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Case Laws
Showing 81 to 100 of 456 Records
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2001 (5) TMI 903 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Company when deemed unable to pay its debts ... ... ... ... ..... such view. As the appeal court has taken into consideration the aspect of payment of interest and quantified the total amount inclusive of all interest and no payment of interest was directed in the case of default, this court cannot give any direction for payment of interest and it has to accept that the appeal court refused any further interest. Therefore, the company is liable to pay the said quantified amount found due from the company to the petitioner on the date of the order of the appeal court. The company is liable to pay the petitioner the sum as specified by the appeal court. The Registrar, Original Side, High Court, Calcutta, is directed to pay the said amount to the petitioner forthwith out of the sum lying deposited with him on account of the company. This order is subject to stay order passed by the appeal court in ACO No. 8 of 2001 in connection with APOT No. 54 of 2001. All parties are to act on a xeroxed signed copy of this judgment on the usual undertaking.
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2001 (5) TMI 902 - NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION
... ...
... ... ..... of the petitioners that Forum under the Consumer Protection Act is prohibited from taking cognizance of any dispute arising under the Chit Fund Act, and that the dispute could be entertained by the Registrar under that Act relating to disputes covered by section 64 of that Act. State Commission has gone to the extent of holding that the case of the complainant was not covered under the provisions of the Chit Fund Act. We, however, need not go into that question as we are of the opinion that District Forum under the Act had jurisdiction to decide the dispute raised before it. 4. State Commission is right in its view that the amount which was admitted due to the complainant could not have been adjusted against any loan that may be due to his father. Complainant was wrongfully denied the amount of Rs. 1,25,000 which was due to him all this period. State Commission rightly held against the petitioners. We uphold the order of the State Commission and dismiss the revision petition.
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2001 (5) TMI 901 - HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Detention - Powers of Central Government to revoke detention ... ... ... ... ..... the Central Government and ultimately the Central Government also rejected the said representation and there was no delay on the part of the Central Government in considering the representation. This Court held that there was no denial of making a representation to the Central Government and the delay on the part of the State Government in forwarding the representation to the Central Government, by itself, was not sufficient to invalidate the order of detention. Sat Pal was, therefore, not a case of non consideration of the representation by one of the authorities who was required to consider the said representation. (p. 70) 10. In view of the above legal position and the undisputed position that representation was considered by the detaining authority on the date it was received from the Central Government, there is no substance in the plea that there was any explained period of inaction. The petitions, therefore, are without any merit and deserve dismissal, which we direct.
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2001 (5) TMI 892 - CEGAT, KOLKATA
Exemption - Notification No. 33/99-C.E. - Delay in filing ... ... ... ... ..... uperintendent on 5-7-2000. As such even if the said particulars were received in the office of the Asstt. Commissioner after 7-7-2000, the same will not result in denial of benefit of the notification in question. I note that the notification in question is the one according to which the Revenue has to make suo motu refund to the assessees situated in those particular areas of Assam and no refund application as such under the provision of Section 11B is required to be filed. In these circumstances the delay on the part of the respondents to file the statements showing duty payment particulars shall not result in denial of benefit to the respondents. Reference in this regard has also been made to the Tribunal rsquo s decision vide Order No. A-246/KOL/2001, dt. 26-4-2001 2002 (147) E.L.T. 724 (Tribunal) in the case of CCE, Shg. v. M/s. Vinay Cement Ltd., when the appeal filed by the Revenue on an identical ground was rejected. The Revenue rsquo s appeal is accordingly rejected.
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2001 (5) TMI 887 - HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Winding up - Application for ... ... ... ... ..... v. Taylor 1875 1 Ch D 426, and Nazir Ahmad v. Emperor, AIR 1936 PC 253. The Supreme Court has also expressed the same view in respect of the procedural requirement of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act in the case of Ramchandra Keshav Adke v. Govind Joti Chavare 1975 AIR 1975 SC 915 and as regards compliance with the requirement contained in rule 3 of Order 39 of the Code in Shiv Kumar Chadha v. Municipal Corpn. of Delhi 1993 3 SCC 161. 19. There appears to be a purpose for the manner in which advertisement is to take place that it must have a wider publicity and by its publication in the Official Gazette an authenticity is put to the advertisement. We find no infirmity in the order passed by the learned company judge holding that in view of the clear mandate of sub-rule (2) of rule 24 of the Rules, the company court cannot invoke powers under rule 6, 9 or 99 to dispense with advertisement of the winding up petition of a company in the Official Gazette. Dismissed.
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2001 (5) TMI 886 - HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
Company Secretaries ... ... ... ... ..... hether there was a prima facie case or not for proceeding against the accused and could not enter into a detailed discussion of the merits or demerits of the case and the scope of the revisional jurisdiction was very limited, the High Court could not in our opinion launch on a detailed and meticulous examination of the case on merits. . . . (p. 1570) Therefore, for the reasons stated above, I find no merit in the petition. The petition is bound to fail and it fails. 12. At this stage, it was submitted by the learned counsel for petitioners that an order may be passed dispensing with the attendance of the accused directors before the learned magistrate in the course of their trial. Such an order cannot be passed by this Court at the present stage of the proceeding and more so, it is upto the petitioner-accused to move the learned trial magistrate himself for their dispensation in appearance at the appropriate stage of the proceeding invoking the enabling provision in the Code.
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2001 (5) TMI 885 - HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Winding up - Circumstances in which company may be wound up ... ... ... ... ..... brought on record are liable to be adjudicated upon by the competent Civil Court. In order to arrive at a conclusion whether to entertain or not to entertain the petition of the appellants, the learned Company Judge had to consider the material on record and come at least to a prima facie view. This the learned Company Judge has done. The appellants cannot make a grievance of the same. Needless to say that the observations of the learned Company Judge are only prima facie and that too for the purpose of considering the petition filed by the appellant. The said observations including the one made while deciding the appeal cannot prejudice the rights of either of the parties the controversy which would ultimately will have to be determined by the competent Civil Court on merits uninfluenced by the said observations. 11. We find no merit in the appeal and the same is dismissed with cost quantified at Rs. 5,000. 12. No interim applications survive in view of the aforesaid order.
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2001 (5) TMI 884 - HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Foreign Companies ... ... ... ... ..... ia. It was held that such an issue has to be decided by the arbitrator as an international agreement. It is not necessary that the arbitrator could not be of a nationality of one party. 29. Thus, in view of the finding that there exists privity of contract between the petitioners and the respondent and that petitioner No. 2 though a foreign company had no established place of business in India at the time of signing the contract through its constituted attorney was not obliged to fulfil the requirements of Part II of the Companies Act and, thus, is entitled to bring any suit, claim, any set off, make any counter claim or institute any legal proceedings in respect of contract, dealing or transaction, the petition is allowed as the respondent failed to appoint the arbitrator despite service of notice in this regard. 30. Since both the parties are raising disputes and there are claims and counter-claims, the arbitrator shall adjudicate both as referred in the petition and reply.
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2001 (5) TMI 883 - HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
Reference to BIFR ... ... ... ... ..... y pointed out in his submissions that it was necessary for BIFR to make an inquiry, and for that, it was essential for the BIFR to appoint independent agency for satisfying itself whether the industry in question should be treated as sick industry. The record shows that a proper inquiry was made by BIFR. AAIFR has also considered the relevant factors while affirming the judgment and order of BIFR. 9. The tone and texture of the judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge does indicate that he has considered all facets of the matter. The BIFR has also considered all facets of the matter. The necessary inquiry has also been made in the case. Therefore, the BIFR was not wrong in appointing BoB as necessary agency. 10. Thus, the facts of this case do not attract the provisions of article 226. We do not find anything wrong in the judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge and the L.P.A. has to be dismissed without admitting it for final hearing. 11. Dismissed.
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2001 (5) TMI 882 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the first respondent, a limited company is entitled to sue as an indigent person under Order 33, rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. The word "person" has to be given its meaning in the context in which it is used. It refers to a person who is capable of filing a suit and this being a benevolent provision, it is to be given an extended meaning. Therefore, we are of the view that a public limited company, which is otherwise entitled to maintain a suit as a legal person, can very well maintain an application under Order 33, rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. We hold that the word "person" mentioned in Order 33 includes not only a natural person but other juridical persons also.
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2001 (5) TMI 881 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the award would be governed by the Act for its enforcement or whether the provisions of the old Act would apply?
Held that:- Appeal allowed by way of remand. From the plain and literal reading of the said provision and the Gazette Notification, it is clear that the Act came into force on 22-8-1996. Thus the Act was brought into force with effect from 22-8-1996 vide Notification No. G.S.R. 375(E) dated 22-8-1996 published in the Gazette of India and that the Act being a continuation of the Ordnance is deemed to have been effective from 25-1-1996 when the first Ordinance came into force.
Section 47 states as to what evidence the party applying for the enforcement of a foreign award should produce before the court. Section 48 states as to the conditions for enforcement of foreign awards. As per section 49, if the Court is satisfied that a foreign award is enforceable under this Chapter, the award shall be deemed to be a decree of that court and that court has to proceed further to execute the foreign award as a decree of that court. If the argument advanced on behalf of the respondent is accepted, the very purpose of the Act in regard to speedy and effective execution of foreign award will be defeated. Thus, none of the contentions urged on behalf of the respondent merit acceptance so as to uphold the impugned judgment and order. We have no hesitation or impediment in concluding that the impugned judgment and order cannot be sustained.
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2001 (5) TMI 880 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Suspension of legal proceedings, etc. ... ... ... ... ..... r the execution preceding consequent upon the award, and consequential attachment is maintainable or not, in view of the provisions of section 22. In my considered view, respondent Nos. 2 and 3, being guarantors of the industrial unit also are protected by virtue of section 22 and, therefore, no execution proceeding could be initiated pursuant to the award against any of the respondents. 6. In the result, the attachment levied in the said Execution Application No. 42 of 1999, against the property of respondent No. 2 is rendered illegal and requires to be raised. It is made clear, however that the issue regarding illegality of the award has to be kept open for proper adjudication. 7. In view of the aforesaid observations, the chamber summons is hereby allowed in terms of prayer clause (a) by virtue of section 22. All other contentions of both the sides are left open. 8. At this stage, the learned counsel for the petitioners prayed for stay of the order. Prayer stands rejected.
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2001 (5) TMI 879 - SUPREME COURT
Whether omission of pendente lite interest to the decree by the trial court was an accidental or clerical error?
Held that:- Appeal allowed. The correct position of law is that a decree cannot add to or subtract from any relief except what has been provided in the judgment. But this is not the case here. In this case, the trial court awarded mesne profit, however, in the decree, it was written as net profit. On an application filed by the plaintiff for correction of the decree under section 152, the word ‘net’ was the case of typographical mistake and, therefore, not applicable to the present case.
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2001 (5) TMI 876 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the acts attributed to the respondents amounted to professional misconduct?
Held that:- In our opinion, the State Bar Council has abdicated its duties when it was found that there was no prima facie case for the Disciplinary Committee to take up. The Bar Council of India also went woefully wrong in holding that there was no case for revision at all. In our considered view, the appellant complainant has made out a very strong prima facie case for the Disciplinary Committee of the State Bar Council to proceed with. We, therefore, set aside the order of the State Bar Council as well as that of the Bar Council of India and we hold that the complaint of the appellant would stand referred to the Disciplinary Committee of the State Bar Council.
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2001 (5) TMI 874 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Securities and Exchange Board of India - Powers to issue directions ... ... ... ... ..... r. Singhvi tried to distinguish the case of the petitioner no. 3 viz. Capital and Securities Pvt. Ltd. on the ground that the 1st petitioner had only 18 per cent share in the said company. However, it has been brought to our notice that majority share holding in this company is that of the son in law of the 1st petitioner. It is also pointed out that the 1st petitioner himself has described this company as his associate concern to the Stock Exchange. Whether the petitioner no. 3 company is really involved in the aforesaid acts is also to be investigated by the SEBI. SEBI is directed to complete the inquiry and pass final orders within 4 months from today. All contentions of the parties are expressly kept open. SEBI shall decide the matter on its own merits without being influenced in any manner by the observations made in this order. We express no opinion at all on merits of the matter. 41. In the result, for the foregoing reasons, petition is dismissed. No order as to costs.
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2001 (5) TMI 851 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Remand when proper adjudication and finding of facts required ... ... ... ... ..... gure of Rs. 1.6 crore is specifically mentioned in the show cause notice on the basis of which duty of Rs. 33 lakhs has been demanded. Ld. Counsel for the appellants has clearly contended that the Department rsquo s case is only on the basis of statements of employees of the appellants and no corroborative evidence is available with the Department. The seven chits which show the clandestine clearances have not been corroborated. 9. emsp From the above, it will appear that there are many facts involved in the case which are required to be properly appreciated/adjudicated upon and finding of fact recorded thereon by the authorities below and which cannot be done by the Tribunal in the appellate stage. Moreover, the order appealed against is an ex parte order. Therefore, keeping in view the facts of the case, we find it reasonable that in the interest of justice, the case may be remanded to the authorities below for proper appreciation of facts in the case. We order accordingly.
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2001 (5) TMI 850 - CEGAT, KOLKATA
Smuggled goods - Burden to prove ... ... ... ... ..... tainable, nor, in the circumstances, the penalty. rdquo 4. emsp I have heard Shri V.K. Chaturvedi, learned SDR for Revenue and Shri P.R. Biswas, learned Consultant for the parties. Shri Biswas, learned Consultant has placed strong reliance upon the Tribunal rsquo s Order Nos. S-338 to 409/A-680 to 751/Cal/96, dated 9-10-96 wherein under similar circumstances, the Tribunal extended the benefit to the appellants in that case in respect of metal scrap. I also find from grounds of appeal of Revenue that no evidence has been adduced by them to show smuggled nature of the scrap in question. As rightly observed by the Commissioner (Appeals) the scrap is non-notified item under the provisions of Section 123 of the Customs Act and as such the onus to prove the same lies heavily upon the Revenue. In the absence of such evidence the Commissioner (Appeals) has rightly extended the benefit to the respondents. No merits are being found in the Revenue rsquo s appeals. The same are rejected.
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2001 (5) TMI 849 - CEGAT, BANGALORE
Demand - Limitation - Remand when order factually incorrect - Brand name ... ... ... ... ..... ered by lsquo Trade Mark Registration rsquo and they had heavily relied upon the case of K.M. Muttani v. Paramount Talkies of India 1943 (13) Company cases 90 (Bom.), to claim the right of the Company to use its own name were relevant submissions made before the learned Collector. The order has ignored these vital submissions, by recording a factually in accurate finding. Such orders are required to be set aside, at the threshold and remanded back for re-determination. (c) Since we find, this case, is a fit case to send it back for de novo adjudication, we refrain from going into the other aspects of the classification and the points urged before us in the cases filed by both sides. We leave the same open to be urged before the Adjudicating Authority in the remand proceedings. 5. emsp In view of our finding, we set aside the order and allow both the appeals (i.e. E/440/95 and E/1602/96 and dispose of the cross objection E/Cr/75/2001) by way of Remand for de novo Adjudication.
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2001 (5) TMI 848 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Reference application - Maintainability of ... ... ... ... ..... limitation. 2. emsp On hearing both sides we are of the view that the Reference Application is not maintainable as it arises out of an order passed in terms of Section 35G of the Central Excise Act. While the law Section 35C(2) provides for filing of such application arising only out of an order passed in terms of Section 35C(1) of the Act. 3. emsp Hence the application is dismissed as not maintainable.
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2001 (5) TMI 847 - CEGAT, KOLKATA
Exemption - Delay in filing statement ... ... ... ... ..... stinction has to be made between substantive mandatory policy consideration and those in the area of procedure. The notification required the assessee to submit statements of duties paid under PLA by 7th of the following month. Nothing more is required to be done by the assessee for claiming the benefit. RT-12 returns were submitted to the range superintendent and as such we hold that late filing of a separate statement by itself will not result in denial of the substantive benefit, otherwise available to the respondents. There is no allegation much less any finding that the respondents have not fulfilled the substantive conditions of the notification. We also take note of the Tribunal rsquo s Order No. A-246/KOL/2001, dt. 26-4-2001 2002 (147) E.L.T. 724 (Tribunal) wherein the Revenue rsquo s appeal filed on the identical ground in respect of the same notification was rejected. Accordingly, we do not find any merits in all the three appeals of the Revenue and reject the same.
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