2025 (5) TMI 975 - HC - Income Tax

Delay in Approaching High Court with writ petitions - Validity of notices issued u/s 143(2) and 142(1) - Whether delay in approaching this court writ petition be dismissed on the ground of delay? - HELD THAT - We find that notices under Section 143(2) and 142(1) of the Income Tax Act 1961 were issued in the month of June 2023 and the writ petitions were filed in January 2024. Therefore in these circumstances in exercise of our discretion we are not inclined to entertain the petitions and the same are accordingly dismissed with liberty to challenge the order by taking recourse to appropriate remedy available under the law. If the individual appeal is filed within a period of two months the appeal shall be decided on its own merit without going into the issue of limitation.

Summary

The Rajasthan High Court, in an order delivered by Chief Justice Manindra Mohan Shrivastava and Justice Pankaj Bhandari, addressed writ petitions challenging notices issued under Sections 143(2) and 142(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The petitioners sought indulgence despite delay, relying on precedents including *Suresh Chand v. Union of India* (2004) 13 SCC 563 and other Supreme Court and High Court decisions emphasizing discretionary relief against delay.The respondents countered with the Court's prior ruling in *Nirmal Kumar Bardiya v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax* (2023), where a similar delay led to dismissal.The Court noted the notices were issued in June 2023, but the writ petitions were filed only in January 2024, reflecting a significant delay. Exercising its discretion, the Court declined to entertain the petitions, stating: "we are not inclined to entertain the petitions and the same are, accordingly, dismissed with liberty to challenge the order by taking recourse to appropriate remedy available under the law."Importantly, the Court granted that if an individual appeal is filed within two months, it "shall be decided on its own merit without going into the issue of limitation," thus preserving the petitioners' substantive rights despite procedural delay.