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Showing 1 to 20 of 497 Records
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2005 (6) TMI 576 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... definitely on 26.4.2005, both, because of lapse of time and because the fresh remand order under section 309) CrPC came to be passed. The remand order of 26.04.2005 was passed after cognizance had been taken and when the petitioner was in custody in the sense explained above. At present also, the petitioner is in judicial custody on the basis of a subsequent valid remand order. In these circumstances the petitioner is not entitled to be released on bail on the grounds urged by him. Accordingly, this application is dismissed. It is made clear that no arguments were advanced on 'merits' nor was this application treated a regular bail application solely under section 439 CrPC. The entire scope and discussion centered around section 309 CrPC. So, the dismissal of this application does not foreclose the petitioner from moving an application for regular bail under section 439 CrPC which, if filed, would undoubtedly be disposed of on merits. The application stands dismissed.
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2005 (6) TMI 575 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... which is raised under Section 118 r/w Section 139 of the said Act. 30. Apart from that, in my view, there is no reason to interfere with the finding recorded by the Additional Sessions Judge as it is well settled that the High Court while exercising its jurisdiction is not expected to substitute its own view to the view taken by the lower Court. In my view, it cannot be said that the finding of the lower Court is perverse or reasonable. In any event after having perused the entire evidence on record, I am of the view that there is no infirmity to the final Order and the finding will be recorded by the Additional Sessions Judge. I do not see any reason to interfere with the said judgment and order. 31. In the result, the appeal is dismissed. I must record my appreciation of the assistance given by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant and the respondents and the research that a number of judgments are cited in this case. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.
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2005 (6) TMI 574 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of criminal trials, it is to be held that no criminal trial where the plea of the accused has to be recorded, the evidence has to be taken at a trial and the accused if found guilty will have to be convicted and sentenced either with imprisonment or fine, could be effectively held in the absence of the accused. In other words, the ex parte procedure as prescribed under the civil law is unknown to criminal law. In this view of the matter, our answer to Question No. 3 must necessarily be in the negative. 10. To conclude, our answers to Question Nos. 1 and 2 shall be in the affirmative whereas our answer to Question No. 3 shall be in the negative. 11. The reference is answered accordingly and the matter will have to be placed now before the learned single Judge to decide the case on merits with reference to the facts and circumstances of the case, in the light of the reference being answered by us in the manner as indicated above. The reference thus stands disposed of as above.
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2005 (6) TMI 573 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ubramaniam, it is not possible to come to the conclusion that there was no liability. There is a promissory note, followed by the cheque. It is highly improbable to come to the conclusion, that these two documents must have been forged or concocted for the purpose of the case. In this view, the finding of the Trial Court, that the prosecution has failed to prove the issuance of the cheque is not acceptable to me, considering the fact that the cheque belongs to M/s. Southern Biologicals, for which the accused was acting as a mandate holder. This finding will not in any way change the result of the case viz., the acquittal, in view of the fact, the case has not been filed against the proper person, in whose account, the cheque was drawn. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal deserves dismissal, though not for the reasons recorded by the Trial Court but for the reasons recorded by the supra. 14. In the result, the appeal fails and the same is dismissed, confirming the acquittal.
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2005 (6) TMI 572 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... as, in my opinion, it would be appropriate that the applicants prefer a revision before the concerned Sessions Court against the order issuing process against them. 28. Liberty is granted to the applicants to prefer necessary revision before the concerned Sessions Court for setting aside the process issued against them by the Magistrate. The learned counsel for the applicants prayed that stay may be granted to the proceedings before the trial Court for a period of three weeks from today. Looking to the facts and circumstances of this case the prayer appears to be reasonable and hence, the proceedings before the trial Court are stayed for a period of three weeks from today. 29. On the necessary revision being preferred by the applicants before the concerned Sessions Court, the concerned Sessions Court shall dispose of the same on merits after hearing necessary parties. 30. Office to issue authenticated copy of this order to the parties. 31. Criminal Application is disposed of.
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2005 (6) TMI 571 - SECURITIES APPELLATE TRIBUNAL MUMBAI
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... ... ..... . The appellant was also directed by the interim order not to alienate any movable property standing in the name of the company without the leave of the Tribunal and the appellant was also not to mobilize any further funds. The learned senior counsel for the appellant submitted that the appellant filed the above application praying for certain conditions to be lifted and for the reasons stated in the affidavit. It is for SEBI to consider the application sympathetically in accordance with law during the pendency of the matter before SEBI in the interest of both the investors and in public interest. SEBI may retain the amount deposited by the company till the time it passes the final orders or disburse it to any person who wants the money back during the pendency of the matter before SEBI. All contentions of the appellant are left open. The respondent may issue fresh show cause notice and dispose of the matter under remand as expeditiously as possible. 38. No order as to costs.
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2005 (6) TMI 570 - CESTAT BANGALORE
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... ... ..... he Finance Act, the notification has been held to be operative for the earlier period as in the case of LH Sugar Factories Ltd. v. CCE . Further he stated that the Apex Court in the case of Gujarat Ambuja Cements Ltd. v. Union of India has clarified the ruling rendered in the case of Laghu Udyog Bharati (supra). 3. On a careful consideration of the submissions made by both the sides, we notice that the very issue has already been decided by the Apex Court in the case of Gujarat Ambuja Cements Ltd. (supra). The Larger Bench of the Tribunal has also held that duty demand cannot be confirmed from the service providers for the period in question. In view of the judgments cited above by the learned Counsel, the pre-deposit of service tax is waived including penalty and its recovery stayed till the disposal of the appeal. The stay application is allowed. The matter should be placed in its turn for final hearing before Single Member Bench. (Pronounced and dictated in the open court)
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2005 (6) TMI 569 - COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS AND CENTRAL EXCISE (APPEALS) AT NASHIK
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... ... ..... endering services of clearing and forwarding operations in any manner shall be deemed to be the gross amount of remuneration or commission (by whatever name called) paid to such agent by the client engaging such agent. In view of above the service tax confirmed on godown rent and freight charges are not sustainable in law. Therefore, I am of the opinion that the impugned order is not sustainable in law and needs to be set aside. The appellant has paid ₹ 4,26,690/- on 22-7-2002 along with interest towards service tax payment on misc. expenses, minimum guarantee charges, material handling charges etc. which is appropriated under the proper head by the adjudicating authority. The remaining part of the confirmed amount and penalties is not sustainable in law and needs to be set aside. 9. I am inclined therefore to allow the appeals and set aside the remaining part of the confirmed amount and penalties. The Order No. 261/2004 dated 31-8-2004 is modified to that extent.
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2005 (6) TMI 568 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of the fact that despite pendency of appeal before the Tribunal, no stay was granted in favour of the Department regarding operation of the order of Commissioner (Appeals). Applying the ratio and analogy of the said decision, the petitioner is required to be granted the relief prayed for, considering the admitted position on facts that the order of Commissioner against which appeal has been filed by the Department before the Tribunal, has not been stayed, and further the fact that the order of CESTAT rendered in assessee's appeal has also not been stayed by any higher forum in absence of any appeal having been filed as on date. 9. In the result, the petition is allowed and the respondent authorities are directed to return to the petitioners 78 bars of gold weighing 9097.920 grams seized on 16th January 1998 within a period of ten working days from today i.e. on or before 8th July 2005. Rule made absolute. Costs payable by the respondents are quantified at ₹ 1,500/-.
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2005 (6) TMI 567 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ree, henceforth. Even where no such specific steps are taken, an implied symbolic, delivery of possession can be culled out, if the transferee is able to prove to the satisfaction of the Court, that he is started receiving the rents of the property, subsequent to the agreement, as of right. 39. In the absence of any of the circumstances referred to above, the Court cannot infer delivery of possession in favour of a transferee. Taking of possession, being one of the most important ingredients of Section 53-A, the plaintiff cannot derive the benefit of that provision, once he failed to prove that he has taken possession of the suit schedule property. 40. Viewed from any angle, the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief. The Trial Court dismissed the suit on proper appreciation of facts and by applying the correct principles of law. This Court does not find any basis to interfere with the same. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.
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2005 (6) TMI 566 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s petitions are closed. After the pronouncement of the orders, Mr. K.M.Vijayan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for some of the petitioners pointed out that as per the prospectus now issued after the issuance of the impugned Government Order, the candidates who apply for medical and allied courses will not be in a position to make their applications based on the marks scored in the Common Entrance Test as well as the Improvement Test for the academic year 2005-2006. In view of our order in so far as it related to the cancellation of the Common Entrance Test and the Improvement Test we direct the respondents herein to prescribe the necessary procedure to be followed by the concerned students to enable them to apply as per the erstwhile procedure that was hitherto in force prior to the cancellation of the Common Entrance Test and the Improvement Test. The respondents shall carry out the above direction expeditiously to enable the candidates to apply for the necessary courses.
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2005 (6) TMI 565 - COMPANY LAW BOARD NEW DELHI
Oppression and Mismanagement - allotment of additional shares - fabricating the minutes books and by filing fake returns before the Registrar of Companies (ROC) - removal of directors in terms of Section 283(1)(g) of the Companies Act, 1956 (the Act) - HELD THAT:- There is no denial by the respondents of the veracity of the minutes. In addition, the Annual Report filed with the Registrar of Companies as on 30th September, 2000 indicates that the 1st and 3rd petitioners were in office on that date and this Annual Return has been signed by the 2nd respondent and the 1st petitioner. Thus, the contemporaneous records signed by the 2nd respondent himself indicate that the 1st and 3rd petitioners were directors on 30th September, 2000 and as such they could not have been declared to have ceased as directors on 14.8.2000 and any record contrary to the contents of the Annual Return as on 30.9.2000 has no validity especially since other than enclosing photocopies of the certificates of posting about which the learned counsel for the petitioners has brought out various infirmities, the respondents have not brought on record any other document as indicated earlier. Therefore, considering all the facts, I declare that the 1st and 3rd petitioners have not ceased to be directors in terms of Section 283(1)(g) of the Act and they continue to be the directors on the Board of Limrose.
As far as induction of the respondents 4 and 5 as directors is concerned, Even assuming that the authorised capital was in fact increased in an EOGM actually held on 14th August, 2000, there is nothing on record justifying allotment of further shares. It is a settled law, as has been recently reiterated by the Supreme Court, in Dale & Carrington Investment Pvt. Ltd. v. P.K. Prathapan [2004 (9) TMI 385 - SUPREME COURT] and Sangram Sinh P. Gaekwad v. Shanta Devi P. Gaekwad [2005 (1) TMI 409 - SUPREME COURT] that any allotment of further shares should be for a proper purpose, bonafide and in the interest of the company and cannot be for the purpose of creating a new majority. In the reply filed by the company, no justification has been given for allotment of further shares which has resulted in creation of a absolute majority in favour of the 2nd respondent's group. Therefore, the purported allotment deserves to be cancelled and accordingly I do so.
In view of my findings that the 1st and 3rd petitioners could not have be held to have ceased to be directors and that the allotment of shares was made solely with a view to create a new majority, I direct the restoration of status quo as existed before 14th August 2000 in respect of the Board of Directors as well as authorized and paid up capital of the company. These directions will take immediate effect and the records of the company shall be suitably rectified. All returns/documents filed by the company with the ROC in respect of the affairs of the company that are contradictory to the contents of the Annual Return as on 30.9.2000 are declared as null and void and under the authority of this Order, the ROC will ignore/reject all such returns/documents.
The learned counsel for the respondents, Shri Ganesh, urged that the 2nd respondent was willing to restore the status quo provided his position in Palanpur Unit is also restored. As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioners, such a direction is beyond the scope of the petition and cannot be acceded to.
The petition is disposed of in the above terms with no order as to cost.
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2005 (6) TMI 564 - CEGAT, DELHI
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... ... ..... r disallowing the deductions in respect of the operating as well as application software has been passed prior to the above referred judgment of the apex court. The question as to whether the deductions in respect of the software can be claimed by the appellants or not, deserves to be examined by the adjudicating authority, keeping in mind the above said judgment of the apex court. 4. Similarly, the claim of the appellants for cash discount and transport charges also needs re-examination in view of the above referred decision of the tribunal in the appellants' own case and the subsequent order-in-appeal passed by the Commissioner (appeals) in the appellants own case on 13.11.2004. 5. In the light of discussion made above, the impugned order is set aside. The matter is sent back to the adjudicating authority for fresh decision on all the issues including of limitation raised by the appellants. The appeals of the appellants accordingly stand disposed of in the above terms.
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2005 (6) TMI 563 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ncome under Section 143(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. This view is in accordance with law laid down by this Court. In the circumstances, there being no infirmity in the order of the Tribunal, no substantial question of law arises for determination and the appeal is accordingly dismissed.
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2005 (6) TMI 562 - CESTAT, CHENNAI
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... ... ..... partment has appealed to the High Court against the above final order and hence the issue has not reached finality. 3. Ld. SDR reiterates these grounds. On the other hand, ld. Counsel for one of the respondents submits that there is no stay of operation of the Tribunal's decision in Sudharsanam Spinning Mills Ltd. (supra) and, he also relies on the decision of this Bench in Sri Shanmuga Mills Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner, 2005 (179) ELT 221 (Tri-Chennai) 2004 (117) ECR 555 (T), wherein the ratio of Sudharsanam Spinning Mills (supra) was followed and it was held that capital goods credit was available to "speed frames" which were used by the assessee in a preparatory stage of manufacture of cotton yarn prior to 21.10.1994. In the absence of stay of operation of the above decisions of the Tribunal, the case law requires to be followed in the appeals. Accordingly, the impugned orders are upheld and these appeals are dismissed. (Dictated and pronounced in open Court).
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2005 (6) TMI 561 - CESTAT BANGALORE
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... ... ..... the Chennai Bench has accepted the party’s plea for classification under Heading 5207 and overruled the department’s classification under Heading 59.06. He submits that the issue being covered, the appeal can be disposed of. Learned DR seeks time to respond to the Tribunal’s ruling. 3. On a careful consideration, we notice that the issue is covered fully in favour of the assessee by the ruling rendered by the Chennai Bench. Therefore, with the consent of both sides, we take up the appeal for final disposal. In the cited judgment, the Chennai Bench has considered exhaustively with regard to the classification of tarpaulin cloth and has clearly held that the same is classifiable only under 5207 of CETA, 1985 and not under Heading 5906. As the issue has been settled in favour of the appellants, the appeal is required to be allowed. The impugned order is set aside and appeal allowed with consequential relief if any. (Pronounced and dictated in open Court)
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2005 (6) TMI 560 - ITAT MUMBAI
Interpretation of the provisions in section 80HHC - Word "Profit" in the proviso - Deduction under the proviso to sub-section (3) of section 80HHC in respect of export incentives - receipts in the form of duty draw back, cash incentives - profit from sale of special import licence - profit derived from the export of the goods and merchandise - doctrine of precedent - Whether in a case where the assessee has admittedly suffered a loss u/s 80HHC(1) - HELD THAT:- As we understand, the case of the assessee and the interveners is that the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in IPCA’s case [2004 (3) TMI 9 - SUPREME COURT] is to be considered in the light of the question posed before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. There, the assessee had exported both self-manufactured as well as trading goods. There was a profit in the export of self-manufactured goods, whereas there was loss in the export of trading goods. The assessee pleaded that the loss should be ignored. It is in this context that it came to be held by the Supreme Court that the loss cannot be ignored and the profit and loss in the export of self-manufactured goods as well as in the export of trading goods needs to be considered. The decision of the Supreme Court does not hold that if there is a loss in sections 80HHC(3)(a), (b) and (c), then 90 per cent of the export incentives, as prescribed in the proviso, has to be ignored, which is the case of the Department. Rather, the Supreme Court has held that the loss cannot be ignored, but should be adjusted along with the profit. The decision of the Supreme Court was with regard to sub-clauses (i) and (ii) of section 80HHC(3)(c). It would apply on all fours. There is loss in section 80HHC(3)(a), (b) or (c) and a positive amount as per the proviso. When there is a loss in section 80HHC(3)(a), (b) and (c), it cannot be ignored. It has to be taken into account along with 90 per cent of the export incentives, as prescribed in the proviso.
The intention of the Legislature is to give deduction for the profit earned by an assessee from the export of goods. So far as regards Rohan Dyes & Intermediates Ltd.’s case [2004 (8) TMI 93 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT], while holding that the loss in section 80HHC(3)(c) cannot be ignored or taken at nil, the Supreme Court decision in IPCA’s case (supra) was relied on.
It was held that the profit from export of self-manufactured goods is to be adjusted against the loss from export of trading goods. Likewise, the loss in section 80HHC(3)(c) is to be adjusted against 90 per cent of the export incentives in the proviso and if after adjustment there is any positive profit, the assessee will get deduction u/s 80HHC. However, if after such adjustment the ultimate result is a loss, the assessee will not get any deduction u/s 80HHC.
The department’s case, as we understand, is that the Supreme Court decision in IPCA’s case (supra) squarely covers the case at hand. This position has been clarified further by the subsequent decision of the Hon’ble Bombay High Court in the case of Rohan Dyes & Intermediates Ltd. (supra). As such, the proviso in question is not an independent provision.
‘Profit’ in the proviso to section 80HHC(3)(c) means the same as ‘profit’ in section 80HHC(1) and (3). This profit means a positive profit arrived at after taking into consideration, the losses incurred. Only profits derived from exports can be ‘further increased’. That which is absent cannot be increased. So, in the event of the resultant of figure u/s 80HHC(3)(c) being a negative figure, there cannot be anything that can be ‘further increased’. Therefore, the proviso cannot be invoked. In view of the Supreme Court decision in IPCA’s case (supra), section 80HHC is governed by section 80AB.
We have given our thoughtful consideration to the matter. As per the doctrine of precedent, precedents not only have great authority, but must, where applicable, be allowed. The practice of treating precedents as absolutely binding is necessary to secure the certainty of the law, predictability of decisions being more important than approximation to an ideal. Authoritative decisions must be followed, whether they are approved of or not, they being legal sources of law. Here, it becomes necessary to examine as to what part of a decision it is that is actually binding on lower courts.
The final and decisive portion of a judgment consists of two parts, the decision and the reason therefore, the decision in concrete or the res judicata, and the principii generalis or the general principles, on which that concrete decision of the case is founded.
For the present purposes, we may also accept the proposition that an unreasoned order of even the Hon’ble Supreme Court may not be a binding precedent or a decision having force under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. But in our considered opinion, the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of IPCA (supra), regarding the issue at hand, is ratio and not obiter. It fully covers the controversy. This was specifically held by the Hon’ble Bombay High Court in Rohan Dyes & Intermediates Ltd.’s case (supra).
Both IPCA’s case (supra) and Rohan Dyes & Intermediates Ltd.’s case (supra) are to be treated as binding, for disposing of the two questions referred to this Bench.
As regards the first contention, their Lordships have already considered and rejected the same with cogent reasons which need not be repeated. Besides, export incentives, despite the purpose therefore, have been made taxable under the provisions of Section 28 of the Act. Therefore, there is no question of treating them as exempt from tax on equitable grounds.
Hence, both these issues are decided in favour of the Department and against the assessee, in respectful consonance with the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of IPCA (supra) and the decision of the Hon'ble Bombay High Court in the case of Rohan Dyes (supra).
The other issues raised in the respective appeals will also be duly considered and decided by the regular Division Benches. In the above manner, the reference stands disposed of.
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2005 (6) TMI 559 - CESTAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... record, which indicate that gold in question is smuggled, even in the initial statement of Imtiyaz Iqbal Pothiawala submitted that gold was purchased locally. Nowhere he admitted that gold were smuggled into India. In these circumstances, as appellant produced the evidence regarding the sale of gold by Bank to various dealers from him M/s. Paras Bullion and M/s. Pawan Jewellers purchased the same which was purchased by the appellant. The confiscation of gold is not sustainable, hence set aside. 15. The Indian currency of ₹ 21 lakhs was seized on the ground that it is in respect of the sale proceed of smuggled gold as we are setting aside the confiscation of the gold on the ground that it is lawfully purchased by Imtiaz Iqbal Pothiawala and the sale is out of that legally procured gold. Therefore, confiscation of currency is also set aside. Consequently, the confiscation of jeep from which the gold is recovered and penalties are also set aside. Appeals are allowed.
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2005 (6) TMI 558 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Undisclosed income on account of suppressed sales of oil and oil-cakes - purchases of tin plate for manufacture of tins - manufacture of tins in excess of the number reflected by the books of account - concealed income - Whether, the conclusions drawn by the Tribunal against the appellant are perverse, in that no reasonable person could have reached these conclusions on the basis of the evidence on the record of the case ? - HELD THAT:- Once the Tribunal had found after appreciating evidence on record that no case was made out for making any addition on account of any suppressed sales of unaccounted oil and oil-cakes, it ought to have approached the issue of alleged suppressed production of tins in light of the basic case of the assessing authority, namely, the assessee was not a dealer in tins and it was not even alleged that the said tins were sold away. This becomes all the more material when one bears in mind that the assessing authority has categorically found that such alleged suppressed production of tins viz., 28,284 tins were not reflected in the closing stock. The question that the Tribunal was required to pose to itself was as to whether Revenue was justified in making addition on such count especially when Tribunal itself had recorded in no uncertain terms that there was no production of undisclosed oil and oil-cakes. The Tribunal having failed to address itself in this regard would go to show as an additional factor that the explanation tendered by the assessee was not unreasonable, was not fanciful and was duly supported by evidence and material on record and the Tribunal failed to not only appreciate but even consider the said evidence.
It is necessary to record that the assessee had made a specific grievance before CIT(A) to the effect that though statement of the concerned person of M/s Girishchandra & Co. had been recorded by the assessing authority, despite a specific request, no opportunity to cross-examine the said party was offered, and to the contrary the assessing authority had relied upon the said statement. The CIT(A) has mentioned the aforesaid objection in paragraph No. 7.1 of his order. The Tribunal has also recorded the grievance in paragraph No. 10 of its order. However, both the authorities have thereafter not appreciated the significance of the grievance made while confirming the addition in tin account. This factor would also go to vitiate the impugned order of Tribunal.
Thus, it is not necessary to enter into a detailed discussion of the procedure adopted to work out the so-called deficit of manufactured tins as per books of account. All the authorities have proceeded on the presumption that firstly, each component set would result in one manufactured tin container; secondly, each component set would yield a tin container of equal weight. Though, both the premises, prima facie, do not appear to be justified, in view of what is stated hereinbefore, it is not necessary to enter into any further discussion on this aspect of the matter.
In the result, the Tribunal was not justified in rejecting the evidence in the form of certificates and statements filed during the course of assessment proceedings; it was also not justified in holding that purchases of tin plates for manufacture of tins were not made on the basis of weight but on the basis of number of component sets; the consequential finding that there was suppression of production of 28,284 tins by the assessee and the value thereof was to be added in the income of the assessee also cannot be justified on the facts of the case.
Accordingly, question Nos. 1 to 5 raised at the instance of the assessee are answered in the negative i.e., in favour of assessee and against Revenue. Similarly, for the reasons stated hereinbefore, question No. 6 at the instance of the assessee is answered in the affirmative i.e., in favour of the assessee and against Revenue. The reference stands disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs.
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2005 (6) TMI 557 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... was filed. Under the circumstances, the scope of suomotu revision u/s.67(1) at the hands of the Assistant Commissioner was very narrow and limited. When finality is attached to the matter between the parties then final decision arrived at in favour of the assessee u/s.62 of the Act cannot be reviewed on the ground that there was subsequent order of the Tribunal in which Tribunal had taken different view of the matter. 11.In view of the above, we are of the considered opinion that the learned Tribunal rightly held that there was no valid ground available to the learned Assistant Commissioner for taking up the matter in revision in his suomotu powers and to take different view in the matter than the view taken by the Deputy Commissioner of Sales tax on 9.11.1981. 12.In view of the above discussion Question No.1 is answered in affirmative. As the question No.1 is decided in affirmative, therefore, question No.2 is not required to be answered. 13.Reference answered accordingly.
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