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TMI Blog1961 (5) TMI 54X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... pondent's case the appellant purchased from it 3,307 tons of coal at the rate of Rs. 14-9-0 per ton between January 1952, and March 1953. The price for this coal was Rs. 48,158-4-0. Since the appellant did not pay the price due from it the respondent filed the present suit in-the Court of the District Judge, Umaria, and claimed a decree for Rs. 52,514-14-0 including interest accrued due on the amount until the date of the suit. A substantial part of, the respondent's claim was disputed by the appellant. It was urged by the appellant in its written statement that the amount claimed by the respondent had been arbitrarily calculated and that for a substantial part of the coal purchased by the appellant from the respondent due price had been paid. The appellant pleaded that for some time past it had stopped purchasing coal 'from the respondent and it was obtaining its supplies from Messrs Sood Brothers, Calcutta, to whom payments for the coal supply had been duly made. The appellant admitted its liability to pay Rs.7,496-11-0 and it expressed its readiness and willingness to pay the said amount. On these pleadings the learned trial judge framed seven issues. It appears that on the d ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... period of Limitation the illness of Ramlal cannot be said to be sufficient cause for condoning the delay though it was only one day's delay. On the other hand, the appellant urged that it had a right to file the appeal on the last day and so the. delay of one day which it was required to explain by sufficient reason had been satisfactorily explained. The learned-Judicial Commissioner, however, accepted the plea raised by the respondent and in substance, refused to excuse delay on the ground that the appellant's partner had showed lack of diligence and negligence during the *hole of the period of Limitation allowed for the appeal. It is on this ground that the application for condonation of delay was rejected and the appeal was dismissed on August 6, 1955. The appellant then applied to the Judicial Commissioner for a certificate and urged that on the question of construction of s. 5 of the Limitation Act there was a conflict of judicial opinion' and so the point decided by the Judicial Commissioner was one of general importance. This argument was accepted by the- Judicial Commissioner and so a certificate of fitness has been issued by him under Art. 133 of the Constitution. It is w ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d of limitation prescribed has expired the decree-holder has obtained a benefit under the law of limitation to treat the decree as beyond challenge, and this legal right which has accrued to the decree-holder by lapse of time should not be lightheartedly disturbed. The other consideration which cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause for excusing delay is shown discretion is given to the Court to condone delay and admit the appeal. This discretion has been deliberately conferred on the Court in order that judicial power and discretion in that behalf should be exercised to advance substantial justice. As has been observed by the Madras High Court in Krishna v. Chattapan (1890) J.L.R. 13 Mad. 269. "s. 5 gives the Court a discretion which in respect of jurisdiction is to be exercised in the way in which judicial power and discretion ought to be exercised upon principles which are well understood; the words "sufficient cause' receiving a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence nor inaction nor want of bona fide is imputable to the appellant." Now, what do the words "within such period" denote ? It is possible that the expression ',within such ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d by some of the High Courts and their decisions show a conflict on the point. In Karalicharan Sarma v. Apurbakrishna Bajpeyi (1931)I.R.L 58 Cal 549, it appeared that the papers for appeal were handed over by the appellant to his advocate in the morning of the last day for filing the appeal. Through pressure of urgent work the advocate did not look into the papers till the evening of that day when he found that was the last day. The appeal ",as filed the next day. According to the majority decision of the Calcutta High Court, in the circumstances just indicated there was sufficient cause to grant the appellant an extension of a day under s. 5 of the Limitation Act because it was held that it was enough if the appellant satisfied the Court that for sufficient cause he was prevented from filing the appeal on the last day and his action during the whole of the period need not be explained. This decision is in favour of the appellant and is in accord with the view which we are inclined to take. On the other hand, in Kedarnath v. Zumberlal A.I.R. 1916 Nag, 39 the Judicial Commissioner at Nagpur has expressed the view that an appellant who wailfully leaves the preparation and presentati ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... y have only themselves to blame if they should find that some thing has happened which was unexpected, but which ought to be reckoned and are not entitled in such circumstances to the indulgence of the court." These observations are subject to the same comment that we have made about the Nagpur decision A.I.R. 1916 Nag. 39. It is, however, necessary to emphasise that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the Court by s. 5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condoning delay has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the Court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the enquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally b ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... om the question with which we are concerned; and it is in regard to the delay made between August 9, 1895 to September 16, 1895 that the Privy Council approved of the view taken by the High Court that the said delay had not been satisfactorily explained. We do not see how this decision can assist us in interpreting the provisions of s. 5. The next case on which reliance has been placed by the respondent is Bri Indar Singh v. K anshi Ram (1917) L.R. 44 I.A. 218. The Principal point decided in that had reference to 8. 14 read with 8. 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908; and the question which it was whether the time occupied by an application in (food faith for review, although made upon a mistaken view of the law, should be deemed as added to the period allowed for presenting an appeal. As we have already pointed out, when the question of limitation has to be considered in the light of the combined operation of ss. 14 and 5 of the Limitation Act the conditions expressly imposed by s. 14 have to be satisfied. It would, however, be unreasonable to suggest that the said conditions must to the same extent and in the same manner be taken into account in dealing with applications falling under ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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