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Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 531 Records
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2002 (9) TMI 866
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... ... ..... t List and each time because of their repugnancy to the Central Law, they were assented to by the President to give them overriding effect. My understanding of the proposals contained in the file is that the 'assent of the President' was obtained each time in a general way by referring to some of the Central Laws covered by the relevant entries in the Concurrent List. 99. My conclusion, therefore, is that the 'assent of the President' to the State Act having been obtained in a general way, State Act would prevail over the Central Act. 100. Consequently this appeal and all connected appeals and writ petitions on this point succeed. The impugned order of the High Court of Bombay deserves to be set aside. The cases be sent to competent courts for deciding remaining legal and factual questions as are involved in each of them. The cost incurred in this court in each case shall abide the final result of the each case. The connected SLPs are accordingly disposed of.
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2002 (9) TMI 865
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... ... ..... t succeeds in substantiating the plea which he would obviously be permitted to raise in his pleading by way of consequential amendment then the suit shall be liable to be dismissed. The defendant is not prejudiced, more so when the amendment was sought for commencement of the trial. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is allowed. The impugned orders of the High Court and the Trial Court are set aside. The plaintiff is permitted to incorporate the pleas sought to be raised by way of amendment in the original plaint foregoing the plea to the extent given up by him before the Trial Court, However, in view of the delay in making the application for amendment, it b directed that the plaintiff shall pay a cost of ₹ 2,000 (Rupees Two Thousand only) as a condition precedent to incorporating the amendment in the plaint. The prayer for declaration of title and recovery of possession shall be deemed to have been made on the date on which the application for amendment was filed.
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2002 (9) TMI 864
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... ... ..... relied upon by the learned counsel for the assessee has held that the assessee can change the method of accounting of duty drawback and cash incentive from Government from mercantile to cash basis on ground that (i) it was not statutory but gratuitous concessions and amount could not be known beforehand with certainty and (ii) amounts involved were received irregularly and was late from Government. In the present case, the Assessing Officer has not pointed out any mala fide intention on the part of the assessee to change the method of accounting. From the facts of this case, it appears that the method of accounting has been changed by the assessee on the basis of receipt till the realization of the said amount has become ascertained. The bona fide of the assessee, therefore, cannot be doubted. In view of the court cases discussed above and keeping in view the facts of this case, we decide this issue in favour of the assessee. 17. In the result, the appeal is partly allowed.
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2002 (9) TMI 863
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... ... ..... ct with tourists, the vehicle cannot be said to be used or kept for use in the State. However, they will be entitled to refund of tax only on fulfilment of requirements of Section 14 of Act 25 of 1991 and the Rules made thereunder, referred to above. For these reasons, we find no merit in these appeals and they are, accordingly, dismissed with costs. Interim orders passed by this court in these cases shall stand vacated. Writ Petition (C) No. 281 of 1994 On the contention raised, we are not satisfied that any fundamental right of the petitioners is infringed to maintain this petition under Article 32 of the Constitution. However, in view of the order passed in the Civil Appeal Nos. 5560, 5561 and 5562-5570 of 2002 (arising out of S.L.P. (C) Nos. 4771/1994, 5034/1994 and 4516/1995), this writ petition is dismissed. Civil Appeal No. 2176/1993 and S.L.P. (C) No. 6483/1995 None appears for the appellants/petitioners. The civil appeal and the special leave petition are dismissed.
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2002 (9) TMI 862
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... ... ..... osed of the public interest litigation by its judgment dated 10.11.2000, which has been dealt with hereinabove, the High Court dismissed the writ petition filed by Suchita Cooperative Housing Society by brief order and holding that in view of its judgment delivered earlier on the same day the petition of the society did not survive and was liable to be rejected summarily. We cannot find fault with the view taken by the High Court. It is interesting to note that this SLP has been filed by the proposed Suchita Cooperative Housing Society through its member Satyajit Hanumantrao Bhand. The proposed society is petitioner No.l and Satyajit Hanumantrao Bhand is petitioner No.2, Copy of writ petition filed in the High Court has not been produced in this Court. There is no disclosure made of the members of the proposed society. In view of what has been stated in the main judgment hereinabove we are not inclined to grant leave to appeal to these petitioners. The petition is dismissed.
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2002 (9) TMI 861
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... ... ..... of 1987 resolution. It is clear that if the said clause had been brought to the notice of the division bench of the High Court there would have been no question of grant of any relief to the respondent as the impugned judgment notices that if 1972 resolution had not been amended the respondent would not have been entitled to the benefit of family pension. In view of Clause 4 of 1987 resolution, the respondent is not entitled to benefit of family pension. She is also not entitled to family pension under 1972 resolution for want of minimum five years' continuous service of her husband. No other resolution, rule or scheme was brought to our notice on basis whereof directions could be issued for grant of family pension to her. 14. For the aforesaid reasons we set aside the impugned judgment of the division bench of the High Court and restore that of the learned single judge dismissing the writ petition. The appeal is thus allowed leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
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2002 (9) TMI 860
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... ... ..... tory documents such as AR 3As filed by the appellants during the relevant period. In these circumstances, the department ought to have issued the notice for recovery of duty within the normal period of limitation as the documents filed by the assessees would clearly show that the re-warehoused quantity fell short of the actual quantity despatched by the assessees. In this context, the decision of the Tribunal in the case of M/s. ITI Ltd. vs. CCE, Allahabad Order No. A/ 263/2001/NB (D) dated 30.3.2001 reported in 2001 (45) RLT 163 (CEGAT) wherein the Tribunal held that the extended period of limitation cannot be invoked when the show cause notice is based on statutory documents filed, is directly applicable to the facts of the present case. We, therefore, hold that the demand is barred by limitation, set aside the impugned order and allow the appeal on the time bar aspect without going into the merits viz. the admissibility of the Notification No. 75/84-CE. Dictated in Court.
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2002 (9) TMI 859
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... ... ..... , JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
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2002 (9) TMI 858
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... ... ..... ith the conclusion. As was observed by this Court in Ranbir and Ors. v. State of Punjab, AIR (1973) SC 1409 the investigating officer has to be specifically asked as to the reasons for the delayed examination where the accused raised a plea that there was unusual delay in the examination of the witnesses. In the instant case however the situation does not to arise. Therefore, in the aforesaid background, the appeals filed by the four appellants who were acquitted by the Trial Court but convicted by the High Court also deserve dismissal which we direct. Corning to the appeal filed by the State in respect of whom both the Trial Court and High Court recorded acquittal, it is seen that there was no acceptable material. This aspect has been analysed in great detail by the Trial Court and the High Court and we do not find any reason to interfere with the conclusions. The appeal filed by the State is accordingly dismissed. In the ultimate result, all the four appeals are dismissed.
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2002 (9) TMI 857
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... ... ..... the Apex Court decision in the case of CCE, Jaipur vs. Raghuvar (India) Ltd. reported in 2000 (38) RLT 777 (SC) 2000 (118) ELT 311 (SC). 2. I have heard Shri H.C. Verma, learned JDR on behalf of the Revenue and Shri G.S. Bhangoo, learned Advocate on behalf of the respondents. 3. I have carefully perused the records and I find that the matter relates to availment of credit and not that of any not paid or short paid duty so as to invoke the provisions of Section 11 A. Since the appellate authority has passed the order granting consequential relief, a mere letter by the respondents for re-credit is enough and there does not appear to be any necessity to file any formal refund claim. I fully agree with the reasoning given by the learned Commissioner (Appeals) which in addition to the case laws relied on by him also gets support by the Ministry of Finance (Department of Revenue) Letter No. 275/37/2K-CX-8A dated 2.1.2002. Accordingly, the appeal filed by the Revenue is dismissed.
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2002 (9) TMI 856
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... ... ..... t the Explanation appears to have been added "for the removal of doubts". However, the fact remains that prior to the insertion of the Explanation, there was no express provision by which depreciation could be fictionally deemed to have been claimed and granted." 13. Taking into consideration the entire conspectus of the case and the precedents available on the point, Expln. 5 in s. 32(1)(ii) cannot be held to be retrospective. As such, it is not relevant for deciding the present issue. 14. The apex Court in the case of CIT vs. Mahendra Mills (supra) has clearly laid down that a privilege cannot be to a disadvantage and an option cannot become an obligation. If the assessee does not wish to avail the benefit of depreciation for some reason, the benefit cannot be forced upon him. I, therefore, respectfully following the precedent, decide this issue in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. 15. In the result, appeal of the Revenue stands partly allowed.
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2002 (9) TMI 855
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... ... ..... is required to lead his evidence. So far as obtaining compensation by fraud by the claimant is concerned, it is no longer res integra that fraud vitiates the entire proceeding and in such cases it is open to an insurer to apply to the Tribunal for rectification of award. For the aforesaid reasons, our answer to the question is that even if no appeal is preferred under Section 173 of 1988 Act by an insured against the award of a Tribunal, it is not permissible for an insurer to file an appeal questioning the quantum of compensation as well as findings as regards negligence or contributory negligence of the offending vehicle. For the aforesaid reasons, the order and judgment under challenge in Civil Appeal No. 5911/2002 S.L.P. (Civil) No. 9238/2000 is set aside and appeal is allowed. Civil Appeal No. 4292/2002, Civil Appeal No.5913/2002 S.L.P. (Civil) No.10616/2001 and Civil Appeal No. 5914/2002 S.L.P. (Civil) No. 17076/2001 are dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
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2002 (9) TMI 854
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... ... ..... his order. As a result the assessee's grounds stand allowed. 11. Ground No. 8 of the assessee in terms of order vide para 34 of the order forming part of this order stands disposed of. 12. In ground No. 9, the Tribunal directed the AO to charge interest under s. 234B on the total income as returned by the appellant and not on the income so determined by the AO. In accordance with the order forming part of this order, the ground of the assessee, therefore, stands allowed. 13. Ground Nos. 10.1 and 10.2 were restored back to the learned CIT(A) as per directions contained in para 38 of the order forming part of this order. The grounds so raised by the assessee, therefore, stand disposed of. 14. Ground Nos. 11 and 12 stand dismissed as the same were not pressed. 15. The orders of the learned AM, learned JM, dt. 26th July, 2001, and the order of the Third Member dt. 22nd May, 2002, shall form part of this order. 16. As a result the appeal of the assessee stands partly allowed.
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2002 (9) TMI 853
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... ... ..... , JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
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2002 (9) TMI 852
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... ... ..... in re-filing appeal is condoned. The appeal is dismissed.
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2002 (9) TMI 851
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... ... ..... e of the writ petitioner is very much relevant for the purpose of proper assessment. I am of the view that the aforesaid three notices show the satisfaction of the Assessing Officer which confers jurisdiction upon the Assessing Officer to issue notice under section 142(1) of the said Act asking for production of document and detailed information I am of the view that these three notices clearly show that the Assessing Officer has complied with the requirements laid down in Barium Chemicals Ltd.’s case (supra) and Grindlays Bank Ltd.’s case (supra). I am of the view that the Assessing Officer acted within the four corners of his power and jurisdiction and did not travel beyond his jurisdiction. 18. In view of the discussions made hereinabove I am of the view that there is no merit in the writ petition and the same deserves to be dismissed. I dismiss the writ petition. All interim orders are vacated. However, there shall be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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2002 (9) TMI 850
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... ... ..... t is difficult to deny that a valuable asset has been transferred. When membership of the Bombay Stock Exchange is put on sale through the nomination, a personal privilege is converted into an asset and the consequential gain is exigible to tax. This would be in line with the legislative intent as apparent from the provisions of section 47(xi) and the CBDT Circular quoted in para 14 above. This would also be in conformity with the ground realities which show that membership cards are being sold for substantial consideration. 17. In view of the foregoing, we find no infirmity in the order of the learned Assessing Officer and the learned CIT(A) on this point. The grounds raised by the assessee in regard to taxability of long-term capital gains are accordingly rejected. 18. The next ground relates to levy of interest under sections 234A, 234B and 234C. These are consequential grounds and do not need any specific order. 19. In the result, the appeal of the assessee is dismissed.
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2002 (9) TMI 849
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... ... ..... inal Courts is not a relevant consideration. The law envisages "such an eventuality when it expressly refrains from making the decision of one Court binding on the other, or even relevant, except for limited purpose such as sentence or damages." Hence, the observation made by this Court in V.M. Shah's case (Supra) that the finding recorded by the criminal Court stands superseded by the finding recorded by the civil Court is not correct enunciation of law. Further, the general observations made in Karam Chand's case are in context of the facts of the case stated above. The Court was not required to consider the earlier decision of the Constitution Bench in M.S. Sheriff's case as well as Sections 40 to 43 of the Evidence Act. In the present case, after remand by the High Court, civil proceedings as well as criminal proceedings are required to be decided on the evidence, which may be brought on record by the parties. In the result, the appeal is dismissed.
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2002 (9) TMI 848
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... ... ..... condoned in C.A. No. D14631/2002. The Appeals are dismissed.
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2002 (9) TMI 847
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... ... ..... t what interest is as defined in Section 2(28-A). There in the order of the State Commission interest means compensation or damages for delay in construction of the house or handing over possession of the same causing consequential loss to the Complainant by way of escalation in the price of the property and also on account of distress, disappointment faced by him. Interest in the order has been used merely as a convenient method to calculate the amount of compensation in order to standardise it. Otherwise, each case of the allottee will have to be dealt with differently. Nomenclature does not decide the issue. In our view, therefore, considering the definition of 'interest' as contained in Section 2(28-A) of the Income Tax Act, provisions of Section 194-A were not applicable and the GDA was clearly wrong in deducting the TDS from the interest payable to the Complainant. Accordingly, the order of the State Commission is upheld and this Revision Petition is dismissed.
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