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2025 (5) TMI 1708 - AT - Income TaxRevision u/s 263 - as per CIT order u/s 143(3) r.w.s. 147 passed by the AO is erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the revenue - Scope of Doctrine of Merger - share capital received by the assessee from paper / shell companies having no business activities was added to the total income of the assessee - As per CIT Commission paid by the assessee for arranging such accommodation entry which was not disclosed by the assessee in it s books of accounts was also required to be added back to the income of the assessee which was not done by the AO HELD THAT - Once the relevant part of the assessment order is the subject matter of appeal before the Ld. CIT(A) then to that extent proceedings cannot initiated under Section 263 of the Act. The aforesaid provision empowers the Principal CIT only to exercise revisionary power under Section 263 only with respect to those matters which have not been considered and decided in appeal by the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals). In the instant case we are of the considered view that the payment of commission is directly linked to receipt of alleged bogus share capital by the assessee from paper / shell companies. However when Ld. CIT(A) in appeal against the assessment order has himself held that the alleged bogus share capital is genuine looking into the instant facts and addition on this account has been deleted by Ld. CIT(A) then in our considered view there is no question of initiating 263 proceedings with respect to commission paid towards bogus share capital when such share capital have been held to be genuine by Ld. CIT(A). In the case of Slum Rehabilitation Authority 2019 (4) TMI 64 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT the assessee filed its return of income claiming benefit under Section 11 claiming itself to be engaged in charitable activity. AO was of view that assessee was not a Local Authority within the meaning of Section 10(20). Commissioner (Appeals) allowed assessee s claim and granted exemption under Section 11. Subsequently the Principal Commissioner initiated revision proceedings under Section 263 of the Act on the ground that by virtue of Section 2(15) of the Act activities of assessee could not be considered as charitable in nature and thus he directed assessment to be made afresh after considering proviso to Section 2(15) of the Act. Tribunal was of view that on principle of merger it was not open for the Principal Commissioner to revise the order of assessment in revisionary proceedings. In further appeal the Bombay High Court held that when the Assessing Officer disallowed the claim of the assessee for benefit of exemption u/s 11 and Commissioner (Appeals) allowed the said claim of the assessee it being a case of merger of assessment order with the order of Commissioner (Appeals) the Commissioner in exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 263 of the Act could not disallow assessee s claim of exemption. Thus we are of the considered view that this is not a fit case for initiating proceedings under Section 263 of the Act since assessment order in the instant facts merged with the order of Commissioner (Appeals) and accordingly the PCIT has erred in facts and in law in initiating proceedings under Section 263 of the Act. Appeal of the assessee is allowed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The core legal questions considered by the Tribunal in this appeal are: (a) Whether the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax (PCIT) was justified in exercising revisional powers under Section 263 of the Income Tax Act to set aside the assessment order on the ground that the Assessing Officer erred in not adding back the undisclosed commission paid by the assessee for arranging alleged bogus accommodation entries in the form of share capital? (b) Whether the doctrine of merger, as embodied in Explanation 1(c) to Section 263(1) of the Act, bars the PCIT from initiating revisionary proceedings when the subject matter of the assessment order has already been considered and decided by the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) (CIT(A))? (c) Whether the addition of commission paid on the alleged bogus share capital is a separate issue that can be independently considered under Section 263, notwithstanding the appellate deletion of the addition of the share capital itself? (d) What is the scope and limitation of the revisional powers under Section 263 of the Act, particularly in light of judicial precedents interpreting the doctrine of merger and the Explanation 1(c) to Section 263(1)? 2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS Issue (a) and (c): Justification for initiation of revision proceedings under Section 263 for non-addition of commission paid on alleged bogus share capital Relevant legal framework and precedents: Section 263 empowers the Principal Commissioner or Commissioner to call for and examine the record of any proceeding and revise the same if the order passed by the Assessing Officer is erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue. Explanation 1(c) to Section 263(1) restricts the exercise of revisional powers to matters not considered and decided in appeal. Precedents such as Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Nirma Chemicals Works Pvt. Ltd. and CIT(E) vs. Slum Rehabilitation Authority emphasize that once an issue has been considered and decided by the appellate authority, the revisional jurisdiction under Section 263 cannot be exercised on the same issue. The doctrine of merger prevents reopening of matters already adjudicated upon in appeal. Court's interpretation and reasoning: The Tribunal noted that the Assessing Officer had added Rs. 6.70 crores to the assessee's income treating it as bogus share capital introduced through paper/shell companies. The PCIT initiated revision proceedings contending that the commission paid by the assessee for arranging such accommodation entries (at 5% amounting to Rs. 33.50 lakhs) was not added back and thus the assessment order was erroneous and prejudicial to the Revenue. The Tribunal observed that the commission paid was directly linked to the receipt of alleged bogus share capital. However, the CIT(A) had deleted the addition of Rs. 6.70 crores on the share capital after detailed consideration, effectively holding the share capital genuine. Since the commission expense pertained to the accommodation entry which was held to be genuine by the appellate authority, the PCIT could not initiate revision proceedings on the commission paid as a separate issue. Key evidence and findings: The Assessing Officer relied on statements of Shri Shirish Chandrakant Shah, who admitted to providing accommodation entries for commission. The PCIT relied on this to argue that commission should have been added back. However, the appellate order deleted the bogus share capital addition, thus negating the premise for adding commission expense. Application of law to facts: Since the CIT(A) had fully considered and decided the issue of bogus share capital, the commission paid, being intrinsically connected, was also subsumed within that decision. Therefore, the revisionary powers under Section 263 could not be invoked for the commission expense. Treatment of competing arguments: The assessee contended that the assessment order merged with the appellate order and hence no separate revision was permissible. The PCIT argued that the commission expense was a separate issue and the appellate order did not appreciate the nature of transactions fully. The Tribunal rejected the PCIT's contention relying on the doctrine of merger and statutory explanation. Conclusions: The initiation of revision proceedings under Section 263 on the commission paid was held to be erroneous and not maintainable. Issue (b) and (d): Doctrine of merger and scope of revisional powers under Section 263 Relevant legal framework and precedents: Explanation 1(c) to Section 263(1) of the Act states that the powers of the Principal Commissioner or Commissioner to revise an order shall extend only to such matters which have not been considered and decided in appeal. This embodies the doctrine of merger, preventing conflicting decisions by quasi-judicial authorities of the same rank. Judicial precedents relied upon include:
Court's interpretation and reasoning: The Tribunal extensively analyzed the Explanation 1(c) to Section 263(1), concluding that the revisional powers are limited to matters not considered and decided in appeal. It held that since the CIT(A) had decided the issue of bogus share capital, the assessment order merged with the appellate order to that extent, barring the PCIT from exercising revisional jurisdiction on the same issue or any matter directly connected thereto (such as commission paid). Key evidence and findings: The appellate order was a detailed speaking order that considered the totality of facts and deleted the addition of Rs. 6.70 crores. The Department had filed an appeal before the Tribunal, but the pendency of such appeal does not restrict the application of the doctrine of merger for the purpose of Section 263 proceedings. Application of law to facts: The Tribunal applied the doctrine of merger strictly, holding that the PCIT's initiation of revision proceedings on the commission paid was barred as the issue had been decided in appeal. The Tribunal relied on the principle that the appellate authority has the power to enhance or reduce additions, and if the appellate authority did not enhance the addition or disallow the commission expense, the revisional authority cannot do so. Treatment of competing arguments: The PCIT argued that the appellate authority did not appreciate the nature of the transactions fully and that the revision was necessary to protect Revenue's interest. The Tribunal rejected this, emphasizing that the statutory scheme and judicial precedents limit the revisional powers to prevent conflicting decisions and protect the finality of appellate orders. Conclusions: The doctrine of merger as codified in Explanation 1(c) to Section 263(1) prohibits the PCIT from revising an order on issues already considered and decided in appeal. The revisional powers under Section 263 are thus circumscribed and cannot be exercised to re-examine matters adjudicated upon by the CIT(A). 3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS The Tribunal held: "From bare reading of the aforesaid provision, in our considered view once the relevant part of the assessment order is the subject matter of appeal before the Ld. CIT(A), then to that extent proceedings cannot be initiated under Section 263 of the Act. The aforesaid provision empowers the Principal CIT only to exercise revisionary power under Section 263 of the Act only with respect to those matters which have not been considered and decided in appeal by the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals)." "When Ld. CIT(A) in appeal against the assessment order has himself held that the alleged bogus share capital is genuine looking into the instant facts and addition on this account has been deleted by Ld. CIT(A), then in our considered view, there is no question of initiating 263 proceedings with respect to commission paid towards bogus share capital, when such share capital have been held to be genuine by Ld. CIT(A)." "Clause (c) of Explanation 1 of sub-section (1) of section 263 of the Act...statutorily recognizes the principle of merger and avoids any conflict of opinion between two quasi judicial authorities of the same rank." "Accordingly, in light of our observations in the preceding paragraphs and in view of the assessee's set of facts, we are of the considered view that this is not a fit case for initiating proceedings under Section 263 of the Act since assessment order in the instant facts merged with the order of Ld. Commissioner (Appeals) and accordingly, the PCIT has erred in facts and in law in initiating proceedings under Section 263 of the Act." Core principles established include:
Final determination: The appeal was allowed, and the order passed by the PCIT under Section 263 setting aside the assessment order was quashed as erroneous and not maintainable in law.
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