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Showing 1 to 20 of 781 Records
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2007 (8) TMI 826 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 1997, which was reiterated on 26.12.1997. If we exclude some time from the date of demand, it would be appropriate that the interest is awarded from 1.1.1998. There is no stipulation of grant of interest in the contract. Therefore, it has to be for the period after the demand is made in view of the provisions of Section 3 of the Interest Act. Further, award of interest at the rate of 24% per annum up to 30.9.1998 and at the rate of 18% from 1.10.1998 also seems to be excessive keeping in view the prevailing rate of interest and the mandate of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Rajasthan v. Nav Bharat Construction Co. reported as AIR2002SC258 . I, Therefore, modify the award in so far as grant of interest is concerned and hold that interest would be payable at the rate of 12% per annum with effect from 1.1.1998 till the payment is made. 46. This petition is partly allowed reducing the interest in the aforesaid manner and challenge to the award is rejected. 47. No costs.
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2007 (8) TMI 825 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... said award falls within the order under Section 28A of the L.A. Act passed by the Court and therefore the landlords are entitled to the benefit of higher compensation as per the award passed by the Lok Adalat. The approach of the trial Court is wholly erroneous, contrary to law and cannot be sustained. 12. In that view of the matter, petitioners are entitled to the reliefs sought for in these petitions. Hence, I pass the following ORDER Writ petitions are allowed. The impugned orders passed by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 28A of the Land Acquisition Act refusing to re-determine the compensation in terms of the Lok Adalat award is hereby set-aside. The respondent/Land Acquisition Officer is directed to consider the application of the petitioners under Section 28A of the Land Acquisition Act for re-determination of the compensation payable to the lands belonging to them which are acquired, with reference to the award of the Lok Adalat and pass appropriate orders.
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2007 (8) TMI 824 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... we are of the view that directions be issued to the appellant in the following terms 1) The appellant shall endeavour to obtain/realise maximum price from the assets which can be alienated under the provisions of Sub-section (4) of Section 13 like a prudent man in respect of his own property. 2) The appellant shall on realising the amount, apply to the Company Court to inform the appellant as to the dues of the workmen of the Industry concerned. 3) The appellant shall also place before the learned Company Judge a list of the other secured creditors and the amount due to them. 4) The appellant Company shall file an undertaking before the Company Court to the effect that the appellant shall abide by the provisions of Section 529A of the Companies Act as incorporated in Section 13(a) of the SERFAESI Act, 2002. 10. With the above modification in the 'direction of the learned Company Judge, this appeal is disposed of with no order as to costs. Certified Copy within four days.
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2007 (8) TMI 823 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... orted in 2003 (151) E.L.T. 14 (S.C.), which squarely applies to the facts of the present cases, the Civil Appeals filed by the Department stand dismissed. No order as to costs.
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2007 (8) TMI 822 - CESTAT, BANGALORE
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... ... ..... that they charge service tax at the rate of 10 per cent and education cess at two per cent in respect of the charges collected from them for hiring the storage bases to them. In our view, the appellants are only recipients of the services of storage and warehousing and it cannot be said that they are providing the services of storage and warehousing so that they would be liable to payment of service tax under that category in terms of the Finance Act, 1994. The fact that they record the charges collected as storage charges would alone be not a proper reason for treating them as storage charges in view of the decisions of the honourable apex court holding that the substance of a transaction would prevail over the form. In view of our above observations, we do not find any merit in the impugned order. There is also no justification for imposing such a savage penalty on a State Government Corporation. In these circumstances, we allow the appeal with consequential relief, if any.
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2007 (8) TMI 821 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... , we are of the opinion that the view taken by the Commission as well as the Appellate Authority are unsustainable and they have erred in coming to the conclusion that the Commission has jurisdiction. Consequently, we set aside the order dated 18th October, 2005 passed by the Commission and the orders dated 5th April, 2006 and 2nd June, 2006 passed by the Appellate Authority and remit the matter to the proper Forum created under Section 42(5) of the Act to decide the grievance of the respondent herein in accordance with law. We make it clear that we have not made any observation with regard to the merits of the demand raised by the appellant upon the respondent company and it will be open for the proper forum to adjudicate the same. The payment, if any, made by the company will not operate as an estoppel against the respondent company. We hope that the forum will decide the matter expeditiously. 30. With the above observations, the appeal is allowed with no order as to costs.
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2007 (8) TMI 820 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... that the banker's cheque was dishonoured on account of either of the two grounds on which an action can be founded under Section 138 of the N.I. Act. 21. As noted above, the banker had duly informed the complainant when notice of demand was served that the banker's cheque was not being honoured because the account of the customer had been attached by the income tax authorities and notwithstanding said attachment, by mistake, the banker's cheque in question was issued. Thus, on a mere reading of the complaint it would be evident that cognizance of the complaint could not have been taken by the learned Magistrate. 22. I clarify once again that tort of negligence is not an ingredient of an offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act 1881. 23. The petition is accordingly allowed. 24. Summoning order against the petitioners and the criminal complaint filed by M/s. Omniplast Pvt. Ltd. under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act 1881 are quashed.
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2007 (8) TMI 819 - SECURITIES APPELLATE TRIBUNAL MUMBAI
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... ... ..... is apparent on the face of the record but it also results in manifest injustice to the appellant. The Board has collected fee on the basis of two registrations of the company whereas it should have considered only the first registration which was granted on 17.10.1995 and ought to have calculated the fee liability on that basis. Since this has not been done, we have no hesitation in setting aside the impugned order on this ground which we hereby do and remit the case back to the Board for a fresh computation of the registration fee payable by the company on the basis of its registration with effect from 17.10.1995. We further make it clear that the company will have only one block period keeping in view its date of initial registration. The questions posed in the earlier part of the order stand answered accordingly. The Board will pass a fresh order in accordance with law in the light of the observations made herein above. The appeal stands allowed with no order as to costs.
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2007 (8) TMI 818 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... dent Nos. 1 to 4 would be deemed to be served instead of respondent Nos. 1 to 5. This inadvertent mistake would not be fatal to the process of service as observed by their Lordship of the Apex Court in the case of Basant Singh and another v. Roman Catholic Mission. 45. In this view of the matter, it is clear that the petitioner avoided the services and did not accept the summons even after having knowledge and information from the postman. They did not file counter-affidavit in this case hence the averments made in the writ have to be taken as correct. From the aforesaid discussion of the relevant provisions referred above, I am of the considered opinion that no case for restoration or recall of the order dated 20.12.2006 has been made out which was passed on merits. In this view, the recall application is not maintainable as only a review could have been filed for review of the judgment on limited grounds. For the reasons stated above, the application for recall is rejected.
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2007 (8) TMI 817 - SUPREME COURT
Seeking to release and Pay D.A. with arrears along with interest - management of the school is the direct responsibility of the HCL or not? whether a writ of mandamus could be issued against the management of HCL - Difference Of Opinion between Judges - Principle of equal pay for equal work - Fixing Pay scale at par with the pay scale of Government Secondary School teachers or at par with Grade I and II Clerks - HELD THAT:- We are of the view that the view taken by learned Single Judge appears to be correct that there was no relationship of the management of the HCL with that of the management of the school though most of the employees of the HCL were in the managing committee of the school. But by that no inference can be drawn that the school had been established by the HCL. The children of workers of HCL were being benefited by the education imparted by this school. Therefore, the management of HCL was giving financial aid but by that it cannot be construed that the school was run by the management of HCL. Therefore, under these circumstances, we are of opinion that the view taken by the learned Single Judge appears to be correct.
Next, it was contended that even if the school is not a part of the management of the HCL, yet a direction could be given to the State of Jharkhand under the Act of 1981 to take over the management of the school and in that connection our attention was invited to the definition of proprietary school as defined in Section 2(d) of the Act.
Therefore, the Government of Jharkhand in order to fulfill the constitutional mandate has got these students admitted to various schools. Therefore, the studies of the students have not been affected. So far as issuance of mandamus to the State Government for taking over of the proprietary school is concerned, that cannot be issued because the proprietary school as defined under section 2(d) read with Section 19 of the Act will have to make a request to the State of Jharkhand that they will bear all the financial responsibilities. If the Managing Committee makes a request to this effect to the State of Jharkhand, then the Government may consider but at present there is no such offer by the Managing Committee and as such no direction can be given to the State of Jharkhand to grant recognition to proprietary school because nobody is prepared to take the financial responsibilities of the management of the school. Hence, no direction can be issued to the State Government to take over the management of the School.
In this view of the matter, we are of opinion that the view taken by learned Single Judge of the High Court of Jharkhand appears to be correct and there is no ground to interfere with the impugned order. Consequently, the Civil Appeal is dismissed.
Fixing Pay scale at par with the pay scale of Government Secondary School teachers or at par with Grade I and II Clerks - After going through the order of the Division Bench we are of opinion that the view taken by the Division Bench of the High Court is correct. Firstly, the school is not being managed by the BCCL as from the facts it is more than clear that the BCCL was only extending financial assistance from time to time. By that it cannot be saddled with the liability to pay these teachers of the school as being paid to the clerks working with BCCL or in the Government of Jharkhand. It is essentially a school managed by a body independent of the management of BCCL. Therefore, BCCL cannot be saddled with the responsibilities of granting the teachers the salaries equated to that of the clerks working in BCCL.
For application of the principle of equal pay for equal work - There should be total identity between both groups i.e. the teachers of the school on the one hand and the clerks in BCCL, and as such the teachers cannot be equated with the clerks of the State Government or of the BCCL. The question of application of Article 39(d) of the Constitution has recently been interpreted by this Court in State of Haryana and Ors. v. Charanjit Singh and Ors. wherein their Lordships have put the entire controversy to rest and held that the principle, 'equal pay for equal work' must satisfy the test that the incumbents are performing equal and identical work as discharged by employees against whom the equal pay is claimed. Their Lordships have reviewed all the cases bearing on the subject and after a detailed discussion have finally put the controversy to rest that the persons who claimed the parity should satisfy the court that the conditions are identical and equal and same duties are being discharged by them. More so, when we have already held that the appellants are not the employees of BCCL, there is no question seeking any parity of the pay with that of the clerks of BCCL.
Hence, as a result of our discussion, we do not find any merit in these appeals and the same are dismissed with no order as to costs.
Markandey Katju, J.- HELD THAT:- In our opinion fixing pay scales by Courts by applying the principle of equal pay for equal work upsets the high Constitutional principle of separation of powers between the three organs of the State. Realizing this, this Court has in recent years avoided applying the principle of equal pay for equal work, unless there is complete and wholesale identity between the two groups (and there too the matter should be sent for examination by an expert committee appointed by the Government instead of the Court itself granting higher pay).
It is well settled by the Supreme Court that only because the nature of work is the same, irrespective of educational qualification, mode of appointment, experience and other relevant factors, the principle of equal pay for equal work cannot apply vide Government of West Bengal v. Tarun K. Roy and Ors.[2003 (11) TMI 585 - SUPREME COURT].
Thus, I concur with the conclusion arrived at by my learned brother Hon'ble A.K. Mathur, J. that the appeals preferred by the appellants deserve to be dismissed. Ordered accordingly.
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2007 (8) TMI 816 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ourt in ITA 1280/2006 (Commissioner of Interest Tax Vs. M/s G.E. Capital Transportation). In respect of second issue, it is also covered against the Revenue, in terms of Orders dated 1.9.2006 in ITA No. 1275/2006, (Commissioner of Interest Tax Vs. M/s G.E. Capital Transportation). Appeal is dismissed.
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2007 (8) TMI 815 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... Therefore, the possibility of the right of private defence vis-à-vis the deceased has to be considered in the background of what was stated in Section 106 IPC. It has been held that A-1 to A-5 were not the members of any unlawful assembly. A specific stand was that A-3 and A-4 had thrown the body of the deceased to fire and reliance was placed on the evidence of PW-26. 10. It is to be noted that there can be no dispute that Section 201 would have application even if the main offence is not established in view of what has been stated in V.L. Tresa's and Sou. Vijaya's cases (supra). PW-26 who was the star witness was not believed by the trial Court and the High Court and it was held that his evidence was not cogent and credible. Therefore, while clarifying the position in law we find no scope for interference with the order of the High Court in view of the specific findings recorded regarding the role played by A-3 and A-4. 11. The appeal fails and is dismissed.
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2007 (8) TMI 814 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ion of sentence, but also of the victims of the crime and the society at large, and also by considering the object sought to be achieved by the particular legislation. No material is placed for consideration of this Court in support of the plea for leniency. Complainant no doubt has a remedy of filing a civil suit to recover his money but that in normal course would take years to be decided. Considering that the Complainant has been deprived of, of his money, for a period of almost two years and also considering the object of legislation i.e. to inculcate faith in the efficacy of banking system and credibility in transacting business by cheques ends of justice would be met by sentencing the accused under Section 138 of the Act to undergo S.I. for four months and also directing him to pay a compensation of Rs. 4.60 lakhs and in default to undergo S. I. for six months. The accused to surrender before the learned trial Court within a period of four weeks to undergo the sentence.
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2007 (8) TMI 813 - SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE BOARD OF INDIA, MUMBAI
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... ... ..... ons are not trivial to be condoned, considering the nature of the trades executed by the Broker and its involvement in the said trades. The aforesaid violations committed by the Broker calls for a penalty and considering the facts and circumstances of the case, I, find that this is a fit case for imposing major penalty as ordered herein under. 5. ORDER 5.1 In view of the foregoing, I, in exercise of the powers conferred upon me in terms of Section 19 of the Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992 read with Regulation 13(4) of Securities and Exchange Board of India (Procedure for Holding Enquiry by Enquiry Officer and Imposing Penalty) Regulations, 2002, hereby impose a major penalty of suspension of certificate of registration of Accord Capital Markets Ltd. (Registration No. INB 230776837), Member, National Stock Exchange of India Ltd. for a period of twelve months. 5.2 This order shall come into force immediately on the expiry of 21 days from the date of this order.
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2007 (8) TMI 812 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of the KGST Act to correct their earlier order. Ext. P-2 order of rectification issued and produced in all the W.Ps. are accordingly set aside. 3. Government Pleader in the course of argument submitted that the original order of the Tribunal was not accepted by Respondents. However, by the time they took steps for filing revision petitions, the Tribunal initiated rectification proceeding which ended up in the impugned orders. As Tribunal has rectified earlier orders in favour of the Revenue, revision could not be filed is what is stated by him. I do not think there is any need for this Court to express any view about the correctness or otherwise of the original order namely Ext. P-1 which now stands restored by virtue of this judgment setting aside Ext. P-2 orders produced in all the W.Ps. It is upto the Respondents to challenge first order issued by the Tribunal in appropriate proceedings, if so advised. The W.Ps. are allowed as above. A reproduction from ILR (Kerala Series)
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2007 (8) TMI 811 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... en dismissed as the defendants have failed to raise any triable issue or disclose any defence in their application, in my considered opinion, the plaintiff has become entitled to have the decree for the suit amount forthwith. Accordingly, suit of the plaintiff is hereby decreed with costs. The plaintiff is held entitled to a decree in the sum of ₹ 5,51,74,220/- against the defendants. However, since the plaintiff has failed to establish its claim of interest at 25% p.a which he has claimed at the market rate for commercial transaction, I am inclined to award interest at the prevalent rate only at 12% p.a on the decretal amount from the date of institution of the present suit till realization. Decree sheet be prepared. Needless to say that the defendants shall be entitled to the adjustment of ₹ 35 lacs paid by them to the plaintiff during the pendency of the suit or to any other amount that they might have paid to the plaintiff after the filing of the present suit.
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2007 (8) TMI 810 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... certainly demonstrated his awareness of the procedural law and, therefore, no prejudice has been caused to the present petitioners by the impugned order rejecting the applications for issue of witness summons. I am sure that the Trial Court will take into consideration the observations made in this order and take all the possible steps to comply with the procedural requirements while conducting the trial in the aforesaid complaints. Petitions are, therefore, rejected. At this stage Mr. Marwadi stated that the Trial Court has issued non-bailable warrant on 16.8.2007 against the petitioner No. 2 and he states that the petitioner No. 2 will appear before the Trial Court on or before 28.8.2007. Undertaking is accepted. In view of the aforesaid undertaking the non-bailable warrants so issued are hereby stayed upto 28.8.2007. 6. The learned A.P.P. on behalf of the respondent No. 2 states that he will take appropriate steps to communicate this order to the concerned police station.
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2007 (8) TMI 809 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... occupation is unauthorised. As per the plaint, no lease deed had been executed nor had any arrangement been made between the plaintiff and the defendant No. 2 for the defendant No. 2 to continue in possession or to be in possession of the premises in question. Therefore, according to averments made in the plaint, the defendant No. 2 is in unauthorised occupation of the property belonging to the plaintiffs. Even if I assume, for the time being, that the suit against the defendant No. 2 cannot be maintainable, it is well settled that the plaint cannot be rejected in part. The suit is definitely maintainable against the defendant No. 2. The submission of the learned Counsel for the defendant No. 2 is that the defendant No. 2 has been sued in his personal capacity. If that be the case then the suit against the defendant No. 2 shall survive in any event. Since the plaint cannot be rejected in part, therefore, in my view, this application cannot be allowed and the same is rejected.
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2007 (8) TMI 808 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Ker (Dr. K. R. Ramakrishnan v. Dr. K.K. Parthsaradhy), wherein, it is held in paragraph 26 that 26. ...It is held that (1) When a person issues a cheque, he acknowledges his liability to pay. In the event of the cheque being dishonoured on account of insufficiency of funds he will not be entitled to claim that the debt had become barred by limitation and that the liability was not thus legally enforceable. He would be liable for penalty in case the charge is proved against him. 10. In view of the above consideration, the proceedings against the petitioner-accused cannot be quashed. Anyhow, as per the Explanation (2) of Section 25 of the Act, it is for the trial Court to decide whether the consent of the promisor was freely given, i.e., whether the cheque was actually given voluntarily by the petitioner-accused to the respondent-complainant herein after the period of limitation or any other fact remains. With the above observations, the criminal original petition is dismissed.
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2007 (8) TMI 807 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... yet has commented on the same to reject the contention of the appellant that the place of management was at Mauritius. Secondly, it is contended that the learned Tribunal relied upon the evidence collected by the A.O. This material was not made available to the appellant herein and consequently the reliance of the said material would result in violation of the principles of natural justice and fair play in as much as the appellant had no opportunity of dealing with the said material. 4. Considering the controversy in our opinion it would be appropriate that the Tribunal rehear the entire appeal considering its order dated 17th June, 2005. 5. In the light of that the impugned order is set aside to the extent it was not recalled by the order dated 17th June, 2005 and the question of law as framed are also left open for consideration by the Tribunal while disposing of the Appeal in the light of its order dated 17th June, 2005. Appeal is accordingly allowed. No order as to costs.
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