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Showing 21 to 40 of 1450 Records
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2021 (7) TMI 1432 - CUSTOMS AUTHORITY FOR ADVANCE RULINGS, MUMBAI
Seeking withdrawal of Advance Ruling application - HELD THAT:- In exercise of the power vested, vide regulations 20 of the Custom Authority for Advance Ruling Regulations, 2021, leave granted for withdrawal of the said applications.
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2021 (7) TMI 1431 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Extension of Time to furnish reply - HELD THAT:- The letter dated 27th July, 2021 issued by the advocates of the respondent no.1 to the advocates of the petitioner offering inspection of certain documents at Delhi, accepted.
Time to furnish reply to the notice under Section 13(2) of the Securitization and Re-construction of Financial Assets and Enforcement Security Interest Act, 2002 is extended till 31st August, 2021.
Petition disposed off.
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2021 (7) TMI 1430 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Maintainability of appeal - Condonation of delay in filing appeal - whether a claim made by one against the other and controverted by the other, on adjudication thereof, whether by the Court or by the Arbitrator, ceases to be a "dispute", for it to be said that the proceedings for execution of adjudication of a commercial dispute, whether by way of a decree or an arbitral award, do not qualify as a "dispute"?
Maintainability of appeal - HELD THAT:- The amendment to Section 13, while splitting up the erstwhile sub-section (1) of Section 13 into two subsections, 13(1) and 13(1A) as aforesaid, did not alter the proviso thereto, and the amended proviso is in pari materia to erstwhile proviso to Section 13(1). Though in Delhi there are no Commercial Courts below the level of the District Judge but since both, Section 13(1) and Section 13(1A) provide for appeals arising from commercial disputes and there being nothing in the proviso to indicate that the same is applicable only to Section 13(1A), it is concluded that the proviso applies to both, Section 13(1) as well as Section 13(1A).
The subject matter of arbitration in the present case was a commercial dispute of a specified value, within the meaning of Section 10 of the Arbitration Act. To be fair to the senior counsels for the judgment debtors, they did not seriously controvert the aforesaid. Their contention however was that since this appeal does not arise out of arbitration under the provisions of the Arbitration Act, within the meaning of Section 10(2) of the Arbitration Act, the execution was not within the jurisdiction of the Commercial Division and the appeal thereagainst does not lie to the Commercial Appellate Division, under Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act. It was further contended that the Arbitration Act is concerned only with the arbitration proceedings and challenge to the arbitral award and is not concerned with execution of the arbitral award, with the Act, in Section 36 merely providing for the award to be executed as a decree of the Civil Court in accordance with the provisions of the CPC. It was contended that the Execution Petition is thus not an application arising out of arbitration under the Arbitration Act, to be entertained by the Commercial Division of this Court - Needless to state, this question also was not raised before and has not been considered by the Commercial Division in any of the orders in the subject execution proceedings.
Whether Execution Petitions are "applications" within the meaning of Sections 10, 12, 6 and 7 of the Commercial Courts Act? - HELD THAT:- A claimant in a dispute is not interested merely in adjudication thereof. The claimant is interested in delivery to him, of what he claims to be due and what has been adjudicated to be due to him from the opposite party - To hold that the Commercial Courts/Commercial Divisions would not have jurisdiction over applications for execution of a judgment or decree or for enforcement of an arbitral award, subject matter whereof was a commercial dispute, would in our opinion sound the death knell for the objective behind setting up of the Commercial Courts and the Commercial Divisions.
Order XXI Rule 11(2) of the CPC provides that every 'application' for execution of a decree shall be in writing, signed and verified. Thus the CPC, in accordance wherewith an arbitral award is to be executed/enforced, envisages such execution to be by way of an 'application' and since the jurisdiction of the Commercial Courts/Commercial Divisions extends vide Sections 6 and 7 of the Commercial Courts Act extends, besides over suits, also over applications relating to commercial disputes, such jurisdiction would also extend over execution applications - Execution of a decree of the Court, per Section 38 of the CPC, has to be by the same Court which passed the decree. Since the jurisdiction over arbitrations subject matter whereof is a commercial dispute, is of the Commercial Courts/Commercial Divisions, applying Section 38 of the CPC, the jurisdiction for enforcement of awards of arbitration subject matter whereof is a commercial dispute, has to be of the Commercial Courts/Commercial Divisions.
It is not as if Order XLIII of the CPC, to orders specified wherein the right of appeal against orders is confined by the proviso after Section 13(1A), does not cater to any orders in the course of an execution. Order XLIII Rule 1(j) and (ja) provide for appeals against orders passed in the course of an execution proceeding. Of course, an order under Order XXI Rule 41 is not covered therein but in view of the dicta of this Court in D & H INDIA LTD. VERSUS SUPERON SCHWEISSTECHNIK INDIA LTD. [2020 (3) TMI 1458 - DELHI HIGH COURT]], the appeal against such an order would also be maintainable.
Applicability of M/S BHANDARI ENGINEERS & BUILDERS PVT LTD VERSUS M/S MAHARIA RAJ JOINT VENTURE, M/S YOU ONE MAHARIA (JV) DELHI & ORS. [2020 (8) TMI 933 - DELHI HIGH COURT] - HELD THAT:- The first source of power referred to, is Section 151 of the CPC. Section 151 however merely saves the inherent power of the Court and provides that nothing in the CPC shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent powers of the Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. The exercise of power under Section 151 is however restricted to the facts of a particular case before the Court and does not extend to issuing any general direction, to be abided by all courts in all cases of execution of money decree. Thus, in exercise of power under Section 151, the Court, in Bhandari Engineers & Builders Pvt. Ltd. supra, could have made/pass order/s only to meet the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of the process of Court, in the facts of that case and could not have issued a mandate or direction of a general nature.
For the Court/Commercial Division in Bhandari Engineers & Builders Pvt. Ltd., to exercise powers under Section 151 of the CPC, it was necessary for the Court/Commercial Division to first hold that there was no provision in the CPC or any other law to meet the exigency which had arisen.
Not only did the Commercial Division in Bhandari Engineers & Builders Pvt. Ltd. not hold so but has itself in the judgment referred to Order XXI Rule 41 of the CPC and rather identified that also as a source of power to do what has been done therein. Order XXI Rule 41 read with Form 16A in Appendix-E of the CPC and Order XLVIII Rule 3 of the CPC are precisely for the same exigency with which the learned Judge in Bhandari Engineers & Builders Pvt. Ltd. was concerned i.e. holder of a money decree being unaware of the assets of the judgment debtor. Order XXI Rule 41 of the CPC enables such a decree holder to apply thereunder to the Court for a direction to the judgment debtor to disclose his assets and further empowers the Court to direct the judgment debtor to disclose his assets in Form 16A in Appendix-E of the CPC. Though Order XLVIII Rule 3 permits the Court to order variation in the forms given in the appendices to CPC but only to the extent "as the circumstances of each case may require".
Inherent jurisdiction of the Court must be exercised subject to the Rule that if the Code does contain specific provisions which would meet the necessities of the case, such provision should be followed and inherent jurisdiction should not be invoked. Section 151 cannot be invoked where a party has his remedy provided in the Code and has neglected to avail himself of the same.
The next Source of power relied upon by the Court in Bhandari Engineers & Builders Pvt. Ltd, is Sections 106 and 165 of the Indian Evidence Act. Section 106 provides that where any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon that person. Section 165 empowers the Court to ask any question at any time to any party about any fact relevant or irrelevant. The powers under the said provisions also, are to be exercised in the facts of a particular case and do not extend to issuing a general direction. The powers under Section 106 and 165 of the Evidence Act have to be construed harmoniously with the provisions of the CPC - The Court, in Bhandari Engineers & Builders Pvt. Ltd. has lastly drawn power from Article 227 of the Constitution of India, to issue the directions as issued therein. Article 227 vests in every High Court, the power of superintendence over all Courts and Tribunals throughout its territory, in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction and to make and issue general rules and prescribe format for regulating the practice and proceedings of such Court.
Bhandari Engineers & Builders Pvt. Ltd., to the extent extends what is laid down therein to execution proceedings pertaining to all money decrees and to all courts executing a money decree, cannot said to be good law. Axiomatically, what is held in Bhandari Engineers & Builders Pvt. Ltd. could not have been followed in the execution proceedings from which this appeal arises - Once it is so, the impugned orders have no other reason whatsoever for directing the judgment debtors to file the affidavits and which are liable to be set aside on this ground alone.
As per the existing provisions of Order XXI Rule 41 of the CPC, the Commercial Division, in our view erred in issuing direction to judgment debtors to file affidavits and affidavits in a form other than as prescribed in the CPC. The impugned orders do not record that the decree holder had applied therefor, verbally or in writing. A direction under Order XXI Rule 41 could not have been issued without the decree holder applying therefor - No merit is found in the contention of the counsel for the respondent no. 1/decree holder, that the judgment debtors having not challenged the order dated 3rd December, 2019, are not entitled to challenge the subsequent orders. The order dated 3rd December, 2019 stood substituted by the order dated 23rd December, 2019 and not challenging the order dated 3rd December, 2019 which ceased to exist, cannot deprive the judgment debtors from challenging the order dated 23rd December, 2019.
The impugned orders, to the extent directing the judgment debtors to file additional affidavits or for that matter affidavits in any form, in exercise of powers under Order XXI Rule 41 of the CPC, are set aside - Appeal disposed off.
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2021 (7) TMI 1429 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Insolvency proceedings against Guarantor - Whether an individual, in his capacity as a guarantor in connection with credit facilities granted by a bank or financial institution to a corporate entity, may be proceeded against by way of insolvency proceedings under Section 95(1) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 before an appropriate Debts Recovery Tribunal?
HELD THAT:- The statutory source of authority for carrying such application to the Debts Recovery Tribunal is found in Section 95 of the Code of 2016. Section 95 is included in Chapter III of Part III of the Code. Part III of the Code is intituled "Insolvency Resolution and Bankruptcy for Individuals and Partnership Firms".
A creditor may apply to the jurisdictional Debts Recovery Tribunal for initiating an insolvency resolution process against appropriate persons under Section 95 of the Code. Section 60 of the Code, which is included in Part II thereof, identifies the adjudicatory authority in relation to insolvency resolution and liquidation for corporate persons. Section 60(1) of the Code mandates that insolvency resolution and liquidation for corporate persons, including corporate debtors and personal guarantors, may be brought before the National Company Law Tribunal having territorial jurisdiction over the places where the registered office of the corporate person is located - However, a “corporate debtor” is defined in Section 3(8) of the Code to mean a corporate person who owes a debt to any person and a "corporate person", in turn, is defined in Section 3(7) of the Code to mean a company, a limited liability partnership firm or any person incorporated with limited liability under any law for the time being in force but not including any financial service provider.
Thus, by no stretch of imagination, may a human individual, whether as a guarantor or otherwise, be seen to be a corporate debtor or a corporate person within the definitions ascribed to such expressions in the Code.
The petitioner seeks to send the Court on a wild goose chase by seeking to take advantage of the perceived anomaly upon the Code, like the Companies Act, 2013, being notified and implemented in stages. That Section 95(1) of the Code applies to any debtor, other than debtors against whom an insolvency resolution process may be initiated under other specific provisions, is apparent - the construction as suggested by the petitioner would also be impermissible, inter alia, in the light of Section 94 which permits an individual debtor to initiate an insolvency resolution process and the use of the general word ‘debtor’ therein, without it being confined to certain classes of persons or partners of partnership firms.
In view of Section 128 of the Contract Act, 1872 the liability of a guarantor is co-extensive with that of the principal-debtor, unless it is otherwise provided by the contract. The petitioner does not claim that there is any agreement or clause present in any agreement that obliges the creditor-bank to exhaust its remedies against the concerned corporate entity before proceeding against the guarantor. The rule as embodied in Section 128 of the Act of 1872 will apply in equal measure to a guarantor who has furnished a guarantee in connection with any credit facilities obtained by a corporate entity.
The petition is found to be completely devoid of merit and nothing but a kite-flying exercise to waste time and dodge the inevitable. For all of the petitioner’s efforts, the petitioner will pay costs assessed at Rs.50,000/- (Rupees Fifty Thousand only) to the respondent bank which the respondent bank will be entitled to recover in course of the insolvency resolution process initiated before the appropriate Debts Recovery Tribunal.
Petition dismissed.
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2021 (7) TMI 1428 - ITAT MUMBAI
TP Adjustment - Comparable selection - functional dissimilarity - HELD THAT:- As based on functional dissimilarities and also in the absence of segmental details for marketing support service exclusion of Aptico Ltd.,BVG India Ltd., Axis Integrated System Ltd.,Killick Agencies and Marketing Ltd. and include Quadrant Communication Ltd., which was included as a comparable company by the assessee and upheld by the ld. DRP, more so, when the revenue is not in appeal before us, against such inclusion. The ground Nos. 2.1 to 2.9 raised by the assessee are disposed of in the above mentioned terms.
Addition made on account of marketing service fees - HELD THAT:- We find that the ld. DR argued that assessee is a low level marketing service provider and as such should have operated at cost plus margin model and hence, ought not to have incurred in loss of ₹ 2 Crores in the incentives given to travel agents. We find that this is not even the case of the lower authorities and hence, the argument of the ld. DR could not be appreciated at this stage. Respectfully following the aforesaid decision in assessee‟s own case for A.Y.2012-13 the addition made on account of income from marketing service fees is hereby directed to be deleted.
Disallowance made on account of foreign exchange loss - HELD THAT:- We find that the same issue was the subject matter of adjudication in assessee‟s own case by this Tribunal for A.Y. 2012-13 thus we direct the ld. AO to grant deduction towards foreign exchange loss.
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2021 (7) TMI 1427 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Additional substantial questions of law - Computation of tax on capital gains in terms of S. 45 r/w S. 48 - Whether unregistered agreement can be construed as a document effecting transfer of the subject properties in terms of S. 2(47)? - HELD THAT:- According to us, the aforesaid additional substantial questions of law appear to be involved and therefore, the same are framed as additional substantial questions of law (2) and (3), in addition to the substantial question of law framed on 21.06.2016 whilst admitting this appeal.
After framing the aforesaid additional substantial questions of law, we post this matter for final disposal on 22.07.2021 subject to overnight part heard, so that the Respondents have reasonable opportunity of dealing with the aforesaid additional substantial questions of law.
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2021 (7) TMI 1426 - SC ORDER
Extension of time-cum- enlargement of time for completion of the task of reconciliation of accounts of the Corporate Debtor and JAL and submission of final report by Grant Thornton (GT) before the adjudicating authority - SC [2021 (3) TMI 1143 - SUPREME COURT] held that The matter regarding approval of the resolution plan stands remitted to the Committee of Creditors of JIL and the time for completion of the process relating to CIRP of JIL is extended by another period of 45 days from the date of this judgment - HELD THAT:- The final report by the GT be submitted before 15th August, 2021, before the adjudicating authority.
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2021 (7) TMI 1425 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Maintainability of petition - availability of effective alternative remedy of appeal under Section 61 of I&B Code - writ petitions are filed on the premise that the appeals and stay petitions are not being taken up by the NCLAT - HELD THAT:- As observed by the Apex Court in M/s. Innoventive Industries Ltd v. ICICI Bank [2017 (9) TMI 58 - SUPREME COURT], the IBC, 2016 is a Single Unified Umbrella Code, covering the entire gamut of the law relating to insolvency resolution of corporate persons and others in a time bound manner. The code provides a three-tier mechanism namely, (i) the NCLT, which is the adjudicating authority (ii) the NCLAT, which is the appellate authority (iii) the Supreme Court, which is the final authority, for dealing with all issues that may arise in relation to the re-organisation and insolvency resolution of corporate persons. An order passed by the NCLT is appealable to the NCLAT under Section 61 of the Code and the orders of the NCLAT are amenable to the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Section 62.
One of the issues that arose for consideration before the Division Bench in Sulochana Gupta [2021 (1) TMI 240 - KERALA HIGH COURT], was the maintainability of the writ petition under Article 226 against an order of the NCLT. The Division Bench, after elaborate survey of precedents, answered the issue by holding that the writ petition to be not maintainable.
Petition dismissed.
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2021 (7) TMI 1424 - SC ORDER
Principles of Natural Justice - after long 15 years of the remand by the Appellate Tribunal, respondent No.2 scheduled personal hearing of the show cause notice - HELD THAT:- Issue notice.
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2021 (7) TMI 1423 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Validity of assessment order passed u/s 144B - shorter period granted to respond to SCN - HELD THAT:- As timeframe provided, to respond to the show cause notice-cum-draft assessment order dated 16.04.2021, was far too short, having regard to the fact that the pandemic was raging in the city at that juncture. In fact, the pandemic continues to prevail even now, although its severity may have lessened.
Therefore, as prayed, the impugned assessment order and consequential notices are set aside with liberty to respondent no. 1/revenue to pass a fresh assessment order and consequential orders, if any, after considering the reply dated 22.04.2021 filed by the petitioner.
Respondent no. 1, before passing the fresh assessment order, will accord a personal hearing to the authorised representative of the petitioner. For this purpose, respondent no.1/revenue will take recourse to the videoconferencing ('VC’) mechanism. In this behalf, respondent no.1/revenue will issue a written notice, indicating the date and time of the hearing, and transmit the VC link, albeit, to the registered e-mail id of the petitioner.
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2021 (7) TMI 1422 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Seeking grant of Interim Bail - seizure of contraband item - non-compliance of Section 52-A of the NDPS Act - HELD THAT:- It is manifest from Section 52-A(2)(c) that upon seizure of the contraband the same has to be forwarded either to the officer-in-charge of the nearest police station or to the officer empowered under Section 53 who shall prepare an inventory as stipulated in the said provision and make an application to the Magistrate for purposes of (a) certifying the correctness of the inventory,(b) certifying photographs of such drugs or substances taken before the Magistrate as true, and (c) to draw representative samples in the presence of the Magistrate and certifying the correctness of the list of samples so drawn.
The question of drawing of samples at the time of seizure which, more often than not, takes place in the absence of the Magistrate does not in the above scheme of things arise. This is so especially when according to Section52-A(4) of the Act, samples drawn and certified by the Magistrate in compliance with sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 52-A above constitute primary evidence for the purpose of the trial. Suffice it to say that there is no provision in the Act that mandates taking of samples at the time of seizure. That is perhaps why none of the States claim to be taking samples at the time of seizure.
Section 52A was inserted by the Amendment Act of 1989 w.e.f. 29th May, 1989.The provision relates to the disposal of the seized narcotic drugs and psychotropic substance and Section 52A (1) provides that the Central Government may having regard to hazardous nature of any narcotic drugs or psychotropic substance, their vulnerability to their substitution, constraints of proper storage space or any other relevant consideration by notification published in the Official Gazette, specify the narcotic drugs or psychotropic substance which may as soon as after their seizure be disposed of by such officer. Thus the provision relates to disposal of the drug after the same is seized so as to rule out substitution, misuse and being hazardous. It is not unknown that applications under Section 52A NDPS Act are also filed at the stage of appeal seeking permission of the Court to dispose of the narcotic drugs and psychotropic substance.
By this petition, petitioner seeks bail on the ground of non-compliance of Section52A of the NDPS Act, however, in view of the fact that the trial does not stand vitiated by drawing the samples at the spot in the absence of a Magistrate for being sent to FSL analysis for filing a appropriate charge-sheet before the Special Court for as certaining the nature of contraband and whether the sanctity of drawing the samples was vitiated for the non-presence of the Magistrate would be an issue to be seen during the course of trial, hence this Court finds no ground to grant bail to the petitioner on this ground.
As regards the prayer of the petitioner seeking interim bail on the ground that his wife is suffering, the petitioner has enclosed copy of the discharge summary of his wife Ms. Rekha Yadav, who had been advised cervicotrochanteric fracture right hip for which the surgery was performed in September, 2020 and as per the report received the patient has already recovered from the injury and the surgery and is stable. Further the petitioner has surrendered on 31st March, 2021 and thus had adequate time to take care of his wife. As regards the petitioner's medical condition is concerned, the documents on record do no suggest any immediate medical treatment or hospitalization. Thus this Court finds no ground to grant interim bail as well to the petitioner.
Petition dismissed.
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2021 (7) TMI 1421 - ITAT JABALPUR
Validity of assessment u/s 143(3) - principal addition in this case is on account of a valuation difference (of a storage Godown) based on the report by the Departmental Valuation Officer (DVO) to whom reference was made by the AO during assessment proceedings - as argued appellate order is without proper application of mind by the first appellate authority and there has been no consideration of the assessee’s replies and explanations furnished during the assessment proceedings for which reference was made - HELD THAT:- ‘Valuation’ being a technical matter, while the AO is not a technical person, the statute provides for a reference by him to the DVO where he seeks to verify the veracity of the assessee’s claim with regard to the cost of acquisition/construction of an asset incurred during the relevant previous year (s.142A). The law accordingly obliges an appellate authority (including the Tribunal) to hear the DVO in adjudicating an appeal agitating an addition based on his valuation report. This has not been observed by the ld. CIT(A), which procedure he shall accordingly comply with in the set aside proceedings, dilating on and issuing specific finding/s qua each item of valuation being contested by the assessee before him.
Whether a rejection of accounts has to necessarily precede a reference to the DVO u/s. 142A? - As the cost met by the assessee, or otherwise proved to have been incurred, or even not incurred by the assessee, as in the case of gift, inheritance, etc., and irrespective of its reflection in his accounts, where maintained, forms part of the assessee’s explanation, and it is only the balance, excess cost, which is unexplained with any evidence, for which the rule of evidence (ss. 69/69A) deems it to be his income for the relevant year.
Where, then, one may ask, is the question, i.e., for invocation of this rule of evidence, of the rejection of the books of account of the assessee’s business, which may not even be maintained or even not bear the said cost, and which (rejection) is for the purpose of properly deducing the business income, which is not a concomitant of the said invocation, and may even be independent of it? Why, the business itself may not have commenced, as in the case of Warehouse business in the instant case. The question begs an answer before the decision in Sargam Cinema [2009 (10) TMI 569 - SC ORDER] holding a reference without rejection of accounts as bad, could be relied upon.
As seen, the clear and settled law does not require the rejection of accounts and, where so, is deemed irrelevant where specific adjustments to the returned income are made on the basis of the satisfaction of the relevant provisions of law, even though the said adjustments pertain to the entries in those accounts, while for an addition u/s. 69/69A the accounts are in fact being accepted to the extent of the relevant entries therein.
The said decision does not cite the precise question of law raised before it for being answered, and indeed that admitted and answered by the Hon’ble Court. Further still, the judgment is sans any discussion of or on the law in the matter or reference to any precedents. The issue that therefore arises for being answered first is if, in view of the clear provisions of law and the scheme of the Act, and as further explained and expounded by the Apex Court per its several decisions, including by its’ larger Benches, could the said judgment be regarded as a complete statement of law in the matter and, where considered so, the basis thereof, as also the specification of the said statement.
Before parting, it may be clarified that the various issues discussed with reference to the invalidity of the AO’s reference to the DVO are only with a view to emphasize the several aspects/dimensions of the matter on which, therefore, adjudication, where sought, may be required – upon considering all the factual and legal aspects, including those, not discussed, as are agitated or otherwise deemed relevant, per a speaking order. No final opinion in the matter is expressed or may be construed as such. That is, is a case of an open set aside.
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2021 (7) TMI 1420 - NATIONAL COMPANY LAW APPELLATE TRIBUNAL , PRINCIPAL BENCH , NEW DELHI
Claim of outstanding GST dues - Appellant submits that the amount approved for the Appellant – Operational Creditor is too insufficient considering the claim which was outstanding - HELD THAT:- Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ghanashyam Mishra and Sons Private Limited vs. Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction Company Limited &. Others [2021 (4) TMI 613 - SUPREME COURT] has held that once a resolution plan is duly approved by the Adjudicating Authority under subsection (1) of Section 31, the claims as provided in the resolution plan shall stand frozen and will be binding on the Corporate Debtor and its employees, members, creditors, including the Central Government, any State Government or any local authority, guarantors and other stakeholders.
Considering the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the Resolution Plan approved is binding on the Central Government, State Government, any local authority, Guarantors and other stakeholders. Sufficiency or insufficiency of the amount is matter of Commercial Decision of the Committee of Creditors. It would not be appropriate on our part to interfere in the same. As such, the appeal does not make out any ground to admit the same.
There are no reason to admit the Appeal. The Appeal is disposed of as not admitted.
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2021 (7) TMI 1419 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Stay petition - petitioner’s prayer confined to the relief of directing the AO to dispose of the petitioner’s application under Section 220(6) of the Act relating to the relevant Assessment Year - HELD THAT:- We are not inclined to entertain this writ petition for the relief of direction upon the Assessing Officer to consider the petitioner’s application u/s 220(6) of the Act, which was filed in September, 2018 and the petitioner has filed this writ petition in July, 2021 without explaining the delay in approaching this Court, if at all the petitioner was so seriously prejudiced by the demand notices raised in 2018. Instead of approaching this Writ Court, the petitioner should have taken steps for expediting the pending appeal in question arising out of the impugned Assessment Order and the demand. WP dismissed.
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2021 (7) TMI 1418 - SC ORDER
Condonation of delay in filing appeal - HELD THAT:- It is not in dispute that the appeal before the High Court by the Revenue against the judgment of the Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal “CESTAT” was filed within limitation. In the circumstances, the delay would have to be condoned. Similarly, for the same reason, the delay on the part of Infosys Limited in filing its appeals against the judgment of CESTAT in M/S INFOSYS LTD. (FORMERLY KNOWN AS M/S INFOSYS TECHNOLOGIES LTD.) VERSUS COMMISSIONER OF SERVICE TAX, - BANGALORE, [2014 (3) TMI 695 - CESTAT BANGALORE] would have to be condoned.
Delay is accordingly condoned in both sets of appeals.
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2021 (7) TMI 1417 - SECURITIES APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, MUMBAI
Violation of Regulation 11(1) of the SAST Regulations - Non issue of open offer - Initiation of proceedings after delay of 12 Years - WTM came to the conclusion that all the acquirers collectively acquired more than five percent of the shares in the financial year 2005-06 and such acquisition beyond five percent triggered the open offer under Regulation 11(1) which acquirers failed to make and, therefore, became liable for penal action under the SAST Regulations - HELD THAT:- In the present case, SEBI is sitting quietly and has not taken any action for 12 years. Such delay defeats the purpose of initiation of proceedings for appropriate action.
Inspite of specific orders being issued from time to time on the question of delay the WTM chooses to ignore those decisions as if they do not exist or is not binding upon them. In the instant case, we find that the WTM has trenchantly asserted that it is a settled position that there is no time limit for issuing notice and that an order cannot be set aside on the ground of delay. Such assertion being used time and again in the order passed by the AO or the WTM is patently erroneous. This Tribunal in a large number of appeals have set aside the orders only on the ground of delay.
Thus considering the long lapse of time in initiating the proceedings, the direction to make an open offer was not appropriate in the circumstances of the case.
For the reasons stated aforesaid, the impugned order cannot be sustained and is quashed. The appeals are allowed
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2021 (7) TMI 1416 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Principles of natural justice - no personal hearing granted to the petitioner - HELD THAT:- The respondent/State has very fairly accepted that there is such a provision in the Punjab GST Act, 2017 and that the petitioner had in fact requested for personal hearing, which was not granted.
The orders Annexure P-5 and P-6 are set aside - respondent No.2 are directed to pass a fresh order after hearing the petitioner.
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2021 (7) TMI 1415 - ITAT HYDERABAD
Disallowing agricultural income claim u/s. 10(1) - HELD THAT:- Revenue sought to highlight the fact in CIT(A)’s lower appellate proceedings in para 4 that he had issued several notices to the assessee. We note that there is no indication at all in the said para 4 and 3; respectively that the CIT(A) hearing notices had been actually served on the assessee.
Faced with this situation, we deem it appropriate to restore the instant latter twin appeals back to the CIT(A) for his afresh appropriate adjudication as per law within three effective opportunities of hearing. It is made clear that the assessee or his learned authorised representative shall appear before the CIT(A) on or before 30-11-2021 with all the relevant evidence; at his own risk and responsibility only, to be followed by three effective opportunities of hearing.
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2021 (7) TMI 1414 - SC ORDER
Whether the period of limitation as mentioned in the Scheme would be applicable in the present case or the general limitation of 3 years would apply for assertion of claim? - HELD THAT:- It is submitted that the petitioner is ready to pay the amount to the respondents/claimants but this question of law may be decided. He states that the payment shall be made to the respondents/claimants within four weeks from today and proof of making such payment shall be filed in this Court.
List for further orders in the Week commencing 9th August, 2021.
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2021 (7) TMI 1413 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Seeking withdrawal of the petition - HELD THAT:- Placing the submission of learned Advocate for the petitioner on record, petition is dismissed as withdrawn.
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