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Showing 21 to 40 of 655 Records
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2007 (9) TMI 702 - APPELLATE TRIBUNAL FOR ELECTRICITY, NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... wn Circular No. 687. Nor did it approve the Circular No. 687. It suggested that approval under Section 29 could be obtained by GEB for this Circular. As stated earlier, this approval was not required to be taken as the circular was not ab initio void and continued to remain in force till it was superseded by another order or was specifically set aside. The appellant is however, satisfied with the amount recovered towards parallel operation charges up to 31.08.2000 itself. We need not consider the situation about the entitlement of the appellant after 31.08.2000. 10. In view of the above analysis the appellant was certainly entitled to recover parallel operation charges as fixed by circular No.687 at least up to 31.08.2000. The claim for refund made by the respondent No.2 was not sustainable. The impugned order allowing refund of parallel operation charges paid during this period cannot therefore be sustained. Accordingly, we allow the appeal and set aside the impugned order.
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2007 (9) TMI 701 - COMPANY LAW BOARD
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... ... ..... cept and take e-form No. 8 on record without the e-form No. 8 being signed on behalf of the company. As I have observed earlier, the powers of this Board under Section 141 is limited only to the extent of condoning the delay or allow rectification. The powers do not extend to giving directions as sought for by the petitioner and as such this prayer cannot be granted. Therefore, I only extend the time upto 30(thirty) days from the date of this order, for filing e-form 8 as per the provisions of Section 141. The petitioner shall file with the Registrar of Companies, West Bengal, a certified copy of this order, along with the aforesaid documents, within the period as fixed by this order. In case the ROC lakes on record the documents without the e-form being signed on behalf of the company, then the petitioner shall pay a sum of ₹ 5,000/- (Rupees live thousand only) towards costs payable to the said Registrar of Companies. 9. The petition is disposed of in the above terms.
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2007 (9) TMI 700 - SUPREME COURT
Jurisdiction of High Court for directing the appellants to lower the cut-off marks - Advertised Vacancy For the Posts of 'Gangman' by the Waltair Division of the then South Eastern Railways (now known as East Coast Railways) - Respondents herein had not been appointed although they had obtained the qualifying marks specified in terms of the notification dated 09.06.1998 - vacancies reserved for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes directed to be filled up by general candidates - HELD THAT:- The fact that the Railway Administration intended to fix the cut-off mark for the purpose of filling up the vacancies in respect of the general category as also reserved category candidates is evident from the fact that different cut-off marks were fixed for different categories of candidates. We are, therefore, unable to accept the submission of the learned counsel that the cut-off marks fixed was wholly arbitrary so as to offend the principles of equality enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The power of the employer to fix the cut-off marks is neither denied nor disputed. If the cut-off mark was fixed on a rational basis, no exception thereto can be taken.
So far as the submission of the learned senior counsel in regard to the Railway Board's circular letter dated 12.03.1976 is concerned, we may at the outset notice that such a contention had not been raised before the Tribunal. Respondents herein did not have any occasion to meet the said contention. In any event, only because in a case of this nature, the said circular had not been complied with, the same, in our opinion would not lead to a conclusion that action on the part of the appellants in its entirety was unwarranted or mala fide in nature.
Even assuming that the appellants should have filled up the unfilled vacancies meant for the reserved category candidates by the general candidates, but then for the said purpose, the general candidates were required to fulfill the eligibility clause including the cut-off marks fixed therefor. Respondents admittedly did not do so. The High Court, in our opinion, committed a serious error in directing the appellants to lower the cut-off marks. The cut-off mark 20 was fixed for the Scheduled Caste and Schedule Tribe candidates. The same was not meant to be applied to the general category candidates. The jurisdiction of the appellants to fix different cut-off marks for different category of candidates has never been questioned and in that view of the matter only because the Railway Board had issued a circular as far back as in the year 1976 to fill up the vacancies by unreserved candidates in the event the reserved category of candidates was not available therefor, in our opinion, the same would not mean that irrespective of the qualification and performance of general category candidates they were entitled to be appointed.
It is now a well-settled principle of law that even wait-listed candidates have no legal right to be appointed. [Ashwani Kumar Singh v. U.P. Public Service Commission and Others [2003 (7) TMI 698 - SUPREME COURT].
It was for the appellant to decide as to whether the posts were to be dereserved or carried forwarded. [Rajasthan Public Service Commission and Another etc. v. Harish Kumar Purohit and Others etc.[2003 (4) TMI 568 - SUPREME COURT].
In any view of the matter, the respondents appeared in a competitive examination. The posts advertised were public posts. They did not have any vested right for appointment. It is well-known that even selected candidates do not have legal right in this behalf. [See Shankarasan Dash v. Union of India [1991 (4) TMI 444 - SUPREME COURT], Asha Kaul (Mrs.) and Another v. State of Jammu and Kashmir and Others [1993 (4) TMI 324 - SUPREME COURT].
It is also well-settled that those candidates who had taken part in the selection process knowing fully well the procedure laid down therein were not entitled to question the same. [See Munindra Kumar and Others v. Rajiv Govil and Others [1991 (5) TMI 255 - SUPREME COURT]. [See also Rashmi Mishra v. Madhya Pradesh Public Service Commission and Others [2006 (10) TMI 485 - SUPREME COURT]
We are, however, not oblivious that there are certain exceptions to the aforementioned rules but we are not concerned therewith in the present case - Thus, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained, which is set aside accordingly. The appeal is allowed.
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2007 (9) TMI 699 - COMPANY LAW BOARD
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... ... ..... ting parties will submit a final report by 30.11.2007. The Chartered Accountant will also verify and confirm the development expenses said to have been incurred by the Company in respect of the landed properties originally owned by the Company at JANWADA village. The final report is binding on all the parties. (vii) The second respondent shall reimburse monies of the Company, if any, found diverted, on verification by the Chartered Accountant, within 30 days of receipt of final report, failure of which will attract the interest at the rate of 10 simple till date of payment in full. (viii) The Company shall bear the remuneration of the Chartered Accountant, appointed by the Bench. With the above directions, the company petition stands disposed of. In view of this, the interim order dated 23.01.207 is vacated. No order as to costs. The parties are at liberty to apply in the event of any difficulty only in regard to the implementation of this order and not on any other account.
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2007 (9) TMI 698 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ective of the fact whether he is principal debtor or a surety. Therefore, I have no hesitation to find that there is perversity in the judgment of the appellate Court in reversing the judgment of the trial Court and I am inclined to set aside the same. The appeal has been preferred only for the purpose of recovery of the suit costs. When the appellate Court exercised the discretion and passed such order, the plaintiff cannot insist that the suit should be decreed with costs. In the cross objections, D3 disputed his liability and this Court accepted his plea that he is not liable to pay any amount in view of the dismissal of the suit for default against the D1. In the result, the cross objections are allowed by setting aside the judgment of the appellate Court in A.S. No. 12 of 1996 and confirming the decree of the trial Court in O.S. No. 683 of 1989. Consequently, the Second Appeal No. 918 of 1998 for recovery of the costs is dismissed. Each party shall bear their own costs.
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2007 (9) TMI 697 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the Supreme Court had upheld the constitutional validity of the Securitisation Act in Mardia Chemicals, certain points of challenge were not before the Supreme Court. It was contended that though the entire Act was challenged, the Supreme Court referred to certain aspects which were not answered. (B) The contention was rejected by the Division Bench inter-alia in paragraphs 22 to 25 of the judgment which we have set out earlier. The Division Bench held that once the Apex Court had decided the validity of the Securitisation Act in Manila's case, it was not open to the High Court to consider the validity of the Securitisation Act once again. (C) We are bound by the judgment of the Division Bench. The contention must be rejected on this ground alone. 21. To sum up, this attempt of the petitioner to evade recovery of dues by action under the Securitisation Act must, therefore, fail, since the contentions raised have absolutely no force. The petition is, therefore, dismissed.
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2007 (9) TMI 696 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ntioned as 30-12-1979 in the question) having been set aside, the order of CIT(A) revived automatically, with the result the Assessing Officer had jurisdiction to pass fresh assessment order in pursuance thereof. The only point which could be urged by Sri R.R. Agrawal, Advocate is that the matter be restored back to the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) to decide the appeal preferred by the assessee against fresh assessment order, on merits, i.e., on other points, if any, available to the assessee. 12. The said contention has got substance and the Tribunal, while passing the order in pursuance of this judgment, shall take into account the afore-stated contention of the assessee. 13. Viewed as above, we find that the Tribunal was not justified in upholding the order of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals), Agra whereby he annulled the fresh assessment order dated 29-5-1980. 14. We answer the question in negative, i.e., in favour of the revenue and against the assessee.
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2007 (9) TMI 695 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ion the correctness of a policy decision. But then this does not mean that the Courts have to abdicate their right to scrutinize whether the policy in question is formulated keeping in mind all the relevant facts and the said policy can be held to be beyond the pale of discrimination or unreasonableness, bearing in mind the material on record. It is with this limited object if we scrutinise the policy reflected in the letter dated 23.10.1992. 18. Indeed in the said decision, the Apex Court has ruled that ordinarily, the Court should not interfere where the decision of the authority is in respect of a policy matter, unless it is shown that it is beyond the pale of discrimination or unreasonable. Having recorded a finding that the said two conditions cannot be said to be discriminatory or unreasonable, I am of the view that the question of interfering with the notification issued by the 2nd respondent or altering the conditions thereof is permissible. Petition stands rejected.
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2007 (9) TMI 694 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... should be sent by special messenger or by Regd. Post only. 3. to incorporate in the body of resolution, the names of members who have attended the meeting of Managing Committee. If the DE nominee has not attended the meeting, a certificate should be recorded therein that notice of meeting of Managing Committee was sent on (Date) by Regd. Post or by special messenger. 4. Resolution should not be passed by circulation among the members. 22. The manner in which the meeting of the Managing Committee should be called for is a matter governed by the internal rules of the school. The said departmental instructions does not state that any deviation therefrom would result in the Resolution passed by the Managing Committee by circulation, if rendered nullity, the same must be held to be directory. 23. The Division Bench of the High Court committed a serious error in passing the impugned judgment, which cannot be sustained and is set aside accordingly. The appeal is allowed. No costs.
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2007 (9) TMI 693 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e public policy of England bearing in mind that the paramount public policy is that freedom of contract is not lightly to be inferred with. 17. Whatever has been mentioned by Russell in this paragraph is equally true for Indian Arbitrators. 18. Arbitration is a mechanism or a method of resolution of disputes that unlike court takes place in private, pursuant to agreement between the parties. The parties agree to be bound by the decision rendered by a chosen arbitrator after giving hearing. The endeavour of the court should be to honour and support the award as far as possible. 19. We have perused the award and the judgment of the learned Single Judge by which the award has been made the rule of the Court and the impugned judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court. In our considered view, no interference is called for. The appeal being devoid of any merit is accordingly dismissed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we direct the parties to bear their own costs.
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2007 (9) TMI 692 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rect in law in holding that in the absence of any specific finding that any particular expenditure was incurred by the assessee in relation to exempted dividend income, no artificial disallowance can be made invoking Section 14A of the Act? 2. The tax effect in this case is very minimal, 3. No substantial question of law arises. Dismissed.
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2007 (9) TMI 691 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rpose it can be challenged whenever and wherever it is produced. The decision of the Supreme Court in Kiran Singh and Ors. v. Chaman Paswan and Ors. 1955 1SCR117 is clear on that point. In an innumerable decisions the Supreme Court and other High Courts have followed the above case and I need not refer to all the cases. 16. Once mistake of this kind is pointed out, this Court would have no hesitation to recall that order. Therefore, it is not on the premise that the Court is reviewing the order and those principles are to be applied but on the ground that necessary parties were not heard and it was imperative to hear them and on this precedent the Court is exercising its jurisdiction. Such a jurisdiction is independent of Section 362 of CrPC. 17. Consequently, the order dated 18.11.2006 is recalled. The effect would be that the petition, namely, Crl. M.C. No. 2581/2004 would be heard afresh after hearing the applicant and the applicant is to be impleaded as respondent No. 2.
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2007 (9) TMI 690 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Maintainability of Writ Petition - Doctrine of "forum conveniens" - Territorial limits of jurisdiction - cause of action, arises - Whether the writ Petition challenging the order of the Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal (DRAT) which is situate within the territorial limits of this Court, while the original Tribunal is situate in another State is maintainable - notice to the petitioner u/s 13 (2) of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 ("sarfaesi Act") r/w Rule 3 of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002 -
HELD THAT:- The Division Bench in Bhanu Constructions case [2000 (11) TMI 1141 - SUPREME COURT] held that the High Court would have no power of superintendence, if as a result of intervention under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, an order of a tribunal over which the High Court has no power of superintendence, is subject to scrutiny and that then the High court would refuse to entertain the request since it would amount to interfering and usurping the power of the other High court, and that, in that case the seat of authority must be deemed to be in hyderabad. This is really contrary to the judgment in Kusum Ingots case [2004 (4) TMI 342 - SUPREME COURT].
Even in Bhanu Constructions case, the Division Bench has held that after the 15th amendment of the Constitution introducing Article 226 (2) of the Constitution of India, the legal position is that a Writ can be issued by a high Court within whose jurisdiction the cause of action wholly or in part arises irrespective of the seat of authority. Therefore, even assuming that by a fiction, the seat of Appellate Authority in this case should be deemed to be in Hyderabad logically, that alone is not the criterion and the High Court within whose jurisdiction, cause of action, arises can definitely issue a Writ. In this case, the order of the Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal by which the petitioner is aggrieved is most certainly "a cause of action".
The decision in Bhanu Constructions Pvt. Ltd. "s case as regards maintainability is not correct. The order of reference is answered accordingly. The connected Miscellaneous Petitions are closed
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2007 (9) TMI 689 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... ORDER Delay condoned. The appeal is dismissed.
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2007 (9) TMI 688 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... siness. These findings were relevant if not conclusively binding. In utterly ignoring them the competent authority and the tribunal fell into error. 30. The facts of this case show how drastic laws like SAFEMA can be used to badger individuals, often weak in comparison with the might of the State. Three decades have passed by; Shiv Shankar and his wife expired. Yet the stigma cast by the impugned order has visited their heirs. This is an oft recurring situation, so evocatively described by James Jeffrey Roche, in 'The Net of law' The net of law is spread so wide, No sinner from its sweep may hide. Its meshes are so fine and strong. They take in every child of wrong O wondrous web of mystery Big fish alone escape from thee Quoted by the Supreme Court in Tekchand v. Competent Authority 1993 (201) ITR 658 (SC) 31. In view of the above conclusions, the petition is entitled to succeed. The impugned order is accordingly quashed. Rule made absolute in these terms. No costs.
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2007 (9) TMI 687 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... held that pension is not a bounty and it is a deferred salary. This Court is not concerned herein with such a situation. In the said decision, this Court was concerned with a case where an employee retiring on a particular date was to receive 50 of the pension on the enhanced salary. In the fact situation obtaining therein that as the revision of pay and consequent revision in pension had come into force and by reason of a notification, the modality of computing the pension was required to be determined, those who had fulfilled the conditions laid down therein were held to be entitled to the benefits provided for thereunder holding that the concerned employees had a vested right therein. 21. For the reasons aforementioned, we regret to express our inability to agree with the view of the High Court. The impugned order of the High Court is, therefore, set aside. The appeals are allowed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, however, there shall be no orders as to costs.
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2007 (9) TMI 686 - SUPREME COURT
Remand in police custody - Application of Sub-section (2) of Section 173 of the CrPC vis-`-vis Sub-section (2) of Section 309 - Application for statutory bail u/s 167 (2) of the Code filled on expiry of 60 days from the date of arrest - further investigation was pending - Right of the appellant under Sub-section (2) of Section 167 of the Code - HELD THAT:- Concededly, the investigating agency is required to complete investigation within a reasonable time. The ideal period therefor would be 24 hours, but, in some cases, it may not be practically possible to do so. The Parliament, therefore, thought it fit that remand of the accused can be sought for in the event investigation is not completed within 60 or 90 days, as the case may be. But, if the same is not done with the stipulated period, the same would not be detrimental to the accused and, thus, he, on the expiry thereof would be entitled to apply for bail, subject to fulfilling the conditions prescribed therefor.
Such a right of bail although is a valuable right but the same is a conditional one; the condition precedent being pendency of the investigation.
It is a well-settled principle of interpretation of statute that it is to be read in its entirety. Construction of a statute should be made in a manner so as to give effect to all the provisions thereof. Remand of an accused is contemplated by the Parliament at two stages; pre-cognizance and post cognizance. Even in the same case depending upon the nature of charge sheet filed by the investigating officer in terms of Section 173 of the Code, a cognizance may be taken as against the person against whom an offence is said to have been made out and against whom no such offence has been made out even when investigation is pending. So long a charge sheet is not filed within the meaning of Sub-section (2) of Section 173 of the Code, investigation remains pending. It, however, does not preclude an investigating officer, as noticed hereinbefore, to carry on further investigation despite filing of a police report, in terms of Sub-section (8) of Section 173 of the Code.
The statutory scheme does not lead to a conclusion in regard to an investigation leading to filing of final form under Sub-section (2) of Section 173 and further investigation contemplated under Sub-section (8) thereof. Whereas only when a charge sheet is not filed and investigation is kept pending, benefit of proviso appended to Sub-section (2) of Section 167 of the Code would be available to an offender; once, however, a charge sheet is filed, the said right ceases. Such a right does not revive only because a further investigation remains pending within the meaning of Sub-section (8) of Section 173 of the Code.
The High Court, in our opinion, is correct in its finding that, in the fact situation obtaining, the appellant had no statutory right to be released on bail.
We do not, thus, find any infirmity in the judgment of the High Court. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.
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2007 (9) TMI 685 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of the following substantial questions of law “(A) Whether in the facts and under the circumstances of the case, the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal was right in law in holding that the appellant is liable to pay interest tax on the interest earned by it? Issue notice to the other side. Paper Book be filed within three months. List the appeal for final hearing after three months.
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2007 (9) TMI 684 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ntion of the petitioner. It is not know as to why the summons in respect of another case/region have been withdrawn. On being asked, Mr. Das, learned counsel appearing for the respondents, submits that there is no instruction to him regarding withdrawal of the impugned summons. Thus, the plea of the petitioner and that too, in absence of any finding of this Court that the impugned summons are wholly without any jurisdiction and/or has been issued malafide and/or arbitrary exercise of power and/or in violation of any statutory provisions, cannot be interferred with. For all the aforesaid reasons, I am of the considered opinion that it is not a fit case for exercising writ jurisdiction so as to thwart the very process of investigation sought to be carried out by the respondents as per the provisions of the aforesaid Act for which the impugned summons and the letters have been issued. Writ petition is dismissed. Interim order stands vacated. There shall be no order as to costs.
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2007 (9) TMI 683 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... es concerned may have moved out or closed down their business appears plausible. The mechanical approach of the Assessing Officer to the issues at hand was not justified in the facts of the case. 6. We also find merit in the submission of learned counsel for the assessee that at best the Assessing Officer could have added back the amount disallowed as deduction towards fabrication charges to the business profits and not treated it as income from other sources. It appears correct that had the amount been added to the business profits, the assessee may have been able to get the corresponding benefit of section 80HHC of the Act. On the other hand, by treating the amount as income from other sources, the Assessing Officer proceeded on the premise that the amount had been siphoned off by the assessee, for which conclusion there was clearly no material on record. 7. We do not find any error having been committed by the Tribunal. No substantial question of law arises. 8. Dismissed.
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