9911796707
TMI Blog1993 (2) TMI 267X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... in the said petition for interim and ad interim reliefs as more particularly set out therein. On December 18, 1986, the petitioners also filed another Company Petition No. 664 of 1986, against the said NKIPL, Rajen Arvindkumar Kilachand and one Puthucode Subramaniam who are described as respondents therein, inter alia , for declaration that the transfer by way of transmission of 1936 shares of NKIPL held by Lilavati Nandlal Kilachand is bad in law, void ab initio , illegal and unauthorised and for rectification of the register of membership of shareholders of the said NKIPL by deleting the entry for transmitting the said 1,936 shares from the name of Lilavati Nandlal Kilachand to the name of Rajen Arvindkumar Kilachand and by substituting in its place the names of Jyotsna Nalinikant Kilachand and the said Puthucode Subramanian, the executrix and executor respectively of the estate of Nalinikant Nandlal Kilachand or in the alternative to the names of the petitioners one-fourth of the said 1936 shares, i.e., shares of NKIPL to the extent of 121 shares in the name of each of the four petitioners therein. Company Application No. 10 of 1987 was taken out by the petitioners in the said ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 1980, leaving behind his widow, Jaya Ushakant. Nalinikant Nandlal Kilachand died on March 12, 1982, leaving behind his widow, Jyotsana, who is the first petitioner in the said company petitions and three daughters, Hardevi alias Harsha, Kalindi and Radhika, who are petitioners Nos. 2, 3 and 4, respectively, in the said company petitions. The said Lilavati Nandlal Kilachand held 1,936 equity shares of NKIPL. The petitioners as the next of kin to the said Lilavati Nandlal Kilachand have been entitled each to 121 equity shares of the said NKIPL held by the said Lilavati Nandlal Kilachand. The said Rajen got transferred (according to the petitioners illegally and unauthorisedly) the said 1,936 equity shares of NKIPL to his name. The said Dodsal Pvt. Ltd. and the said Indmag Pvt. Ltd. are wholly owned subsidiary companies of the said NKIPL. The said Dodsal Pvt. Ltd. owns 100 per cent. of the shares of Dodsal GmbH, a company incorporated and/or constituted according to the laws of West Germany. According to the petitioners, the said Rajen who is the second respondent sought to divert and exclusively appropriate the profits and benefits of the business of the said NKIPL and sough ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... after taking instructions from their respective clients, agreed to the course suggested by Pendse J. Minutes of order in both the company petitions were prepared and tendered before Pendse J. which were taken on record and order in accordance with the said minutes was assed by Pendse J. in both the said company petitions on September ,7,1989. Under the said order, the shares held by the petitioners in the said NKIPL along with all other shares that the petitioners might be entitled to in the said NKIPL were by mutual agreement of all the parties to both the said company petitions ordered to be valued by the said M. L. Bhakta, solicitor for the said NKIPL, Rajen, Dodsal Pvt. Ltd., one Dodsal Manufacturing Pvt. Ltd., Indmag Pvt. Ltd., Dodsal GmbH and one Dodsal Technologists and Contractors (P.) Limited, who are respondents Nos. 1, 2, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 in the said Company Petition No. 663 of 1986, and the petitioners therein were to be paid the value of such shares as per valuation of the said Bhakta. The mode, manner and quantum of such payment was to be decided by the said Bhakta in his absolute discretion and even without reference to any of the parties to the said company petit ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... at Rs. 4 crores, which value, according to the said Bhakta, was agreed to and accepted by the parties to the minutes of the said order. The said Bhakta directed the petitioners to sell their respective shares in the said NKIPL to the said Rajen and/or his nominee or nominees or assignees and to the said Rajen to purchase the said shares by himself or through his nominee or nominees or assignees at or for the aggregate price of Rs. 4 crores. The said Rajen was directed by the said Bhakta to pay by himself or cause his nominee or nominees or assignees to pay to the petitioners the purchase price of Rs. 4 crores together with interest in the manner set out by him in the said decision. The said Bhakta gave further directions as recorded in the said decision. As per clause 4( i ) of the said decision, the said Rajen was to pay to the petitioners the sum of Rs. 50 lakhs on or before September 15, 1991 which the said Rajen did not pay. On Septembers, 1991, the petitioner! through their advocate got a letter addressed to the advocates for respondents Nos. 1, 2, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11, requesting them to confirm whether the said respondents accepted the said decision of the said Bhakta to ena ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the said order passed by Pendse J. disposed of the said premises at Raheja Centre and thereby received sizable amount which according to the petitioners exceeded Rs. 5 crores. Since the said respondents have deliberately failed and neglected to comply with the said decision which is final and binding on all the parties and is required to be implemented by the parties concerned, the present application has been taken out by the petitioners for implementation thereof. On behalf of respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 7 to 11 the said Rajen has filed his affidavit in reply to this application. On behalf of respondents Nos. 4, 5 and 6, one Jaya Ushakant Kilachand, the constituted attorney of respondents Nos. 4, 5 and 6 has filed an affidavit in reply to the application. According to respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 7 to 11 (for short, "these respondents"), the said Bhakta was required to value the shares held by the petitioners in the said NKIPL and that the said order passed in terms of the minutes was based on the understanding that the petitioners were to be paid the value of such shares and a suitable scheme for payment was to be formulated by the said Bhakta. It is also the case of these respo ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ready been agreed even prior to the passing of the said order at Rs. 4 crores and that the said Bhakta was required to consider the circumstances existing on the date of the said order and was not concerned with the subsequent events. According to these respondents, the second respondent had thereafter submitted to the said Bhakta a proposal of the scheme by which the petitioners would be paid the value of their shares. However, before further discussions could take place, the said Bhakta suddenly addressed a letter to the second respondent being the letter dated August 28, 1991, forwarding along therewith his decision and informing that he would be filing the same in this court. It is the case of these respondents that directions given by the said Bhakta in his said decision are totally beyond the scope of the said order and are clearly not in accordance with the mandate of the said order. It is also the case of these respondents that the said directions are bad in law, totally arbitrary, void, illegal and ineffectual. In the affidavit filed by the said Jaya, Ushakant Kilachand, it is contended that respondents Nos. 4, 5 and 6 are the executors and trustees of the will of the la ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... sed the said order in terms of the said minutes which is valid, legal and binding on all the parties concerned. The court while passing the said order had considered as to whether there could be delegation to the said Bhakta and thereafter passed the said order. It is now not open to consider whether there could have been delegation to the said Bhakta. The respondents are estopped from challenging the authority of the said Bhakta more particularly in view of the fact that all parties concerned had participated in the proceedings before the said Bhakta. Mr. Chagla has further submitted that the respondents cannot be permitted to approbate and reprobate. Under the said order passed by this court, the seventh respondent was permitted to sell and/or dispose of the premises at Raheja Centre. The seventh respondent while accepting the said order has acted upon the same and disposed of the said premises at Raheja Centre which the seventh respondent could otherwise not dispose of by reason of the statement of learned counsel for respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 7 to 11 earlier made to this court. Mr. Chagla further submitted that the value of the shares in question has been decided and what follo ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s is a step in specific performance or execution of a primary obligation existing between the parties. He has also submitted that no persona designata can be clothed with judicial power except by an express statutory provision. When the statute confers power (judicial or otherwise) on the holder of a public office, the question often arises whether he exercises it as that public officer or as an individual who happens to hold that office. Persona designata in the context of the present case is neither relevant nor meaningful. Mr. Jethmalani has further submitted that the agreement between the parties recorded in the minutes of September 7, 1989, consists of parts that are mutually reciprocal, interdependent and unseverable and only when the entire agreement is worked out and everything is settled, the totality of the decision can alone bind morally and legally. The differences and disputes mentioned therein are of a kind that cannot be legally left to be decided to anyone except an arbitrator and as such, the entire agreement is void and unenforceable. He has further submitted that the said agreement is void for uncertainty and also by reason of consideration being unlawful and opp ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... all parties were, in the submission of Mr. Desai, not heard by the said Bhakta there is violation of the said order. Mr. Desai has further submitted that the said Bhakta was exercising quasi-judicial power and exercise of such a power cannot be beyond the principles of natural justice and also cannot be beyond judicial scrutiny. In the submission of Mr. Desai, the said Bhakta has violated the principles of natural justice by not giving any notice of hearings before him to respondents Nos. 4, 5 and 6 and also by not enquiring from them about their disputes in the matter. According to Mr. Desai, in the circumstances, the discretion vested with the said Bhakta is reviewable by the court. Mr. Desai has also submitted that though the said decision given by the said Bhakta records that all parties were heard by him, it is manifestly false. Mr. Desai has further submitted that the said Bhakta either acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction. Mr. Desai has also submitted that the record shows that the said Bhakta never gave any notice to respondents Nos. 4, 5 and 6, which by itself shows that he was biased in the legal sense as against respondents Nos. 4, 5 and 6. In the subm ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... omise that is sought to be made in the proceeding under sections 397 and 398 of the said Act and the compromise effected in ordinary litigation like suits between private parties. The consideration of the interests of the company concerned and public interest relevant in compromise under sections 397 and 398 of the said Act is not with which the court is concerned while considering whether the compromise between private parties in ordinary litigation should be recorded or not. Mr. Chagla has also put reliance on the case of Ittyavira Mathai v. Varkey Varkey, AIR 1964 SC 907, where it has been held that if the suit was barred by time and yet, the court decreed it, the court would be committing an illegality and, therefore, the aggrieved party would be entitled to have the decree set aside by preferring an appeal against it. The apex court further held that it is well settled that the court having jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the suit and over the parties thereto, though bound to decide right may decide wrong; and that even though it decided wrong it would not be doing something which it has no jurisdiction to do. Reliance has also been placed on the case of Hirachand ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... procedure must prevail. The same view has been taken by the Kerala High Court in the case of Mathulla Mathulla v. Thomas George, AIR 1962 Ker 320, on which also reliance has been placed by Mr. Chagla. In support of his submission that the respondents are not entitled to approbate and reprobate, Mr. Chagla has relied upon the case of Nagubai Ammal v. B. Shama Rao, AIR 1956 SC 593, whereat the law as stated in the Halsbury's Laws of England, has been cited with approval. On the principle of promissory estoppel, Mr. Chagla has relied upon the case of Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1979 SC 621, In support of his submission that the valuation made by the said Bhakta is not challengeable, Mr. Chagla has relied upon the case of Jones v. Sherwood Computer Services Pic. [1992] 1 WLR 277, where it has been held by the Court of Appeal that where parties had agreed to be bound by the report of an expert, the report, whether or not it contained reasons for the conclusion in it, could not be challenged in the court on the ground that mistakes had been made in its preparation unless it could be shown that the expert had departed from the in ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Arenson v. Arenson [1973] 2 All ER 235 (CA). In the case of Subir Kumar Basu v. New Central Group Engineering Pvt. Ltd. [1986] 59 Comp Cas 222 (Cal) on which reliance has been placed by Mr. Jethmalani, where, on the facts of the case, it was held that the valuer was not appointed by consent of the parties and there was no dispute between the parties which was referred to the valuer so that he could not be held to be an arbitrator appointed by the parties, it was further held that the chartered accountant was appointed in the same manner as a special officer to make a report to the court on the valuation of the shares of the company which the court intended to treat as a piece of evidence. It was further held that the hearing given by the valuer was ineffective, incomplete and vitiated as the parties did not know and were kept unaware of the material evidence on which the valuer proceeded and this was sufficient to set aside the report of the valuer. Reliance has also been placed on the case of Shree Sadul Textiles Ltd. v. Raja Textiles Ltd. [1973] Tax LR 2119 (Raj) where it has been held that the jurisdiction of the court under sections 397 and 398 of the said Act is of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... roceedings before the said Bhakta as applicability of the principles of natural justice is not restricted to administrative law only. Reliance has also been placed on the case of Swadeshi Cotton Mills Co. Ltd. v. Union of India [1981] 51 Comp Cas 210 ; [1981] 58 FJR 190 ; AIR 1981 SC 818, where it has been held that a quasi-judicial or administrative decision rendered in violation of the audi alteram partem rule.-wherever it can be read as an implied requirement of the law, is null and void. Mr. Desai has also relied upon the case of S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan, AIR 1981 SC 136, where it has been held that where on the admitted or indisputable facts only one conclusion is possible and under the law only one penalty is permissible, the court may not issue its writ to compel the observance of natural justice, not because it approves the non-observance of natural justice but because courts do not issue futile writs. But it will be a pernicious principle to apply in other situations where conclusions are controversial, however slightly, and penalties are discretionary. It is further held by the Supreme Court in that case that it is again absolutely basic to our system that justice ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... quiry in question". In this primitive sense, the difference between jurisdictional error and error of law within jurisdiction has been reduced almost to a vanishing point. Mr. Desai has also relied upon the case of JV. Parthasarathy v. Controller of Capital Issues [1991] 72 Comp Cas 651 ; AIR 1991 SC 1420. In the case of Venkata Subbayya v. Venkataramanayya, AIR 1930 Mad 646, on which reliance has been placed by Mr. Desai, it has been held that if the arbitrator receives evidence given by the plaintiff in the absence of the defendant, the award could be vitiated by the misconduct of the arbitrator. In the case of Tikaram Khupchand v. Hansraj Hazarimal, AIR 1954 Nag 241, it is held that because it was quite open to the arbitrators to decide the case without examining any person, it does not follow that when they considered it necessary to take the statements of parties or witnesses for the disposal of the case, they were free to face such a statement in the absence of any of the parties. In respect of his submission that the petition under sections 397 and 398 of the said Act is per se a representative action, Mr. Desai has relied upon the case of Pioneer Protective Glass ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... inal complaint against the second respondent in the Metropolitan Magistrate's Court at Espla nade, Bombay, for having committed offences under sections 403 and 406 of the Indian Penal Code by having unauthorisedly and fraudulently purported to sell the said properties. Summons has been issued to the second respondent and the said complaint still is pending. There has been justifiable lack of confidence on the part of the petitioners in the second respondent and his conduct of the business and affairs of the said NKIPL and its assets. Mutual confidence and trust no longer subsisted. In the circumstances, the said Company Petitions Nos. 663 of 1986 and 664 of 1986 were filed. At the hearing of the said company petitions before Pendse J., it appears that the second respondent intended to get rid of the petitioners on payment of the value of the shares held by the petitioners and to which the petitioners were entitled in the said NKIPL. As is evident from the oral order passed by Pendse J. on September 7, 1989, Pendse in the interest of the said NKIPL and its creditors suggested to learned counsel appearing before him that, in the facts and circumstances, it would be appropriate if t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... legally passed. The court having jurisdiction over the parties before it and subject-matter had passed the said order in the said company petitions, it cannot be treated as a nullity and ignored in subsequent litigation. In the case of Ittyavira Mathai v. Varkey Varkey, AIR 1964 SC 907, the apex court of our country where the suit was barred by time and yet, the court decreed it, held "that it is well settled that a court having jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the suit and over the parties thereto, though bound to decide right may decide wrong and that even though it decided wrong it would not be doing something which it had no jurisdiction to do. It had the jurisdiction over the subject-matter and it had the jurisdiction over the party and, therefore, merely because it made an error in deciding a vital issue in the suit, it cannot be said that it has acted beyond its jurisdiction. Courts have jurisdiction to decide right or to decide wrong and even though they decide wrong, the decrees rendered by them cannot be treated as nullities. If it fails to do its duty, it merely makes an error of law and an error of law can be corrected only in the manner laid down in the Civ ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... that it is invalid and ask to set it aside, or to set up to the prejudice of persons who have relied upon it a case inconsistent with that upon which it was founded ; nor will he be allowed to go behind an order made in ignorance of the true facts to the prejudice of third parties who have acted on it." Relying upon the promise of the respondents as recorded in the said minutes in accordance therewith the said order was passed, the petitioners permitted the seventh respondent to dispose of the said premises and altered their position. Even on the basis of equitable principle evolved by the courts for doing justice, viz. , the doctrine of promissory estoppel, the respondents are now estopped from challenging the said order as invalid, void and/or illegal. In the case of Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co, Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh [1979] 118 ITR 326 ; [1979] 44 STC 42 ; AIR 1979 SC 621, the Supreme Court has held (headnote of AIR 1979 SC) : "The true principle of promissory estoppel seems to be that where one party has by his words or conduct made to the other a clear and unequivocal promise which is intended to create legal relations or effect a legal relationship to ari ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 24,1992, filed in surrejoinder, the second respondent has stated as under : "I say that I have tried to act in a family spirit and have attempted to accommodate the petitioners in every possible way. I say that in that spirit I had entered into the minutes of the order dated September 7,1989. I say that the result has only been ruinous to me and I am constrained to therefore point out that the agreement underlying the minutes of the order was clearly unenforceable, in breach of law and void." Hence, according to the second respondent himself, since the result has been ruinous to him, he is constrained to challenge the agreement underlying the minutes of the said order and not that the same is void and/or illegal as is now sought to be canvassed on behalf of the respondents. The said minutes of order in accordance therewith the said order was passed contain two things : ( i )Valuation of shares held by the petitioners in the said NKIPL along with all other shares that the petitioners may be entitled to in the said NKIPL by the said Bhakta ; ( ii )Mediation by the said Bhakta in respect of various other matters. Clauses 1 to 4 of the said minutes of order deal with valuat ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the said Bhakta in deciding the mode, manner and quantum of payment to the petitioners even without reference to any of the parties thereto ; in matters pertaining to transfer of shares by the petitioners as also deciding all questions which might be referred to him and specific agreement amongst the parties that the said Bhakta is not to act as an arbitrator in any manner (emphasis supplied) make it absolutely clear that the said Bhakta was not appointed as arbitrator for resolving the disputes and/or differences amongst the parties to the said company petitions. From the said clauses, it is also clear that the said Bhakta was even not required to comply with the principles of natural justice ; he was not required to give a hearing ; he was not required to receive evidence and that he was not required to follow any specified procedure. The directions to be given by the said Bhakta were agreed to be binding and parties were to implement the same after obtaining necessary permissions from requisite authorities including the Reserve Bank of India and order from the court. The petitioners were agreed to be paid the value of the shares held by them along with all other shares that t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... y approves of his utterance in anticipation and adopts that as his own. As held by the Supreme Court in the case of Hirachand Kothari v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1985 SC 998, the principle is the same as that of reference to arbitration. In the facts of the case, I hold that the said order passed by this court in the said company petitions on September 7, 1989, is valid, legal and binding on the parties thereto and that the same is neither invalid nor void or illegal or a nullity. By the said decision, the said Bhakta declared that the petitioners are entitled to an aggregate number of 3,800 equity shares of Rs. 100 each in the said NKIPL which include 484 equity shares, being one fourth share of the petitioners in 1936 equity shares left behind by the said Lilavati Kilachand. The Bhakta has also decided and declared aggregate value of the said 3,800 equity shares at Rs. 4 crores which value has been agreed to and accepted by the parties. He has directed the petitioners to sell their respective shares in the said NKIPL to the second respondent and/or his nominee or nominees or assignees and the second respondent has been directed to purchase the said shares by himself or throu ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... not paid the sum of Rs. 50,00,000 payable on or before September 15,1991, under the said decision. As a matter of fact no amount has been paid by the second respondent to the petitioners under the said decision. Defaults having been committed by the second respondent in payment of the amounts on their respective due dates, the entire sum of Rs. 4 crores together with interest as provided in the said decision has become payable. The second respondent after having disposed of the said premises as aforesaid and appropriating the sale proceeds in respect thereof to his own benefit, has now chosen to raise various false and frivolous disputes denying the liability for payment of the said sum of Rs. 4 crores and interest to the petitioners in accordance with the said decision. Even respondents Nos. 4, 5 and 6 have joined hands with the second respondent in raising false and frivolous disputes to implementation of the said decision. Respondents Nos. 4, 5 and 6 were duly represented through their counsel when the said order was passed. They were fully aware about the said order and scope and ambit of inquiry required to be made by the. said Bhakta in pursuance thereof. At all material t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s held by the petitioners and to which the petitioners were entitled in the said NKIPL were to be purchased by the second respondent or his nominee or nominees or assignees, the mode, manner and quantum of payment in respect thereof was to be decided by the said Bhakta in his sole discretion without reference to any of the parties thereto. In any event, there is identity of interest between the second respondent and respondents Nos. 4, 5 and 6. The grievance now sought to be made by respondents Nos. 4, 5 and 6 about they or their alleged interest being allegedly disregarded by the said Bhakta is not only devoid of any merit but is also an after-thought on their part intended to help the second respondent while acting in collusion with him. Besides this, although neither of the respondents was entitled to any hearing before the said Bhakta, as stated in the minutes of the said order, the said Bhakta was to decide the mode, manner and quantum of payment of the value of the said shares entirely in his discretion without reference to any of the parties thereto, as mentioned in the said decision, the said Bhakta did hold numerous meetings with the parties and/or their respective advocat ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... in him and has not abused or misused his powers under the said order, no interference of this court is called for. The said Bhakta was not exercising quasi-judicial power under the said order. The said decision is not subject to judicial review. The cases of S. Partap Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1964 SC 72 and Union of India v. Tarachand Gupta and Bros., AIR 1971 SC 1558, relied upon by Mr. Desai has no applicability to the facts of the instant case. Under the minutes of the said order the parties had agreed that all, the shares held by the petitioners in the said NKIPL along with all other shares to which they might be entitled in the said NKIPL could be valued by the said Bhakta who was then a solicitor for respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 7 to 11. It was also agreed that the determination of the quantum of payment to be made in respect of such shares would be entirely in the discretion of the said Bhakta who was entitled to decide the same without reference to any of the parties. In the said decision, the said Bhakta has stated as under : "I hereby decide and declare that the aggregate value of the said 3,800 equity shares is Rs. 4,00,00,000 (rupees four crores), which va ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... lue of the said shares at Rs. 4 crores. On matters of opinion, the court has not to interfere as has been laid down in the case of Dean v. Prince [1953] 1 All ER 749 (CA) ; [1953] 1 Ch D 409. As held in the case of Jones v. Sherwood Computer Services Pic. [1992] 1 WLR 277 (CA) in the facts of the case, the valuation of the said equity shares decided by the said Bhakta is binding on the parties and is not capable of being challenged nor it is subject to judicial review. As is evident from the said order, the right of the petitioners to receive the fair value in respect of the shares held by the petitioners along with all other shares to which the petitioners were entitled in the said NKIPL was crystalised as on the date of the said order, i.e. , September 7, 1989. The mode, manner and quantum of such payment was agreed to be decided by the said Bhakta as per the minutes of the said order. Moreover, the said decision does not disclose the data on the basis of which the said Bhakta has made valuation of the said 3,800 equity shares and as such, no enquiry in respect thereof is called for. Even otherwise, it has been held in the case of Malati Ramchandra Raut v. Mahadevo ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ard are not available in the instant case. Even if principles on which an award can be set aside as laid down in a catena of decisions commencing from the decisions of the Privy Council in the case of Champsey Bhara and Co. v. Jivraj Balloo Spg. and Wvg. Co. [1923] AC 480, where it is held that an award of arbitration can be set aside on the ground of error of law on the face of the award only when in the award or in a document incorporated with it, there is found some legal proposition which is the basis of the award and which is erroneous, are applied, I hold that no legal proposition is stated in the said decision which is made basis thereof and is erroneous. The said decision is not such as no reasonable man could, in the facts of the case, have arrived at. The said decision is not perverse. There is no non-application of mind on the part of the said Bhakta. The said Bhakta was not biased nor has be misconducted himself or the proceedings before him. There has been neither fraud on power nor jurisdictional error. The said decision is not bad in law. It is proper, valid and capable of being translated into orders of this court. It is needless to say that no litigant can be p ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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