9911796707
TMI Blog2007 (9) TMI 407X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... usiness of marketing of oils, etc. According to the petitioner, the respondent is indebted to it for a sum of Rs. 10,97,574, that, despite its repeated requests and demands, the respondent had failed and neglected to pay its dues and as such is unable to pay its debts and is, therefore, liable to be wound up. The petitioner would contend that the respondent had approached them, vide letter dated July 27, 2003, to provide 85 Reliance India Mobile (RIM) phone connections under the "Corporate Scheme" for its use, that it had filled up the requisite customer application form C.A.F. No. 5900999683 on June 28, 2003, and that, on the basis of the application, 85 RIM handsets were duly allotted, activated and delivered to the respondent vide delivery challan No. 46592 dated June 28, 2003. The petitioner would submit that the respondent had surrendered eight handsets and had subscribed additional thirty RIM phone connections vide C.A.F. No. 2803310741, that these RIM handsets were also activated and that the respondent, while retaining two RIM handsets had later surrendered 28 RIM handsets. The petitioner would submit that, despite having extensively availed its services, the respondent had ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... various outlets of the respondent in the twin cities, that they would pay commission to the respondent on these connections, that negotiations took place and ultimately a memorandum of understanding dated March 25, 2003, was executed between the petitioner and the respondent under which it was agreed that the petitioner would also provide 30 handsets for promoting the sales of RIM phones, that these phones would be provided exclusively to those representatives who were engaged in the promotional campaign and that, for these 30 handsets, no charges would be levied. While denying that it had retained two of the thirty handsets, respondent would contend that these two handsets were misplaced by the officials of the petitioner, that there was no necessity for them to retain two handsets and the very admission that they had surrendered 28 RIM phone connections would itself establish that the thirty RIM phone connections were given exclusively for the promotional campaign under the "Monsoon Hungama Scheme". While denying the allegation that it had neglected to pay the alleged outstanding dues of Rs. 10,97,574, respondent would submit that the petitioner had failed to send the bills regu ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... that they were sending bills periodically, that the facility to view the bills was also provided free of cost on each of the mobile phones, that the respondent could have approached any of the Reliance Web World outlets to find out the dues payable by them, that clause 5(ii) of the Customer Application Form required the respondents to enquire about the bills, that the memorandum of understanding showed that the respondent had approached the petitioner for providing them handsets under the "Monsoon Hungama Scheme" for sales promotion activities, that the statement of the respondent that no charges could be levied for the thirty handsets was false since the petitioner had not held out any such promise, that only calls made from these 30 RIM phones to other RIM phones were free and that calls to other phones were chargeable, that it was false to allege that the officials of the petitioner had misplaced two handsets, that there was complete absence of bona fides on the part of the respondent who had not denied usage of the RIM phones, that non-payment of even a single rupee towards the legitimate bills raised by the petitioner clearly discredited their claim of being financially strong ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 00999683 dated June 28, 2003, eighty five RIM handsets were supplied to the respondent of which eight were returned, that later 30 RIM handsets were supplied vide C.A.F. No. 2803310741 of which 28 were returned, that, even if the respondent's contention that the dues in respect of the first block of 77 phones should be limited only to Rs.700 per phone per month were to be accepted, since the respondent had not paid even a single rupee the entire amount was due from them to the petitioner. Learned counsel would refer to exhibit B. 15 letter dated April 15, 2004, to contend that the respondent was due a sum of Rs. 3.57 lakhs till December, 2003, as the fact of RIM phones being supplied and activated is not in dispute the respondents were liable to pay the monthly bills due and, since the admitted liability is far in excess of Rs. 500, (the minimum amount stipulated under section 434(1)(a) of the Companies Act), and they had neglected to pay the amount due despite notice being issued calling upon them to make payment within 3 weeks, the respondent must be deemed to be unable to pay its debts and as such liable to be wound up. Learned counsel would refer to the statement of accounts, e ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ayment till January, 2004 and thereafter to depute its personnel, along with two representatives of the petitioner, to collect dues of February and March, 2004, from each of the individual dealers of the respondent to whom RIM handsets had been supplied by the petitioner under the "Corporate Scheme" and, only if these bills were not paid, was the respondent required to make good the dues. Learned counsel would submit that though the petitioner had agreed, in its letter dated April 12, 2004, that its' personnel, along with the team of the respondent, would fill up the transfer of ownership forms of the dealers, while collecting the February and March, 2004 dues, they had made no efforts to approach the dealers for collection of February or March, 2004, dues or to transfer ownership and that, in any event, the respondent cannot be said to be due any amount towards these RIM handsets under the "Corporate Scheme" from April, 2004 onwards. Learned counsel would submit that the accounts statement, relied upon by the petitioner, was erroneous inasmuch as they had combined the commission paid to Sheetal Infocomm and Sheetal Refinery though they had agreed that M/s. Sheetal Refineries Pvt. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 835 (SC) ; [1994] 3 SCC 348, Mediqup Systems P. Ltd. v. Proximo Medical System GmbH [2005] 124 Comp Cas 473 (SC) ; [2005] 7 SCC 42, Airwings P. Ltd. v. Viktoria Air Cargo GmbH [1995] 84 Comp Cas 688 (Kar.) ; AIR 1995 Kar. 69, Excel Embroideries v. Trend Designs Ltd., AIR 1997 Ker. 329, Kesar Enterprises Ltd. v. IDI Ltd. [2002] 112 Comp Cas 174 (Bom.), Premlal Birla v. Gilt Pack Ltd. [2004] 121 Comp. Cas. 802 (MP), Mysore Sales International Ltd. v. United Breweries Ltd. [2005] 6 Kar. LJ 615 ; [2006] 133 Comp. Cas. 190 (Kar.) and Benares Cotton and Silk Mills Ltd. v. Sulbha Devi Gupta [1986] 60 Comp. Cas. 639 (All.) in this regard. Importance of pleadings : It is a matter of serious concern that very little attention is paid to pleadings. Both the petition and the counter-affidavit are bereft of even the basic facts necessary for effective adjudication of the questions raised. Both Sri Prabhakar Sripada, learned counsel for the petitioner, and Sri B. Chandrasen Reddy, learned counsel for the respondent, have relied extensively on the documents placed before this court to buttress their submissions both for and against "admission and advertisement of the company petition". The imp ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... f the case set up, and the documents relied upon by the petitioner, the claim is barred, either in whole or in part, to the extent such claim is barred by time the court is not required to adjudicate on merits. Vijayalakshmi Art Productions v. Vijaya Productions P. Ltd. [1997] 88 Comp. Cas. 353 (Mad.). "The period of limitation" has been defined under section 2( j) of the Limitation Act, 1963, to mean the period of limitation prescribed, for any suit, appeal or application by the Schedule, and "prescribed period" has been defined to mean the period of limitation computed in accordance with the provisions of the Limitation Act. Under section 3(1), subject to the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24, every suit instituted, appeal preferred and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a defence. Under section 3(2)(a)(iii ), for purposes of the Limitation Act, a suit is instituted, in the case of a claim against a company which is being wound up by the court, when the claimant first sends in his claim to the official liquidator. The Schedule to the Limitation Act prescribes the period of limitation. The first divis ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n operates in favour of all the creditors and contributories of the company as if it had been made on their joint petition. A petition does not cease to be maintainable thereafter, merely because the debt of the creditor which was within limitation on the date of filing the petition, is time-barred subsequently at the date of the hearing. If that were so, section 447 would be rendered nugatory for, by the time the petition comes up for hearing, the debt would, more often than not, be barred by limitation. There is nothing in the Companies Act to hold that a petition for winding up, which was properly maintainable when filed, ceased to be so maintainable if, at the date of the order, the debt on which the petition was based was barred by limitation. If a petition, which was maintainable on the date of its filing, is held to be not maintainable because the debt is barred by limitation on the date of the hearing, over which the creditor has no control, it would, for no fault of his, work to his prejudice. (Modern Dekor Painting Contracts P. Ltd. v. Jenson and Nicholson (India) Ltd. [1985] 58 Comp. Cas. 255 (Bom.) ; Maharashtra Small Scale Industries Development Corporation v. Trawlers ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the law of insolvency), all debts payable on a contingency, and all claims against the company, present or future, certain or contingent, ascertained or sounding only in damages, shall be admissible to proof against the company, a just estimate being made, so far as possible, of the value of such debts or claims as may be subject to any contingency, or may sound only in damages, or for some other reason may not bear a certain value. section 229 : In the winding up of an insolvent company the same rules shall prevail and be observed with regard to the respective rights of secured and unsecured creditors and to debts provable and to the valuation of annuities and future and contingent liabilities as are in force for the time being under the law of insolvency with respect to estates of persons adjudged insolvent; and all persons who in any such case would be entitled to prove for and receive dividends out of the assets of the company may come in under the winding up, and make such claims against the company as they respectively are entitled to by virtue of this section. section 529 : Application of insolvency rules in winding up of insolvent companies.- (1)In the winding up of an ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... eiver as hereinafter provided, and shall become divisible among the creditors, and thereafter, except as provided by this Act, no creditor to whom the insolvent is indebted in respect of any debt provable under this Act, shall during the pendency of the insolvency proceedings have any remedy against the property of the insolvent in respect of the debt, or commence any suit or other legal proceeding, except with the leave of the court and on such terms as the court may impose. (3) For the purposes of sub-section (2), all goods being at the date of the presentation of the petition on which the order is made, in the pos session, order or disposition of the insolvent in his trade or business, by the consent and permission of the true owner, under such circumstances that he is the reputed owner thereof, shall be deemed to be the property of the insolvent. (4) All property which is acquired by or devolves on the insolvent after the date of an order of adjudication and before his discharge shall forthwith vest in the court or receiver, and the provisions of sub-section (2) shall apply in respect thereof. (5) The property of the insolvent for the purposes of this section shall not inclu ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ion 12, a decision under section shall be deemed to be a decree. (2) Where an order of adjudication has been annulled under this Act in computing the period of limitation prescribed for any suit or application for the execution of a decree (other than a suit or application in respect of which the leave of the court was obtained under sub-section (2) of section 28) which might have been brought or made but for the making of an order of adjudication under this Act, the period from the date of the order of adjudication to the date of the order of annulment shall be excluded: Provided that nothing in this section shall apply to a suit or application in respect of a debt provable but not proved under this Act. Section 28(7) read with section 34(2) of the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920, provides that a claim, which is not time-barred on the date of presentation of the petition for adjudication, can be admitted to proof even though it may become barred on the actual date of adjudication. (A. Subramania Iyer v. S. Meenakshisundaram Chettiar, AIR 1937 Mad. 577 ; Byramji Bomanji Talati v. Official Assignee, AIR 1936 Bom 130 and Ram Chand Puri v. Lahore Enamelling and Stamping Co. Ltd. [19 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... debt from the company even when his winding up petition is pending and no final order has been passed thereon. Consequently, to suspend the operation of limitation even before the winding up order was passed was not contemplated at all. Reference may be made to Palmer's Company Law, volume I, page 1166, paragraph 85.53 reads (page 645 of 60 Comp. Cas.) : "A statute-barred debt does not constitute a 'liability' of the company for the purposes of winding up. The liquidator in a compulsory winding up or an insolvent voluntary winding up is under a duty to reject the proof of a statute-barred debt; in a solvent voluntary winding up, he must do so likewise unless the contributories consent... A winding up order stops the period of limitation from running in the company's favour so that a debt which is not statute barred at the date of the order can be proved for." Buckley on the Companies Acts, 13th edition, page 630, section 316 states (page 646 of 60 Comp Cas) : " 'The assets are to be applied in payment of liabilities subsisting at the time of the winding up order ; after the order is made, statutes of limitations do not run. But, of course, a debt barred at the date of the order ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... erfere with the law of limitation and especially with the rule embodied in section 9 of the Indian Limitation Act. Moreover, if the scope of the doctrine of relation back is widened that will introduce considerable uncertainty regarding the termination of the period of limitation." With respect, we entirely agree with the view expressed by Tek Chand J. (page 648 of 60 Comp Cas) : "On a consideration of the law and the various decisions cited above, we are of the opinion that the material date for the purposes of computing the limitation is the date of passing of the order on the winding up petition, which is commonly known as winding up order. We are further of the view that the date of making of the application for winding up is not the material date for the purposes of section 171 of the Indian Companies Act. We are also of the view that there is no question of relating back the winding up order to the date of the making of application for winding up . . ." (emphasis supplied) In Lahore Enamelling and Stamping Co. Ltd. v. A.K. Bhalla [1958] 28 Comp Cas 216, the question which arose for consideration before the Punjab High Court was whether the claims submitted by the creditors ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... er the insolvency law and also under the Companies Act the order of adjudication or the order of winding up is an extraneous circumstance which affects the question of limitation. Under both laws the final order dates back to the filing of the original petition. This is not a legal fiction but the result of a specific provision of law and must be given full effect to. There is nothing extraordinary or questionable in the fact that limitation is extended by virtue of section 28(7) in the case of insolvency law and section 168 in the case of company law. The creditor may well take the risk to pursue his remedy in a civil court or wait for the decision of the winding up proceedings. He may well say to himself that if the order of winding up is going to be made, it would be so much waste of time and money on his part to pursue a remedy in a civil court. The financial state of the company may be such that it may be inadvisable to pursue the ordinary remedy in a court of law and he may well decide to await the decision of the company court and take his chance on receiving a portion of the dividends which would be paid out to creditors. Simply because there is no specific embargo on the f ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... la [1958] 28 Comp Cas 216, explained the observations made by the single judge of the Allahabad High Court in Jwala Prasad v. Jwala Bank ltd. [1957] 27 Comp Cas 310 and expressed its disapproval of the opinion expressed by the Division Bench of the Punjab High Court in Ram Chand Puri v. Lahore Enamelling and Stamping Co. ltd. [1960] 30 Comp Cas 515. In S. Abdul Muthalibu v. K.M. Mohammed Abdul Khader [1962] 32 Comp Cas 1102 (Mad.), the question which arose for consideration, before the Division Bench of the Madras High Court, was whether a claim put in by a creditor, before the liquidator in winding up proceedings, was barred by limitation. The creditor had advanced a sum of Rs. 375 on January 12, 1952, and a further sum of Rs. 50 on March 1, 1952. The application for winding up was presented on November 22, 1954, and the company was ordered to be wound up on October 14, 1955. Reckoning the period of 3 years, from the date of the debt, the claim was barred by limitation on October 14, 1955, but not on November 22, 1954. The creditor filed the claim on March 26, 1956. The Division Bench observed (page 1106) : " . . . a suit can be filed even when a winding up order has been made i ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t should have instituted a suit before January 12, 1955, (three years from the date of the first debt), though it would normally be merely waste of money. On the other hand the view which we are taking would permit him to wait without instituting a suit and avail himself of the distribution of the dividends in due course, which is all that he could reasonably hope to get. Of course it may turn out in some cases that the petition for winding up was frivolous and is eventually dismissed. In such a case the benefit of advancing the date of the claim to the date of presentation of the petition for winding up will not be available. In such a case the creditor must obviously file a suit in time. But there is no reason why in a case where the winding up order is made, the creditor should not be allowed to wait and should be forced to file a suit wasting money. In fact, it may happen that even if he files and obtains a decree he may not be able to execute it in view of the terms of section 171 of the Companies Act, 1913, (section 446). It is needless to add that the creditor cannot file any claim in the winding up proceeding till after the winding up order is made and if retrospective effe ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... J opined : " . . .I now return to the issue : whether time ceases to run on the presentation of the petition or the making of the winding up order. I start by looking at the Limitation Act 1980. The purpose of the Act is to provide time limits for the bringing of actions of various classes. The class here is that of actions founded on simple contract. Actions, so founded are not to be brought after expiration of six years from the date on which the cause of action accrued : section 5. 'Action' is defined in section 38(1) to include : 'any proceeding in a court of law. . .'.In this context it must mean any form of initiating process and would include a creditors petition to wind up a company, as was held by Mervyn Vavies ]. in Karnos Property Co. Ltd., In re [1989] BCLC 340 (Ch. D). Accordingly, as from the date of the presentation of the petition, the petitioning-creditor has brought an action founded on the debt owed to him and stopped time running against him. Mr. Phillips submitted that the presentation of the petition was the initiation of a class remedy on behalf of all the creditors whose rights are thus suspended until the order is made which quantifies their rights. He th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tion for recovery of the debt owed to him, within the period of limitation as on the date of presentation of a petition for winding up, time would stop running against him thereafter in computing the period of limitation. Even in the event of the winding up petition being dismissed by the company court, or in appeal, the position of the petitioning-creditor may be different from other creditors who later joined as parties to the winding up proceedings having regard to the provisions of section 14 of the Limitation Act which saves the time spent in the prosecution of bona fide proceedings. Ram Chand Puri v. Lahore Enamelling and Stamping Co. Ltd. [1960] 30 Comp Cas 515 (Punj.). In this context reference can usefully be made to section 78(2) of the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920, as the rules prescribed therein apply equally to winding up proceedings. It is evident that, on the date of presentation of the company petition, the debt allegedly due to the petitioning-creditor is within the prescribed period of limitation. The contention that in August, 2007, when the company petition was heard on admission and advertisement, the claim of the petitioning-creditor was barred by limitat ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ues. The object and scope of winding up of a company under the Companies Act is entirely different. It cannot be confined to the claim of the petitioner alone but has to be viewed, judged and tested in its entirety, including the petitioner's claim, the defence taken by the company in relation to the claim in question, the financial position of the company, its viability, commercial sustainability in the market, etc., whether or not the debt is admitted by the respondent. The petitions for winding up ought not to be entertained unless a very strong prima facie case is made out on facts. (Mysore Sales International Ltd. v. United Breweries Ltd. Bangalore [2006] 133 Comp Cas 190 (Kar.); [2005] 6 Kar. LJ 615). A debt under section 433 (e) must be a determined or a definite sum of money payable immediately or at a future date The words "unable to pay its dues" in section 433(e) should be taken in the commercial sense, in that, it is unable to meet its current demands, i.e., it is plainly and commercially insolvent-that is to say, its assets are such and its existing liabilities are such as to make it reasonably certain-as to make the court feel satisfied-that the existing and provable ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... eglected to pay", i.e., omitted to pay without reasonable cause and that a condition of insolvency in the commercial sense exists. (Federal Chemical Works Ltd., In re [1964] 34 Comp Cas 963 (All.) and Kanchanaganga Chemical Industries v. Mysore Chipboards Ltd. [1998] 91 Comp Cas 646 (Kar.)). In Madhusudan Gordhandas and Co. v. Madhu Woollen Industries P. Ltd. [1971] 3 SCC 632 ; [1972] 42 Comp. Cas. 125 , the Supreme Court observed (page 131) : "Two rules are well-settled. First, if the debt is bona fide disputed and the defence is a substantial one, the court will not wind up the company . . . Where the debt is undisputed the court will not act upon a defence that the company has the ability to pay the debt but the company chooses not to pay that particular debt, (see A Company, In re [1894] 2 Ch. D 349; 94 SJ 369 (Ch.D.)). Where, however, there is no doubt that the company owes the creditor a debt entitling him to a winding up order but the exact amount of the debt is disputed the court will make a winding up order without requiring the creditor to quantify the debt precisely, (see Tweeds Garages Ltd., In re [1962] 32 Comp Cas 795 (Ch. D) ; [1962] Ch. D 406 ). The principles on ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... to be kept in mind at the time of consideration as to whether the application should be admitted on the allegations mentioned in the petition. (Hind Overseas P. Ltd. v. Raghunath Prasad Jhunjhunwalla [1976] 46 Comp Cas 91 (SC) ; AIR 1976 SC 565). While a detailed inquiry at the preliminary stage of admission should be avoided, courts should nonetheless consider the dispute raised by the company. This can be achieved on assessment and appreciation of the evidence placed before the court at the stage of the admission. It is for the limited purpose of arriving at a conclusion whether a bona fide, serious and substantial dispute arises or not, that the court examines the matter. The court looks out for a prima facie case. If a petitioner makes out a prima facie case, then the court would exercise its discretion. The remedy afforded is an equitable one. (P.G. Bhatia and Co. v. Softsule P. Ltd. [1977] 47 Comp Cas 438 (Bom.)). A prima facie case does not mean a case proved to the hilt but a case which can be said to be established if the evidence which is led in support of the same were believed. While determining whether a prima facie case had been made out the relevant consideration is ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ney. (ii)Whether the said debt is within limitation ; (iii)Whether the defence of the company is valid and bona fide or whether it is a mere moonshine. (iv) Whether, from the material on record, a presumption arises that the company is unable to pay its debts as contemplated under section 434(1)(a) or (b ) as the case may be ; or (v)Whether, from the material on record, the court is prima facie satisfied that the company is commercially insolvent as contemplated under section 434(1) (c). The company court ought to examine the material placed before it by the petitioning-creditor and further evidence, if any, which the company court may require the petitioning-creditor to furnish. The company court must also examine the evidence placed before it by the respondent-company at the stage of admission. The balance-sheet of the company is one such document which may be kept in view. On assessment of the evidence, let in by the petitioning-creditor and the contesting company, if the company court comes to the conclusion that the company, prima facie, appears to be commercially insolvent, a rebuttable presumption would arise under section 434(1)(c) that the company is unable to pay its ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t till January, 2004 and that, in case any of the dealers did not agree to pay the dues of February and March, 2004, the respondent would make good the payment. The petitioner agreed that its personnel, along with the representatives of the respondent, would simultaneously fill up the transfer of ownership forms for these dealers while collecting the February and March, 2004 dues and sought the respondent's whole hearted co-operation in the matter. The petitioner's claim for payment of dues towards the phone bills for thirteen months from June, 2003 till July, 2004, is disputed and it is contended that the respondents are liable to make payment at Rs. 700 per telephone per month only for eight months from June, 2003 till January, 2004. The accounts statement, relied upon by the petitioner, indicates that Rs. 10,97,574 is due from the respondent. While the said accounts statement shows that the commission paid by the petitioner is Rs. 4,32,333, it is contended on behalf of the respondents that only two demand drafts for Rs. 1,70,610 and Rs. 88,608, i.e., Rs. 2,59,228 was paid to them as commission and that payments under the other three demand drafts was made to M/s. Sheetal Infoco ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d by them under the "Monsoon Hungama Scheme". The memorandum of understanding a copy of which has been filed by the respondent, would indicate that the petitioner is liable to pay commission at Rs. 500 per RIM phone sold by the respondent to its dealers, i.e., Rs. 150 in the month following the month in which delivery of the handset was effected, Rs. 150 on the customer staying on the RIM network and paying two billing cycles and Rs. 200 on the customer staying on the RIM network and paying three billing cycles. Whether the customers, to whom the RIM handsets were delivered, continued to stay on in the RIM network for three months is not discernible from the evidence on record. While it is not for this court, in summary proceedings for winding up, to adjudicate on the merits in issue, the correspondence referred to hereinabove indicates that the respondent's defence, to the petitioner's claim, is bona fide, and not a moonshine. The audited balance-sheet of the respondent, for the year ending March 31, 2007, would show that its reserves as on that date exceeded Rs. 4.21 crores, its net current assets exceeded Rs. 21 crores and that its profits before tax for the year ending March 31 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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