of law arises in this matter. Hence the application is rejected. Rule discharged. No order as to costs.
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1999 (10) TMI 741 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... r year and also loss for the year under appeal and, therefore, there was no liability to pay any advance tax. From the statement of facts filed before the CIT(A), we find that the position with regard to the loss and depreciation is as under Business Loss Depreciation Total Rs. Rs. Rs. Upto asst. yr. 1994-95 1,19,46,681 11,03,832 1,30,50,513 For asst. yr. 1995-96 97,95,048 3,87,490 1,01,82,538 Total 2,17,41,729 14,91,322 2,32,33,051 As shown in the above charge, not only were there losses brought forward from the earlier years, but even for the year under appeal, there was a loss of ₹ 1,01,82,540. In the assessment the said loss has been accepted and the demand arises only on account of the assessment of the capital gains. Under the circumstances, we are of the view that the assessee was not liable to pay advance tax and therefore, there was no liability to pay interest. The same is cancelled and the grounds are allowed. 19. In the result, the appeal is partly allowed.
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1999 (10) TMI 740 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... ings. Reliance was placed on the decision of the Karnataka High Court in CIT vs. Sridev Enterprises (1991) 97 CTR (Kar) 80 (1991) 192 ITR 165 (Kar). . 18. The learned Departmental Representative by and large relied on the orders of the lower authorities. However, it was pointed out that in three cases there were additional loans. He relied on the decisions in Phalton Sugar Works Ltd. vs. CWT (1995) 127 CTR (Bom) 359 (1994) 208 ITR 989 (Bom) and CIT vs. Doctor & Co. (1989) 80 CTR (Bom) 174 (1989) 180 ITR 627 (Bom). 19. It is a fact that the advances have actually reduced this year and no disallowance was made in the earlier year. Therefore, this year also no disallowance is called for. Even otherwise, it is difficult to establish any nexus between funds which flowed in and funds which flowed out. Thus, entire interest paid has to be treated as incurred for business purposes. Accordingly, we delete the disallowance. 20. In the result, the appeal of the assessee is allowed.
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1999 (10) TMI 739 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... case of S. Gopal Reddy v. State of A.P. ( 1996 (4) SCC 596, 608 1996 SCC(Cri) 792 1996 AIR(SC) 2184, 2188) (SCC at 608 AIR at p. 2188). Thus, following the above rule of interpretation and with a view to iron out the creases in the impugned rule which offends Article 14, we interpret Rule 7 as follows "Local student means a student who has passed HSC (sic SSC)/New SSC Examination and the qualifying examination from any of the high schools or colleges situated within the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation limits and includes a permanent resident student of the Ahmedabad Municipality who acquires the above qualifications from any of the high schools or colleges situated within the Ahmedabad Urban Development Area." 15. For the reasons stated above, this appeal is allowed, setting aside the judgment and order of the High Court of Gujarat in SCA No. 3360 of 1999, the validity of Rule 6 is upheld as it stands and the validity of Rule 7 is upheld as interpreted hereinabove
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1999 (10) TMI 738 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... said preparation. What has to be seen for the purpose of imposition of levy of octroi is whether an item in question is enumerated in the Schedule or not. If the item is mentioned therein then irrespective of the hadging under which it is contained the Corporation would be entitled to levy octroi on the import of the said item into Bombay. We therefore hold that the decision of the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court does not call for any interference. The appeals are accordingly dismissed. For the view we are taking it is quite obvious that the decision of the Full Bench in Municipal Corporation, Greater Bombay v. Monopol Chemicals, AIR (1988) Bombay 217 does not lay down the correct law. In view of the order dated 11-3-1991 of this Court in the present case the appellant will pay to the respondent the amount of duty due along with the interest at the rate of 12 per cent. This payment will be made within three months from today. The respondent will be entitled to costs.
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1999 (10) TMI 737 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ions because there was no audit for the preceding year. For subsequent years though the books of account were ready, the same could not be audited. The Tribunal and the Commissioner (Appeals) found that the audit could not be completed because the books of account for the first year were not ready. 10. Exercise of a discretion on the facts established is a question. Explanation rendered by the assessee coupled with the findings of fact such as books of account were readily being accepted as sufficient for exercising discretion in favour of the assessee by the Commissioner (Appeals) as confirmed by the Tribunal, in our opinion, does not raise any question of law. In our view, on appreciation of the evidence, when the finding recorded by the first appellate authority is confirmed by the Tribunal, it cannot be said that any substantial question of law arises in these matters and, therefore, we dismiss these applications. Rule discharged in all the matters. No order as to costs.
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1999 (10) TMI 736 - CESTAT KOLKATA
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... ... ..... nd documents seized. Further issuance of licences to various Units also cannot be a factor in imparting knowledge to the Revenue as regards the internal arrangement of the various Units. Nothing has been brought on record by the appellants to show that the agreements entered into between the various partners being members of the same family were brought to the notice of the Department. To that extent, there is a clear suppression on the part of the appellants reflecting upon their intent to evade duty by availing the small-scale exemption benefits by various Units, the purpose for which the same were created. As such, we do not find any merits in this ground of the appeals also and reject the same. 7.18 As regards the imposition of penalty, upon the main appellant firm, M/s. Ruby Rubber Industries and the other appellants, in view of the findings above, we uphold the same and reject their pleas. As a result, the impugned Order is upheld and all the appeals are rejected.
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1999 (10) TMI 735 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... office of the assessee. On appreciation of evidence and in particular the statement of Mahendrabhai, the Tribunal has recorded a finding. #. It was also submitted that the Tribunal has erred in cancelling the addition of ₹ 66,99,500/- made on account of security against unsold lottery tickets. The Tribunal has considered this aspect in detail and particularly in para 8.4 of the judgment. On reading that para, it clearly transpires that the Tribunal has decided the matter on evidence. When the matter is decided on appreciation of evidence, it is difficult to accept the contention that it raises a substantial question of law and therefore, the appeal stands dismissed.
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1999 (10) TMI 734 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... welfth Schedule does not say that every mineral or ore, which is processed, is excluded from the operation of clause 2(a)(b). If it were so then the contention on behalf of the assessee would be acceptable. However, that is not so. The item (x) in the Twelfth Schedule specifically refers to cut and polished minerals and ores and not processed minerals and ores. In this view of the matter we are of the view that the assessee is not entitled to deduction under section 80HHC on the export of rough diamonds. The mere fact that the CIT(A) has allowed the claim of the assessee in earlier years does not bind us not to decide the issue in accordance with law. Each year is an independent unit of assessment and it is well settled that principles of estopple do not apply to income-tax proceedings. In the year under appeal the decision of the CIT(A) being contrary to our view is set aside and that of the Assessing Officer restored. 9. In the result, the appeal of the revenue is allowed.
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1999 (10) TMI 733 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... There is no allegation on the assessee that it did not provide a particular material or it provided false material. In the absence of such allegation and with the presence of fact that the enhancement of assessment was resulted a change in interpretation about assessability of the receipts under particular heads of income. The same is not free of any inherent disputes. Interpretation of AO is just opposed to the findings of the CIT(A) which has been upheld by the Tribunal. When the different interpretation exists in the hierarchy of the assessing machinery it will be unreasonable to hold that the assessee's interpretation and choice about taxability of income under particular head carry an element of falsehood or intention of deliberately furnishing inaccurate particulars. 27. In view of the above, we are of the view that the penalty imposed on the assessee is not justified. Consequently we delete the penalty under s. 272(1)(c). 28. The appeal of the assessee is allowed.
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1999 (10) TMI 732 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... cost of acquisition of the equity shares obtained on conversion has to be taken at a figure of ₹ 1,80,508. On a fair reading of the provisions of section 49(2A), we are of the view that the cost of acquisition of the equity shares sold by the assessee has to be taken for the purpose of working out the short term capital gains thereon at ₹ 1,80,508. In effect, the short term capital loss on the sale of the debentures has to be taken as returned by the assessee at ₹ 6,99,258. The short term capital gains on the sale of the shares has to be taken at ₹ 8,36,617 (10,17,125 - 1,80,508). After setting off of the short term capital loss against the short term capital gains, there is a net short term capital gain of ₹ 1,37,359. The CIT(A) has determined the net short term capital gain at ₹ 1,37,000 as against the figure of ₹ 1,37,359 arrived at by us. In the circumstances, we have to uphold the order of the CIT(A). 9. The appeal is dismissed.
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1999 (10) TMI 731 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... d the explanation furnished before the AO that the amounts are introduction of capital by the partner was not correct. It has further been stated that the transaction was so arranged under the advice of the accountant in order to show a happy financial position in the balance sheet of Mehta Construction to the bank. Apparently the exhibition of the accounts in the balance sheet filed with the bank was an overriding consideration and in the anxiety to do so the provisions of section 269SS has not been kept in view. This in effect is the explanation of the assessee which seems to us to be acceptable. The fact that the assessee-firm acted on the advice of the accountant is also supported by an affidavit filed by the partner before us. We have no reasons to disbelieve the averments contained in the affidavit. Under the circumstances therefore, we are of the view that the penalty imposed on the assessee under section 271D is not justified. We cancel the same and allow the appeal.
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1999 (10) TMI 730 - HIGH COURT OF KERALA
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... ... ..... the date of transfer for the purpose of capital gains. The said provision reads as follows “7. Power to acquire requisitioned property.-. . . (2) When a notice as aforesaid is published in the Official Gazette, the requisitioned property shall, on and from the beginning of the day on which the notice is so published, vest absolutely in the Central Government free from all encumbrances and the period of requisition of such property shall end.” The statutory provisions involved in the case at hand are different from those in G. M. Omer Khan’s case 1992 196 ITR 269 (SC). Therefore, the Tribunal was justified in its conclusion that the liability for capital gains did not arise on the date of the notification. It is, therefore, clear that the property vests in the Government after the possession is taken. The answer to the question referred is in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. The income-tax reference is disposed of as above.
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1999 (10) TMI 729 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... worthiness attached to the assessee with reference to the original return cannot be avoided by filing a fresh return after concealment was detected by the assessing authority. Where the surrender of income made in the revised return was not voluntary, but was as a result of detection by the assessing authority, the filing of the revised return is of no consequence. The very word “omission” connotes an intentional act. The factual position is that the revised return was a veiled attempt to present a mitigating circumstance. Further, a return in response to a notice under section 148 is not to be treated at par with or compared to a revised return. That being the position, the filing of the return including the agreed concealed income does not constitute a mitigating circumstance and penalty has been rightly levied. We, therefore, answer the question in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. References are disposed of accordingly.
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1999 (10) TMI 728 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nding of the Appellate Tribunal is conclusive. Thus, in view of the fact that in the order of the Appellate Tribunal, the conclusion reached by the Collector, Central Excise have been set aside, the very basis of the complaint is knocked out and the petitioners' prosecution on the same set of fact and evidence cannot be sustained. That being so, there is no prospect of the case ending in connection and the valuable time of the Trial Court would be wasted for holding the trial only for the purpose of formally completing the procedure to pronounce its conclusion on a future date. In this view of the matter, allowing the criminal proceedings to continue and thereby forcing the petitioners to face the ordeal of a trial would be an abuse of the process of law. 6. For the foregoing reasons, the petitioner is allowed and the proceedings emanating from the complaint filed by the respondent and pending on the file of the Addl. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi are quashed.
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1999 (10) TMI 727 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... act that the loans had, when obtained, been for the purpose of the assessee's business. Apart from this, the Tribunal found as a fact that the business carried on by the assessee as a jeweller and in running the cinema theatre, etc. was composite. The apex Court, therefore, held that in view of this also, the assessee was entitled to deduction of interest paid on the loans in question. 9. Mr. Mehta submitted that in the instant case, the same company was carrying on three-fold activities before commencement of the year, namely, ginning, pressing and selling of cotton. Out of the three, the company stopped two of its activities, namely, ginning and pressing. He, therefore, submitted that the Tribunal has committed no error whatsoever and no question of law arises in the instant case. 10. After going through the decision of the Tribunal and the aforesaid judgments, we are of the view that no interference is called for. Hence, this appeal is dismissed. Notice is discharged.
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1999 (10) TMI 726 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ion of deciding the remanded writ petition at the earliest and to decide the question of interim relief if the proceedings are not disposed of within that time. Liberty to both the parties to mention before the Hon'ble Chief Justice for getting an early disposal of the remanded proceedings. ( 4. ) WE make it clear that continuing of the interim order will not come in the way of the High Court in passing appropriate interim and final orders in the remanded writ petition in accordance with law. Liberty is reserved to the parties to file additional documents and amended pleadings in support of their respective cases in the remanded proceedings within a period of six weeks from the receipt of the copy of this order by the High Court. The writ petition is accordingly restored to the file of the High Court. It will be open to the High Court to extend the time for filing the requisite pleadings and documents if it is so required in the interest of justice. No order as to costs.
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1999 (10) TMI 725 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ther independent evidence to show that the appellant was in possession of the contraband article. ( 6. ) IN the aforesaid view it is unnecessary for us to consider whether conviction under S.31 of the Act need be sustained. Nevertheless, we may point out that S.31 was invoked by the Trial Court on the strength of the conviction imposed on the appellant in Sessions Case No. 21 of 1989 of the same Trial Court though the said conviction has been confirmed by the High Court. We may point out that this Court has interfered with the said conviction and sentence and set them aside in Criminal Appeal No. 710 of 1994 as per order dated 4-9-1995. So, even apart from our finding on the merits of the case in the present incident we are of the view that S.31 is inapplicable as against the appellant in this case. In the result we allow this appeal and set aside the conviction and sentence and acquit him. We direct him to be set at liberty forthwith unless he is required in any other case.
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