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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 614 Records
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2001 (7) TMI 1310 - CESTAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... etters were returned by the Deputy Commissioner as the present address could not be ascertained. Learned S.D.R. also mentioned that the company's letter dated 1.9.2000 requesting to give two months time for filing reply was duly received by the Commissioner's office. 4. In view of the position enumerated by both the sides, we find that the present impugned Order has been passed by the Commissioner without receiving the replies to the show cause notice and without hearing any of the parties. We, are, therefore, of the view that in the interest of justice, matters should go back to the Adjudicating Authority for afresh adjudication as the allegations contained in the show cause notice has not been replies by any of the Appellants. Accordingly we set aside the impugned Order and remand all the matters to the Commissioner for fresh adjudication after taking replies to the show cause notice on record and after affording reasonable opportunity of hearing to the Appellants.
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2001 (7) TMI 1309 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ice and under the peculiar circumstances of the case we set aside the order impugned and condone the delay in filing the application for setting aside ex-parte decree. To avoid further delay, we have examined the merits of the main application and feel that sufficient grounds exist for setting aside the ex-parte decree as well. Consequently, the appeal is allowed by setting aside the orders impugned. The appellant's application for condoning the delay and for setting aside the ex-parte decree shall stand allowed subject to payment of exemplary costs of ₹ 50,000/- to be paid to the opposite side within a period of 30 days. If the costs are not paid within the time specified, this appeal shall be deemed to have been dismissed and the ex-parte decree passed against the appellant revived. We may clarify that the costs awarded by this order are in addition to the amount of ₹ 10,000/- deposited in this Court for payment to the respondent vide order dated 3.11.2000.
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2001 (7) TMI 1308 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e of the same are outside the city of Madras. 22. We, therefore, do not find any merit in the appeal and the same is liable to be dismissed. 23. We place on record the submission made by the learned senior counsel for the defendants that his clients have no desire to prolong the suit and that they are ready to file written statement in the Court which is found to have jurisdiction to try the suit and that they would be ready for trial of the suit in September, 2001. 24. The trial Judge had granted three weeks' time to present the plaint in the proper forum. We now extend that time till the expiry of a period of thirty days from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order. The Court, which is found to have jurisdiction to try the suit, shall fix the dale for the appearance within 30 days from the dale of such presentation and shall direct filing the written statement and thereafter proceed with the trial expeditiously. 25. Parties to bear their respective costs.
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2001 (7) TMI 1307 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he plaintiff is not a party to the GAFTA Rules, the rules framed by the Association cannot be rammed down the throat of the plaintiff. 14. In view of the aforesaid reasons, I do not find any merit in the application and dismiss the same. 15. However, the pleas raised by the defendant in the application shall be treated as preliminary objection as to the maintainability of the suit and accordingly an issue will be framed in this regard. 16. Similarly the contention of learned counsel for the defendant that plea raised by the plaintiff in para (A) of the reply to application namely that the defendant company is being wound up requires the plaintiff to obtain permission from the proper court in italy to proceed further with the suit and therfore, till such time this permission is obtained, the suit continues to be barred by law shall also be taken into consideration when the parties are called upon to complete their pleadings for the purpose of framing of issues in this regard.
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2001 (7) TMI 1306 - COMPANY LAW BOARD, CHENNAI
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... ... ..... ry proceedings under Section 111A it is not possible for us to make any roving enquiry into this matter. Since the criminal court is already seized of the matter, taking into consideration the undertaking given by the learned counsel for the respondent that in case the criminal court comes to the finding that the signature is forged, the company would restore the name of the petitioner in respect of these 40,000 shares and also deliver the share certificates thereon, we are of the view that we should leave the matter of determination of the genuineness of the signature of the petitioner on the instrument of transfer to the criminal court. Accordingly, we dispose of this petition with the direction that the company should re-enter the name of the petitioner on the register of members and deliver the share certificates to him in case the criminal court comes to a finding that the signature of the petitioner on the instrument of transfer is a forged one. 8. No order as to cost.
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2001 (7) TMI 1305 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... , ; Amritdhara Pharmacy v. Satya Deo Gupta, AIR 1940 SC 142; Corn Products Refining Co. v. Shangrila Food Products Ltd., and Parle Products (P) Ltd. v. J.P. & Co., Mysore, in support of his contention that the trade marks LIPICARD and LIPICOR and deceptively similar, are not applicable in the instant case. 16. In view of the aforesaid discussion, order dated 9th February, 2001 warrants to be vacated and injunction application filed by the plaintiffs merits rejection. I.A. No. 12230/2000 filed by the plaintiffs is accordingly dismissed and IA No. 3035/2001 filed by the defendant is hereby allowed. The interim order dated 9th February, 2001 stands vacated. 17. Needless to mention the entire matter is examined on the touchstone of Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 dealing with the application for grant of ad interim injunction, and therefore, views expressed above are tentative and prima facie conclusions which shall not be treated as any final expression on the merits of the case.
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2001 (7) TMI 1304 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ets of the company (d) Such further order or orders and/or direction or directions as to this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper." 31. A perusal of the aforesaid prayer clearly shows that there is no prayer for payment of debts. Learned counsel for appellant though argued that there is no prayer for debt but in substance it is for discharge of debt. We are unable to accede to the submission of the learned counsel for the respondent that such petitions are not basically for discharge of debts, debt is only one element but there is also public purpose behind it that such defunct companies should not be allowed to survive in the commercial world to the detriment of public. As a result of the above discussion, we are of the opinion that the view taken by the learned single Judge is correct and it does not require any interference by this Court, Hence the appeal filed by the appellant is dismissed. No order as to costs. G.C. Gupta, J. 32. I agree. 33. Appeal dismissed
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2001 (7) TMI 1303 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d February, 1992 while the petition by the creditors was filed on 3rd March, 1992. In fact the restraint order was passed only on 4th August, 1992 and the winding up petition was admitted on 29th September, 1992. In view of the sequence of these dates and the fact that the DFC had taken over possession of the property prior to these proceedings on 23rd February, 1992 and in respect thereof possession and management being synonymous as the company was lying closed, the proceedings could not have been initiated without the permission of the DFC. 16. We may also add that considerable time has since passed and the appellant company is running its affairs in the property and has on fact repaid the loans availed of it by the DFC. 17. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances the impugned order dated 13th September, 1996 is set aside and the appeal is allowed. The sale effected in favor of the appellant company is thus confirmed. The parties are left to bear their own costs.
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2001 (7) TMI 1302 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ed or not. Word "evidence" occurring in sub-section is used in comprehensive and broad sense which would also include the material collected by the investigating officer and the material or evidence which comes before the Court and from which the Court can prima facie conclude that person not arraigned before it is involved in the commission of the crime. Lastly, learned counsel further submitted that power under Section 319 is an extraordinary power and should be used very sparingly and only for some compelling reasons for taking cognizance of other persons against whom action has not been taken. For this purpose, he referred to MCD vs. Ram Kishan Rohtagi (1983) 1 SCC 1 . In our view, there cannot be a dispute that power under Section 319 is to be sparingly used. But that would not mean that when a prosecutrix names three persons who were involved in the serious crime are not to be added as accused by exercise of such power. In the result, the appeal is dismissed.
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2001 (7) TMI 1301 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... el for the parties, we affirm the order of the C.E.G.A.T. The appeal is dismissed No costs.
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2001 (7) TMI 1300 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e collection of the Tax which the legislature thought would otherwise be evaded. This Court cannot substitute its own wisdom for the wisdom of the Legislature in such matters relating to fiscal statutes. It is well known that the Legislature and the Government has to think of various contingencies in taxing measures, and this Court can only interfere if there is any constitutional violation or violation of any Statute. However, we find no Constitutional invalidity in Section 4-A in the impugned Notification. o p /o p 9. The petition is therefore, dis missed. o p /o p 10. However , before parting with the case we would certainly agree with the apprehension of the petitioners that they may be harassed by the Trade Tax Authorities and hence we direct the Com missioner, Trade Tax U. P. to issue a cir cular forthwith directing all Trade Tax Authorities that they must not harass the sugar manufacturers, and if they do so they will be severely punished. Petition dismissed. o p /o p
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2001 (7) TMI 1299 - HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT
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... ... ..... Tribunal came to the conclusion that the Commissioner of Income Tax was not empowered to take into revision an order passed by the Assessing Officer under Section 143 (3) read with Section 144-B of the Act. 4. During the pendency of this reference, the decision which was rendered by the Special Bench was under scrutiny of Andhra Pradesh High Court. The Andhra Pradesh High Court has reversed the order passed by the Special Bench in case of Commissioner of Income Tax v. East Coast Marine Products (P.) Ltd. and Another, 181, ITR 314. 5. We have gone through the facts of the case and law laid down by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in case of Commissioner of Income Tax v. East Coast Marine Products (P.) Ltd. and Another. We are in respectful agreement with the judgment delivered in the said case and accordingly we also answer the question referred to us in the negative i.e., in favour of revenue and against the assessee. The reference stands disposed of with no order as to costs.
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2001 (7) TMI 1298 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... o the defence to establish it. In such an eventuality, the question of sanction should be left open to be decided in the main judgment which may be delivered upon conclusion of the trial. In the present case, the accused is claiming that in awarding contract in his capacity as Secretary, Department of Rural Development, Government of Sikkim, he did not abuse his position as a public servant and works were awarded in favour of the contractor at a rate permissible under law and not low rates. These facts are required to be established which can be done at the trial. Therefore, it is not possible to grant any relief to the appellant at this stage. However, we may observe that during the course of trial, the court below shall examine this question afresh and deal with the same in the main judgment in the light of law laid down in this case without being prejudiced by any observation in the impugned orders. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed.
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2001 (7) TMI 1297 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he assessee. There was, thus, a concealment of income and penalty proceedings could be validly continued. He further submits that even negative income is a part of the income and the assessee being entitled to carry forward the loss to the subsequent year, it cannot be said that there was no concealment. 3. After hearing the counsel for the Revenue, we find that the issue as sought to be raised in the present appeal is concluded by the judgment of this Court in Prithipal Singh's case (supra). Still further, the decision has been affirmed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in CIT vs. Prithipal Singh & Co. (2001) 166 CTR (SC) 187 (2001) 249 ITR 670(SC). 4. Mr. Sawhney submits that their Lordships of the Supreme Court have not given any reason for affirming the decision. In our opinion that is of no consequence. Once the decision has been affirmed in the civil appeal, it is binding on this Court. Resultantly, we find no ground to interfere. The appeal is dismissed.
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2001 (7) TMI 1296 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... es the cause of action and the relief claimed. Unless the cause of action and the relief claimed in the second suit are the same as in the first suit, it cannot be said that the subject-matter of the second suit is the same as that in the previous suit. The Court further observed that the mere identity of some of the issues in two suits would not bring about identity of the subject matter in two suits. In this view of the matter, in our view it is not necessary to decide the further contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the Rent Act is a self-contained Code and the provisions of the CPC as a whole are not applicable to the proceedings under the Rent Act. In the result, the appeal is allowed with no order as to costs. The impugned order dated 8.12.1999 passed by the High Court of Karnataka in HRRP No. 845 of 1999 is set aside and the order dated 24.7.1999 passed by the trial court is restored. The trial court to proceed with the matter as early as possible.
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2001 (7) TMI 1295 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... sel, appearing for the respondents, referred to Sankara Hali & Sankara Institute of Philosophy and Culture v. Kishori Lal Goenka and Anr. (2). This case has no application as this case arose out of benami transaction. In the case of Syed Abdul Khader v. Rami Reddy and Ors. (3), the father was found to be ostensible owner and in that context, it was held that Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act would apply, which is not the case here. The widow can be ostensible owner to the extent that she has a right during her lifetime. She ceased to be an ostensible owner after her death and cannot pass on a better title than what she had. Admittedly, she had a life estate in the Property and after her death, the title in the land would revert to the Slate of Punjab. 4. In view of the matter, the appeal deserves to be allowed. The order and judgment of the High Court is set aside and the decree of the trial court is affirmed. There shall be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.
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2001 (7) TMI 1294 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... erned parties. In any event, we do not wish to go into the same, neither any detailed discussion is also called for having regard to the issue raised in the matter, the Appellate Bench of the High Court has passed the order upon preservation of the rights and contentions of the parties and specifically without prejudice to the rights of the lessee to file suit or appropriating proceedings for recovery or otherwise or to enforce the agreement for purchase of the properties in accordance with the law and we do also feel it convenient to record such a reservation of right. In the premises we are unable to lend any concurrence in support of the appeal. The appeal, therefore, fails and is thus dismissed without prejudice, however, to the rights and contentions of the parties in the pending matter or in the matter of initiation of any proceedings or in the matter of enforcement of any agreement or otherwise in accordance with law. Each party, however, to pay and bear its own cost.
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2001 (7) TMI 1293 - CESTAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... ment, we see no reason to interfere with the conclusion reached by the Tribunal and, therefore, we dismiss these appeals, but make no order as to costs.” The Hon’ble Supreme Court had emphasised the importance of popular meaning in interpreting the statutes and had explained that the popular meaning is the one attached to them by those using the product. 22. In the light of the above discussion, we consider that the product in question is not a shampoo or a preparation for use on the hair in the sense the term has been used in Heading No. 33.05 but is a soap as described in Heading No. 34.01 of the Central Excise Tariff. Accordingly, we hold that the product Kesh Nikhar branded cake/bar is correctly classifiable under sub-heading No. 3401.12 of the Central Excise Tariff. Its classification under Heading No. 33.05 is not correct. As a result, the impugned order is set aside and the appeal is allowed with consequential benefits as per law. Ordered accordingly.
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2001 (7) TMI 1292 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... , the Tribunal has concluded that the entire income of the assessee was relatable to the business. Reliance has been placed by the Tribunal on the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in CIT vs. Chugandas & Co. (1965) 55 ITR 17(SC) TC 44R.1224 wherein it was inter alia observed that "business income is broken up under different heads only for the purpose of computation of the total income...... by that break-up, the income does not cease to be the income of the business...." 6. Besides the above, it also deserves notice that the addition of the cl. (baa) to the Explanation to s. 80HHC is indicative of the legislative intent to exclude income on account of interest and rent, etc. from the benefit under s. 80HHC w.e.f. 1st April, 1992, only. 7. No other point has been raised. 8. In view of the above, we find no ground to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the Tribunal and the CIT. Resultantly, the appeal is dismissed. No costs.
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2001 (7) TMI 1291 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ntend that the Director of the K.J. Hospital would not fall within the wide purview of "some person aggrieved" as envisaged in Section 199(1) of the Code. The learned senior counsel made a last attempt to save the appellant from prosecution on the strength of the decision of this Court in K.M. Mathew vs. State of Kerala 1992 (1) SCC 217 . In that case prosecution against Chief Editor was quashed for want of necessary averments in the complaint regarding his role in the publication. That part of the decision rests entirely on the facts of that case and it cannot be imported to this case. It is pertinent to point out, in this context, that the appellant did not have any such point either when he first moved the High Court for quashing the proceedings or when he moved the trial court for discharge. Hence it is too late in the day for raising any such point, even apart from non-availability of that defence to the appellant on merits. We, therefore, dismiss this appeal.
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