9911796707
TMI Blog2002 (4) TMI 889X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ny relief against a final judgment/order of this Court, after dismissal of review petition, either under Article 32 of the Constitution or otherwise. In our endeavour to answer the question, we may begin with noticing that the Supreme Court of India is established by Article 124 of the Constitution which specifies its jurisdiction and powers and enables Parliament to confer further jurisdiction and powers on it. The Constitution conferred on the Supreme Court original jurisdiction (Articles 32 and 131); appellate jurisdiction both civil and criminal (Articles 132, 133, 134); discretionary jurisdiction to grant special leave to appeal (Article 136) and very wide discretionary powers, in the exercise of its jurisdiction, to pass decree or make such order as is necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before it, which shall be enforceable throughout the territory of India in the manner prescribed (Article 142); powers like the power to withdraw any case pending in any High Court or High Courts to itself or to transfer any case from one High Court to another High Court (Article 139) and to review judgment pronounced or order made by it (Article 137). Conferm ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rt to exercise within the local limits of its jurisdiction all or any of the powers exercisable by the Supreme Court under clause (2). The constitutional mandate embodied in clause (4) is that Article 32 shall not be suspended except as otherwise provided for by the Constitution. Inasmuch as the Supreme Court enforces the fundamental rights by issuing appropriate directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, it may be useful to refer to, in brief, the characterisitics of the writs in general and writ of certiorari in particular with which we are concerned here. In English law there are two types of writs -- (i) judicial procedural writs like writ of summons, writ of motion etc. which are issued as a matter of course; these writs are not in vogue in India and (ii) substantive writs often spoken of as high prerogative writs like writ of quo warranto, habeas corups, mandamus, certiorari and prohibition etc.; they are frequently resorted to in Indian High Courts and the Supreme Court. "Historically, prohibition was a writ whereby the royal courts of common law prohibited other courts from entertai ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... orical background and the very nature of writ jurisdiction, which is a supervisory jurisdiction over inferior Courts/Tribunals, in our view, on principle a writ of certiorari cannot be issued to co-ordinate courts and a fortiorari to superior courts. Thus, it follows that a High Court cannot issue a writ to another High Court; nor can one Bench of a High Court issue a writ to a different Bench of the same High Court; much less can writ jurisdiction of a High Court be invoked to seek issuance of a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court. Though, the judgments/orders of High Courts are liable to be corrected by the Supreme Court in its appellate jurisdiction under Articles 132, 133 and 134 as well as under Article 136 of the Constitution, the High Courts are not constituted as inferior courts in our constitutional scheme. Therefore, the Supreme Court would not issue a writ under Article 32 to a High Court. Further, neither a smaller Bench nor a larger Bench of the Supreme Court can issue a writ under Article 32 of the Constitution to any other Bench of the Supreme Court. It is pointed out above that Article 32 can be invoked only for the purpose of enforcing the fundamental rights co ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... suggested that the High Courts might issue writs to this Court and to other High Courts and one Judge or Bench in the High Court and the Supreme Court might issue a writ to another Judge or Bench in the same Court. This is an erroneous assumption. To begin with the High Courts cannot issue a writ to the Supreme Court because the writ goes down and not up. Similarly, a High Court cannot issue a writ to another High Court. The writ does not go to a court placed on an equal footing in the matter of jurisdiction. Where the county court exercised the powers of the High Court, the writ was held to be wrongly issued to it (See : In re The New Par Consols, Limited [1898 (1) Q.B. 669]." (Emphasis supplied) In A.R.Antulay vs. R.S.Nayak & Anr. [1988 (2) SCC 602], the question debated before a seven-Judge Bench of this Court was whether the order dated February 16, 1984, passed by a Constitution Bench of this Court, withdrawing the cases pending against the appellant in the Court of Special Judge and transferring them to the High Court of Bombay with a request to the Chief Justice to assign them to a sitting Judge of the High Court for holding trial from day to day. [R.S.Nayak vs. A.R. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ently without jurisdiction. In that he agreed with Venkatachaliah,J. (as he then was) who gave a dissenting opinion. The learned Judge held that it would be wholly erroneous to characterise the directions issued by a five-Judge Bench as a nullity liable to be ignored and so declared in a collateral attack. However, five learned Judges were unanimous that the Court should act ex debito justitiae. On the question of power of the Supreme Court to review its earlier order under its inherent powers Mukharji, Oza and Natarajan,JJ. expressed the view that the Court could do so even in a petition under Articles 136 or Article 32 of the Constitution. Ranganath Misra,J. gave a dissenting opinion holding that the appeal could not be treated as a review petition. Venkatachaliah,J. (as he then was) also gave a dissenting opinion that inherent powers of the Court do not confer or constitute a source of jurisdiction and they are to be exercised in aid of a jurisdiction that is already invested for correcting the decision under Article 137 read with Order XL Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules and for that purpose the case must go before the same Judges as far as practicable. On the question ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... various Benches of this Court reiterated the same principle in the following cases : [A.R.Antulay vs. R.S. Nayak & Anr. [1988 (2) SCC 602], Krishna Swami vs. Union of India & Ors. [1992 (4) SCC 605], Mohd.Aslam vs. Union of India [1996 (2) SCC 749], Khoday Distilleries Ltd. & Anr. vs. Registrar General, Supreme Court of India [1996 (3) SCC 114], Gurbachan Singh & Anr. vs. Union of India & Anr. [1996 (3) SCC 117], Babu Singh Bains & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors. [1996 (6) SCC 565] and P.Ashokan vs. Union of India & Anr. [1998 (3) SCC 56]. It is, however, true that in Supreme Court Bar Association vs. Union of India & Anr. [1998 (4) SCC 409], a Constitution Bench and in M.S.Ahlwat vs. State of Haryana & Anr. [2000 (1) SCC 278] a three-Judge Bench, and in other cases different Benches quashed the earlier judgments/orders of this Court in an application filed under Article 32 of the Constitution. But in those cases no one joined issue with regard to the maintainability of the writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution. Therefore, those cases cannot be read as authority for the proposition that a writ of certiorari under Article 32 would lie to challenge an earlier fina ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Antulay's case, Supreme Court Bar Association's case and Ahlwat's case as instances in which this Court had corrected its earlier judgments. He advocated : (i) for oral hearing on such an application and (ii) for hearing by a Bench of Judges other than those who passed the order on the ground that it would inspire confidence in the litigant public. Mr.K.K.Venugopal, the learned senior counsel, while adopting the arguments of Mr.Shanti Bhushan submitted that the provisions of Order XLVII, Rule 6 of the Supreme Court Rules, is a mere restatement of the provisions of Article 137 of the Constitution and that the inherent jurisdiction of this Court might be exercised to remedy the injustice suffered by a person. He suggested that a Constitution Bench consisting of senior judges and the judges who passed the order under challenge, could be formed to consider the application seeking correction of final orders of this Court. He added that to ensure that floodgates are not opened by such a remedy, an application for invoking the inherent power of this Court might require that it should be certified by a senior advocate and in case of frivolous application the petitioner could be subjected t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... c. Vs. Rai Bahadur Sukhraj Rai & Ors. etc. [1940 (2) FCR 78]. He submitted that for correction of a final judgment of this Court on the ground of lack of jurisdiction or violation of principle of natural justice, a curative petition could be entertained which might be heard by an appropriate Bench composed of the senior Judges as well as Judges who passed the order. Dr.Rajiv Dhavan, the learned senior counsel, argued that since the Supreme Court is the creature of the Constitution so the corrective power has to be derived from the provisions conferring jurisdiction on the Supreme Court like Articles 32 and 129-140; such a power does not arise from an abstract inherent jurisdiction. The corrective power must be exercised so as to correct an injustice in a case of patent lack of jurisdiction in a narrow sense, not in the Anisminic's broader sense, and gross violation of natural justice. Relying on the judgment of House of Lords in R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate and others, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No.2)'s case [1999 (1) All ER 577] he has submitted that this Court has inherent power to correct its own judgment where a party through no fault of his own has ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... India & Ors. [2000 (6) SCC 224] the exercise of inherent power for correcting the manifest illegality and palpable injustice after dismissal of the review petition has to be much narrower than the power of review. These contentions pose the question, whether an order passed by this Court can be corrected under its inherent powers after dismissal of the review petition on the ground that it was passed either without jurisdiction or in violation of the principles of natural justice or due to unfair procedure giving scope for bias which resulted in abuse of the process of the Court or miscarriage of justice to an aggrieved person. There is no gainsaying that the Supreme Court is the Court of last resort - the final Court on questions both of fact and of law including constitutional law. The law declared by this Court is the law of the land; it is precedent for itself and for all the courts/tribunals and authorities in India. In a judgment there will be declaration of law and its application to the facts of the case to render a decision on the dispute between the parties to the lis. It is necessary to bear in mind that the principles in regard to the highest Court departing from its b ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... r clarification of the order passed earlier. It was urged by the petitioner that any modification or recalling of the order passed by this Court would result in destroying the principle of finality enshrined in Article 141 of the Constitution. Sahai, J. speaking for himself and for Pandian,J. observed : "Justice is a virtue which transcends all barriers. Neither the rules of procedure nor technicalities of law can stand in its way. The order of the Court should not be prejudicial to anyone. Rule of stare decisis is adhered for consistency but it is not as inflexible in Administrative Law as in Public Law. Even the law bends before justice." The learned Judge referring to the judgment of Raja Prithwi Chand Lall Choudhury's case (supra) further observed : "Even when there was no statutory provision and no rules were framed by the highest court indicating the circumstances in which it could rectify its order the courts culled out such power to avoid abuse of process or miscarriage of justice." The position with regard to conclusive nature of the precedent obtained in England till the following practice statement was made by Lord Gardiner, L.C. in Lloyds Bank, Ltd. Vs. Dawson and ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... as to the validity of the reasoning by which it was supported. That there were two eminently possible views is shown by the support for each by at any rate two members of the House. But doubtful issues have to be resolved and the law knows no better way of resolving them than by the considered majority opinion of the ultimate tribunal. It requires much more than doubts as to the correctness of such opinion to justify departing from it." Lord Edmund-Davies observed : "My Lords, I respectfully share your views that the Chancery Lane decision [1966 (1) All.E.R. 1] was correct. But even had I come to the opposite conclusion, the circumstances adverted to are such that I should not have thought it 'right' to depart from it now. To do so would have been to open the floodgates to similar appeals and thereby to impair that reasonable certainty in the law which the Practice Statement [Note 1966 (3) All E.R. 77] itself declared to be 'an indispensable foundation upon which to decide what is the law and its application to individual cases'." The law existing in other countries is aptly summarised by Aharon Barak in his treatise thus : "The authority to overrule exists in most countries, w ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... though that view has held the field for a number of years. In quite a number of cases which come up before this Court, two views are possible, and simply because the Court considers that the view not taken by the Court in the earlier case was a better view of the matter would not justify the overruling of the view. The law laid down by this Court is binding upon all courts in the country under Article 141 of the Constitution, and numerous cases all over the country are decided in accordance with the view taken by this Court. Many people arrange their affairs and large number of transactions also take place on the faith of the correctness of the view taken by this Court. It would create uncertainty, instability and confusion if the law propounded by this Court on the basis of which numerous cases have been decided and many transactions have taken place is held to be not the correct law." In the case of The Indian Aluminium Co. Ltd. (supra), the question before a Constitution Bench of five learned Judges was : when can this Court properly dissent from a previous view? In regard to the effect of an earlier order of this Court Sawant, J. speaking for the Constitution Bench observed i ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... th one of the parties. That did not mean that judges could not sit on cases concerning charities in whose work they were involved, and judges would normally be concerned to recuse themselves or disclose the position to the parties only where they had an active role as trustee or director of a charity which was closely allied to and acting with a party to the litigation. In the instant case, the facts were exceptional in that AI was a party to the appeal, it had been joined in order to argue for a particular result and the Law Lord was a director of a charity closely allied to AI and sharing its objects. Accordingly, he was automatically disqualified from hearing the appeal. The petition would therefore be granted and the matter referred to another committee of the House for rehearing per curiam" On the point of jurisdiction of the House to correct any injustice in an earlier order, it was observed : "In principle it must be that your Lordships, as the ultimate court of appeal, have power to correct any injustice caused by an earlier order of this House. There is no relevant statutory limitation on the jurisdiction of the House in this regard and therefore its inherent jurisdictio ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rts governed by the English Jurisprudence that departing from an earlier precedent was considered heresy. With the declaration of the practice statement by the House of Lords, the highest court in England was enabled to depart from a previous decision when it appeared right to do so. The next step forward by the highest court to do justice was to review its judgment inter partie to correct injustice. So far as this Court is concerned, we have already pointed out above that it has been conferred the power to review its own judgments under Article 137 of the Constitution. The role of judiciary merely to interpret and declare the law was the concept of bygone age. It is no more open to debate as it is fairly settled that the courts can so mould and lay down the law formulating principles and guidelines as to adapt and adjust to the changing conditions of the society, the ultimate objective being to dispense justice. In the recent years there is a discernable shift in the approach of the final courts in favour of rendering justice on the facts presented before them, without abrogating but by-passing the principle of finality of the judgment. In Union of India and Anr. etc. Vs. Raghubir ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... plained of. In such case it would not only be proper but also obligatory both legally and morally to rectify the error. After giving our anxious consideration to the question we are persuaded to hold that the duty to do justice in these rarest of rare cases shall have to prevail over the policy of certainty of judgment as though it is essentially in public interest that a final judgment of the final court in the country should not be open to challenge yet there may be circumstances, as mentioned above, wherein declining to reconsider the judgment would be oppressive to judicial conscience and cause perpetuation of irremediable injustice. It may be useful to refer to the judgment of the Supreme Court of United States in Ohio Power Company's case (supra). In that case the Court of Claims entered judgment for refund of tax, alleged to have been overpaid, in favour of the tax payer. On the application of the Government a writ of certiorari against that judgment was declined by the Supreme Court of United States in October 1955. The Government sought re- hearing of the case by filing another application which was dismissed in December 1955. A second petition for hearing was also rejecte ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n's case (supra), on an application filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner sought declaration that the Disciplinary Committees of the Bar Councils set up under the Advocates Act, 1961, alone had exclusive jurisdiction to inquire into and suspend or debar an advocate from practising law for professional or other misconduct and that the Supreme Court of India or any High Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction had no such jurisdiction, power or authority in that regard. A Constitution Bench of this Court considered the correctness of the judgment of this Court in Re: Vinay Chandra Mishra [(1995) 2 SCC 584]. The question which fell for consideration of this Court was : whether the punishment of debarring an advocate from practice and suspending his licence for a specified period could be passed in exercise of power of this Court under Article 129 read with Article 142 of the Constitution of India. There an errant advocate was found guilty of criminal contempt and was awarded the punishment of simple imprisonment for a period of six weeks and was also suspended from practice as an advocate for a period of three years from the date of the judgment of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... acting without jurisdiction or without following the due procedure, it was observed that to perpetuate an error was no virtue but to correct it was a compulsion of judicial conscience. The correctness of the judgment was examined and the error was rectified. In the cases discussed above this Court reconsidered its earlier judgments, inter alia, under Articles 129 and 142 which confer very wide powers on this Court to do complete justice between the parties. We have already indicated above that the scope of the power of this Court under Article 129 as a court of record and also adverted to the extent of power under Article 142 of the Constitution. The upshot of the discussion in our view is that this Court, to prevent abuse of its process and to cure a gross miscarriage of justice, may re-consider its judgments in exercise of its inherent power. The next step is to specify the requirements to entertain such a curative petition under the inherent power of this Court so that floodgates are not opened for filing a second review petition as a matter of course in the guise of a curative petition under inherent power. It is common ground that except when very strong reasons exist, the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ewith I wish to add a few paragraphs of my own. The issue involved presently though not a concept within the ambit of doctrine of stare decisis but akin thereto to the effect as to the scope or finality of the decision of this Court in the normal course of events. There cannot possibly be any manner of doubt that the matter once dealt with by this Court attains a state of finality and no further grievance can be had in regard thereto. The founding fathers of the Constitution decidedly provided that the decision of this Court as final, conclusive and binding final and conclusive inter-parties and binding on all. But the makers have also conferred a power of review of the Judgment of this Court and the perusal of the provisions of Articles 137 and 145 makes it abundantly clear. In the event, however, a party stands aggrieved by reason of a rejection of review, the question posed as to whether a litigant thereof to suffer the onslaught for all times to come and in perpetuity when on the face of the Order it appears to be wholly without jurisdiction or in violation of natural justice a further factum of there being a bias or gross or manifest injustice, which shocks the conscience of a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rse of this judgment, we are satisfied that the impugned order cannot be brought within the scope of this Court's jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari under Art. 32; to hold otherwise would be repugnant to the well-recognised limitations within which the jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari can be exercised and inconsistent with the uniform trend of this Court's decisions in relation to the said point." Two decades later, this Court in A.R.Antulay vs. R.S. Nayak and another (1988) 2 SCC 602, relying upon the nine Judge Bench Judgment, came to a conclusion that in view of the decision in Mirajkar case, it must be taken as concluded that the judicial proceedings in this Court are not subject to the writ jurisdiction under Article 32 of the Constitution and that is so on account of the fact that Benches of this Court are not subordinate to larger Benches thereof and certiorari is not admissible thus for quashing of the Orders made on the judicial side of the court. In Smt. Triveniben vs. State of Gujarat (1989) 1 SCC 678, a Constitution Bench of this Court also in no uncertain terms laid down that it will not be open to this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Arti ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... law is meant for the society and if flexibility is its virtue, which law enjoys, its corresponding primary duty thus would be to change the legal horizon and perspective with the appropriate socio-economic change. The law must follow the society rather than abandon the society and carry on it strict track without any deviation or without being hindered of the social changes and thus resultantly face a social catastrophe. Lord Denning's exposition of the doctrine 'ex debito justitiae' in A/s Cathrineholm vs. Norequipment Trading Ltd. (1972 (2) All ER 538) has been stated to be rather restrictive, but since basically the same stands out to be on the concept of justice, speaking for myself do not subscribe to such a criticism. The Master of the Rolls stated that if the Judgment is irregular that is, which ought not to have been signed at all then the defendant is entitled ex debito justitiae to have it set aside but in the event it is otherwise regular, question of setting aside of the Judgment would not arise. It is, thereafter, however, arises, the question as to the true effect of Regular and Irregular Judgments : Since the issue involves a much wider debate, we refrain ourselves ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... relied upon another Judgment of Lord Denning in Ostime (Inspector of Taxes) vs. Australian Mutual Provident Society (1959 (3) All ER 245 : 1960 AC 459) and the dissent noting by Justice Jackson in the case of Commonwealth of Massachusetts et al vs. USA (92 L ed 968), wherein in similar tone it has been stated that as soon as one finds a journey in the wrong direction, there should always be an attempt to turn to the right direction since law courts ought to proceed for all times in the right path rather than in the wrong. Adverting to the issue of inherent power, the observations of this Court in S. Nagaraj and others vs. State of Karnataka and another (1993 Supp. (4) SCC 595) seems to be rather apposite. This Court in paragraph 19 of the report, upon relying on the fundamental principles of jurisprudence that justice is above all, stated as below: "Review literally and even judicially means re- examination or re-consideration. Basic philosophy inherent in it is the universal acceptance of human fallibility. Yet in the realm of law the courts and even the statutes lean strongly in favour of finality of decision legally and properly made. Exceptions both statutorily and judicially ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nferred the substantive power to review any judgment or order by Article 137 of the Constitution. And clause (c) of Article 145 permitted this Court to frame rules as to the conditions subject to which any judgment or order may be reviewed. In exercise of this power Order XL had been framed empowering this Court to review an order in civil proceedings on grounds analogous to Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code. The expression 'for any other sufficient reason' in the clause has been given an expanded meaning and a decree or order passed under misapprehension of true state of circumstances has been held to be sufficient ground to exercise the power. Apart from Order XL Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules this Court has the inherent power to make such orders as may be necessary in the interest of justice or to prevent the abuse of process of Court. The Court is thus not precluded from recalling or reviewing its own order if it is satisfied that it is necessary to do so for sake of justice." In one of its recent pronouncements [Supreme Court Bar Association vs. Union of India and another (1998 (4) SCC 409)] this Court has had the occasion to deal with the issue at some length ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ise statutorily available only to the Bar Council of India, on the ground that the contemner is also an advocate, is, therefore, not permissible in exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 142. The construction of Article 142 must be functionally informed by the salutary purposes of the article, viz., to do complete justice between the parties. It cannot be otherwise. As already noticed in a case of contempt of court, the contemner and the court cannot be said to be litigating parties. 48. The Supreme Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 142 has the power to make such order as is necessary for doing complete justice "between the parties in any cause or matter pending before it". The very nature of the power must lead the Court to set limits for itself within which to exercise those powers and ordinarily it cannot disregard a statutory provision governing a subject, except perhaps to balance the equities between the conflicting claims of the litigating parties by "ironing out the creases" in a cause or matter before it. Indeed this Court is not a court of restricted jurisdiction of only dispute-settling. It is well recognised and established that this Court has al ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ons are not maintainable. The petitioner, who appeared in person, referred to the judgment in Antulay's case (1988) 2 SCC 602 : (AIR 1988 SC 1531). We are, however, of the opinion that the principle of that case is not applicable here. All the points which the petitioner urged regarding the constitutionality of the Government orders in question as well as the appointment of respondent instead of petitioner to the post in question had been urged before the Bench, which heard the civil appeal and writ petitions originally. The petitioner himself stated that he was heard by the Bench at some length. It is, therefore, clear that the matters were disposed of after a consideration of all the points urged by the petitioner and the mere fact that the order does not discuss the contentions or give reasons cannot entitle the petitioner to have what is virtually a second review." True, due regard shall have to have as regards opinion of the Court in Ranga Swamy (supra), but the situation presently centres round that in the event of there being any manifest injustice would the doctrine of ex debito justitiae be said to be having a role to play in sheer passivity or to rise above the ordinary ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... here is any affectation of such an administration of justice either by way of infraction of natural justice or an order being passed wholly without jurisdiction or affectation of public confidence as regards the doctrine of integrity in the justice delivery system technicality ought not to out-weigh the course of justice the same being the true effect of the doctrine of ex debito justitiae. The oft quoted statement of law of Lord Hewart, CJ in R v. Susssex Justices, ex p McCarthy (1924 (1) KB 256) that it is of fundamental importance that justice should not only be done, should manifestly and undoubtedly be seem to be done had this doctrine underlined and administered therein. In this context, the decision of the House of Lords in R v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate and others, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No.2) seem to be an ipoc making decision, wherein public confidence on the judiciary is said to be the basic criteria of the justice delivery system any act or action even if it a passive one, if erodes or even likely to erode the ethics of judiciary, matter needs a further look. Brother Quadri has taken very great pains to formulate the steps to be taken and the met ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
|
