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2007 (9) TMI 642 - DELHI HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... ibunal that there is no capital gains arising from such a transaction since the value of the property in the hands of the assessee was not indicated anywhere in the agreement. We are of the view that even if the agreement did not spell out the value of the property in the hands of the assessee, the valuation of the property in question indicated by the assessee itself in its accounts should be sufficient for the purposes of computation of capital gains tax. 20. In that view of the matter, the impugned order of the Tribunal to the extent it holds that there was no transfer of the assessee’s share in the property in question from the assessee to the Builders pursuant to the agreement dated 6-11-1979 is erroneous. Consequently, both questions referred to us are answered in the negative, that is, in favour of the revenue and against the assessee. The computation by the ITO of the capital gains tax, concurred with by the CIT(A) is affirmed. 21. The reference is disposed of.
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2007 (9) TMI 641 - SUPREME COURT
Murder - High Court reversed the Order of Conviction passed by the learned trial Court - Offences punishable u/s 302 r/w Section 34 and Section 201 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 ('the Act') - HELD THAT:- The time of lodging the FIR was found to be suspicious by the High Court in view of several contradictory statements made by PW-l. The investigating officer also admitted in his cross examination that the seals of the two containers in which blood stained earth and samples had been kept were found to be tampered with.
The investigating officer had admitted that he had recorded the statement of Chhotey Lal (PW-4) on 31.8.1978 as this witness was not available earlier. The case diary interestingly was not produced during trial by the investigating officer. The High Court found that in the absence of any definite material to prove that the dead body was that of the deceased, the prosecution version was rendered to that extent, doubtful. Since PW-4 resiled from his statement made earlier, the High Court examined the evidence of PW-l in detail.
So far as Paramjeet (PW-7) is concerned, his evidence was also found to be not reliable because he appeared to have been tutored. He was aged about 7-8 years when he gave the statement on 11.7.1980. The incident had occurred on 24.08.1978, i.e. nearly two years before his deposition. That means that he was about 5-6 years old at the time of incident. The High Court, with reference to his evidence found that the testimony he gave in court was the result of tutoring. In these circumstances, the High Court concluded that the prosecution has failed to establish the accusation.
Though learned counsel for the State submitted that the circumstances highlighted by the prosecution were sufficient to record conviction, we find that the High Court has examined all the relevant aspects in detail and has recorded the judgment of acquittal.
There is no embargo on the appellate Court reviewing the evidence upon which an order of acquittal is based. Generally, the order of acquittal shall not be interfered with because the presumption of innocence of the accused is further strengthened by acquittal. The golden thread which runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted.
The principle to be followed by appellate Court considering the appeal against the judgment of acquittal is to interfere only when there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. If the impugned judgment is clearly unreasonable and relevant and convincing materials have been unjustifiably eliminated in the process, it is a compelling reason for interference. These aspects were highlighted by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade and Anr. v. State of Maharashtra [1973 (8) TMI 160 - SUPREME COURT], Jaswant Singh v. State of Haryana [2000 (4) TMI 825 - SUPREME COURT].
In the instant case, we find that the reasons indicated by the High Court for recording the order of acquittal do not suffer from any infirmity to warrant interference. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.
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2007 (9) TMI 640 - CESTAT NEW DELHI
... ... ... ... ..... gistration numbers of the vehicle. On enquiries made with various registration authorities, it was reported that the registration numbers were not of trucks but were of vehicles like mopeds, scooters etc., which were incapable of carrying huge material. Many truck owners denied having transported the goods on behalf of the party or having ever dealt with them. 7. The evidence collected during the proceedings showed that the goods were never physically transported to the assessee. The transactions are proved to have been mere paper transactions and no modvatable credit could be availed on the basis of such fraudulent evidence. The authorities below were, therefore, fully justified in ordering recovery of the modvat credit and imposing penalty on both the appellants. There is absolutely no warrant for interference with the impugned order, on any of the contentions raised in the memorandum of appeals. Both the appeals are, therefore, dismissed. Order dictated in the open Court.
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2007 (9) TMI 639 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... has passed the original assessment order under Section 143(1) on 31.3.1979 and the record indicates that 31/2 years prior there to i.e., Superintendent of Police's letter dated 25.9.1975, the I.T.O. had the necessary information and had accepted the explanation as well as taking statements of the assessee on oath, the Revenue has failed to explain why the Income Tax Officer had to wait till after he passed the original order of assessment, to issue the notice under Section 147(a) of the Act. Therefore, we answer the question framed in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue and hold that in the facts and circumstances of the case the initiation of the proceeding under Section 147(a) of the Act was invalid and therefore we quash the order passed by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal and affirm the order passed by the First Appellate Authority. 20. The S.J.C. is allowed in terms of the answer to the question of law framed hereinabove. A.K. GANGULY, C.J. 21. I agree.
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2007 (9) TMI 638 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... relied on the case of M.V.Sonvala V/s. Commissioner of Income Tax reported in 177 I.T.R. 246 and found that considering the aforesaid Judgment, the question of law would not arise. 2. Considering that the question of law has been dealt by the order of this Court in Income Tax Appeal No.416 of 2004, the question of law would not arise and consequently the appeal is dismissed.
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2007 (9) TMI 637 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... he case of The Commissioner of Income-Tax V/s. M/s.Shapoorji & Co. which has been dismissed by this Court on the ground that no substantial question of law arise relying on the Judgment of this Court in the case of M.V.Sonvala V/s. Commissioner of Income Tax reported in 177 I.T.R. 246. Considering the above, in our opinion, no substantial question of law as framed will arise. Consequently, appeal is dismissed.
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2007 (9) TMI 636 - DELHI HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... ourt in Commissioner of Income-Tax Vs. Ram Commercial Enterprises Ltd., 2000 246 ITR 568, the Assessing Officer had not recorded his satisfaction for initiating penalty proceedings under Section 271(1)(c) of the Act. Without going into the question of the applicability of the decision of this Court in Ram Commercial Enterprises Ltd., we find that on merits, the concurrent view taken by the CIT (A) as well as the Tribunal is unexceptionable. Both the authorities have found that no case of either concealment of income or furnishing of inaccurate particulars by the ? Assessee had been made out by the Assessing Officer. We too find that the issues involved in the assessment were debateable and even if the Assessee was not entitled to claim a deduction under Section 80 HHB of the Act it does not necessarily mean that the Assessee had concealed its income with a view to gain any unforeseeable benefit. We find no merits in the case. No substantial question of law arises. Dismissed.
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2007 (9) TMI 635 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... e-cum- sale agreement with the BDA was executed on 28.02.1981 contrary to the judgement of this Court in 218 ITR 1?” 3. We have carefully examined th ectrcted portion of the decision of the Supreme Court , Punjab and Haryana High Court Andhra Pradesh High Court and this court in the cases referred to supra and also the provision c;lause (v) to Section 2(47) of the Income Tax Act, which provision came into force with effect from 1.04.1998. According to us, the decision rendered by the KAT applying the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in the cases in Poddar Cement and the Mysore Minerals, is rightly applied to the fact situation of the case on hand and decided the case of the assessee in her favour. Therefore we are of the view that the question of law would arise in this appeal and also we do not find any good reason to interfere with the impugned judtgement of the tribunal, therefore, the appeal must fail. 4. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed, but without costs.
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2007 (9) TMI 634 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT, JAIPUR
... ... ... ... ..... he completeness of the books of accounts which is also not the finding. In the absence of any such finding/satisfaction the AO could not have invoked jurisdiction to reject the books of accounts and resort to best judgment assessment. The answer being obvious from the perusal of the provision along with order of AO the Tribunal was justified in holding that no referable question of law arises from its order. The said order in our opinion is not erroneous. 10. So far as the question Nos. 4 and 5 are concerned which relate to the acceptance of the results of the books of accounts by the Tribunal it is also a finding of fact and does not call for reference as a question of law. It is not necessary that in all cases where the books of accounts are not found to be incorrect or irregular still some addition had to be made. Accordingly, on that count also no error is found in the order of Tribunal. As a result, the application under s. 256(2) fails and is hereby rejected. No costs.
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2007 (9) TMI 633 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... er clothes were torn nor there was any presence of hair of the accused on the private part of the prosecutrix. The doctor after examining the prosecutrix deposed that the girl was habituated to sexual intercourse. In view of this evidence, we are of the opinion that the High Court as well as the Trial Court has not correctly appreciated the evidence and has wrongly convicted the accused-appellant. The accused who has been charged under Section 376 read with Section 511 IPC is entitled to benefit of doubt. In the facts and circumstances of the case. we give the benefit of doubt to the appellant-accused as of the charges framed against him are not proved beyond reasonable doubt. Consequently, we allow this appeal, set aside the judgment and order of the High Court as well as of the Trial Court and acquit the accused of the charges levelled against him. This appeal is accordingly allowed. If the accused is in jail, he may be released forthwith if not required in any other case.
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2007 (9) TMI 632 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... ly affirmed by the Tribunal. The financial capacity of the NRI Shri Natha Singh has been found to be so inadequate that the claim made by the appellant-assessee could not at all be supported. It has been found that his monthly income in the country like Hong Kong was about ₹ 8 lakhs per annum. In the teeth of this, firm finding concerning the financial capacity of the creditor and the appellant-assessee, it is not possible to hold that the money transaction claimed to have emanated from the NRI Shri Natha Singh, friend of the assessee-appellant, had actually come from him. Therefore, we find that the appeal does not warrant admission as pure findings of fact have been recorded. Even the questions of law which have been claimed by the assessee-appellant proceed on presumption of facts which are contrary to the well based findings recorded in one tone by the Assessing Officer and the Tribunal. 7. For the reasons aforementioned this appeal fails and the same is dismissed.
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2007 (9) TMI 631 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Expenditure on the annual bonus - Whether ITAT was correct on the facts and in the law in holding the expenditure being the annual bonus paid to the dealers is not in the nature of "Sales Promotion" expenses and the provisions of section 37(3A) of the Income-tax Act are not applicable? - HELD THA:- The admitted position is that in view of the decision of this Court in CIT v. High Blyma Labs (P.) Ltd., the question of law is required to be answered in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the revenue.
Thus, the reference is disposed of accordingly.
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2007 (9) TMI 630 - DELHI HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... orrect because the assessee had deposited two cheques of ₹ 4 lakhs and ₹ 3.4 lakhs during the survey proceedings. The Tribunal concluded on these facts that the assessee was not avoiding its liability and had co-operated with the revenue in the payment of tax. It also held that the assessee had not been correctly advised by its chartered accountant in regard to its liability. 6. We may note that section 273B of the Act does not make a levy of penalty under section 271C of the Act mandatory. The assessee would not be liable to penalty if he is able to prove that there was a reasonable cause for failing to deduct the tax. The assessee in the present case had given an explanation which found favour with the Tribunal. We think that the view taken by the Tribunal is one that could have possibly been taken in the matter. It is not perverse as to warrant interference or which gives rise to a substantial question of law. 7. There is no merit in this appeal. 8. Dismissed.
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2007 (9) TMI 629 - ITAT DELHI
Deduction u/s 10A - Interest income derived from the industrial undertaking - HELD THAT:- Similar issue had arisen for consideration in assessee's own case for the assessment year 1999-2000 and this Tribunal in I.T. Appeal and held that interest income cannot be considered as part of the profits and gains derived from the business of export of computer software. This Tribunal has referred to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. Sterling Foods [1999 (4) TMI 1 - SUPREME COURT] and ultimately concluded that interest income cannot form part of the income eligible for deduction u/s 10-A of the Act. Thus, first ground of appeal of the assessee, is dismissed.
Expenditure incurred for earning dividend income - exempt u/s 10(33) - invoking the provisions of section 14A - HELD THAT:- In the present case, we find that no attempt has been made by the assessing officer to establish the expenses, which were incurred in earning the tax-free income. We may also add here that the decision of the Third Member in the case of Wimco Seedings Ltd. vs. DCIT [2006 (12) TMI 65 - ITAT, DELHI] in the absence of any decision of the Special Bench in Maruti Udyog Ltd. [2004 (10) TMI 278 - ITAT DELHI-A] to the contrary has a binding force as that of a Special Bench as laid down by the Special Bench of the Tribunal in the case of DCIT vs. Padam Prakash,[2006 (9) TMI 222 - ITAT DELHI-E]. Thus, we uphold the order of the CIT (Appeals) and dismiss the first ground of appeal of the Revenue.
Addition on account of common expenses - HELD THAT:- Similar disallowance was made by the assessing officer and the Tribunal had an occasion to deal with the same and in I.T. Appeal for assessment year 1999-2000, The Tribunal deleted the similar addition made by the assessing officer. The Tribunal found that there were no common expenses attributable to the software unit, which were incurred or met by the head office and consequently no disallowance of expenses could be made in the head office account. In the present assessment year the assessing officer has merely followed the order in assessment year 1999-2000. The facts and circumstances being identical, we are of the view that the CIT (Appeals) was justified in deleting the addition made by the assessing officer. Consequently, ground No. 2 raised by the Revenue, is dismissed.
Addition on account of notice pay - HELD THAT:- It is not in dispute that in AY 1999-2000 in this issue had come up for consideration before this Tribunal and the Tribunal held that the notice period pay was debited to the software division and when it was recovered, the same has to be considered as income derived by the industrial undertaking. The Tribunal held that such notice period pay would go to reduce the expenses on account of salary and this real nature of the transaction will not have any effect on the income derived by the assessee from the business of computer software. Respectfully following the aforesaid decision of the Tribunal, we uphold the order of the CIT (Appeals) and dismiss the third ground of appeal of the Revenue.
In the result, both the appeals by the assessee and the Revenue, are dismissed.
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2007 (9) TMI 628 - SUPREME COURT
Application of the provisions of Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 ("the Act") - Sanction granted by the competent authority was defective and illegal - Public Servant - alleged commission of an offence under Sections 7, 13(1)(d) read with 13(2) of the Act - High Court reversed the order of Conviction opining that the order of sanction being illegal - HELD THAT:- We have noticed that the sanctioning authority had purported to pass the order of sanction solely on the basis of the report made by the Inspector General of Police. Even the said report has not been brought on record. Thus, whether in the said report, either in the body thereof or by annexing therewith the relevant documents, IG Police had placed on record the materials collected on investigation of the matter which would prima facie establish existence of evidence in regard to the commission of the offence by the public servant concerned is not evident.
Ordinarily, before passing an order of sanction, the entire records containing the materials collected against the accused should be placed before the sanctioning authority. In the event, the order of sanction does not indicate application of mind as the materials placed before the said authority before the order of sanction was passed, the same may be produced before the court to show that such materials had in fact been produced.
In this case, the High Court called for the original records. It had gone thereinto. It was found that except the report, no other record was made available before the sanctioning authority. The order of sanction also stated so. PW-8 also did not have the occasion to consider the records except the purported report.
We are, therefore, of the opinion that the impugned judgment does not suffer from any legal infirmity although some observations made by the High Court, as noticed, do not lay down the correct legal position. The appeal is dismissed.
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2007 (9) TMI 627 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... hould be treated as "capital asset". A reading of the Tribunal order and applying the law laid down by the Supreme Court in 77 ITR 253 referred supra shows that factually the assessee had been dealing with the shares as an "investment". Being an investment company it is not uncommon for a person like that of an assessee to have a back up of an investment as capital in its business. No material has been placed before this Court to question the correctness of the Tribunal's finding of fact on the admitted facts that the assessee was holding that investments as a capital asset and that in the absence of any finding as to the intention of the assessee to carry on business in shares as a trading activity, we do not find any justification in the contention of the revenue. Considering the material placed before this Court, we do not find any justification to disturb the finding arrived at by the Tribunal and in these circumstances, the appeals are dismissed.
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2007 (9) TMI 626 - PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... the present time and would not be contingent liability. 10. Similarly, second question is also decided against the revenue by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of CIT v. Indo Nippon Chemicals Co. Ltd. 2003 261 ITR 275. In the aforementioned case, upholding the view of the High Court, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that merely because the modvat credit was an irreversible credit available to manufacturers upon purchase of duty-paid raw material, that would not amount to income which was liable to be taxed under the Act and the income was not generated to the extent of the modvat credit on unconsumed raw material. It was further held that the Assessing Officer was not right to adopt the ‘gross method’ for valuation of raw materials at the time of purchase and the ‘net method’ for valuation of stock on hand. 11. In view of above discussion, the questions referred to above are answered against the revenue and in favour of the assessee.
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2007 (9) TMI 625 - DELHI HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... Officer had failed to bring any other material on record and accordingly held that the initiation of penalty proceedings was not warranted in law. 5. The view taken by the CIT(A) was upheld by the Tribunal which noted that apart from the fact that the assessee had surrendered the income there was no additional adverse material brought on record by the Assessing Officer. 6. Apart from the fact that the two authorities have taken a concurrent view which should not be lightly interfered with, we are satisfied that no error has been committed by the CIT(A) or by the Tribunal. The assessee had surrendered the income at the first instance. The Assessing Officer had failed to bring on record any other material to show that the conduct of the assessee was such that it warranted penalty proceedings being initiated against him. We find no error in the view taken by the CIT(A) as well as by the Tribunal. There is no merit in the appeal. No substantial question of law arises. Dismissed.
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2007 (9) TMI 624 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Authority to reduce penalty - discretion is vested in the authority to impose lesser penalty u/s 76 after considering section 80
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2007 (9) TMI 623 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Deduction u/s 80O, 80-IA and 80-HHE - gross income - disallowance u/s 37 - ‘provision of warranty’ based on management estimation - deduction as it had accrued on the date of sale - Contingent Liability - Mercantile System of Accounting - concessional taxes - total turnover - HELD THAT:- The important aspects notified in the Notification issued by the Central Government u/s 145(1)(2) of the I.T. Act are read along with Section 209(1) clauses (q-d) of sub-section (3) of the Companies Act and the accounting standard Notification regarding procedure to be followed for maintaining Accounts of a company issued by the Central Government in the year 1979 wherein it is stated “accrual” extracted in the said Notification. It mandates the assesses to maintain mercantile systems of accounting. Therefore the phrase ‘accrual’ occurred in the notification has got importance to interpret the phrase “laid down” occurred in section 37(1) of the I.T. Act.
Accordingly, we answer the said substantial questions of law Nos. 14, 9, 12 and 13 framed in these Appeals in favour of the assesses against the Revenue.
The assesses who were aggrieved of the assessment orders passed by the Assessing Authorities, whose orders are confirmed by the Appellate Authority have questioned the same before the ITAT in disallowing the special benefits claimed by them u/s 80A, 80IA and 80HHE of the I.T. Act for the respective assessment years mentioned in their returns by disallowing certain mounts and giving certain benefits which were the subject matter of appeals before the appellate Tribunal.
The Appellate Tribunal accepting the case of the assesses has set aside that portion of the assessment orders under the aforesaid provisions of the Act by accepting the grounds urged in the appeal and placing strong reliance upon the decision of the Calcutta High Court in M.N. Dastur’s [1997 (1) TMI 118 - ITAT BANGALORE]. No doubt, it has referred to in the impugned judgment the judgments of various other High Court in justification of its findings. aggrieved by the said impugned judgments of the Appellate Tribunal, the revenue filed these appeals before this Court framing certain substantial questions of law which are extracted above in this judgment and in support of the same has urged various legal grounds and requested this Court to answer the said substantial of law in favour of the revenue.
In our considered view having regard to the finding of fact recorded by the Assessing Authority in its order, whose findings are referred to supra by us have been rightly concurred with by the First Appellate Authority with valid reasons. The said concurrent findings of fact recorded by the First Appellate Authority on the Claim of the assessee for deduction in respect of the various items referred to supra has been allowed by the Appellate Tribunal on erroneous assumption of facts and material produced by the assessee which is not only contrary to the relevant statutory provisions of the I.T Act referred to supra but also the law laid down by the Supreme court and various other High Courts in the decisions referred to in the First appellate Authority’s order, wherein it has held that expenditures made by the assessee to do its business and therefore, that amount will be the capital receipt, but not revenue expenditure erroneously held by the Tribunal.
In our view, the said finding of fact of the Tribunal recorded on contentious point is not only erroneous but also suffers from error in law and therefore the same is liable to the set aside. Therefore, the deductions allowed by the tribunal in the impugned judgment in respect of those items from the gross income turnover of the assessee is totally impermissible in law.
The learned counsel appearing on behalf of M/s. K.R. Prasad for the assesssee has placed reliance upon the Circular and also the decision of the Apex court in the case of Cloth Traders Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Addl. CIT [1979 (5) TMI 2 - SUPREME COURT] in support of the concessional taxes u/s 80-O of the I.T. Act, the said decision is overruled by the Apex court in its later judgment in the case of Distributors (Baroda) P.Ltd. Vs. Union of India & Ors.[1985 (7) TMI 1 - SUPREME COURT] upon which strong reliance is placed by the learned counsel on behalf of the Revenue in support of his submission to answer the substantial question No. 6 in its favour.
Accordingly for the forgoing reasons, the appeals filed by the revenue framing the aforesaid substantial question of law Nos. 15, 16, 10, 13, 14 and 6 framed in these Appeals are answered against the assesses and in favour of the Revenue.
The appeal of the revenue in so far as the payment claimed by the assessee for deduction from their income under the warranty provisions, the relief is granted in favour of the assessees. Hence, the appeal of the revenue in this regard is dismissed.
Thus, we have answered all the substantial question of law regarding warranty in favour of the assessee and in respect of all other substantial questions of law regarding the benefit claimed by the assesses under the provisions of Sec. 80-O 80IA, Sec. 80HHE are answered in favour of the revenue by allowing the appeals partly as indicated above.
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