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2003 (2) TMI 403

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..... stalments of Rs. 21,10,322. There is a clause in this Agreement which stipulates that any decrease or increase in the number of buses will not in any manner change/alter the monthly rental fees. By Clause 9(C) the parties were competent to terminate the contract without assigning any reason, but on giving three months notice in writing. This clause has been invoked by the DTC and after the expiry of three months the contract between the parties was sought to have been terminated with effect from 2-2-2003. This letter dated 2-11-2002 is reproduced in extensio : "To The Pioneer Publicity Corporation, 227, Office Complex, Jhandewalan (M-1) New Delhi - 110055 Sub : - Notice for termination of contract. Sir, The contract for advertisement on buses of D.T.C. was awarded to you vide letter No. Pub./2000/4(15/633 dated 5-9-2000) for East, West, North Zone, and South Zone (w.e.f. 20-11-2000). The matter has been reviewed by the competent authority in view of the directions of the Hon ble Supreme Court as well as of Govt. of N.C.T. of Delhi and it has been decided to discontinue the advertisement on buses forthwith on the DTC buses. Accordingly, this three months noti .....

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..... ion by three months notice simplicitor no interference was called for by this Court. It is also her contention that if the prayers in the petition are granted it would be tantamount to the Court directing and decreeing the specific performance of the contract. She forcefully contended that this would not be a proper course to adopt in view of section 9 of the Specific Relief Act especially since the contract was determinable. Therefore, section 14 of the Specific Relief Act imme-diately comes into play. It is further contended by her that the principal requisite for the grant of relief would be for the Court concluding that the termination was bad and illegal and this determination should properly be left to the Arbitrator. Ms. Jyoti Singh has relied on a decision of a Single Judge of this Court in Classic Motors Ltd. v. Maruti Udyog Ltd. 65 (1997) DLT 166 where it was held that - "In view of the long catena of decisions and consistent view of the Supreme Court, I hold that in private commercial transaction the parties could terminate a contract even without assigning any reason with a reasonable period of notice in terms of such a Clause in the agreement. The submission that t .....

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..... of prejudicing the reputation of the appellant-Corporation; and such acts would permit exercise of the right of termination of distributorship under clause 27. However, the arbitrator having held that clause 27 was not available to the appellant-Corporation, the question of grant of relief on that finding has to proceed on that basis. In such a situation, the Agreement being revokable by either party in accordance with clause 28 by giving thirty days notice, the only relief which could be granted was the award of compensation for the period of notice, that is, 30 days. The Plaintiff-respondent No. 1 is, therefore, entitled to compensation being the loss of earnings for the notice period of thirty days instead of restoration of the distributorship. The award has, therefore, to be modified accordingly. The compensation for thirty days notice period from 11-3-1983 is to be calculated on the basis of earnings during that period disclosed from the records of the Indian Oil Corporation Ltd." Predicated on these decisions it has been contended on behalf of the Respondent that the prayer for injunction should be rejected as the Petitioner had adequate remedy of proving damages, if any, .....

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..... ional engagement is used therein to distinguish it from appointment to a post under the Government in the strict sense. This, however, does not necessarily mean that a person who is not a Government servent holding a post under the Government does not hold any public office and the engagement is purely private with no public element attaching to it. This part of clause (3) of para 7.06 means only this and no more. The other part of clause (3) which enables the Government to terminate the appointment at any time without assigning any cause can also not be considered in the manner suggested by the learned Additional Advocate General. The expression at any time merely means that the termination may be made even during the subsistence of the term of appointment and without assigning any cause means without communicating any cause to the appointee whose appointment is terminated. However, without assigning any cause is not to be equated with without existence of any cause . It merely means that the reason for which the termination is made need not to be assigned or communicated to the appointee. It was held in Liberty Oil Mills v. Union of India that the expression with .....

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..... ir play, lack of arbitrariness, and its being founded on good and sound reasons. Government s freedom to contract as well as freedom to break free from the obligations of a contract is now rightly restricted in diverse manners. While the Government may enjoy the role of distribution of largesse, it may also suffer from the vulnerability of committing errors or perpetrating an inequitable or unjust implementation of its policies through its faceless and unidentifiable officers and agents. It, therefore, behoves the Court to treat Government contracts in a manner altogether different to that of the compact between private parties. Reliance of Ms. Jyoti Singh on the decisions mentioned above is of no avail as the learned authors of the judgments have taken care to highlight the fact that they had to pronounce upon contracts between private parties. The Hon ble Supreme Court has opined that even where the State is empowered by a particular clause in a contract to terminate it by a notice simplicitor, the only possible construction that can be given to such a clause is that the reasons which prevailed upon it for justifying the termination need not be conveyed to the adversary. The Apex .....

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..... peal against the finding of the High Court that the mere visibility of the hoarding to the traffic is sufficient for either removing the hoarding or from refusing to grant a license or from renewing a license. Mr. Chandhiok has also pointed out that the Commissioner-Secretary, Transport Department, Government of NCT had filed an affidavit in M.C. Mehta v. Union of India [Writ Petition No. 13029 of 1985] pending before the Hon ble Supreme Court praying that the advertisements and hoardings be permitted on Kiosks and street lamp posts as also on DTC bus-shelters with appropriate restrictions of size and the colour as such advertisements or hoardings would generate necessary funds for the agency. I cannot appreciate the Respondent s stand that its decision to put an end to the Contract was to implement the direction of the State Government. This is merely an ipse dixit . Keeping in view the provisions of Order XXXIX Rule 2 it is no longer possible to contend that the Court does not possess power to prohibit or prevent the breach of contract. If this is possible in the realm of private contracts, it is an obligation in the realm of public enterprises. Furthermore, the provisions o .....

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