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Showing 41 to 60 of 432 Records
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1999 (10) TMI 724 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d 3.2.1999 which vests in the Commissioner of Police the powers of the State Government as contemplated under Sub-section (1) of Section 3 of MPDA Act. The Notification clearly provides that the Commissioner of Police would be authorised to exercise powers conferred on the State Government by Sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the said Act for the period commencing from 3.2.1999 and ending on 2.5.1999, whereas the impugned order of detention is passed on 16.4.1999. In view of the aforesaid discussions and particularly we having found that the respondent Detaining Authority has passed the impugned order without application of mind, we are inclined to quash and set aside the order of detention. 15. In the result, the order of detention dated 16.4.1999 passed by the respondent Detaining Authority under Sub-section (1) Section 3 of MPDA Act is quashed and set aside. The petitioner be released forthwith if not required in any other case. Rule is made absolute in the aforesaid terms.
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1999 (10) TMI 723 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... ounsel for the appellant. The civil appeal is dismissed. No order as to costs.
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1999 (10) TMI 722 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... vy and realisation of tax on the basis which had been held to be invalid by it "for the period between 1st April, 1991 andf 30th Septemper, 1992 shall not stand invalidated.........We propose to direct that the declaration made by us today shall be applicable prospectively and with effect from October 1, 1992 alone." Some operators challenge the correctness of this. They are right, for the doctrine of prospective over-ruling cannot be utilised by the High Court. Once the High Court came to the conclusion, rightly, that the concerned provisions were invalid, it was obliged to so declare and, consequently, the collections made thereunder stood invalidated. These civil appeals are, therefore, allowed and the direction of the High Court insofar as it relates to prospective over-ruling is set aside. The judgment and order of the High Court shall also operate for the period between 1st April, 1991 and 30st September, 1992. No order as to costs. Appeals dismissed/allowed.
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1999 (10) TMI 721 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ognizance of the offence under Section 138 of the said Act shall be taken, except on a complaint of payee or holder in due course. Section 142 of the said Act does not contemplate that the complaint should be personally filed by the complainant. The complainant can appoint a Power of Attorney for filing the complaint in view of Section 142 of the said Act. However, neither Code of Criminal Procedure nor the said Act contemplates that anyone can depose for and on behalf of the complainant. In such complaint, the Power of Attorney is entitled to appear as a witness and depose in respect of facts which are within his knowledge and on the basis of record on which reliance is placed. In this case, it appears that no objection was taken when the Power of Attorney examined him in the case and the deposition of the Power of Attorney can be taken into consideration as a witness. 15. In view of the above, I do not find any merit in this revision and the revision is, hereby, dismissed.
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1999 (10) TMI 720 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ant before the authority for invoking Section 30-A of the Act was not at all tenable as this power could be exercised only on discovery of further interest of the intermediary. It has been urged before us by Mr. Sanyal that final assessment roll was prepared without complying with Rule 18(2) in form F' which is a step prior to preparation of final assessment roll. As the petitioner accepted the final assessment roll such plea could not be taken up by the petitioner, therefore, this contention has no force. For what has been stated above we hold that the order of the learned Member of Board of Revenue directing the action to be taken for refund of the excess compensation was valid and proper though he had no jurisdiction to pass the order. In the event it is set aside it would amount to reviving an invalid order of payment of excess compensation to the appellant. For the reasons stated above the appeal is liable to be dismissed which we hereby do but no order as to costs.
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1999 (10) TMI 719 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the powers under Article 142 of the Constitution were exercised to convict the petitioner under Section 193 IPC?
Held that:- To perpetuate an error is no virtue but to correct it is a compulsion of judicial conscience. We, therefore, unhesitatingly set aside the conviction of the petitioner for the offence under Section 193 IPC. We also do not at this stage, consider it expedient to direct the filing of a complaint in the competent court as envisaged by Section 340 Cr.P.C. because the petitioner has already undergone the sentence imposed upon him for an offence under Section 193 IPC although set aside now by this order and we are upholding his conviction and sentence imposed under Article 129 of the Constitution of India for committing contempt of court.
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1999 (10) TMI 718 - SUPREME COURT
Whether there were valid notices as required under Clause (b) of the proviso to Section 138 of the Act?
Held that:- In the notices it was stated that on re-presentation of the cheques if returned unpaid, the appellant-bank would report the matter to the police for initiating appropriate criminal action against the respondents.
Under Section 142 of the Act, court can take cognizance of an offence punishable under Section 138 only on a complaint in writing made by the payee. Therefore, the police could not have started investigation under Section 138 of the Act. But if a cheque is dishonoured drawer may expose himself to prosecution under various Sections of the Indian Penal Code which are cognizable and police could take up investigation. What was indicated in the notice was that in addition to the legal action by the appellant-bank under the Act, option was kept open for taking action against the respondents under the provisions of Indian Penal Code by informing the police. Therefore, the contention of learned counsel for the respondents has no force.
For the reasons stated above we hold that notices were valid and proper and, therefore, the High Court erred in holding that there was no proper notice for payment as required under Section 138 of the Act.
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1999 (10) TMI 717 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... llant understood very well what he was told. He declined to be searched either in presence of a Magistrate or a Gazetted Officer. It is therefore not possible to agree with the contention of the learned Counsel that the mandatory requirement of Section 50 was not complied within this case. 4. Learned counsel also wanted to draw our attention to some irregularities committed in following the procedure with respect to safe custody of the charas seized from the appellant and in other respects. The said irregularities are not of such a nature as would vitiate the trial or the conviction of the appellant. His conviction, therefore, will have to be confirmed. 5. Accordingly, Criminal Appeal No. 1652 of 1996 is allowed. The conviction of appellant Krishan Mohar Singh Dugal and the sentence imposed upon him are set aside and he is acquitted of the charge leveled against him. Criminal Appeal No. 1653 of 1996 is dismissed with the result that his conviction and sentence are confirmed.
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1999 (10) TMI 716 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the quantity of substance recovered from the appellant would fall within the limit of 'small quantity' envisaged in Section 27 of the Act?
Whether the offence charged against him was made out?
Held that:- Provided that where such psychotropic substance is in possession of any individual for his personal medical use the quantity thereof shall not exceed one hundred dosage units at a time.
The research institution, hospital and dispensary referred to in Sub-rule (2) shall maintain proper accounts and records in relation to the purchase and consumption of the psychotropic substance in their possession. The proviso to Sub-rule (2) is very evident that a person is permitted to keep in his possession for his personal medical use the psychotropic substance upto one hundred dosage at a time.
We are not disposed to think that 6 ampoules would cross the above limit and there is no attempt made either through DW-1 (Doctor) or through Court Witness No. 1 (D.M.O.) that 100 dosage would be below the 6 ampoules recovered from him.
It is unfortunate that the aforesaid points have not been put forward before the trial court or the High Court. We feel that the conviction and sentence imposed on this appellant were without the sanction of law. Appellant is unlawfully deprived of his personal liberty for such a long period of 5 years on account of over looking the aforesaid facts and the legal position. Allow this appeal and quash the judgment of the High Court as well as the Sessions Court. We acquit the appellant and direct him to be set at liberty forthwith.
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1999 (10) TMI 715 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ion 68(1). 10.. We also take note of the fact that in earlier proceedings the Tribunal has passed orders similar to those asked for by the petitioners herein. We, see no reason why the Tribunal should have adopted a different approach in the petitioners case. Accordingly, the writ petition is disposed of by modifying the order of the Tribunal to the effect that the respondent No. 1 shall dispose of the matter within 48 hours from date and while disposing of the petitioners prayer for way-bills, the respondent No. 1 shall not refuse the same on the ground of non-payment of tax as mentioned in the impugned order. The writ petition is accordingly disposed of. 11.. Having regard to the urgency of the matter, leave is granted to the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners to communicate the gist of the order to the respondent No. 1 forthwith. All parties are to act on a signed xerox copy of this order on the usual undertaking. Writ petition disposed of accordingly.
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1999 (10) TMI 714 - WEST BENGAL TAXATION TRIBUNAL
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... ... ..... hat is done, the original order becomes non est. Mr. A.K. Chakraborty, learned Advocate for the applicant, relied on B.D.J. Stamping Industries Ltd. v. C.T.O. 1994 93 STC 494 (WBTT) (1992) 25 STA 319 (WBTT), K.P. Enterprises v. Divisional Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax 1996 102 STC 483 (MP), and State of Maharashtra v. Suresh Trading Company 1998 109 STC 439 (SC) in support of his contention that the order of 3rd June, 1999 cancelling EC ab initio will be only prospectively operative with effect from 3rd June. The facts of those cases were different in various ways from those of the present case. The applicant obtained the EC contrary to law yet it has challenged retrospective cancellation of EC. On these facts, applicant cannot be allowed to challenge. 9.. No other point was argued for the applicant. 10.. In the result, the application is dismissed. No order for cost. J. GUPTA (Judicial Member).-I agree. D. BHATTACHARYYA (Technical Member).-I agree. Application dismissed.
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1999 (10) TMI 713 - WEST BENGAL TAXATION TRIBUNAL
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... ... ..... ssessment is already fixed after an adjournment on November 2, 1999 for hearing. He submits that the money already debited from the bank account of the applicants and paid to respondent No. 3 may be directed to be either adjusted or refunded on the basis of the fresh order of assessment that will be made after hearing on November 2, 1999. 4.. We are not impressed by the argument of the learned State Representative, because the money is now being held by the respondents without any valid and legal basis. The order of assessment has already been set aside and no fresh order of assessment has yet been made. Accordingly, we direct respondent Nos. 2 and 3 to refund the sum of Rs. 4,82,105 to the applicants within the October 31, 1999. In fixing this date, we have taken into account the holidays on account of puja, as submitted by the learned State Representative. 5.. The main application is thus finally disposed of. No order is made for costs. Application disposed of accordingly.
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1999 (10) TMI 712 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... it is a fact that the sales tax of these States is lesser than the sales tax of Delhi. 12.. Keeping in view the orders of various authorities, the facts narrated above and the conduct of the plaintiff, I have no hesitation in affirming the concurrent view taken by the learned courts below that the plaintiff has no prima facie case nor balance of convenience is in favour of the plaintiff. 13.. The learned courts below have exercised their judicial discretion in consonance with the settled principle of law. Thus, such exercise of jurisdiction by the learned courts below would hardly justify interference by this Court, within the limited scope of its revisional jurisdiction under section 115 of the Code of Civil Proce dure. However, nothing observed in this order would affect the rights and contentions of the either parties to the proceedings. 14.. For the reasons aforestated, this revision petition is dismissed in limine. However, without order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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1999 (10) TMI 711 - WEST BENGAL TAXATION TRIBUNAL
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... ... ..... ol) Order, 1966 as amended by Sugar (Control) Amendment Order, 1999 issued by the Government of India in exercise of powers conferred by section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. In our view, the said order or orders have no relevance to imposition of sales tax by State Legislature under entry 54 of List II. These are all the contentions made on behalf of applicant. 35.. Thus, all the contentions on behalf of the applicant fail. The application is dismissed. The interim orders passed in this case stand vacated. No order is made for cost. After the judgment has been delivered, learned counsel for the applicant orally prays for stay of operation thereof. Mr. K.K. Saha, learned advocate for respondents, opposes the prayer. Having regard to the circumstances of the case including the fact that no order of assessment has been made yet, the prayer for stay is rejected. J. GUPTA (Judicial Member).-I agree. D. BHATTACHARYYA (Technical Member).-I agree. Application dismissed.
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1999 (10) TMI 710 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... bject to sub-section (6), where goods sold are contained in containers or are packed in any packing materials, the rate of tax and the point of levy applicable to such containers or packing materials, as the case may be, shall, whether the price of the containers or the packing materials is charged separately or not be the same as those applicable to goods contained or packed, and in determining turnover of the goods, the turnover in respect of the containers or packing materials shall be included therein. Sl. No. Descroption of goods Point of levy Rate of tax 156 All other goods not coming under any entry in any of the Schedules. At the point of first sale in the State by a dealer who is liable to tax under section 5. 8 per cent. IMFL had suffered tax as contained in the containers. There is no distinct sale of liquor and bottles separately. That being the position, levy of tax on the bottles is in order. Revision applications are accordingly dismissed. Petitions dismissed.
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1999 (10) TMI 709 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... between April 1, 1999 and August 12, 1999. The deeming provision had to be given full effect to and the consequences flowing therefrom cannot be allowed to be whittled down by the formal events that have taken place during the interregnum. Incidentally, we may mention that it is not the case of the respondents that after the transfer of files, any further action in the direction of making the assessments has been taken by the new assessing officer. Apart from assigning a new registration number, nothing more seems to have been done. At best, there was only a physical transfer of records pertaining to the petitioner. That by itself does not preclude the operation of the deeming provision. We, therefore, quash the impugned order and direct that the new registration shall not be given effect to and the assessment files shall continue to be dealt with by the previous assessing officer till April 1, 2000. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed. No costs. Writ petition allowed.
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1999 (10) TMI 708 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ent for initiation of proceeding under section 12(8) of the Act do not exist. In that case, A. Pasayat, J. (as he then was) speaking for the Bench observed thus An assessment order merges with the appellate order by operation of the doctrine of merger. The appellate order would thereafter be the operative decision in law. The assessing officer has no jurisdiction, where an assessment has been taken on appeal, and annulled, to initiate proceedings under section 12(8) of the Act in respect of the assessment, as it has merged with the appellate order . Here the question whether the petitioner was entitled to concessional rate is concluded by the order of the appellate authority and the Government order now relied on in exhibit P4 has no retrospective effect. In the above view of the matter, I hold that exhibit P4 is without jurisdiction. Hence I quash exhibit P4. Original petition is allowed. Order on C.M.P. No. 6625 of 1993 in O.P. No. 3518 of 1993 dismissed. Petition allowed.
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1999 (10) TMI 707 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rs from the date of such order, it cannot be said that the Additional Commissioner had no remedy except to review his order. Remedy under section 39(5) was available to the Commissioner to file an appeal before the Tribunal against the order of Additional Commissioner and that too within a period of two years from the date of such order. Admittedly in this case the mistake has come to the notice of the Additional Commissioner on January 10, 1992 within a period of 90 days of the passing of the order on October 25, 1991. In view of the aforesaid factual and legal position under the specific provision in section 39(5) the impugned order dated March 3, 1992 is held to be without jurisdiction and accordingly it is liable to be quashed. 15.. In the result, the petition is allowed and the impugned order dated March 3, 1992 (annexure F) is hereby quashed with no order as to costs. Security amount, if any, shall be refunded to the petitioner after due verification. Petition allowed.
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1999 (10) TMI 706 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... . It was also observed in that judgment that once a product figured in its schedule as a drug/medicine it could not be treated otherwise by Revenue unless deleted from the Statute. 4.. Assessee-company is admittedly manufacturer of Ayurvedic medicines and its case is squarely covered by the judgment in Vicco Vajradanti (1998) 20 TLD 194. Amongst other products, it also manufactures gulab jal under the licence. It may not be a commonly used Ayurvedic medicines, but so long as it figures as such in the statute, it cannot be derecognised by the Revenue on no basis. We accordingly find ourselves in agreement with the view taken by Board of Revenue and answer the question in affirmative by holding that Tribunal was justified in holding gulab jal as ayurvedic medicine taxable at 3 per cent under entry 16 instead of at 12 per cent under the residuary entry. Reference answered in the affirmative. Reported as Commissioner of Commercial Tax v. Dawar Brothers 1998 111 STC 319 (MP).-Ed.
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1999 (10) TMI 705 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... sing penalty could not be maintained. 5.. In the instant case, the Tribunal has not recorded any finding with regard to the adequacy or otherwise of the explanation furnished by the dealer. The claim of the assessee that he has deposited the amount of tax along with interest due thereon has also not been considered by the Tribunal. In some cases, this Court has held that if before passing of the penalty order the assessee has deposited the entire amount of admitted tax along with interest, the penalty should not be imposed. Since the Tribunal is the last fact finding authority and such finding has not been recorded by the Tribunal, the matter deserves to be reconsidered by the Tribunal in the light of the above observations. 6.. The revision is allowed. The order passed by the Tribunal is set aside, and the matter is remanded back to the Tribunal for re-hearing of the second appeal and disposal in accordance with law considering the observations made above. Petition allowed.
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