|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 851 Records
-
2010 (3) TMI 1265 - CESTAT DELHI
... ...
... ... ..... al authority. The learned advocate for the respondents has fairly conceded that the respondents had not challenged the findings in the proceedings of finalization of provisional assessment. Obviously, therefore, it was necessary for the Commissioner (Appeals) to consider this aspect before deciding the matter before him. The same having not been considered, the impugned order is liable to be set aside and the matter is remanded to the Commissioner (Appeals) to decide the same afresh in accordance with the provisions of law. Accordingly, on the limited ground, as stated above, the appeal is allowed, the impugned order is set aside and the matter is remanded to the Commissioner (Appeals) to decide the appeal in relation to the respondents herein afresh in accordance with the provisions of law. We make it clear that interference in the impugned order is relating only to the respondents herein and not other parties to the impugned order. The appeal accordingly stands disposed of.
-
2010 (3) TMI 1264 - SUPREME COURT
Allegations against the incumbent Chief Minister of the State of Sikkim - Misappropriating funds from the public exchequer - misused public office to amass assets disproportionate to his known sources of income - issuance of a writ of mandamus directing the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) to investigate against him - HELD THAT:- In the present petition, the petitioners have made a rather vague argument that the alleged acts of corruption on part of Shri Pawan Chamling amount to an infringement of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. We do not find any merit in this assertion because the guarantee of `equal protection before the law' or `equality before the law' is violated if there is an unreasonable discrimination between two or more individuals or between two or more classes of persons. Clearly the alleged acts of misappropriation from the public exchequer cannot be automatically equated with a violation of the guarantee of `equal protection before the law'.
Furthermore, we must emphasise the fact that the alleged acts can easily come within the ambit of statutory offences such as those of `possession of assets disproportionate to known sources of income' as well as `criminal misconduct' under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The onus of launching an investigation into such matters is clearly on the investigating agencies such as the State Police, Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) or the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) among others. It is not proper for this Court to give directions for initiating such an investigation under its writ jurisdiction.
Hence it is our conclusion that the petitioners' prayer cannot be granted. This Court cannot sit in judgment over whether investigations should be launched against politicians for alleged acts of corruption. The Supreme Court of India functions as a Constitutional Court as well as the highest appellate court in the country. If the Supreme Court gives direction for prosecution, it would cause serious prejudice to the accused, as the direction of this Court may have far reaching persuasive effect on the Court which may ultimately try the accused. It is always open to the petitioners to approach the investigative agencies directly with the incriminating materials and it is for the investigative agencies to decide on the further course of action. While we can appreciate the general claim that the efforts to uncover the alleged acts of corruption may be obstructed by entrenched interests, in this particular case the petitioners would be well advised to rely on the statutory remedies. It is only on the exhaustion of ordinary remedies that perhaps a proceeding can be brought before a writ court and in any case the High Court of Sikkim would be a far more appropriate forum for examining the allegations made in the present petition.
Hence, the writ petition is dismissed, however with no order as to costs.
-
2010 (3) TMI 1263 - ITAT DELHI
... ...
... ... ..... ing of the income of M/s R.T. Motors (P) Ltd. in the hands of the Assessee. Thus, the whole of the cross-objection has become infructuous. IT(SS)A No. 257/Del/2005-R.T. Motors (P) Ltd. IT(SS)A No. 270/Del/2005-Revenue's appeal in R.T. Motors (P) Ltd. CO. No. 138/Del/2007-R.T. Motors (P) Ltd. 15. It was the common case of both the parties that since Shri Kulwant Singh has accepted the assessment of the undisclosed income of the Assessee company in his hand, the assessment made in its case no longer survives. Therefore, all these appeals do not survive for determination and the same are disposed of accordingly. The undisclosed income in this case shall be taken as nil. 16. In the result IT(SS)A No. 255/Del/2005 is partly allowed; IT(SS)A No. 304/Del/2005 is dismissed; C.O. No. 100/Del/2007 is dismissed as infructuous; IT(SS)A No. 257/Del/2005 is dismissed as infructuous; IT(SS)A No. 270/Del/2005 is dismissed as infructuous; C.O. No. 138/Del/2007 is dismissed as infructuous.
-
2010 (3) TMI 1262 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... reme Court 1376 is of no assistance to the respondent and is distinguishable on facts of the present case. 32. For the reasons stated hereinabove, the impugned order dated 18th October 2008; the impugned 173 demand notices dated 25th March 2005, being Exhibits "D" to the petition; the impugned order dated 5th of December 2006, being Exhibit "I" to the petition; 15 impugned demand notices dated 28-12-2006 being Exhibit "G" are hereby quashed and set aside. 33. The respondents are directed to refund ₹ 24,00,000/- and also ₹ 45,348/- paid by the petitioner under protest together with interest accrued thereon, if the said amounts are kept in fixed deposit, and if the said amounts are not kept in fixed deposit, said amounts be refunded to the petitioner along with simple interest at the rate of 8% per annum from the date of payment by the petitioner till the date of its refund. Writ petition is allowed in above terms. No order as to costs.
-
2010 (3) TMI 1261 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... 7.5 percent. As discussed earlier, Defendants have taken extreme stand of plea of forgery. By withdrawing H.M.G.O.P.No.433 of 1994, the 1st Defendant has committed breach of contract. In such circumstances, while ordering the refund of advance amount of ₹ 3,20,000/- with interest at the rate of 7.5 percent, Defendants 2 and 3 are to be held liable to pay costs to the Plaintiff throughout. 54. In the result, the judgment and decree dated 18.5.2005 made in O.S.No.632 of 2004 on the file of Additional District and Sessions Judge- Fast Track Court No.I, Coimbatore is set aside and the Appeal is partly allowed. It is held that Respondents/Defendants No.2 and 3 are liable to pay ₹ 3,20,000/- with interest at the rate of 7.5 percent per annum from the date of plaint till the date of realisation. In view of our reasonings in Paras (51) to (53), Respondents/Defendants No.2 and 3 are directed to pay costs throughout i.e., in the suit as well as this appeal to the Plaintiff.
-
2010 (3) TMI 1260 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... interference with acquittal is necessary to prevent miscarriage of justice. 13. However, on the question of sentence, it is not necessary to insist upon incarceration of the accused having regard to nature of offence. The accused is sentenced to undergo imprisonment till rising of the Court and to pay compensation in the sum of ₹ 1,55,000/-, the amount covered by cheque in question plus ₹ 10,000/- as cost for prosecuting the accused payable under Section 357(3) Cr.P.C. to the complainant, within two months from the date of this judgment. In default of payment of compensation, the accused shall undergo simple imprisonment for six months. The accused shall appear before the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, 23rd (Special Court under section 138 of the Act) at Nagpur and his surety shall produce him in trial Court within one month. The trial Court to execute the order. If compensation is not paid, it shall be recovered as fine. Appeal is allowed accordingly.
-
2010 (3) TMI 1259 - ITAT MUMBAI
... ...
... ... ..... material facts necessary for his assessment. Adverting to the facts of the instant case it is noted that the assessment u/s.143(3) was completed on 26.3.2003. From the reasons for reopening extracted above it is seen that there was no failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts qua the Modvat credit of ₹ 2.09 lakhs as the same was part of Tax Audit Report annexed to the Balance Sheet filed along with the return of income. The period of four years from the end of the relevant assessment year completed on 31.3.2005. From the instant assessment order u/s.143(3) r.w.s. 147 it is seen that the notice u/s.148 was issued on 30.3.2006. Such notice being beyond the period of four year was obviously time barred. We, therefore, hold that the assessment flowing out of such time barred notice cannot stand and is liable to be quashed. We order accordingly. 4. In the result, the appeal is allowed. Order pronounced on this 29th day of March 2010.
-
2010 (3) TMI 1258 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... work of law and the rules in question. A plain reading of above rule itself in my view shows that in such circumstances and in view of such order of conviction, the action so taken by the petitioner cannot be said to be in violation of rules and/or regulation and without authority. It is not acceptable that it is unreasoned order of termination. In my view all ingredients of the rules are available and the action so taken is within the framework, the record and the circumstances. Resultantly both the orders passed by learned Labour Court, as well as, by the Industrial Court, Kolhapur, are quashed and set aside. The application as filed by the respondent-original complainant is dismissed. 4. However, considering the facts and circumstances of the case, I am inclined to observe that the main complaint bearing (ULP) No. 172 of 2009 pending before the learned Labour Court, Kolhapur be heard expeditiously. 5. The petition is allowed in terms of prayer Clause (a) and (b). No costs.
-
2010 (3) TMI 1257 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... making a specific provision thereto under Section 3, where the Act itself provides some exemptions and provides for specific cases where the Act is not applicable. The fact that the West Bengal State legislature did not, even after insertion of sub-section 4A, amend or modify Rule 8 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Rules, 1999 which prescribes the manner of making applications under Section 17 for fixation of fair rent also fortifies the fact that the State legislature did not intend to incorporate sub-section 4A as an exception to sub-section (1) of Section 17. On the contrary, the non-amendment of Rule 8 goes on to show that the legislature intended the same procedure to be followed with regard to making an application under any provision of Section 17 for the fixation of fair rent. 23. Thus, in light of the discussion made above, we are of the considered opinion that this appeal is liable to be dismissed, which we hereby do. The parties are left to bear their own costs.
-
2010 (3) TMI 1256 - ITAT BANGALORE
... ...
... ... ..... ee to be offered to KPTCL in order to acquire a contract work. Therefore, it cannot be treated as an income from other sources and interest accrued on such fixed deposits has to be treated as business income only. Our view is also supported by the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of CIT v. Govinda Choudhury & Sons (1993) 203 ITR 881." 8.1.3. With respects, we would like to point out that the issue on hand is similar to that of the issue on which the Hon'ble High Court was pleased to observe that "interest accrued on such fixed deposits has to be treated as business income only". In conformity with the above finding of the Hon'ble Court, we direct the AO to treat the interest accrued on fixed deposits as business income only. It is ordered accordingly. 8.1.4. In a nut-shell, the impugned order of the Ld. CIT(A) is sustained. 9. In the result, the Revenue's appeal is dismissed. Pronounced in the open court on this 31st day of March, 2010.
-
2010 (3) TMI 1255 - SC ORDER
... ...
... ... ..... e granted. By consent, the matter is taken up for final hearing. The issue is squarely covered in favour of the Department vide our judgment in the case of M/s. Liberty India vs. C.I.T., Karnal, reported in 317 ITR 218. Accordingly, Civil Appeal stands allowed. No order as to costs.
-
2010 (3) TMI 1254 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... Sashi Agarwal, an empanelled auditor, is appointed for the purpose of valuing one share of the company as at March 31, 2003 and also as at March 31, 2009. The company will pay an initial ad-hoc amount of ₹ 25,000/- to the chartered accountant for the purpose of the chartered accountant travelling to the tea garden of the company in Assam, if necessary, and other incidental expenses. The parties agree that the petitioners before the Company Law Board proceedings will pay one-third of the chartered accountant's final bill and the company will bear the balance expenses. Let the four sets of matters appear on April 30, 2010. The valuer's report should be completed and copies thereof forwarded to Advocates representing the company and Advocates representing the petitioners in the Company Law Board proceedings by April 23, 2010. Urgent certified photocopies of this order, if applied for, be supplied to the parties subject to compliance with all requisite formalities.
-
2010 (3) TMI 1253 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... 7. 7. In this case, there is no prayer for cancellation of the sale deeds. The prayer is for a declaration that the deeds do not bind the “co-parcenery” and for joint possession. The plaintiff in the suit was not the executant of the sale deeds. Therefore, the court fee was computable under section 7(iv)(c) of the Act. The trial court and the High Court were therefore not justified in holding that the effect of the prayer was to seek cancellation of the sale deeds or that therefore court fee had to be paid on the sale consideration mentioned in the sale deeds. 8. We accordingly allow these appeals, set aside the orders of the trial court and the High Court directing payment of court fee on the sale consideration under the sale deeds dated 20.4.2001, 24.4.2001, 6.7.2001 and 27.9.2003 and direct the trial court to calculate the court fee in accordance with Section 7(iv)(c) read with Section 7(v) of the Act, as indicated above, with reference to the plaint averments.
-
2010 (3) TMI 1252 - ITAT BANGALORE
... ...
... ... ..... at M/s Bhuwania Brothers Pvt. Ltd. had enough resources to make an advance of ₹ 55 lakhs to the assessee company. 10. By going through the facts as stated in the above lines, we find that the explanations offered by the assssee are unbelievable, they are only self serving. The findings arrived at by the CIT(A) are unsustainable in law. We vacate the order of the CIT(A) on this point and restore the addition of ₹ 55 lakhs made by the assessing authority. 11. The next ground by the Revenue is regarding the relief granted by the CIT(A) in the matter of sale consideration relating to the properties sold by assessee. This issue is already decided in the cross appeal filed by the assessee. We have accepted the contention of the assessee in this regard. 12. Therefore, this ground raised by the Revenue fails. 13. In result, the appeal filed by the assessee is allowed and appeal filed by the Revenue is partly allowed. Order pronounced on Friday, the 5th day of March, 2010,
-
2010 (3) TMI 1250 - ITAT AHMEDABAD
... ...
... ... ..... of the Learned Commissioner of Income Tax(Appeals) to decide the appeal of the assessee afresh after allowing opportunity to the Learned Assessing Officer to make his submissions on the additional evidences filed before the Learned Commissioner of Income Tax(Appeals). The Learned Departmental Representative also agreed with the submissions made by the Learned Authorised Representative of the assessee. We therefore, set aside the order of the Learned Commissioner of Income Tax(Appeals) and remand the matter back to his file to re-adjudicate the appeal of the assessee after confronting the Learned Assessing Officer with all the additional evidences filed by the assessee before him within three months from the date of this order. Thus, the appeal of the Revenue is allowed for statistical purposes. 8. In the result, the appeal of the revenue is allowed for statistical purposes. Order pronounced in the Court at the close of the hearing in the presence of the parties on 29.03.2010.
-
2010 (3) TMI 1249 - ITAT HYDERABAD
... ...
... ... ..... not filing the appeal in time. The delay is condoned. The assessee raised common grounds in these COs, with reference to allowability of depreciation on intangible assets (good will) acquired during the course of amalgamation of Coastal Papers Ltd., during the financial year 2000-01. 8. We have heard both the parties on this issue. Similar issue was considered by the Tribunal in the assessee own case for the assessment year 2002-03 in ITA No.218/Hyd/2006 vide order dated 4.11.2009 wherein this issue was decided in favour of the assessee. The same view was followed for the assessment year 2003-04 in assessee’s own case in ITA No.811/Hyd/2007 vide order dated 4.11.2009. Respectfully following the above orders of the Tribunal, we allow the ground taken by the assessee in all its cross objections. 9. In the result, all the Revenue Appeals are partly allowed whereas all the cross objections filed by the assessee are allowed in full. Order Pronounced in the Court on 31.3.2010
-
2010 (3) TMI 1248 - ITAT DELHI
... ...
... ... ..... rovision of clause (d) of Section 43-B of the IT Act.” 3.9 We have heard both the counsels and perused the records. Both the counsels fairly agreed that since the above ground taken by the assessee before the CIT(A) has not been adjudicated by the ld. CIT(A, it will be appropriate that the issue is remitted to the files of the ld. CIT(A) to consider the issue and give a finding thereon. Accordingly, we remit this issue to the files of the ld. CIT(A) to consider the same and give a finding. Needless to add that the assessee should be given adequate opportunity of being heard. Hence, this appeal filed for the assessment year 2005-06 by the assessee is allowed for statistical purposes. 4. In the result, all the appeals filed by the revenue are dismissed and appeals filed by the assessee for the A.Y. 2002-03 and 2003-04 are dismissed and for the A.Y. 2005-06 is allowed for statistical purposes. Order pronounced in the open court on 09/03/2010 upon conclusion of the hearing.
-
2010 (3) TMI 1247 - SC ORDER
... ...
... ... ..... rcise of our jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution. Accordingly, the appeal, by special leave is dismissed, keeping the question of law open.
-
2010 (3) TMI 1246 - ITAT AHMEDABAD
... ...
... ... ..... to the trading goods exported, which has been set aside by the CIT(a), and therefore, no grievance can be raised at this stage and the assessee would be at liberty to advance its claim before the Assessing Officer in the fresh proceedings.” 24. In view of the above respectfully following the order of Tribunal we restore the matter to file of the A.O. to take a decision uniformly this year also. This ground is allowed for statistical purposes. 25. The last ground relates to charging of interest u/s. 234B & 234D. These are consequential in nature and has to be allowed as per the assessed income. Interest u/s. 234D is to be charged with effect from 1-6-2003 as this section had come into place with effect from this date. Accordingly the decision of the Ld. CIT(A) being in accordance with law, is confirmed. This ground is accordingly rejected. As a result appeal filed by the assessee is partly allowed for statistical purposes. Order pronounced in Open Court on 22-03-2010
-
2010 (3) TMI 1245 - ITAT DELHI
... ...
... ... ..... in the benefit of exemption under sec. 11 of the Act, the assessee is required to show that donations were voluntary. According to the Hon’ble High Court, the assessee had not only disclosed its donation but had also submitted a list of donors. The fact that the complete list of donors was not filed or, that the donors were not produced does not necessarily lead to the inference that the assessee was trying to introduce unaccounted money by way of donation receipts. This is more particularly so in the facts of the case where admittedly more than 75% of donations were applied for charitable purposes. On due consideration the judgment of Hon’ble High Court and the facts of the present case, we are of the view that it is squarely applicable on the facts of the present case. Therefore, we allow the appeal of assessee and delete the addition of ₹ 3,50,000. 4. In the result, the appeal of the assessee is allowed. Decision pronounced in the open court on 19.03.2010
........
|
