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Showing 21 to 40 of 478 Records
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2001 (4) TMI 938 - COMPANY LAW BOARD, CHENNAI
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... ... ..... portionate basis to the petitioners. 10. In regard to the grievance of the first petitioner about his non-election as a director, the company being a family company in which the first petitioner was a director right from incorporation, we would have held that his non-election is an act of oppression and would have restored his position. But, considering the fact that he has ceased to be a director for eight years and that his induction, in view of the strained relationship between the parties, would not be in the interest of the Company, we are not passing any order on this grievance. 11. The petition contains certain allegations in the affairs of the 11th respondent, which is wholly owned subsidiary of the Company. Since, Shri Raghavan neither argued on the allegations nor sought for any relief in respect of the 11th respondent, we are not dealing with the allegations in respect of the 11th respondent. 12. Petition is disposed of in the above terms with no order as to cost.
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2001 (4) TMI 937 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ught it fit to cure, as such we do not find any material objection to such a method as stands adopted by the High Court. The irregularity has been cured. The prosecution has clearly established that the Appellant No.1 is a public servant and in discharge of his official duties made a demand of ₹ 1300/- from PW 1 Sangamlal as an illegal gratification and taking into account the evidence as is available on record, the accused No.2 also has played a very significant role in negotiating on the figure of the amount and further having the notes exchanged at the dictate of the Appellant No.1, it cannot thus but be said that the Appellant No.2 substantially abetted the crime and thus we record our agreement in the finding of the High Court that the accused persons are guilty of the offence for which they were charged and question of recording a finding of acquittal in the matter cannot by any stretch be sustained. In that view of the matter, this Appeal fails and is dismissed.
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2001 (4) TMI 936 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d the script, the decor and the positioning of different animals, is calculated to deceive the public. Even on the scale, Therefore, the injunction ought to issue. An action of passing off applies as much to services as to goods. 11. For all these reasons I am satisfied that the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case which easily outweighs the defense projected by the defendants. The case was argued in great detail referring to number of cases which, in my view, would be necessary to discuss at the final stage of the suit. In these circumstances the interim order passed on 13.1.2000 is confirmed. I.A. 341/2000 is allowed whereas I.A. 2310/2000 is dismissed. I.A. 342/2000 12. A Local Commissioner had been appointed and he has submitted his report. No objections to the report have been filed by the defendants. The report is accordingly taken on record. No further orders are called for. The application stands disposed off. 13. I.A. 341/2000 allowed. I.A. 2310/2000 dismissed.
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2001 (4) TMI 935 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... and plaintiff therefore did not present remaining cheques. But for filing the Suit under order xxxvII of the Code of Civil Procedure it was still necessary for the plaintiff to present these cheques to the Bank. Admittedly, 7 cheques out of 11 cheques given by the defendant were not presented for payment. Therefore, the Suit under Order xxxvII would not be maintainable. 10. For all these reasons I am the opinion that defendant would be entitled to unconditional leave to defend. This IA is accordingly allowed. Defendant is allowed unconditional leave to defend the Suit. S.No.1802/99 11. Let written statement be filed within four weeks. Replication, if any, within four weeks thereafter. Both the parties may file documents, if any, within eight weeks from today. 12. List before Joint Registrar for admission and denial of documents on 6th September, 2001. 13. List before Court for framing of issues on 18th September, 2001. 14. The aforesaid schedule shall be strictly adhered to.
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2001 (4) TMI 934 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... not from the point of view of word 'subordinate Court' used in Section 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure and, therefore, held that, "in our view, the sub-ordination for the purpose of Section 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act means a judicial sub-ordination and not sub-ordination under the hierarchy of Courts under the Code of Civil Procedure or Code of Criminal Procedure." We have already stated hereinabove that the Full Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court, in Yashwantrao's case, has considered the judgment of the larger Benches of the Apex Court stated hereinabove and held that the Commissioner is not a 'Court' within the meaning of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. We have already expressed our concurrence with the view of the Full Bench. 37. We answer the reference accordingly and overrule the judgment rendered by the Division Bench of this Court in Smt. Rajiyabi Cosman Sayi and Anr. v. Mackinon Machinzie & Co. Pvt. Ltd., (supra).
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2001 (4) TMI 933 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... should get married and subsequently should get himself separated by partition or otherwise prior to the cut off date. In some cases, son may be major, he may get himself separated prior to the cut off date and he may get himself married subsequently before the specified date. That would not mean that he is not entitled to get benefit of the said provision. Only requirement of exclusion clause is that before the cut off date, such son should be major, married and separated by partition or otherwise. In short, for the purpose of the land holding under the Act, the term family does not include such a son, who is major, married and separated by partition or otherwise prior to cut off date. In this view of the matter, this appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court is set aside. As the High Court has not decided the matter on merits, it is remitted back to the High Court for decision in accordance with law. There shall be no order as to costs.
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2001 (4) TMI 932 - COMPANY LAW BOARD, NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... the observer as honorarium. 43. The learned counsel for the Bank forcefully argued for award of cost to compensate the loss of interest on the funds that the bank would have earned by usage of the proceeds of the right issue, occasioned by the institution of the present proceedings by the petitioners. We would have found merit in the claim of the bank if this petition had been a frivolous one. We have held that the Chairman was wrong in withdrawing the resolution which has occasioned this petition. Further we also note that the shareholders had not been advised of the guidelines of the RBI that issue of bonus shares has to be accompanied by right/public issue. Therefore, on the grounds of irregular withdrawal of the resolution and non furnishing of relevant information, the petitioners had the right to file this petition and therefore, the question awarding any cost to the Bank does not arise. 44. The petition is disposed of in the above terms, without any order as to cost.
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2001 (4) TMI 931 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the matter and to find out itself if any substantial question of law is involved or not. In case, such a question or questions arise, the same should be formulated and the appeal be heard thereafter in accordance with law. We would however particularly take care to observe that none of the observations made by us in this order would prejudice the case of the parties while being heard by the High Court after remand. The High Court may take any view of the matter on its merit. In the result, the appeal is allowed, the judgment and order passed by the High Court in Second Appeal is set aside and the case is remanded back to the High Court to consider the same in the light of the observations made above. Since the matter is pending for long, it is requested that the High Court may dispose of the case expeditiously as far as possible within six months of receipt of the record from this Court. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there would however be no order as to costs.
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2001 (4) TMI 930 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... and it would be a plain exercise of judicial power to countenance such action and set the same aside for the purpose of equiting good conscience and justice. Justice of the situation demands action clothed with bona fide reason and necessities of the situation in accordance with the law. But if the same runs counter, law courts would not be in a position to countenance the same. Action in the present context cannot be said to be in the category as noticed in the preceding paragraph but is otherwise as such cannot have the concurrence or acceptance from the Court. It appears prima facie to be tainted with motive and thus not sustainable - this aspect of the matter has been completely overlooked by the Bench of the Calcutta High Court and as such the same cannot be sustained. In that view of the matter, these appeals succeed. The order of the Division Bench of the High Court stands set aside and quashed and that of the learned Single Judge stands restored. No order for costs.
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2001 (4) TMI 929 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... August 22, 2000 and the order sought to be reviewed. We are of the opinion that no case is made out to review our order dated December 15, 2000. The review petition is therefore dismissed.
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2001 (4) TMI 928 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... at frustrates the object of the particular provision. In the instant case, we have highlighted one possibility where an assessee might have applied the income for the purposes other than charitable purposes and thus there is no money available with the assessee in which event it cannot be said that the assessee can accumulate deemed income for some specified purposes. Such an interpretation would lead to anomalous situation which is not contemplated under s. 11(1)(a) and 11(2) of the Act because an assessee is entitled to exemption only on such income which is either applied for charitable purposes or intended to be applied for charitable purposes and not otherwise. 13. The circular issued by the CBDT (supra) is in consonance with the intention of the legislature and also the plain meaning that can be ascribed to s. 11 of the Act. Under these circumstances, we do not find any infirmity in the orders of tax authorities. We, therefore, dismiss the appeal filed by the assessee.
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2001 (4) TMI 927 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... (Tribunal) , which we have just set aside. There has been no determination of the facts involved. It, therefore, becomes necessary to set aside all these orders of the Tribunal and remand the civil appeals to the Tribunal for being heard and decided afresh. They shall be decided afresh having due regard to what we have stated in our order in Civil Appeal No. 5373 of 1999 and connected matters. All contentions may be raised before the Tribunal by either party, including that the goods are not structurals. Liberty is given to both sides to produce additional evidence. The Civil Appeals are allowed. No order as to costs.” Civil Appeal No. 3986/1988 “Having regard to the orders that have been passed in the connected appeals, it is appropriate that this appeal is heard and decided by the Tribunal afresh. All contentions may be raised before the Tribunal by either party. Liberty is given to produce additional evidence. The civil appeal is allowed. No order as to costs.
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2001 (4) TMI 926 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... 4.5 per cent. However, it is to be remembered that the rates prescribed in the said Part I are applicable for asst. yr. 1997-98. Part III of the First Schedule prescribes the rate of income-tax for asst. yr. 1998-99 and in that Schedule the surcharge is not provided. Therefore, in the asst. yr. 1998-99 no surcharge is leviable because in the instant case the search has taken place on 26th Sept., 1997. Therefore, the relevant assessment year is 1998-99 for which no surcharge is leviable as per the provisions of Part III of the First Schedule of Finance Act, 1997. Accordingly, the order of the CIT(A) on this issue is set aside and the AO is directed to delete the surcharge levied. This ground of the assessee is, therefore, allowed. 22. Ground No. 1, quoted above, was not pressed at the time of hearing. It is accordingly rejected. 23. Ground No. 2 is general in nature and in view of our findings as above, it needs no discussion. 24. In the result, the appeal is partly allowed.
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2001 (4) TMI 925 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... extracted above is that once a suit for recovery of possession against the defendant who is in adverse possession is filed, the period of limitation for perfecting title by adverse possession comes to a grinding halt. We are in respectable agreement with the said statement of law. In the present case, as soon as the predecessor-in-interest of the applicant filed an application under Section 91 of the Act for restoration of possession of the land against the defendant in adverse possession, the defendants adverse possession ceased to continue thereafter in view of the legal position that such adverse possession does not continue to run after filing of the suit, we are, therefore, of the view that the suit brought by the plaintiff for recovery of possession of the land was not barred by limitation. For the aforesaid stated reasons this appeal deserves to succeed. We accordingly set aside the judgment under challenge. The appeal is allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.
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2001 (4) TMI 924 - CESTAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... was issued asking the assessee to show cause why the claim for refund should not be rejected. To say the least, the show cause notice is the out-come of the Officer's ignorance of the law. 3. The amount deposited pursuant to the Order passed by this Tribunal under Section 35 F of the Act should have been returned after the Final Order dated 15.2.99 by the Department without demur. In the instant case where the deposit was made by making endorsement in the PLA, the assessee himself could have taken credit of the amount by making necessary endorsement in his own PLA Account. The assessee is directed to take credit of the said amount in his PLA with notice to the concerned Jurisdictional Authority. The Officer is directed not to pursue the show cause notice issued proposing to reject the claim for return of the money. He is also directed to make necessary endorsement in the assessee's PLA allowing him to take credit of the amount deposited pursuant to the order of Stay.
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2001 (4) TMI 923 - CESTAT AHMEDABAD
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... ... ..... ed in respect of other products manufactured in the same factory. Condition clearly provides that the manufacturer should not avail of credit of the duty paid on any product manufactured in the same factory. The words used are "on any other product" and not "in respect of any other product" manufactured in the same factory. As it is not the case of the department; that the appellants have availed of credit of duty paid on any other product manufactured in the same factory, the benefit of Notification No. 5/98 (Srl. No. 68) cannot be denied to the impugned goods. We also find that some of quantity of polystyrene Expandable granules manufactured by the appellants were used by them in the manufacture of impugned goods during June, 1998 to November 1998 no Modvat credit was availed of duty paid on these granules". 3. On the interpretation made by the Tribunal in the cited case, this appeal is allowed with consequential relief if any. Pronounced in Court.
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2001 (4) TMI 922 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... easoning assigned by the trial court and then assign its own reasons for arriving at a different finding. This would satisfy the court hearing a further appeal that the first appellate court had discharged the duty expected of it." The salutary principles referred to above in Santosh Hazari case JT (2001) 2 SC 407 have been respected in their breach. Our careful perusal of the judgment in the first appeal shows that it hopelessly falls short of considerations which are expected from the court of first appeal. We, accordingly set aside the impugned judgment and decree of the High Court and remand the first appeal to the High Court for its fresh disposal in accordance with law. We wish to clarify that nothing said hereinabove shall be construed as any expression of opinion on the merits of the case. We request the High Court to dispose of the appeal expeditiously after notice to the parties. The appeal is disposed of in the above terms. Parties shall bear their own costs.
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2001 (4) TMI 921 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... is Court again noticed number of anomalies in the Second Schedule and, therefore, thought it fit to have assistance of either the Attorney General of India or the Solicitor General of India. When the matter was called out on 15.12.2000, Mr. Altaf Ahmad, ASG, stated before the Court that the order passed by this Court on 30.8.2000 has already engaged serious attention of the Ministry of Surface Transport Department and the Government was considering the matter for bringing necessary correction in the Second Schedule of the Motor Vehicles Act. Thereafter, we again sought assistance of the Additional Solicitor General on the interpretation of Section 163A and also to verify whether there are corrections in the Second Schedule. Learned Additional Solicitor General stated that amendment might take some time. In this view of the matter, we think it would be appropriate if the Central Government takes necessary action as early as possible under Section 163A(3). Ordered accordingly.
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2001 (4) TMI 920 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... om primary market. (ii) The purchases during the year under consideration from the secondary market were quite insignificant. (iii) The investments have been mostly made out of their own funds and not out of borrowed funds. (iv) The shares have been acquired by way of subscription to the public issue. (v) The shares have been held for fairly long period. (vi) The shares once sold have never been repurchased. (vii) In the immediately preceding years, the shares shown have been accepted as investments. (viii) The purchase of shares was with an intention of keeping them as investment. (ix) The shares were never held as stock-in-trade. (x) Shares purchased were never sub-divided into group with an intention to sell." Keeping these aspects in mind and considering other decisions, the Tribunal arrived at a conclusion that the assessee never indulged in adventure of any trade. We find no substantial question of law arising in these appeals. The appeals are therefore dismissed.
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2001 (4) TMI 919 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nate attitude. In the present case the Assessing Officer has elaborately discussed the salient features in his order which depicts dispassionate impartial scrutiny and has rightly come to the conclusion that the assessee-firm was entitled to have deduction of a sum of ₹ 71,007 only, and not a sum of ₹ 1,27,856. The Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) by his well reasoned order confirmed the judgment and the order passed by the Assessing Officer and the same has been done by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. Shri Bagadiya has vehemently attempted to demonstrate that the fraud which has been written by the taxing authority were pertaining to imperfect accounting and without mala fide intention but for that the assessee- firm has to blame itself. In view of the above discussion this court has no alternative but to answer the question referred to us for our opinion, by answering it in the affirmative. We hereby dispose of this matter, but with no order as to costs.
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