|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 559 Records
-
2003 (11) TMI 610
... ...
... ... ..... t shall be subject to the result of these appeals. Tag with Civil Appeal Numbers arising out of S.L.P. (C) Nos. 3334-3338 of 2002.
-
2003 (11) TMI 609
... ...
... ... ..... The appeals are accordingly dismissed as withdrawn with liberty to file after the rectification application is disposed off.
-
2003 (11) TMI 608
... ...
... ... ..... is for the Detaining Authority to come to its own conclusion. It is no use for the Detaining Authority to say in the High Court that it would have come to the same conclusion. As noted in the above referred quotation from the case of Ayya alias Ayub v. State of U.P., the Detaining Authority might very well have come to the same conclusion after considering this material but the omission to reconsider the material becomes material. In view of what is stated above, in our view, non-consideration of the second retraction dated 2nd December 2002 vitiates the order passed by the Detaining Authority which is impugned in the present petition. The period of detention is of one year out of which nine months are already over. 11. In the circumstance, rule is made absolute in terms of prayer Clause (a) and the detenu is directed to be released forthwith from her detention and to be set at liberty unless required otherwise under any authority of law. There will be no order as to costs.
-
2003 (11) TMI 607
... ...
... ... ..... Petition and other connected papers. We find no merit in this petition. It is accordingly dismissed.
-
2003 (11) TMI 606
... ...
... ... ..... ermined by the Assessing Officer as per our direction would further be enhanced as per the rule of indexation. However, there is some confusion regarding the date of acquisition of 56 per cent built up area. As pointed out earlier, we are informed by the learned counsel for the assessee that possession of flats were taken in financial year 1991-92 but there is no material before us in support of the same. This will be verified by the Assessing Officer and then determining the period of holding. If it is found that it is long-term capital asset then indexed cost would also be determined otherwise no indexation would be allowed. 14. In view of the above discussion, the orders of the CIT(A) are modified and the matter is restored to the file of Assessing Officer for determination of the cost of acquisition/indexed cost of acquisition and also the capital gain assessable to tax in accordance with the directions given by us. 15. In the result, both the appeals are partly allowed.
-
2003 (11) TMI 605
... ...
... ... ..... ve extracted above the relevant pleadings in the plaint. What has been pleaded in that certain signed stamped blank papers were given to the defendant to be used for the pending litigations of the landlady and for administration of her estate. The plaintiff failed to lead any evidence to show what were those pending litigations and what was the occasion and necessity to sign printed blank receipts at their back by the plaintiff. The High Court being the first court of appeals was fully within its powers to re-examine and re-appreciate the documentary and oral evidence. It could come to a conclusion contrary to the one reached by the trial court. As discussed above, we find that the High Court was fully justified in taking a contrary view as it did and upsetting the judgment of the trial court resulting in dismissal of the suit. In the result, the appeal fails and is, accordingly, dismissed but in the circumstances, we leave the parties to bear their own costs in this appeal.
-
2003 (11) TMI 604
... ...
... ... ..... e, noted earlier, with regard to sections 198 and 199 read with section 5(2) of the Act. 22. The next argument of the learned counsel for the assessee is that if section 9(1)(vi) and ( vii) are not treated as part of section 9(1)(i ), then quantification is not possible. This argument of the learned counsel for the assessee is self-contradictory because we do not find any material difference in section 9(1)(i) and section 9(1)(vi) and (vii) as both refer to the term "income". The Hon’ble Madras High Court in Copes Vukan’s case (supra) has clearly held that income by way of fees for technical services whether arising out of business connection or not will have to be treated as coming only under section 9(1)(vii) and not under section 9(1)(i). 23. In view of aforementioned discussion, respectfully following the decision of the Hon’ble Madras High Court cited supra, the assessee’s appeal is dismissed. 24. In the result, the appeal is dismissed.
-
2003 (11) TMI 603
... ...
... ... ..... L (supra) 2003 (6) SCC 528 is distinguishable. The decision in favour of the workmen was rendered in that case after an industrial adjudication had ended in their favour. In view of clear and binding pronouncement of law by the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of Steel Authority of India (supra), in the present appeals which arise from writ petitions preferred against the adverse judgment of the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT), none of the reliefs, as prayed for, can be granted to the employees. Without ascertaining through the industrial forum, factual aspects of inter se relationship between the Chandigarh Administration, the Contractor and the contract employees, no relief can be granted. For the aforesaid reasons, these appeals are dismissed but without prejudice to the rights of the employees to resort to the remedy of industrial adjudication in accordance with law as explained above. In the circumstances, we make no order as to costs in these appeals.
-
2003 (11) TMI 602
... ...
... ... ..... und to have indulged in conduct which lowers the esteem of the professionals as a class. Adopting the aforesaid approach, it is not possible to find any infirmity, either on facts or in law, in the reasoning and the findings recorded by the Disciplinary Committee and the petitioner- Council by holding the respondent as being guilty of "other misconduct" under section 21, read with section 22 of the Act and, hence, there is no necessity to interfere with the punishment recommended. It has been proved beyond reasonable doubt, in the facts and circumstances of the case and by the evidence on record, that the respondent, and only the respondent, is guilty of "other misconduct" and hence liable to punishment under section 21(6)(c) of the Act i.e., removal from membership of the Institute permanently. 58. The Reference is accordingly disposed of with a direction to the petitioner-Council to remove the respondent from the Membership of the Institute permanently.
-
2003 (11) TMI 601
Constitutional validity of reservation whether based on domicile or institution in the matter of admission into Post Graduate Courses in government run medical colleges?
-
2003 (11) TMI 600
... ...
... ... ..... ason to interfere. The Civil Appeal is dismissed. No order as to costs.
-
2003 (11) TMI 599
Whether this is a case where there was no scope for awarding sentence lesser than prescribed minimum and it should have been highest prescribed but the trial Court awarded sentence of 5 years for reasons, which may not be strictly meeting the requirements of law?
-
2003 (11) TMI 598
... ...
... ... ..... upon the decision of theTribunal in CCE Vs. Kashmir Conductors 1997 (96) ELT 257 is entirelyunsustainable and requires that amendable like element to this issueproceeds. The decision of the Tribunal that he cites does not say anysuch thing. On the other hand, it quotes the decision of the Tribunalin Madura Coats Ltd. Vs. CCE 1996 (13) RLT 186(CEGAT-LB) RLT(L.B.-CEGAT) -844 1996 (82) ELT 512 to say that wherethere is an order of the High Court with regard to proposition oflaw, the Tribunal is bound to follow that order. 4. This bench and all other benches of the Tribunal are thereforebound by this judgment, in the absence of any conflicting judgment ofany other High Court. 5. It will therefore follow that the penalty was unsustainable.The foundation for the penalty having been set aside by the HighCourt/ the penalty could not be sustained. 6. The appeals are accordingly allowed. Liberty to the departmentto proceed against the appellant, in terms of the High Court's order.
-
2003 (11) TMI 597
... ...
... ... ..... of assessment, questions arise directly and proximately as to the rate of duty or the value of the goods.” 6. Sri Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the Revenue is unable to dispute that the language employed in Section 35H of the Act and Section 130 of the Customs Act are identical. Therefore, we are of the view that the application filed by the Revenue seeking reference from the Tribunal on the question referred to above is required to be rejected. In the light of said conclusion, we find it unnecessary to go into the question as to whether the questions on which reference is sought, involves question of law as contended by the learned counsel appearing for the Revenue. 7. In the light of above conclusion, this application is rejected as not maintainable. However, it is made clear that the rejection of this application will not come in the way of the Revenue filing an appeal against the order passed by the CEGAT as provided under Section 35L of the Act.
-
2003 (11) TMI 596
Whether the purported qualification issued by the Water Resources Department as contained in order dated 22.12.1992 is valid?
-
2003 (11) TMI 595
... ...
... ... ..... fore, in our opinion, the Officer, who had passed the order, which was under consideration of CEGAT, should have requantified the amount of interest in the light of the circular of the Board referred to by the CEGAT. 5. Looking to the above facts, the order passed by the Superintendent of Central Excise and Customs dated 24th July, 2003 is quashed and set aside and respondent No. 3 the Commissioner of Central Excise and Customs is directed to requantify the amount of interest after considering the Board’s circular referred to in the order dated 30th May, 2003/26th June, 2003 passed by the CEGAT after giving an opportunity of being heard to the petitioner. We are sure that respondent No. 3 the Commissioner of Central Excise and Customs shall do the needful as soon as possible so that the order passed by the CEGAT can be implemented at an early date. 6. The petition stands disposed of as allowed. Rule is made absolute to the above extent with no order as costs.
-
2003 (11) TMI 594
... ...
... ... ..... he petitioner’s case, was not followed by respondent No. 2 Commissioner. 7. We have heard the learned advocates. Looking to the fact that, while passing the impugned order, respondent No. 2 did not consider the principle laid down by the CEGAT especially when the items, which were to be considered by respondent No. 2 and the items considered by the CEGAT in its earlier order were the same, in our opinion, respondent No. 2 has committed an error in not following the order passed by the CEGAT in the case of the petitioner. 8. For the aforestated reason, we quash and set aside the impugned order passed by respondent No. 2. Respondent No. 2 shall decide the appeal in the light of the observations made by the CEGAT in its order dated 21-11-2002 in the case of the petitioner and shall decide the matter afresh after hearing the petitioner. 9. The petition, therefore, is disposed of as allowed. Rule is made absolute to the above extent with no order as to costs.
-
2003 (11) TMI 593
... ...
... ... ..... R The appeal is not maintainable. Hence, it is dismissed.
-
2003 (11) TMI 592
Whether the provisions of Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999 had no application in relation to the premises in question?
-
2003 (11) TMI 591
What is the true scope and ambit of Section 2(a) and 17 iii (b) of the Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti Adhiniyam, 1964?
Whether the market fee can be levied on the purchases of wheat by the seed processing unit to process and convert the same into certified seed by treating it chemically?
Whether there is any difference in wheat and wheat seed before it is chemically treated and converted into certified seed and thus becomes unfit for human consumption?
Whether it is necessary, to notify seed of cereals which can itself be used as seed when the object of the legislature was to notify only those seeds which are different from produce itself?
........
|
