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Showing 141 to 160 of 1465 Records
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2016 (3) TMI 1333 - ITAT INDORE
Addition made u/s 14A - assessee has made investment of interest bearing funds in the partnership firm, profit of which was exempt - Held that:- As decided in assessee's own case it has to be necessarily held that once the appellant has earned substantial taxable income from investment in partnership firm and the Exempt Income earned being merely 3% of the substantial taxable income earned by the appellant at ₹ 52.84 lacs, the disallowance has to be made in the ratio of Exempt/Taxable income which comes to 1:30.85 and accordingly, disallowance made under rule 8D has to be proportionately reduced to 1,81,050/-. Therefore, the disallowance made at ₹ 57,52,608/- is hereby directed to be reduced to ₹ 1,81,050/- and appellant shall get consequential relief. We uphold the action of the CIT(A) in restricting the addition to the ratio of exempt income to taxable income. - Decided against revenue
Addition of office and general expenses - Held that:- AO has failed to bring out any instances of missing vouchers and the cash payments made by the assessee. The Ld. DR could not bring anything contrary to the finding of the ld. CIT(A). Hence, we uphold the action of the ld. CIT(A) in restricting the addition to ₹ 50,000/-. - Decided against revenue
Addition under the head “Repairs and Maintenance" - Held that:- We found that the reason given by the Assessing Officer for this disallowance was the missing vouchers and bills. The AO has not brought out any instances of any missing supporting vouchers. The Ld. DR could bring anything contrary to the finding of the ld. CIT(A). We uphold the action of the ld. CIT(A) in restricting the addition of ₹ 10,000/-.- Decided against revenue
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2016 (3) TMI 1332 - ITAT AMRITSAR
Unaccounted stock - assessee during survey proceedings had made a surrender of ₹ 2,40,00,000/- - Held that:- In the present case we find that there is no material with the department to make additions to the tune of ₹ 2,40,00,000/- whereas the material available was only for ₹ 1,94,28,618/-. The calculations made by learned CIT(A) to arrive at the turnover made by assessee and thus profits estimated by him are not based upon any material and are based upon only on surmises and conjectures - we see merits in the arguments of the learned AR that the additions sustained by learned CIT(A) are not based upon any material - decided in favour of assessee
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2016 (3) TMI 1331 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Validity of Complete and overall cap on the duty credit scrip - Incremental Export Incentivisation Scheme (IEIS) - misuse of the scheme - Held that:- The issue stands decided in the case of JSW STEEL LIMITED [2016 (1) TMI 957 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT], where it was held that The 2013 Notification places no cap or restriction on the value of the IEIS scrip - petition allowed - decided in favor of petitioner.
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2016 (3) TMI 1330 - CESTAT NEW DELHI
CENVAT Credit - inputs/capital goods - denial on the ground that drawing of wires from the input namely, “Wire Roads” is not amounting to manufacture - Held that:- It is an admitted fact that even though the activity undertaken by the appellant does not amount to manufacture, but the Central Excise duty paid on removal of “H.B. Wire” and “Binding Wire” has been accepted by the department and retained as Government dues.
Issue is no more res-integra and decided in the case of R.B. Steel Services and Ors. v. CCE, Rohtak [2015 (1) TMI 292 - CESTAT NEW DELHI], where it was held that Cenvat credit cannot be denied, which has been utilized towards payment of duty on the final products, even when the process does not amount to manufacture.
Credit allowed - appeal allowed - decided in favor of appellant.
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2016 (3) TMI 1329 - ITAT CHENNAI
Disallowance u/s 14A - expenditure attributable for earning exempt income - Held that:- We hereby direct the learned Assessing Officer to delete the addition made by the AO which was further sustained by the learned Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) on account of section 14A read with Rule 8D, subject to verification that all the investments are made by the assessee in its subsidiary/sister concerns and to the extent of investments the assessee has own funds in the form of reserves & surplus. See THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX VERSUS M/S. DATA SOFTWARE RESEACH COMPANY (INTERNATIONAL) PVT. LTD. AND VICE-VERSA [2016 (2) TMI 905 - ITAT CHENNAI] - decided in favour of assessee for statistical purposes.
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2016 (3) TMI 1328 - ITAT MUMBAI
Penalty proceedings u/s 271AAA - Addition of unexplained expenditure u/s 69C - Held that:- As decided in assessee's own case None of the sellers have been examined by the AO to strengthen his views that cash has been paid over and above the registered amount. There is not a single document/evidence of parties involved in the sale of land at different villages brought on record to show that an amount other than the payment of consideration has changed hands. No confession from the sellers have been brought on record.
There being no evidence to support the revenue’s case that use figure, whatever be its quantum, over and above the figure in the records and accounts changed hands between the parties, no addition could therefore be made under section 69C of the Act to the income of the assessee considering the entire facts brought on record, we have no hesitation to hold that even on merits no addition could be sustained - Decided in favour of assessee.
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2016 (3) TMI 1327 - COMPETITION APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, NEW DELHI
Anti-Competitive Activities - interpretation of statute - meaning of 'Turnover' appearing in Section 27(b) of the Competition Act, 2002 - imposition of penalty under Section 27(b) or its proviso.
Whether the term 'turnover' appearing in Section 27(b) of the Competition Act, 2002 and its proviso means the total turnover of any enterprise or association of enterprises or person or association of persons, who may have entered into any agreement in respect of production, supply, distribution, storage, acquisition or control of goods or provision of services in violation of Section 3 of the Act or of an enterprise or a group which may be found guilty of abuse of dominant position within the meaning of Section 4? - Held that:- One of the well-recognized rules of interpretation of statutes is the rule of contextual interpretation. This rule requires that the Court should examine every word of a statute in its context. In doing so, the Court has to keep in view preamble of the statute, other provisions thereof, pari materia statutes, if any, and the mischief intended to be remedied. Context often provides the key to the meaning of the word and the sense it carries. Its setting gives colour to it and provides a cue to the intention of the legislature in using it.
The term 'turnover' used in Section 27(b) and its proviso will necessarily relate to the goods, products or services qua which finding of violation of Section 3 and/or Section 4 is recorded and while imposing penalty, the Commission cannot take average of the turnover of the last three preceding financial years in respect of other products, goods or services of an enterprise or associations of enterprises or a person or associations of persons. The definition of the term 'turnover' which includes value of sale of goods or services will necessarily mean the value of goods or services which are made subject-matter of investigation under Section 26 and order of punishment under Section 27. If the accusation/allegation relates to abuse of dominant position, then the Commission is required to take into consideration the factors enumerated in Section 19(4), (5), (6) and (7).
Whether while deciding the issue relating to imposition of penalty under Section 27(b) or its proviso, the Commission is required to follow some objective criteria and take into consideration factors like the nature of anti-competitive agreement and/or abuse of dominant position, appreciable adverse effect on competition, financial health of the enterprise and market condition? - Held that:- Proviso to Section 27(b) (unamended) was couched in a language, which made it mandatory for the Commission to impose on each producer, seller, distributor, trader or service provider included in a cartel, a penalty equivalent to three times of the amount of profits made out of such agreement by the cartel or 10% of the average of the turnover of the cartel for the last preceding three financial years, whichever was higher. It is thus clear that if the proviso to Section 27(b) had not been amended, then the Commission had no option but to impose penalty on each producer, seller, distributor, trader or service provider in cases involving formation of cartel. However, in its wisdom, Parliament amended the proviso and substituted the word 'shall' with the word 'may' - Since the legislature has not laid down any criteria for imposing penalty, the Commission is duty bound to consider all the relevant factors like - nature of industry, the age of industry, the nature of goods manufactured by it, the availability of competitors in the market and the financial health of the industry etc.
Unfortunately, the Commission has, while reiterating the penalty imposed on the appellants by the original order dated 24.02.2012, altogether ignored the principles laid down by the Supreme Court and the High Courts on the interpretation of statutes, which confer power upon the competent authority to impose penalty on a person who is found guilty of having acted in violation of the particular provision - Another error committed by the Commission is that even though it took cognisance of the mitigating factors highlighted by the appellants and others, it brushed aside the same simply because they were found guilty of forming a cartel and indulging in bid-rigging. The fact that many of the appellants were small scale units was also not given due weightage by the Commission while passing the impugned order.
The impression which we gather from the impugned order is that the Commission proceeded to decide the issue of penalty with a determination that the appellants who were found to be guilty of formation a cartel/collusive bidding must be punished so that others may learn a lesson from this. This approach is wholly inconsistent with the objective sought to be achieved by the Act, which is not only aimed at preventing practices having adverse effect on competition, but also to promote and sustain competition in market and to protect the interest of consumers. The Commission could not have over looked the fact that the appellants had reduced their rates after negotiations with IOCL and there was no evidence that they had made unwarranted profits by supplying cylinders at the particular rates.
The matter is again remitted to the Commission for deciding the issue relating to imposition of penalty under Section 27(b).
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2016 (3) TMI 1326 - COMPETITION APPELLATE TRIBUNAL , NEW DELHI
Anti-Competitive Activities - closure of proceedings of the case under Section 26(2) of the Competition Act, 2002 - discrimination followed by DGHS and ECHS between hospitals on the basis of their accreditation to the National Accreditation Board for Hospitals and healthcare providers (NABH) - appellant - informant has alleged that there is no scientific basis to this discrimination.
Whether DGHS and ECHS can be termed as 'enterprise' under Section 2(h) to make them liable under Sections 3 or 4 as the case may be?
Whether there has been any discrimination introduced by the fact of accreditation of hospitals to NABH by fixing higher rates for the accredited hospitals and thereby creating a discriminatory environment not based on sound reasons leading to abuse of dominance by Respondent Nos. 1 and 2?
Held that:- It can be clearly seen that CGHS is not just a facilitative mechanism but it also provides healthcare facilities by itself in the out-patient departments. In cases which require hospitalization or further specialized care, references are made to hospitals which are empanelled for the purpose. It is thus amply clear by its own admission that Respondent No. 1 is not just a facilitator for its target group to seek healthcare in empanelled hospitals but itself provides healthcare in its 273 allopathic dispensaries, 19 polyclinics, 73 labs and 85 Ayush hospitals. This network is further supplemented by private hospitals (648) and diagnostic centres (148). The last two are empanelled following a procedure given out in the Office Memorandum which has fixed differential rates for NABH accredited and non-accredited hospitals.
Central Government Health Scheme (CGHS) is a health scheme for serving/retired Central Government employees and their families." Further the DGHS is clearly in the nature of a service provider that does not perform a function which can be termed as inalienable, as explained in several cases referred above. It cannot be said to be performing a sovereign function and, therefore, warranting exclusion from the definition of enterprise. CGHS is clearly an enterprise which provides healthcare services to the target group and in order to do so, in view of the constraints on its capacity, it laterally complements its resources by empanelling hospitals which include private hospitals as well. Therefore, the process of empanelment is essentially an expansion of CGHS' activities of providing healthcare to the target group. It is not a facilitation but a clear provision of service.
The Commission has taken a simplistic view of the activities of a Government department and has erred in appreciation of the scope of the definition of enterprise.
Differential pricing for treatment/facilities provided by accredited and non-accredited hospitals - Held that:- Both sides did not dwell on the subject at length. Whether the differential pricing is justified or not or in what manner it creates alleged environment for abuse of dominance are matters of detailed investigation and this Tribunal would refrain from going into the same at this stage.
The matter is remitted to the Commission for reconsideration - the Commission would take a prima facie view on whether a case is made out for investigation under Section 26(1) recognizing that DGHS is covered under the definition of 'enterprise' under Section 2(h) of the Act.
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2016 (3) TMI 1325 - ITAT MUMBAI
TDS u/s 195 - liability to deduct tax at source on the remittances made by it to International Air Transport Association (Canada) - Held that:- CIT(A) has held that for every remittances there should be separate appeal. We are not able to appreciate as to what are the basis with the Ld. CIT(A) to lay down such kind of proposition. In our considered opinion, for every order passed u/s. 195(2), there would be only 'one' appeal required to be filed u/s. 248 before CIT(A). But, if the order u/s. 195(2) is for the remittances for more than one financial year and consolidated order is passed u/s. 195(2), then, separate appeal will be required to be filed for each year. Thus, we direct Ld. CIT(A) to take up the appeals keeping in view aforesaid guidelines.
Eligibility of the appellant for filing of appeal u/s. 248 - Held that:- In the cases before us, if the tax liability is ultimately born by Geneva-India (i.e. appellant before us) under any arrangement made between the parties inter-se, even if initial written agreement may not clearly suggest so, then under such circumstances, he can be said to have complied with requisite condition of section 248. Therefore, we send this issue back to the file of CIT(A) to examine the facts of these cases keeping in mind this legal background. The appellant is directed to submit before the Ld. CIT(A) all requisite evidences to show that the appellant has borne impugned liability of tax deducted at source under an agreement or other arrangement, as the case may be. CIT(A) shall give adequate opportunity of hearing to the appellant and shall allow him to raise all legal and factual issues on this aspect. The appellant shall also file requisite evidences to show that the impugned amount of tax has been paid by it to the credit of Central Government, which is another mandatory condition for filing of appeal u/s. 248
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2016 (3) TMI 1324 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Jurisdiction - Whether the Court has been denuded of power to grant interim relief to the appellant under Section 9 of the 1996 Act, from the date on which the Amendment Act of 2015 came into force, since an Arbitral Tribunal has been constituted, and arbitral proceedings have commenced?
Held that:- A careful reading of the provisions of the 1996 Act, and in particular Sections 21 and 32 thereof, makes it amply clear that the expression ‘arbitral proceedings’ in Section 26 of the Amendment Act of 2015 cannot be construed to include proceedings in a Court under the provisions of the 1996 Act, and definitely not any proceedings under Section 9 of the 1996 Act, instituted in a Court before a request for reference of disputes to arbitration is made.
The amendment Act of 2015, which came into force with effect from 23rd October, 2015, would apply to arbitral proceedings which commenced after 23rd October, 2015 but not to arbitral proceedings which commenced before 23rd October, 2015. The Amendment Act of 2015 would apply to all Court proceedings on and from 23rd October, 2015.
The power of the Arbitral Tribunal under Section 17 of the 1996 Act was always of the widest amplitude. From the inception, the Arbitral Tribunal had power under the 1996 Act to order a party to take any interim measure of protection, as the Arbitral Tribunal might consider necessary, in respect of the subject matter of the disputes. The Arbitral Tribunal, therefore, all along had all the powers of Court under Section 9 of the 1996 Act. The Amendments to Section 17 of the 1996 Act by the Amendment Act of 2015 are only clarifactory - It is a cardinal principle of construction that every statute is prospective unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made to have retrospective operation, but the rule in general is applicable when the object of the statute is to affect vested rights or to impose new burdens or to impair existing obligations. Unless there are words in the statute sufficient to show the intention of the legislature to affect existing rights, it is deemed to be prospective only. In contrast to statutes dealing with substantive rights, statutes dealing with merely matters of procedure are presumed to be retrospective, unless such a construction is textually inadmissible.
If, therefore, during the pendency of proceedings in the Civil Court, a new law is enacted, which is worded as to denude the Civil Court of jurisdiction except in specified circumstances, the Civil Court will be debarred from exercising jurisdiction unless the conditions precedent for exercise of jurisdiction by the Civil Court exist - In this case there are no such circumstances. However, considering that the application for interim relief had been entertained long before the amendment and an interim order had been in force, the Court might have passed limited interim relief and remitted the parties to proceedings under Section 17 before the Arbitral Tribunal.
The appeal and the application are disposed of accordingly.
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2016 (3) TMI 1323 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Stay of operation of the arbitral award dated 25th July, 2014 - stay sought until disposal of his application filed under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Held that:- Perusing the substituted section 36 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, which has been introduced by the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Ordinance, 2015, it appears that this provision has no manner of application at all in view of the specific provision as contained under section 26 of the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015.
Considering the fact that the arbitral proceedings, in the facts and circumstances of the instant case, commenced before the Amendment Act of 2015 came into operation i.e. on 23rd October, 2015, it was, perhaps, not necessary for the applicant to take out the instant application - no order is required to be passed in the instant application - application disposed off.
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2016 (3) TMI 1322 - ITAT JAIPUR
Reopening of assessment u/s 147 - computation of capital gain by taking the sale consideration - Held that:- Whatever proceedings are available on the record cannot be presumed directly that the basis of reasons to believe is that the proceedings without referring by the Assessing Officer is reason to believe. The reasons recorded by the Assessing Officer are self contained. AR claimed that the assessee enclosed the copy of sale deed where value by the stamp authority had been disclosed alongwith the return, appears to be incorrect that the assessee had enclosed the copy of sale deed as evident from the remark “photo copy of the sale deed of property sold (2)” can be referred two pages of the copy of deed but on verification of the copy of the sale deed, it is in nine page.
Even the assessee enclosed the copy of sale deed alongwith the return, it is not necessary to verify the each and every item by the Assessing Officer as the returns are processed on computer and whatever refund/demand is sent directly to the assessee. These returns are bunched and put in the record room. The department hardly takes 1% return under the scrutiny to promote the compliance of the tax payment for the public. It is also on the part of the assessee to disclose the true facts in the return. The assessee has calculated capital gain by taking the sale consideration of ₹ 60 lacs in computation of income. Therefore, we uphold the order of the CIT(A) on this issue.
Addition without considering Section 50C(2) - non reference to DVO - computation of capital gain, the sale value on the basis of value adopted by the stamp authority - AR has submitted that the ld Assessing Officer was aware that sale value/fair market value of the property was less than the stamp duty value, he should have referred the case to the valuation officer - Held that:- As per Section 50C, AO is duty bound to take value as taken by the Stamp Authorities. As per law the assessee can challenge the valuation made by the stamp authority by filing the appeal against the stamp duty paid before the appellate authority under the Registration of Stamp Act and another alternative is that he can object the valuation proposed by the Assessing Officer on the basis of Section 50C and on that basis the Assessing Officer can refer the issue to the DVO and get valuation as per law. The Hon’ble Calcutta High Court in the case of Sunil Kumar Agarwal [2014 (6) TMI 13 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT] cited by the assessee are squarely applicable. Therefore, the ld Assessing Officer is directed to refer the matter to the DVO and take fair market value on the date of sale/transfer. On that basis, he will compute the capital gain as per law. Therefore, we set aside this issue to the Assessing Officer. - Decided partly in favour of assessee.
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2016 (3) TMI 1321 - SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE BOARD OF INDIA
Fraud under SEBI - unusual price movement and volume in the scrip of Kailash Auto Finance Ltd. - Share retransfers amongst chosen interconnected parties, unrealistic increase of liquidity in shares of Kailsah Auto held by shareholders of CPAL and PML pursuant to scheme of amalgamation - Held that:- In the instant case, prima facie, find that the entire gamut of events commencing from the typical gambit of allotment of shares by CPAL and PML to a select coterie, running through the maze of funds/shares transfers and retransfers amongst chosen interconnected parties, unrealistic increase of liquidity in shares of Kailsah Auto held by shareholders of CPAL and PML pursuant to scheme of amalgamation is a classic example of touch-me-not distancing through intermediations and culminating in the final denouement wherein connected parties with all their manipulative assemblage came to the fore setting a seal on their machinations of fraudulent, manipulative and deceptive dealings to the detriment of unsuspecting investors.
The whole picture on the canvass suggests tell- tale strands of how each one of the connected entities at various sequences in the chain has catalysed the routing of funds and shares, in a web of make believe transfers/transactions meant to mislead and obfuscate, to the final confluence in the market amidst artificial volume and price rise entrapping the unsuspecting and gullible investors. The manipulation in the traded volume and price of the scrip by a group of connected entities as observed in this case has potential to further induce unsuspecting and gullible investors to trade in the scrip and harm them. These connected parties have grossly misused the stock exchange system to generate bogus LTCG to aid and help beneficiaries to convert their unaccounted income into accounted one with no payment of taxes as LTCG is tax exempt.
SEBI strives to safeguard and protect the interests of a genuine investor in the Indian securities market. The fraudulent, manipulative and deceptive acts, device, plan and artifice employed by the connected parties acting in league in this case have wider impact on the securities market and should be dealt with sternly and post- decisional hearing will be sufficient compliance of procedure, in the facts and circumstances of this case. Considering the facts and circumstances of this case and the indulgence of a listed company in such fraudulent, manipulative and deceptive plan, device and artifice as prima facie found in this case, I am convinced that this is a fit case where, pending investigation, effective preventive and remedial action is required to be taken by way of ad interim ex-parte order to protect the interests of investors and preserve the safety and integrity of the securities market.
In order to protect the interest of the investors and safeguard the integrity of the securities market, I, in exercise of the powers conferred upon me in terms of section 19 read with section 11(1), section 11 (4) and section 11B of the SEBI Act, 1992, pending investigation in the matter, hereby restrain the persons/entities from accessing the securities market and buying, selling or dealing in securities, either directly or indirectly, in any manner whatsoever, till further directions. This order shall come into force with immediate effect. The stock exchanges and the depositories shall ensure that the above directions are strictly enforced.
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2016 (3) TMI 1320 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Disallowance towards expenses incurred for software and website development - nature of expenses - revenue or capital expenditure - Held that:- Assessee had offered a satisfactory explanation, which has been accepted by the CIT(A) as well as the ITAT, that the aforementioned expenditure did not result in a capital asset of an enduring nature. Both the CIT (A) and the ITAT accepted that the expenditure was incurred only to update the website to keep pace with the development in technology, therefore, is not of a permanent character. There are no details unearthed by the AO to support the view that said expenditure was capital in nature. No substantial question of law.
Treatment of expenses incurred towards repair and maintenance - AO treated the said expenses as a capital expenditure as reversed by the CIT(A) holding it to be revenue expenditure and this was concurred with by the ITAT - Held that:- Revenue has projected a break-up of the said expenditure as including expenses towards the procurement of a server, the AO has in his order not made any reference to such break-up. Here again, the Assessee’s explanation that this was an expenditure incurred for upgrading the computer hardware, incurred to keep pace with the changing technology and, therefore, did not result in an asset of an enduring nature has been accepted both by the CIT(A) as well as the ITAT. The Court is not, therefore, persuaded to interfere with that fact.
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2016 (3) TMI 1319 - ITAT DELHI
Addition u/s 68 - Held that:- It is more or less settled position of law that once identity is established, the better course suggested by the judicial authorities is to reopen the assessments of share applicants.
In respect of share applicants other than M/ s Mahanivesh India Ltd. and M/s Geefcee Finance Ltd., nothing adverse was brought on record. The law of evidence mandates that if the best evidence is not placed before the court, an adverse inference can be drawn against the person who ought to have produced it. As stated above the assessee has produced possible/best evidence to support its claim. The assessee cannot be fastened with, tax liability for failing to do an impossible/unjustified act of production of directors of investing companies after lapse of 5/6 years. If there is any discrepancy in the books of accounts maintained by the investing companies, there is a case for reopening of the assessment of the respective shareholders/investing companies. The assessee cannot be penalized for the mistakes/faults committed by the share holders. The AO has not found any discrepancy in the books of account and bank accounts maintained by the assessee.
CIT(A) has discussed each and every aspect of the issue in dispute and has passed a well reasoned order which does not need any interference on our part, hence, we uphold the same and dismiss the ground nos. 1 to 1.10 raised by the Revenue.
Addition of advance given to Sh. K.K. Kapur (HUF) - Held that:- the assessee has received back the advance in the Financial Year relevant to the impugned assessment year through cheques. Since the advance was not doubted by the AO, the recovery of the advance is outside the scope of Section 68, therefore, the Ld. CIT(A) has rightly deleted the addition in dispute, which does not need any interference on our part, hence, we uphold the same and dismiss the ground nos. 2 to 2.2. raised by the Revenue.
Unexplained investment - Held that:- Assessee has explained in the course of assessment proceedings that amount of ₹ 4,50,000/- and shares of Highthrow Corp Ltd. for ₹ 50,000/-. These are already credited to the P&L a/c as sale of shares. The AO simply brushed aside the submission of the AR without appreciating the evidence brought on record. AO has not disputed the acquisition of shares of the assessee. Therefore, the Ld. CIT(A) has rightly deleted the addition in dispute
Addition of unexplained credits - Held that:- AO made the addition in respect of the amounts received on account of sale of shares cannot be upheld unless the acquisition of shares is bogus. The AO simply disregarded the explanation with regard to the amounts credited in the bank account maintained. Therefore, the Ld. CIT(A) has rightly deleted the additions in dispute.
Unexplained investment u/s. 69 in FDRs - Held that:- We find that assessee has made the Fixed Deposit with State Bank of Mysore and FDR No. 012020455263 dated 10.10.2003. The AO has added the amount as unexplained investment u/s. 69B. We note that the same was reflected in the books of account. CIT(A) in his appellate proceedings has verified the Bank of Punjab account maintained in the books of account and found that the assesse company has issued the cheques of Bank of Punjab on 14.10.2003 - CIT(A) has rightly held that there is no scope for addition of ₹ 10 lacs towards Fixed Deposit made with State Bank of Mysore and accordingly, deleted the addition
Addition on non producing documentary evidence and also not produced the books of accounts - Held that:- assessee has issued a cheque no. 581616 for ₹ 40,000/- on 21.5.2003 and the amount was received back on 31.3.2004 vide cheque no. 124066. We further note that the assessee has furnished confirmed account copy. M/s Modiline Build Cap Pvt. Ltd. does possess a PAN : AACCM1716A and Ld. CIT(A) has verified the bank account and found that the transaction were duly recorded, hence, CIT(A) has rightly deleted the addition.
Non disclosure of transaction in books of accounts - Held that:- As on 12.3.2004, the assessee has sold shares of Aparna Capital Services Pvt. Ltd. for ₹ 2 lacs and the same was reflected in the sale of shares credited to P&L account and the transaction passed through the Bank account. Therefore, the Ld. CIT(A) has rightly held that there is no scope for addition of ₹ 2 lacs. - Revenue appeal dismissed.
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2016 (3) TMI 1318 - ITAT CHENNAI (TM)
Reopening of assessment - period of limitation - Held that:- As could be noticed from the observations made by the Tribunal, while disposing of the appeals for assessment years 2003-04 and 2004-05, a casual observation was made to deal with the issue before them as to whether the capital gains is attracted in assessment year 2003-04 and 2004-05; but there is no specific finding or direction that it is assessable to tax in assessment year 2001-02.
Any assessment year wherein further proceedings are barred by limitation, the same cannot be reopened merely by virtue of an opinion expressed by any higher forum at a later date i.e. subsequent to the date of limitation period. In fact, the judgments of the Apex Court are also on the same lines. Thus the reopening of assessment is bad in law since the proceedings u/s 148 of the Act are sought to be initiated by issuing a notice after the period of limitation.
Case will be placed before the Regular Bench for passing a concluding order in accordance with the majority view.
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2016 (3) TMI 1317 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Exit from the 100% EOU scheme - duty liability to be paid by the appellants on the raw materials, in-process goods, finished goods and capital goods lying in stock - Held that:- There is no merit in the appeal - Appeal dismissed.
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2016 (3) TMI 1316 - ITAT AHMEDABAD
Scope of amendment to Section 40(a)(ia) - amendment by the Finance Act, 2012 w.e.f. 01.04.2013 is prospective and by holding so the assessee is aggrieved by the disallowance of interest expenditure - Held that:- The reliance on the Circular by the D.R. is misplaced as that Circular refers to the decision of the Tribunal Special Bench, Vishakhapatnam in the case of Merilyn Shipping & Transports vs. Addl. CIT [2012 (4) TMI 290 - ITAT VISAKHAPATNAM]. The Circular also refers to the decision of the Hon’ble High Court of Gujarat, High Court of Allahabad which all relates to the issue relating to “paid or payable” whereas the issue before us relates to the amendment of second proviso to Section 40(a)(ia) which has been held to have a retrospective effect by the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in the case of Ansal Landmark Township Pvt. Ltd. [2015 (9) TMI 79 - DELHI HIGH COURT]
In the interest of justice and fair play, we restore this issue to the files of the A.O. The assessee is directed to furnish necessary evidences to show that the payee has filed returns and offered the sum received to tax. The A.O is directed to verify the same and decide the issue fresh.
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2016 (3) TMI 1315 - CESTAT MUMBAI
Classification of two products - Bio-95 and Herbal Pet Wash - Revenue classified Bio-95 under CETH 3402.90 and Pet Wash under CETH 3307.90 as against the appellant’s claim under 3402.10 and 3401.11 respectively.
Bio-95 - Held that:- There is no dispute that the product is Organic Surface Active Agent as per the main tariff entry under chapter Heading 3402 - The product Bio-95 is clearly classifiable under the CETH 3402.10. CETH 3402.10 is a specific entry in respect of product namely Sulphonated Castor Oil and 3402.90 is for other. It is a settled law that specific entry prevails over the general entry - On the identical issue, in the case of Unitex Dychem India [1998 (5) TMI 99 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI] this Tribunal decided the classification under 3402.10 of product containing 53% water and 47% Sulphonated Castor Oil. The present case of the appellant is on a better footing for the reason that in the captioned product Sulphonated Castor Oil used is to the extent of 95%, therefore, the judgment is squarely applicable.
Herbal Pet Wash - Held that:- As per the Drug licence in respect of this product, the product is manufactured out of Neem, soap-nut and shikekai, the product is licensed as Ayurvedic Proprietary Medicine, the label of the product highlights that it protects the pet animals from insects & pests. The product is also not used as toilet soap, so with this fact the product is a medicated soap which finds an entry under CETH 3401.11.
The products namely Bio-95 and Herbal Pet Wash are correctly classified under 3402.10 and 3401.11 respectively - appeal allowed - decided in favor of appellant.
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2016 (3) TMI 1314 - CESTAT NEW DELHI
Demand of service tax - Computer Network services - Online Information services - technical consultancy charges recovered by them for software development - Held that:- The said services became taxable w.e.f. 15-05-2008 and for the period being prior to the same, no demand can be sustained - the period in the present case is prior to 15-05-2008.
Appeal allowed - decided in favor of appellant.
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