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Indian Laws - Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 34 Records
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2007 (8) TMI 825 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... said award falls within the order under Section 28A of the L.A. Act passed by the Court and therefore the landlords are entitled to the benefit of higher compensation as per the award passed by the Lok Adalat. The approach of the trial Court is wholly erroneous, contrary to law and cannot be sustained. 12. In that view of the matter, petitioners are entitled to the reliefs sought for in these petitions. Hence, I pass the following ORDER Writ petitions are allowed. The impugned orders passed by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 28A of the Land Acquisition Act refusing to re-determine the compensation in terms of the Lok Adalat award is hereby set-aside. The respondent/Land Acquisition Officer is directed to consider the application of the petitioners under Section 28A of the Land Acquisition Act for re-determination of the compensation payable to the lands belonging to them which are acquired, with reference to the award of the Lok Adalat and pass appropriate orders.
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2007 (8) TMI 821 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... , we are of the opinion that the view taken by the Commission as well as the Appellate Authority are unsustainable and they have erred in coming to the conclusion that the Commission has jurisdiction. Consequently, we set aside the order dated 18th October, 2005 passed by the Commission and the orders dated 5th April, 2006 and 2nd June, 2006 passed by the Appellate Authority and remit the matter to the proper Forum created under Section 42(5) of the Act to decide the grievance of the respondent herein in accordance with law. We make it clear that we have not made any observation with regard to the merits of the demand raised by the appellant upon the respondent company and it will be open for the proper forum to adjudicate the same. The payment, if any, made by the company will not operate as an estoppel against the respondent company. We hope that the forum will decide the matter expeditiously. 30. With the above observations, the appeal is allowed with no order as to costs.
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2007 (8) TMI 820 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... that the banker's cheque was dishonoured on account of either of the two grounds on which an action can be founded under Section 138 of the N.I. Act. 21. As noted above, the banker had duly informed the complainant when notice of demand was served that the banker's cheque was not being honoured because the account of the customer had been attached by the income tax authorities and notwithstanding said attachment, by mistake, the banker's cheque in question was issued. Thus, on a mere reading of the complaint it would be evident that cognizance of the complaint could not have been taken by the learned Magistrate. 22. I clarify once again that tort of negligence is not an ingredient of an offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act 1881. 23. The petition is accordingly allowed. 24. Summoning order against the petitioners and the criminal complaint filed by M/s. Omniplast Pvt. Ltd. under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act 1881 are quashed.
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2007 (8) TMI 818 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... dent Nos. 1 to 4 would be deemed to be served instead of respondent Nos. 1 to 5. This inadvertent mistake would not be fatal to the process of service as observed by their Lordship of the Apex Court in the case of Basant Singh and another v. Roman Catholic Mission. 45. In this view of the matter, it is clear that the petitioner avoided the services and did not accept the summons even after having knowledge and information from the postman. They did not file counter-affidavit in this case hence the averments made in the writ have to be taken as correct. From the aforesaid discussion of the relevant provisions referred above, I am of the considered opinion that no case for restoration or recall of the order dated 20.12.2006 has been made out which was passed on merits. In this view, the recall application is not maintainable as only a review could have been filed for review of the judgment on limited grounds. For the reasons stated above, the application for recall is rejected.
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2007 (8) TMI 817 - SUPREME COURT
Seeking to release and Pay D.A. with arrears along with interest - management of the school is the direct responsibility of the HCL or not? whether a writ of mandamus could be issued against the management of HCL - Difference Of Opinion between Judges - Principle of equal pay for equal work - Fixing Pay scale at par with the pay scale of Government Secondary School teachers or at par with Grade I and II Clerks - HELD THAT:- We are of the view that the view taken by learned Single Judge appears to be correct that there was no relationship of the management of the HCL with that of the management of the school though most of the employees of the HCL were in the managing committee of the school. But by that no inference can be drawn that the school had been established by the HCL. The children of workers of HCL were being benefited by the education imparted by this school. Therefore, the management of HCL was giving financial aid but by that it cannot be construed that the school was run by the management of HCL. Therefore, under these circumstances, we are of opinion that the view taken by the learned Single Judge appears to be correct.
Next, it was contended that even if the school is not a part of the management of the HCL, yet a direction could be given to the State of Jharkhand under the Act of 1981 to take over the management of the school and in that connection our attention was invited to the definition of proprietary school as defined in Section 2(d) of the Act.
Therefore, the Government of Jharkhand in order to fulfill the constitutional mandate has got these students admitted to various schools. Therefore, the studies of the students have not been affected. So far as issuance of mandamus to the State Government for taking over of the proprietary school is concerned, that cannot be issued because the proprietary school as defined under section 2(d) read with Section 19 of the Act will have to make a request to the State of Jharkhand that they will bear all the financial responsibilities. If the Managing Committee makes a request to this effect to the State of Jharkhand, then the Government may consider but at present there is no such offer by the Managing Committee and as such no direction can be given to the State of Jharkhand to grant recognition to proprietary school because nobody is prepared to take the financial responsibilities of the management of the school. Hence, no direction can be issued to the State Government to take over the management of the School.
In this view of the matter, we are of opinion that the view taken by learned Single Judge of the High Court of Jharkhand appears to be correct and there is no ground to interfere with the impugned order. Consequently, the Civil Appeal is dismissed.
Fixing Pay scale at par with the pay scale of Government Secondary School teachers or at par with Grade I and II Clerks - After going through the order of the Division Bench we are of opinion that the view taken by the Division Bench of the High Court is correct. Firstly, the school is not being managed by the BCCL as from the facts it is more than clear that the BCCL was only extending financial assistance from time to time. By that it cannot be saddled with the liability to pay these teachers of the school as being paid to the clerks working with BCCL or in the Government of Jharkhand. It is essentially a school managed by a body independent of the management of BCCL. Therefore, BCCL cannot be saddled with the responsibilities of granting the teachers the salaries equated to that of the clerks working in BCCL.
For application of the principle of equal pay for equal work - There should be total identity between both groups i.e. the teachers of the school on the one hand and the clerks in BCCL, and as such the teachers cannot be equated with the clerks of the State Government or of the BCCL. The question of application of Article 39(d) of the Constitution has recently been interpreted by this Court in State of Haryana and Ors. v. Charanjit Singh and Ors. wherein their Lordships have put the entire controversy to rest and held that the principle, 'equal pay for equal work' must satisfy the test that the incumbents are performing equal and identical work as discharged by employees against whom the equal pay is claimed. Their Lordships have reviewed all the cases bearing on the subject and after a detailed discussion have finally put the controversy to rest that the persons who claimed the parity should satisfy the court that the conditions are identical and equal and same duties are being discharged by them. More so, when we have already held that the appellants are not the employees of BCCL, there is no question seeking any parity of the pay with that of the clerks of BCCL.
Hence, as a result of our discussion, we do not find any merit in these appeals and the same are dismissed with no order as to costs.
Markandey Katju, J.- HELD THAT:- In our opinion fixing pay scales by Courts by applying the principle of equal pay for equal work upsets the high Constitutional principle of separation of powers between the three organs of the State. Realizing this, this Court has in recent years avoided applying the principle of equal pay for equal work, unless there is complete and wholesale identity between the two groups (and there too the matter should be sent for examination by an expert committee appointed by the Government instead of the Court itself granting higher pay).
It is well settled by the Supreme Court that only because the nature of work is the same, irrespective of educational qualification, mode of appointment, experience and other relevant factors, the principle of equal pay for equal work cannot apply vide Government of West Bengal v. Tarun K. Roy and Ors.[2003 (11) TMI 585 - SUPREME COURT].
Thus, I concur with the conclusion arrived at by my learned brother Hon'ble A.K. Mathur, J. that the appeals preferred by the appellants deserve to be dismissed. Ordered accordingly.
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2007 (8) TMI 815 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... Therefore, the possibility of the right of private defence vis-à-vis the deceased has to be considered in the background of what was stated in Section 106 IPC. It has been held that A-1 to A-5 were not the members of any unlawful assembly. A specific stand was that A-3 and A-4 had thrown the body of the deceased to fire and reliance was placed on the evidence of PW-26. 10. It is to be noted that there can be no dispute that Section 201 would have application even if the main offence is not established in view of what has been stated in V.L. Tresa's and Sou. Vijaya's cases (supra). PW-26 who was the star witness was not believed by the trial Court and the High Court and it was held that his evidence was not cogent and credible. Therefore, while clarifying the position in law we find no scope for interference with the order of the High Court in view of the specific findings recorded regarding the role played by A-3 and A-4. 11. The appeal fails and is dismissed.
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2007 (8) TMI 814 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ion of sentence, but also of the victims of the crime and the society at large, and also by considering the object sought to be achieved by the particular legislation. No material is placed for consideration of this Court in support of the plea for leniency. Complainant no doubt has a remedy of filing a civil suit to recover his money but that in normal course would take years to be decided. Considering that the Complainant has been deprived of, of his money, for a period of almost two years and also considering the object of legislation i.e. to inculcate faith in the efficacy of banking system and credibility in transacting business by cheques ends of justice would be met by sentencing the accused under Section 138 of the Act to undergo S.I. for four months and also directing him to pay a compensation of Rs. 4.60 lakhs and in default to undergo S. I. for six months. The accused to surrender before the learned trial Court within a period of four weeks to undergo the sentence.
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2007 (8) TMI 811 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... en dismissed as the defendants have failed to raise any triable issue or disclose any defence in their application, in my considered opinion, the plaintiff has become entitled to have the decree for the suit amount forthwith. Accordingly, suit of the plaintiff is hereby decreed with costs. The plaintiff is held entitled to a decree in the sum of ₹ 5,51,74,220/- against the defendants. However, since the plaintiff has failed to establish its claim of interest at 25% p.a which he has claimed at the market rate for commercial transaction, I am inclined to award interest at the prevalent rate only at 12% p.a on the decretal amount from the date of institution of the present suit till realization. Decree sheet be prepared. Needless to say that the defendants shall be entitled to the adjustment of ₹ 35 lacs paid by them to the plaintiff during the pendency of the suit or to any other amount that they might have paid to the plaintiff after the filing of the present suit.
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2007 (8) TMI 810 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... certainly demonstrated his awareness of the procedural law and, therefore, no prejudice has been caused to the present petitioners by the impugned order rejecting the applications for issue of witness summons. I am sure that the Trial Court will take into consideration the observations made in this order and take all the possible steps to comply with the procedural requirements while conducting the trial in the aforesaid complaints. Petitions are, therefore, rejected. At this stage Mr. Marwadi stated that the Trial Court has issued non-bailable warrant on 16.8.2007 against the petitioner No. 2 and he states that the petitioner No. 2 will appear before the Trial Court on or before 28.8.2007. Undertaking is accepted. In view of the aforesaid undertaking the non-bailable warrants so issued are hereby stayed upto 28.8.2007. 6. The learned A.P.P. on behalf of the respondent No. 2 states that he will take appropriate steps to communicate this order to the concerned police station.
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2007 (8) TMI 809 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... occupation is unauthorised. As per the plaint, no lease deed had been executed nor had any arrangement been made between the plaintiff and the defendant No. 2 for the defendant No. 2 to continue in possession or to be in possession of the premises in question. Therefore, according to averments made in the plaint, the defendant No. 2 is in unauthorised occupation of the property belonging to the plaintiffs. Even if I assume, for the time being, that the suit against the defendant No. 2 cannot be maintainable, it is well settled that the plaint cannot be rejected in part. The suit is definitely maintainable against the defendant No. 2. The submission of the learned Counsel for the defendant No. 2 is that the defendant No. 2 has been sued in his personal capacity. If that be the case then the suit against the defendant No. 2 shall survive in any event. Since the plaint cannot be rejected in part, therefore, in my view, this application cannot be allowed and the same is rejected.
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2007 (8) TMI 808 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Ker (Dr. K. R. Ramakrishnan v. Dr. K.K. Parthsaradhy), wherein, it is held in paragraph 26 that 26. ...It is held that (1) When a person issues a cheque, he acknowledges his liability to pay. In the event of the cheque being dishonoured on account of insufficiency of funds he will not be entitled to claim that the debt had become barred by limitation and that the liability was not thus legally enforceable. He would be liable for penalty in case the charge is proved against him. 10. In view of the above consideration, the proceedings against the petitioner-accused cannot be quashed. Anyhow, as per the Explanation (2) of Section 25 of the Act, it is for the trial Court to decide whether the consent of the promisor was freely given, i.e., whether the cheque was actually given voluntarily by the petitioner-accused to the respondent-complainant herein after the period of limitation or any other fact remains. With the above observations, the criminal original petition is dismissed.
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2007 (8) TMI 806 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... um of ₹ 4,68,581/-as on the date of cheque i. e. 25-4-2001. That was the amount due when the cheque was presented on 8-9-2001, as per statement. In any event, it must also be noted that assuming the cheque was given to the Complainant on 25-4-2001, as contended on behalf of the Complainant, the Complainant at the most, would have had implied authority to fill in the same with an amount which was due to the Complainant as on that date i. e. the date the cheque was given. In other words, the cheque could be filled in for an amount of existing liability or liability in presenti as on the date the cheque was issued and not a liability which would arise subsequently after accrued interest was added to it. From whatever angle one looks at the case of the Complainant, the Complainant cannot succeed. 13. In the light of the above, the conclusion arrived at by the learned trial Court cannot be faulted. There is no merit in this appeal and therefore, the same is hereby dismissed.
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2007 (8) TMI 803 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ded by the courts below suffered from any infirmity or that they were contrary to the record. The High Court also concluded that there was no question of law much less any substantial question of law which arose in the second appeal. Before we part with this judgment, we keep on record that Mr. Mohan appearing for the appellant substantially argued before us on the issue that the High Court was not justified in rejecting the application for acceptance of additional evidence. We have already discussed this aspect of the matter herein before and after such discussion, we have already held that there was no infirmity in that part of the judgment by which the High Court had rejected the application for acceptance of additional evidence. 19. For the reasons aforesaid, we do not find any ground for which interference with the judgment of the courts below can be called for. Accordingly, the appeal requires to be dismissed and is dismissed as such. There will be no order as to costs.
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2007 (8) TMI 798 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... wo companies, the transferor company dies a civil death and the entity which has evolved upon amalgamation cannot be prosecuted for an offence committed by the transferor company. To the same effect are the observations of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh in the unreported decision in Crl. Rev. No. 150/1994 M/s. Brooke Bond Lipton (India) Ltd. and Anr. v. State of H.P. and Anr. decided on 24.3.1995. 20. So far as Clause 8 relied upon by the counsel for the State is concerned, same relates to transfer of legal proceedings. The clause does not contemplate that criminal liability for offence committed by the earlier company would be transferable to the petitioner company. 21. Noting that the petitioner company came into picture on 27.9.2001, after the date of manufacture of the said drug in year 2000, I hold that it cannot be prosecuted for the said offence. 22. Order dated 18.12.2003 summoning the petitioner to face trial in the complaint in question is quashed. 23. No costs.
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2007 (8) TMI 797 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ) 1). The Larger Bench has held that qualification of 'Prathma' cannot be held equivalent to the qualification of Secondary after withdrawal of the recognition of 'Prathma' by the State Government w.e.f. 1.4.1985. However, the court observed that if the vacancies exist prior to the date referred to above i.e. 1.4.1985 and the employees had acquired qualification of 'Prathma' upto the above date, they may be held entitled for promotion or appointment, as the case may be for such vacancies of the years prior to 1.4.1985. In the present case, admittedly, the promotions were made for the year 1995-96 when the qualification of 'Prathma' was not recognised by the State Government. Having considered the entire facts and circumstances, since the impugned order has been passed as per the decision of the Larger Bench of this Court, I find no ground for any further interference of this court. The writ petition is dismissed accordingly as having no merit.
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2007 (8) TMI 796 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... tside power or authority can issue a direction to enact a particular piece of legislation. In Supreme Court Employees’ Welfare Assn. v. Union of India (1989)IILLJ506SC it has been held that no court can direct a legislature to enact a particular law. Similarly, when an executive authority exercises a legislative power by way of a subordinate legislation pursuant to the delegated authority of a legislature, such executive authority cannot be asked to enact a law which it has been empowered to do under the delegated legislative authority. This view has been reiterated in State of J and K v. A.R. Zakki AIR1992SC1546 . In A.K. Roy v. Union of India 1982CriLJ340 it has been held that no mandamus can be issued to enforce an Act which has been passed by the legislature.... 4. In view of the aforesaid legal position, we are of the opinion that this Court cannot grant any relief to the petitioners, as prayed for, in the writ petition. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed.
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2007 (8) TMI 793 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... le mortgage by deposit of title-deeds. It is only through the subsequent administrative instructions dated March 29, 2007 that instrument of deposit of title-deeds have been made compulsorily registerable and this too through a clarification. 12. The settled law is that a mortgage created by a simple deposit of title-deeds. After the deposit has been made, the parties may, if they so desire, record the transaction in a memorandum but such a memorandum would not be an instrument of mortgage and would not require compulsory registration either under Section 59 of the Transfer of Property Act or under the notification dated November 6, 2006 (Annexure R71) and instructions dated March 29, 2007 (Annexure R/2). Resultantly, this petition is allowed. The respondents are directed to enter mutation in favour of the bank recording that the properties which stand equitably mortgaged in favour of the Punjab National Bank, Branch Office Marrahanwala, Panchkula, by deposit of title-deeds.
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2007 (8) TMI 784 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... property. In the background of such facts, this Court held that since the issue of title of the suit property was directly and substantially involved in the former suit, the suit filed by the appellant in that appeal shall operate as res judicata, or at least, the suit was hit by the principle of constructive res judicata. This being the position and in view of our discussions made hereinabove, we hold that by virtue of the ex parte decree passed in the former suit, the subsequent suit filed by the appellant is hit by res judicata. 12. No other point was raised by the counsel for the parties. The applicability of the doctrine of lis pendens was also not agitated by the counsel for the appellant before the High Court. Accordingly we need not go into the question regarding the applicability of the doctrine of lis pendens in the present case. 13. For the reasons aforesaid, we do not find any merit in this appeal. The appeal is thus dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
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2007 (8) TMI 781 - SUPREME COURT
Jurisdiction by the High Court u/s 482 CrPC - Dishonor of Cheque - issued the fabricated cheques to deceive and grab the money - Commission of an Offence of Cheating Or Criminal breach of trust - HELD THAT:- The dispute between the parties herein is essentially a civil dispute. Non-payment or under-payment of the price of the goods by itself does not amount to commission of an offence of cheating or criminal breach of trust. No offence, having regard to the definition of criminal breach of trust contained in Section 405 of the Indian Penal Code can be said to have been made out in the instant case.
Neither any allegation has been made to show existence of the ingredients of the aforementioned provision nor any statement in that behalf has been made. Ordinarily, bouncing of a cheque constitutes an offence u/s 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. No complaint thereunder had been taken.
No act of inducement on the part of the appellant has been alleged by the respondent. No allegation has been made that he had an intention to cheat the respondent from the very inception.
In law, only because he had issued cheques which were dishonoured, the same by itself would not mean that he had cheated the complainant. Assuming that such a statement had been made, the same, in our opinion, does not exhibit that there had been any intention on the part of the appellant herein to commit an offence u/s 417 of the Indian Penal Code.
Furthermore, admittedly, their residences are in different districts. Whereas the appellant is a resident of the district of Ajamgarh, the respondent is a resident of the district of Rampur. Cheques were admittedly issued by the appellant at his place. There is nothing on record to show that any part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the court concerned. Even if such statements merits had been made, the same admittedly have been made only at the place where the appellant resides. The learned Magistrate, therefore had no jurisdiction to issue the summons. Musaraf Hossain Khan v. Bhagheeratha Engg. Ltd. and Ors.[2006 (2) TMI 610 - SUPREME COURT].
Thus, the impugned judgment is set aside. The order taking cognizance is quashed. The appeal is allowed. No offence is made out.
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2007 (8) TMI 778 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ce of the Director, Prevention of Money Laundering Act, we are not inclined to interfere with the order passed by the learned Single Judge. However, we accept the prayer of the counsel for the appellant that he may file appropriate representation before the RBI and also before the Central Government, bringing to their notice the allegations with regard to foreign exchange, money laundering and violation of RBI Regulations. Such representation, if any, may be filed within two weeks from today. As and when such representation is filed, the same may be looked into and action, if any and required, may be taken in accordance with law. However, we express no opinion on the merits of the allegations made and this order shall not be construed as an observation or view expressed by us on any of the allegations made by the appellant herein. In terms of the aforesaid order, the appeal stands disposed of. Copy of this order be given dasti to the counsel appearing for the Union of India.
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