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Showing 1 to 20 of 1399 Records
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2023 (7) TMI 1402 - SC ORDER
Condonation of delay - Delay of 128 days in filing as well as delay of 7 days in refiling the petitions - Foreign Trade Policy (FTP) - Incremental Export Incentivisation Scheme (IEIS) - HELD THAT:- Delay in filing as well as in refiling the petitions is condoned. We are not inclined to interfere with the judgment and order(s) impugned in these petitions. The Special Leave petitions are, accordingly, dismissed.
In view of the dismissal of the Special Leave petitions, respondent(s) is/are at liberty to seek appropriate orders in the contempt petition(s).
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2023 (7) TMI 1401 - ITAT DELHI
Bogus share capital u/s 68 - assessee firm failed to prove the genuineness of the funds utilized to introduce capital - as submitted capital has been introduced by partner of the firm - HELD THAT:- We find that in this case there is no ambiguity about the identity of the partner and capital introduced from him. In such circumstances if he AO was of the opinion that the amount is not proved in the hands of the partner, he should have considered it in his individual hands and not in the hands of the firm. This view is duly supported in the case of CIT vs. Metachem Industries [1999 (9) TMI 21 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT] - Appeal by Revenue stand, dismissed.
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2023 (7) TMI 1400 - NATIONAL COMPANY LAW APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, NEW DELHI
Continuation or stay in the liquidation order of the Corporate Debtor - eligibility under Section 29A of the IBC to submit a resolution plan - resolution plan unilaterally - manner of rejection of the resolution plan can be deemed to have been marred by material irregularity in the conduct of CIRP of the Corporate Debtor by the RP or not - HELD THAT:- After due deliberations, it is the CoC members who advised the RP that only Section 29A compliant plan should be placed before CoC for consideration and voting. Given that CoC had decided that only Section 29A compliant resolution plan can be placed for consideration of CoC members and further that the CoC had sought the opinion of the RP on the Section 29A eligibility of Epitome, it cannot be said that the RP had exceeded his jurisdiction or had acted unilaterally or that RP had supplanted the commercial wisdom of the CoC. Further, the fact that the RP had opined that the Appellant was not eligible in terms of Section 29A criteria cannot be held against the RP simply because the opinion of the RP did not suit the interest of the Appellant - Further it is the CoC which took the decision to intimate the decision of the RP to Epitome which the RP carried out dutifully vide their email dated 16.07.2021. It is significant to note that the 29th CoC meeting was held on 15.07.2021 which pre- dated the letter from the RP to the Appellant informing them about their ineligibility which was dated 16.07.2021. Thus what was conveyed by the RP to the Appellant also clearly had the sanction of the CoC.
It is also noticed that it was the CoC which had directed the RP to give his opinion on the Section 29A compliance of the Appellant and in terms of the IBC, the RP was duty-bound to give his views to the CoC. The CoC members having seconded the RPs opinion after due consideration of all facts presented before it by the RP, it can be safely inferred that this acquired the character of being the final and determinative opinion of the CoC based on the exercise of its own commercial wisdom and definitely not one which was foisted upon the CoC by the RP unilaterally. Thus there is no basis for holding this action on the part of the RP to be in breach of the settled proposition of law.
There are no hesitation in holding that there is no substance in the contention of the Appellant that the RP had usurped the role of the CoC in rejecting the resolution plan of the Appellant and in suo motu determining ineligibility of the Appellant in terms of Section 29A of IBC. It was the CoC which had requested the RP to field his views on the Section 29A eligibility of the Appellant. Thus in giving the prima facie opinion as to whether the Appellant was Section 29A compliant or not, the RP did not tender the opinion on his own volition but on the specific directions and on behest of the members of the CoC.
Whether the liquidation order passed by the Adjudicating Authority should be allowed to be completed or be set aside? - HELD THAT:- Both Epitome, the Appellant in the first appeal and Sanghathan, the Appellant in the second appeal have contended that the liquidation order passed by the Adjudicating Authority should be set aside on grounds of the alleged material irregularities in the CIRP of the Corporate Debtor.
The RP cannot be said to have exceeded the powers vested upon it by the IBC. It is reiterated that there is no sound basis to the claim of the Appellant that the RP unilaterally rejected the resolution plan leading to material irregularity in the CIRP of the Corporate Debtor. It was a duly considered and unanimous decision of the CoC not to put the resolution plan of the Appellant for consideration and voting. Further we notice that the liquidation of the Corporate Debtor was unanimously approved by the CoC with 100% votes in favour of liquidation in the 30th CoC meeting held on 19.07.2021. Prima-facie on this count, no illegality or impropriety can be attributed to CIRP process undertaken by the RP.
The CoC had made all endeavors for resolution of the Corporate Debtor in the first place and had voted upon liquidation only as the last resort. The resolution process has run for more than 3 (three) years before the liquidation resolution was passed by the CoC. Thus reading any ulterior motive behind this decision is misconceived and lacks foundation.
There are no reasons to disagree with the decision of the Adjudicating Authority in passing the liquidation order of the Corporate Debtor as a going concern having been so voted and unanimously recommended by the CoC in the exercise of its commercial wisdom - there are no merit in both the appeals - appeal dismissed.
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2023 (7) TMI 1399 - ITAT DELHI
Assessment order passed u/s 153A - valid approval granted u/s 153D or not? - as argued statutory approval granted by the ld. Addl. Commissioner u/s. 153D of the Act enabling the ld. AO to complete the search assessment, was a mere mechanical approval without due application of mind on the part of the ld. Addl. CIT. - HELD THAT:- Addl. CIT has accorded approval for the said draft assessment orders on the very same day i.e., on 30.12.2018 for seven assessment years in the case of the assessee and for seven assessment years in the case of Smt. Neetu Nayyar. It is also pertinent in this regard to refer to pages 68 and 69 of the paper book which contains information obtained by Smt. Neetu Nayyar from Central Public Information Officer who is none other than the ld. Addl. Commissioner of Income-tax, Central Range-5, New Delhi, under Right to Information Act, wherein, it reveals that the Addl. CIT had granted approval for 43 cases on 30.12.2018 itself. This fact is not in dispute before us.
Of these 43 cases, as evident from paper book which contains the approval u/s. 153D, 14 cases pertained to the assessee herein and Smt. Neetu Nayyar. The remaining cases may belong to some other assessees, which information is not available before us. In any event, whether is it humanly possible for an approving authority like ld. Addl. CIT to grant judicious approval u/s. 153D of the Act for 43 cases on a single day is the subject matter of dispute before us. Further, section 153D provides that approval has to be granted for each of the assessment year whereas, in the instant case, the ld. Addl. CIT has granted a single approval for all assessment years put together.
Similar issue has been addressed in the case of PCIT vs. Anju Bansal [2023 (7) TMI 1214 - DELHI HIGH COURT] wherein, under similar circumstances, the Hon'ble jurisdictional High Court categorically held that statutory approval given by a quasi judicial authority without due application of mind as contemplated in section 153D of the Act would be fatal to the entire search assessment proceedings.
We have no hesitation in holding that the approval u/s. 153D of the Act has been granted by the Addl. CIT in the instant case before us in a mechanical manner without due application of mind, thereby making the approval proceedings by a high ranking authority, an empty ritual. Such an approval has neither been mandated by the provisions of the Act nor endorsed - Hence, we find lot of force in the arguments advanced by the ld. AR in support of the additional ground raised for all the assessment years under consideration before us. Accordingly, the additional ground raised by the assessee is hereby allowed.
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2023 (7) TMI 1398 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Interim order - HELD THAT:- There is no scope of passing any interim order in the matter and the issues involve require affidavit from the respondents for final adjudication.
List this matter for final hearing in the monthly list of October, 2023.
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2023 (7) TMI 1397 - NATIONAL COMPANY LAW APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, NEW DELHI
Rejection of Section 7 Application as barred by Section 10A of IBC - Period of limitation - corporate guarantor defaulted to make payment - Principal Borrower can be made liable for default of corporate guarantor or not - HELD THAT:- When the Financial Creditor has invoked the corporate guarantee of the corporate guarantor by the notice dated 16.10.2020 and asked the corporate guarantor to make the payment within seven days from the receipt of the notice, the default has occurred during the 10A period and the default dated 02.07.2019 which is default alleged against the Principal Borrower can not be put to a default for corporate guarantor. Liability of corporate guarantor although is coextensive of the Principal Borrower but when the Guarantee requires invocation of the guarantee deed, default on the guarantor shall be the date when corporate guarantee has been invoked.
There are no error in the Order of the Adjudicating Authority dismissing Section 7 Application as barred by time - dismissal of Section 7 Application shall not preclude the Appellant to take other recourse in accordance with law - appeal dismissed.
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2023 (7) TMI 1396 - NATIONAL COMPANY LAW APPELLATE TRIBUNAL , CHENNAI
Seeking extension of CIRP beyond the period of 330 days - liquidation of the Corporate Debtor - HELD THAT:- There are no substance in the argument of Appellant because the CoC had time and again extended the period which was allowed by the Adjudicating Authority but two resolution plans in respect of the Corporate Debtor were rejected with the majority of the vote of 91.92% by the CoC and at that time the CoC was aware that 330 days time period in respect of the Corporate Debtor had already been over. Moreover, it has been categorically observed by the Adjudicating Authority that neither any plan was pending nor any application under Section 12A of the Code was pending for their consideration, therefore, the period of CIRP cannot be extended on the flimsy grounds much beyond the period of 330 days as has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Essar Steels Through Authorised Signatory [2019 (11) TMI 731 - SUPREME COURT].
Therefore, the applications filed for extension of time by the RP has rightly been dismissed and the application filed by the RP for an order of liquidation of the Corporate Debtor has rightly been passed which does not require interference by this Tribunal.
There are no merit in the present appeal and the same is hereby dismissed.
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2023 (7) TMI 1395 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Seeking grant of anticipatory bail - Validity of SCN - Department states that the impugned order is illegal on the face of it as the department had specifically submitted before the learned Special Judge that there is not even a proposal to arrest the accused - HELD THAT:- In view of the specific statement by learned senior counsel for the petitioner that there is no apprehension of arrest, the impugned order on the face of it requires an examination. Hence, the operation of the impugned order is stayed. However, in the event the department feels the necessity of affecting arrest of the accused, he shall be given seven days prior notice by the department.
List on 15.09.2023.
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2023 (7) TMI 1394 - ITAT DELHI
Applicability of clause (i) of section 92BA as omitted from 01.04.2017 - validity of transfer pricing reference of a ‘specified domestic transaction’- whether any transfer pricing adjustment per se can be made in respect of specified domestic transactions u/s 92BA of the Act in view of the fact that section 92BA(i) has been omitted from the statute by the Finance Act, 2017 w.e.f. 01.04.2017? - HELD THAT:- This issue is no longer res integra in view of the decision in the case of PCIT vs. Texport Overseas Pvt. Ltd [2019 (12) TMI 1312 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT] wherein it was held that clause (i) of section 92BA having been omitted by the Finance Act, 2017 w.e.f. 01.04.2017 from the statute, the resultant effect would be that it had never been passed and, hence, the decision taken by the AO under the effect of section 92BA of the Act and reference made to the TPO u/s 92CA of the Act was invalid and bad in law.
Respectfully following the same, we have no hesitation in holding that the transfer pricing adjustment made could not be made, in the facts and circumstances of the instant case. Appeal of the assessee is allowed.
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2023 (7) TMI 1393 - ITAT MUMBAI
Additions u/s 68 - bogus sale proceeds of sale of shares - AO received information from the Investigation Directorate, Kolkata that the prices of certain stocks are manipulated by certain people in order to generate bogus capital gains, business loss etc. Those types of shares were named as ‘penny stocks’ - HELD THAT:- There is no dispute with regard to the facts that the assessee has purchased the shares through a broker by paying the consideration in cheque. The said shares were split and were sold through a broker in a recognized stock exchange. The said shares have been held for more than one year.
Assessee has furnished all the documents in support of purchase and sale of shares. However, the AO did not examine those documents and find fault with them. It is the finding of CIT(A) that the shares have entered and exited his demat account of the assessee. There is also no allegation made that the assessee was part of ring which indulged in the alleged price rigging. The AO has placed reliance on the report of Investigation wing to hold that the assessee has availed accommodation entries by way of long term capital gains.
We are of the view that the decision rendered in the case of Shyam R Pawar [2014 (12) TMI 977 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] and Ziauddin A Siddique [2022 (3) TMI 1437 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] are squarely applicable in the present case. Accordingly, we hold that the long term capital gains declared by the assessee cannot be doubted with. Accordingly, we hold that the AO was not justified in assessing the sale value of shares as unexplained cash credit in both the years under consideration. Decided in favour of assessee.
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2023 (7) TMI 1392 - PATNA HIGH COURT
Seeking grant of pre-arrest bail - Money Laundering - proceeds of crime or not - criminal conspiracy - forgery with valuable security - breach of confidentiality and privacy under the I.T. Act - HELD THAT:- Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, the materials available on the record showing the gravity of the offences alleged against the petitioners, the recovery of 36 ATM Cards of various banks from the petitioners and the allegation that he used to receive various phone calls from a Pakistani national and on his instruction he used to withdraw money from various ATMs and the allegation that from the proceeds of crime the petitioners had acquired immovable property as well and now a charge-sheet has been filed against them, this Court is not inclined to grant privilege of pre-arrest bail to these petitioners.
Prayer for anticipatory bail of the petitioners is, thus, refused.
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2023 (7) TMI 1391 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
Condonation of delay of 688 days in filing the appeal - Sufficient reasons for delay or not - no care was taken to file appeal or even to get it set aside by availing appropriate remedy promptly or even within a reasonable time - appellant stated that it has a very strong case on merits and, therefore, the appellant be not non suited only on the ground of delay - HELD THAT:- The submissions are not satisfactory and convincing - The delay in filing the appeal is too long without any cause much less sufficient for adopting liberal approach also. In the absence of any cause shown, delay cannot be condoned. Therefore, the application is rejected.
The appeal is dismissed as barred by limitation.
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2023 (7) TMI 1390 - ITAT PUNE
Levy penalty u/s 270A(9) - Mis reporting of income - as alleged non specification of clear charge - HELD THAT:- AO has discussed how the assessee has mis-reported the income. AO has not identified the specific limb of section 270A(9) of the Act, either in the penalty order or in the assessment order which is applicable in the case of assessee.
We find that ITAT Pune in the case of Kishor Digambar Patil [2023 (3) TMI 1472 - ITAT PUNE] has held that failure on the part of the AO to showcase which of the specific action of the assessee from Clause(a-f) of section 270A(9) was determinant before imposing the impugned penalty u/s 270A of the Act has rendered the entire proceedings invalid and untenable. Appeal of the assessee is allowed.
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2023 (7) TMI 1389 - ITAT KOLKATA
Addition u/s 68 - Bogus share transactions - assessee has failed to prove identity, creditworthiness and genuineness of the transaction - summons u/s 131 were not complied by the directors of the assessee company - CIT(A) deleted the addition - HELD THAT:- Since the alleged sum has been added in the case of Honesty Dealers Pvt. Ltd. and the sum received by it was invested in the form of loans and advances and investments, during the year under consideration some of the funds have been received backed by Honesty Dealers Pvt. Ltd., and has been utilized for investing in the equity share capital of the assessee company. These details have gone uncontroverted at the end of the revenue authorities and it remains an admitted fact that the source of the source stands proved with the details filed before us and, therefore, making an addition again in the hands of the assessee would tantamount to double addition and, therefore, the addition in the year under consideration is not warranted and the CIT(A) has rightly deleted the same.
Assessee company is having a huge turnover and for financial year 2012-13, the same is amounting to Rs.145.38 Crores and net profit from continuing operations is Rs.1.45 Crores. In the return of income, total income has been declared at Rs.1.74 Crores. We find that the genuineness of the transactions is proved since the investment which has been made by the alleged share applicants is in a profit making company and, therefore, since the future prospect of investments are good, this decision of the share applicant company to invest in the equity of the assessee company is prudent one and, therefore, the genuineness of the transactions is established.
Since the assessee has successfully proved the three necessary ingredients i.e., identity and creditworthiness of the share applicants and genuineness of the transactions as provided u/s 68 are of the view that no interference is called for in the order of the CIT(A) deleting the addition made by the AO u/s 68 of the Act and the same is upheld. Decided against revenue.
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2023 (7) TMI 1388 - ITAT AHMEDABAD
Penalty u/s 271(1)(c) - AO noted that the capital gain shown by the assessee in the statement of income as a credit entry was rejected and the addition was made in respect of non-granting of LTCG - HELD THAT:- Fact remains that the assessee at no point of time concealed its particulars of income or filed inaccurate particulars of income at any stage of revealing its income to the revenue authorities. Thus, in the present case Section 271(1)(c) does not apply as the assessee at no point of time concealed its income from the revenue authorities. Thus, the AO as well as the CIT(A) was not right in levying penalty under Section 271(1)(c) of the Act. Hence, the appeal of the assessee is allowed.
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2023 (7) TMI 1387 - CESTAT MUMBAI
Seeking early hearing of appeal - Reversal of CENVAT Credit - HELD THAT:- On perusal of the case records, it is found that an identical matter has already been dealt with by this bench of the Tribunal in the case of the appellant in RELIANCE INDUSTRIES LTD VERSUS COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE, MUMBAI [2022 (11) TMI 923 - CESTAT MUMBAI] and the appeal is allowed, holding that reversal of Cenvat Credit in terms of sub-rule (3) of Rule 6 of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 is not proper and justified. Since, the issue lies in a narrow compass, with the consent of both sides, the appeal taken up today for final disposal.
Cenvat Credit on the inputs used for manufacture of LPG - HELD THAT:- The issue is no more res integra in view of decision in RELIANCE INDUSTRIES LTD VERSUS COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE, MUMBAI [2022 (11) TMI 923 - CESTAT MUMBAI] passed by the Tribunal in the case of the appellant itself. Since, for the earlier period 2010-12, the Tribunal has held that reversal of Cenvat Credit is not proper and accordingly, the benefit of Cenvat Credit cannot be denied, we are of the view that contrary stand cannot be taken to decide the present appeal differently.
There are no merits in the impugned order passed by the Ld. Commissioner (Appeals). Therefore, by setting aside the impugned order, the appeal is allowed in favour of the appellant.
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2023 (7) TMI 1386 - CESTAT NEW DELHI
Levy of service tax - Business Auxiliary service or not - commission on sale of liquor - SCN alleged that the Corporation was not a purchaser of liquor and it was merely providing sales, marketing activities covered under BAS - HELD THAT:- Where service tax is chargeable on any taxable service with reference to its value, then such value shall be determined in the manner provided for in (i), (ii) or (iii) of subsection (1) of section 67. What needs to be noted is that each of these refer to ‘where the provision of service is for a consideration’, whether it be in the form of money, or not wholly or partly consisting of money, or where it is not ascertainable. In either of the cases, there has to be a ‘consideration’ for the provision of such service. Explanation to sub-section (1) of section 67 defines ‘consideration’ to include any amount that is payable for the taxable services provided or to be provided, or any reimbursable expenditure, or any amount retained by the lottery distributor or selling agent.
The contention of the Corporation is that the amount collected by the Corporation for the reason that the conditions stipulated in the agreement had not been complied with by the liquor manufacturers are not consideration in view of any service and, therefore, cannot be held to be taxable under section 66E(e) of the Finance Act 1994 in view of the Larger Bench decision of the Tribunal in Commissioner of Service Tax, Chennai vs. Repco Home Finance Ltd. [2020 (7) TMI 472 - CESTAT CHENNAI]and the Division Bench decision of the Tribunal in South Eastern Coalfileds vs. Commissioner of Central Excise and Service Tax [2020 (12) TMI 912 - CESTAT NEW DELHI].
In Repco Home Finance, the Larger Bench of the Tribunal held that the consideration must flow from the service recipient to the service provider for a taxable service provided under the Finance Act. The service recipient may have to fulfil certain conditions of the contract but that would not necessarily mean that it would form part of the value of the taxable service.
Thus, the transaction of purchase and sale of liquor by the Corporation will not fall within the ambit of BAS and would, therefore, not be taxable - Appeal allowed - decided in favour of appellant.
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2023 (7) TMI 1385 - SC ORDER
Condonation of delay of 52 days in filing appeal - sufficient explanation fro delay provided or not - parties were litigating with regard to the right over immovable properties - HELD THAT:- This Court in the case of COLLECTOR, LAND ACQUISITION VERSUS MST. KATIJI AND OTHERS [1987 (2) TMI 61 - SUPREME COURT] has held The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on `merits’. The expression `sufficient cause’ employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice-that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court.
The above decision expressing the intention of justice oriented approach percolating down to all the courts was rendered nearly three decades ago but unfortunately the case on hand demonstrates the pervading insensitive approach, which apart from continuing the agony of the litigants concerned has also unnecessarily burdened the judicial hierarchy which after going through the entire process will have to set the clock back, at this distant point in time and prolong their agony. If only the court concerned had been sensitive to the justice oriented approach rather than the iron- cast technical approach, the litigation between the parties probably would have come to an end much earlier after decision on the merits of their rival contention - If that be the position, the very manner in which the lower Appellate Court has dismissed the appeal on the ground of delay when the delay was not inordinate is not justified and the High Court was also not justified in dismissing the appeal only on the ground that there was no question of law.
The delay in filing the appeal before the lower Appellate Court is condoned - Appeal disposed off.
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2023 (7) TMI 1384 - SUPREME COURT
Rejection of bail - conspiracy - allegations of recruiting cadres for the banned organisation, to import the provisions of Section 18B of Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 - HELD THAT:- It is not possible to form an opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against the Appellant of committing or conspiring to commit terrorist act is prima facie true. The witness statements do not refer to any terrorist act alleged to have been committed by the Appellants. The copies of the letters in which the Appellants or any one of them have been referred, record only third-party response or reaction of the Appellants' activities contained in communications among different individuals. These have not been recovered from the Appellants. Hence, these communications or content thereof have weak probative value or quality. That being the position, neither the provisions of Section 18 nor 18B can be invoked against the Appellants, prima facie, at this stage. The association of the Appellants with the activities of the designated terrorist organisation is sought to be established through third party communications.
Moreover, actual involvement of the Appellants in any terrorist act has not surfaced from any of these communications. Nor there is any credible case of conspiracy to commit offences enumerated under chapters IV and VI of the 1967 Act. Mere participation in seminars by itself cannot constitute an offence under the bail-restricting Sections of the 1967 Act, with which they have been charged.
To bring the Appellants within the fold of Section 38 of the 1967 Act, the prosecution ought to have prima facie establish their association with intention to further the said organisation's terrorist activities. It is only when such intention to further the terrorist activities is established prima facie, Appellants could be brought within the fold of the offence relating to membership of a terrorist organisation. To bring within the scope of Section 38 of the 1967 Act, it would not be sufficient to demonstrate that one is an associate or someone who professes to be associated with a terrorist organisation. But there must be intention to further the activities of such organisation on the part of the person implicated under such provision. But the same line of reasoning in respect of membership of a terrorist organisation Under Section 20, ought to apply in respect of an alleged offender implicated in Section 38 of the 1967 Act. There must be evidence of there being intention to be involved in a terrorist act. So far as the Appellants are concerned, at this stage there is no such evidence which can be relied upon.
The appellant are directed to be released on bail in respect of the cases(s) out of which the present appeals arise, on such terms and conditions the Special Court may consider fit and proper, if the Appellants or any one of them are not wanted in respect of any other case - appeal allowed.
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2023 (7) TMI 1383 - SUPREME COURT
Rejection of bail - influencing certain citizens to swear false affidavits, which were used as a part of investigation - HELD THAT:- The consideration which weighed with the Court while passing the aforesaid order that the appellant is a lady has not changed. The fact that the offence alleged against her relates to the year 2002 and that the FIR pertains to documents which are sought to be presented or relied upon till the year 2012 has also not changed. The fact that the appellant was available for custodial interrogation for a period of seven days and thereafter she was in continuous judicial custody has also not changed - Another factor that needs to be taken into consideration is that after she was released on interim bail by this Court, she has admittedly not been called for investigation even on a single occasion.
Taking into consideration that most of the evidence in the present case are documentary evidence, which are already in possession of the Investigating Agency and, further, that the charge-sheet has been filed, it is found that she is entitled for bail.
Another factor that needs to be taken into consideration is that at the time of pronouncing the impugned order, the learned Judge, though noticing that on account of order of this Court dated 2nd September 2022 passed in Criminal Appeal No. 1417 and 1418 of 2022 the appellant was on interim bail, directed her to surrender immediately - it is not understood to as to what was the alarming urgency to direct the appellant to surrender immediately, particularly, when the appellant was enjoying the interim protection under the orders of this Court from 2nd September 2022.
The impugned order is quashed and set aside and the appeal is allowed - bail allowed.
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